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Abstract
This thesis considers the commissioning of secondary care by Primary Care Trusts 
(PCTs). It provides an in-depth analysis of the commissioning relations and 
decision-making between PCTs and NHS Trusts using the underlying assumptions 
of principal-agent theory as a lens for investigation.
This qualitative research adopted a range of methodological approaches including 
the use of observation, interviews and documentary evidence in the analysis of three 
case studies. The case studies each comprised an NHS Trust and up to four PCT 
commissioners. Commissioning-related meetings were observed in order to gain an 
understanding of the ways in which PCTs and NHS Trusts acted as principals or 
agents, and how these relations were managed. These were followed by interviews 
with managers and clinicians from primary and secondary care to complement the 
observational data and to investigate additional issues such as the impact of multiple 
principals and tiers of principals and agents. Service and Financial Framework 
documents and Service Level Agreements were also examined.
Analysis shows that commissioning was approached in a different way in each case 
study. The factors affecting the approaches to commissioning were perceptions of 
local and national pressures, accountability, a public service ethos, leadership, trust 
and local history.
Incentives were not used in Service Level Agreements. In each case study, there was 
a weak link in the principal-agent chain of commissioning that had the potential to 
result in non-compliance with decisions. This weakness arose either between 
commissioner and provider, or between managers and clinicians. In either case, the 
greater use of incentives is suggested as a solution. Some PCTs did not appear to 
accept the legitimacy of their roles as commissioners. In addition, and unusually, the 
principals had an agent role; PCTs were providers as well as commissioners. These 
dual roles created conflicts of interest.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1) The research question
This research is concerned with the National Health Service (NHS) in England. The 
aim is to provide an in-depth analysis of primary care trusts (PCTs) as 
commissioners of secondary care services using the underlying assumptions of 
principal-agent theory as a lens for investigation. The specific objectives include an 
evaluation of how (and indeed whether) PCTs and NHS Trusts act as principals and 
agents respectively, an investigation of the importance of key elements of principal- 
agent theory to the commissioning process, an analysis of how PCTs align NHS 
Trusts’ objectives with their own, and an illustration of the impact on commissioning 
styles of external and contextual factors such as multiple principals and vertical tiers 
of principals and agents.
Principal-agent theory deals with problems associated with delegated choice. 
Delegated choice involves one individual (the agent) having the responsibility for 
decisions that are in the interests of one or more others (the principal) in return for 
some form of payment. As well as being in the interests of the principal, the agent’s 
actions affect their own welfare. The challenge for the principal is to set payment 
schedules or devise other forms of incentives that encourage the agent to make 
decisions in the best interests of the principal.
Principal-agent relations in the NHS and elsewhere are ubiquitous. The population 
in general can be viewed as the ultimate principal, electing a government on a 
mandate to deliver its promises. The government is therefore an agent for the 
electorate. The government, however, being a management body without the 
capacity to provide what the population desires, must in turn play the role of 
principal. It must contract with other agencies to deliver services. These other 
agencies become agents for the government. In the case of the NHS, a chain of such 
principal-agent relations exists. The tiers of this chain have been reduced recently 
with the abolition first of regional offices and then Directorates of Health and Social 
Care. From the Department of Health, the chain now proceeds directly to Strategic
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Health Authorities (StHAs), through PCTs and NHS Trusts to clinicians and other 
frontline staff. At the end of this principal-agent chain, however, are more 
principals, in the form of patients. That is, patients enter into informal contracts with 
doctors as their agents to deliver appropriate health care. The patient-doctor 
relationship is referred to commonly in research as a principal-agent relationship. 
When viewed in this way, one could turn upside down the chain just described. 
Doctors and other frontline staff could be viewed as principals, demanding of their 
employing bodies the finances and capacity necessary to deliver care. To add to the 
complexity, the relationship between a doctor from a PCT and one from an NHS 
Trust could be viewed as a principal-agent or agent-principal relation, depending on 
the nature of the request and the individual making the request. For example, when a 
general practitioner (GP) makes a referral request, the NHS Trust doctor acts as 
agent. After discharge from hospital, an NHS Trust doctor will request that the GP 
carries out certain aspects of care; in this case, the GP is the agent.
Principal-agent theory’s central concern is how a principal can persuade an agent to 
perform in a way that satisfies the principal’s requirements. Similarly, for 
commissioning in the NHS, a foremost point of interest is influence; how can a PCT 
use negotiation, contracts, incentives, and monitoring to ensure providers shape their 
services to reflect the needs of the PCT? In this case it is the PCT that is the 
principal and the NHS Trust its agent.
There are many parallels between theory and policy. As I will demonstrate, the 
assumption is made in policy documents that PCTs are principals with both NHS 
Trusts and GPs as their agents. The methods PCTs are expected to use to influence 
their NHS Trust agents are contracts and collaboration. PCTs are expected to set 
contracts, labelled Service Level Agreements (SLAs), with NHS Trusts for the 
delivery of services. In particular, Reforming NHS Financial Flows (Department of 
Health, 2002c) refers to contract negotiation, target setting, the provision of 
incentives and monitoring as the means for managing the continuous cycle of 
commissioning between PCTs and NHS Trusts. PCTs are expected to do this within 
an environment of collaboration and partnership working whilst remaining 
accountable to the centre through a hierarchical structure.
Whilst large-scale surveys are essential for the insights they can offer about the 
scope and pace of change, and they can help NHS organisations to compare their
11
own development with those of others, they do less to help immature organisations 
such as PCTs learn how to improve in their roles or indeed to understand the impact 
of local contexts and other organisations on their development.
This research addresses these issues; it demonstrates to PCTs and NHS Trusts, in 
detail, the ways in which their counterparts in three case studies relate to each other 
with respect to commissioning secondary care services. It draws out the common 
factors that affect the attitudes towards and processes of commissioning. It is a time 
of transition in the NHS. Newly formed organisations are finding their way and 
learning new roles. This thesis provides new insights by applying a principal-agent 
perspective using qualitative methods to the evaluation of commissioning. This is an 
attempt to look inside the black box and consider how organisations play out their 
roles. PCTs, NHS Trusts and other organisations that take part in commissioning 
processes will be able to use the findings of this research to develop their own 
commissioning styles in an informed manner.
2) The format of the dissertation
Chapter two has five main sections. Section one begins with an outline of the formal 
model of principal-agent theory. This is followed by a discussion of its empirical 
application, which is through models of hidden-action and hidden-information. Each 
of the key elements of principal-agent theory is then described, followed by an 
overview of how its main assumptions bring these elements together. These 
elements and assumptions form the basis of investigations in the thesis. The second 
section of chapter two gives an overview of NHS policy and draws parallels between 
the principal-agent framework and current policy. Next, a section shows how, 
although principals and agents are treated as if they exist within market-like 
structures, the language of principal-agent theory can be applied to organisational 
structures other than markets and quasi-markets, namely hierarchies and networks. 
The remainder of the chapter reviews the research literature to date, in section four, 
on how principal-agent and other theories have been used in evaluations of health 
care organisations and, in section five, on commissioning by primary care 
organisations in the UK.
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Chapter three gives the aims, objectives and methods of the thesis. It begins by 
detailing the general aims and specific objectives of the research, and shows how this 
research adds to current levels of knowledge. The majority of the chapter describes 
the research methods. The overall research strategy is explained. This strategy 
consisted of case study analysis using qualitative methods encompassing 
observations, interviews and documentary analysis. The details of and the reasons 
behind the selection and recruitment of the three case studies are then given. The 
next section presents the data collection methods and participants. It details the 
purpose, format and attendance at commissioning meetings, how subsequent 
interviewees were selected, and gives the characteristics of these interviewees. The 
content of the interview guides and the documents provided by the case studies are 
reported. Chapter three finishes with descriptions of the data coding and analysis 
techniques.
Chapter four presents the main findings from this research. These results arise 
directly from investigations guided by the assumptions of principal-agent theory 
given in chapter two. The first section asks whether PCTs set incentive-based 
contracts for their NHS Trust agents. This question is answered through 
examination of Service Level Agreements for 2002/3 and interviewees* beliefs about 
the purpose of these contracts. Section two examines how NHS Trusts’ objectives 
are aligned with those of their PCT principals by investigating the decision-making 
within, and the format of, commissioning meetings. The third section considers 
how, why and how successfully groups of PCTs work together to commission 
services from a single NHS Trust. The data in this section are derived from 
interviews with managers and clinicians, supplemented with observations of 
meetings. Finally, the effects on commissioning of multiple tiers of principals and 
agents are considered through the analysis of interview data. Sections three and four 
include also a discussion of why there are differences and similarities between the 
case studies.
Chapter five offers a summary and discussion of the results. It begins with an 
overview of the findings and draws out the elements of each case study that conform 
to the expectations of a principal-agent model and those that do not. Section two 
discusses the main influences on the commissioning relationships in these case 
studies and places the findings in the context of the broader literature. Policy
13
recommendations based on these findings are then suggested. The following section 
discusses what constitutes a successful commissioning process, how successful these 
case studies were in that process, and speculates on the impact on each case study of 
the proposed policy recommendations. The chapter finishes with some limitations of 
the research.
Chapter six offers a brief conclusion. This summarises the study and sets out its 
contributions to knowledge. A final section offers some thoughts about areas where 
further research would be advantageous.
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Chapter Two: Principals, Agents and 
Commissioning
This chapter reviews the appropriate literature. It gives first an account of principal- 
agent theory, both as a formal model and an empirical framework. The second 
section offers an overview of the commissioning-related reforms in the NHS since 
1991 and shows how current policy parallels closely a principal-agent approach. 
Section three considers the relevance of the language of principal-agent theory to 
non-quasi-market structures, that is, to hierarchies and networks. In the fourth 
section, recent research is reviewed that has used a principal-agent framework as a 
lens for analysis. The use of new institutional economics and trust as frameworks of 
analysis are also discussed in brief. Finally, section five reviews knowledge to date 
about commissioning by primary care organisations in the form of fund-holding 
practices, total purchasing pilots and primary care groups and trusts.
1) Principal-agent theory
Problems associated with delegated choice form a large and important area for 
economic analysis (Rees, 1985a) and other disciplines (see Kiser (1999) for a review 
from political science and sociological perspectives). Delegated choice involves one 
individual (the agent) having the responsibility for decisions that are in the interests 
of one or more others (the principal) in return for some form of payment (Arrow, 
1986; Rees, 1985a). As well as being in the interests of the principal, the agent’s 
actions affect their own welfare. The challenge for the principal is to set payment 
schedules or devise other forms of incentives that encourage the agent to make 
decisions in the best interests of the principal. Rees (1985a) notes that the theory is 
applicable to a wide class of problems. He suggests as examples situations where 
formal delegation relationships are not involved explicitly (a firm handling 
dangerous chemicals will take decisions which affect the likelihood and extent of 
damage which would be caused to others by an accident, despite there being no 
formal relationship with those potentially affected) or where the term contract is 
defined broadly (some employment relations may be characterised by implicit 
contracts).
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Principal-agent theory can be interpreted both descriptively and normatively. 
Descriptively, it can be interpreted as an attempt to explain the characteristics of 
exchange relations observed between principals and agents in the empirical world 
(Arrow, 1986; Rees, 1985a). Normatively, it can be used to illustrate the optimal 
forms of contract that should be devised under differing assumptions about the 
information available to or acquired by the principal or agent (Rees, 1985a), that is, 
it can be interpreted as advice in the construction of contracts to influence principal- 
agent relations (Arrow, 1986).
Principal-agent theory is used in this thesis descriptively, that is, to explain and 
evaluate the characteristics of exchange relations observed between primary care 
trusts and NHS Trusts.
This section of the review summarises first the formal model of agency and 
theoretical analysis in mainstream economics. Second, the empirical interpretation 
of agency theory is considered. The key elements of the empirical model of agency 
are discussed, in particular their relevance to the NHS and, finally, the key 
assumptions of the theory are presented.
a) The formal model of agency
Mainstream economics has concentrated on theoretical modelling to devise optimal 
payment schemes given various extensions to the basic model. It is not the purpose 
of this thesis to devise optimal payment structures, and this extensive literature is not 
described here. Instead, a brief explanation of the standard, formal model is offered.
Rees (1985a; 1985b) explains the theory of principal and agent and extensions to the 
basic problem. The theory is intended to apply to any situation with the following 
structure.
The agent (an individual A) chooses an action {a) from a given set of actions (fa}). 
The outcome resulting from this choice is x. However, this outcome depends also on 
the state of the world (Q) at the time the action is taken. The state of the world is 
uncertain. The outcome (x) affects not only the utility of A, but also the utility of the 
principal (P). P  defines a contract in which s/he agrees to reward^ an amounty  in 
return for output x. The utility of A depends on the value of y  and that of a.
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P  is assumed to be risk neutral or risk averse and to have a utility function u(x,y). 
That is, P ’s welfare depends on the money value of the outcome they receive from A 
and the payment they make to A for that outcome. P  would prefer not to take risks.
A is also risk neutral or risk averse and has a utility function v(y,a). A ’s welfare 
depends therefore on the payment they receive from P  and the effort that is expended 
to produce the output for P  (Dixit, 2002). Action (a) is assumed to have a negative 
effect o n ^ ’s utility, but a positive effect on P ’s utility. The positive effect on P ’s 
utility arises from the probability of achieving any given outcome being higher the 
higher the level of effort (action) by A (Arrow, 1986). A acts to maximise his/her 
own utility. P  is indifferent to ^ 4’s choice of a; P  is concerned only about the net 
value of the outcome, that is, the value of the outcome minus the payment made to A. 
The difference between P ’s welfare when there is full information or where P  and ^ 4 
have identical objectives, and when this is not the case, is known as the agency cost 
(Dusheiko et al., 2001).
The state of the world (6) is taken from a set of states of the world ({6}). An 
important assumption of principal-agent theory is that both P  and A have identical 
beliefs about the probability of the state of the world (Rees, 1985a). This is 
potentially restrictive as A may in fact have better information about the state of the 
world than P  (Rees, 1985a). Outcome (jc )  is dependent on both the state of the 
world, and the action taken by A. That is, x=x(6,a). In addition, other (often 
imperfect) information (z) is used. This additional information may be acquired 
from monitoring, which is costly.
The basic principal-agent problem can therefore be stated as follows. The principal 
must choose a payment schedule that depends on outcome, the state of the world, the 
action taken by the agent and other available information. In the notation used 
above, y=y(x,6,a,z).
A further assumption of principal-agent theory, according to Rees, is that payment 
schedules can depend only upon variables that both P  and A can observe (Rees,
1985a). It is assumed that A knows a and can observe jc and 6. It is assumed that P  
knows the relationship of outcome to the agent’s action and the state of the world 
(jc(a,0)). P  can always observe outcome jc. Given these assumptions, as long as P  
can observe either a or 6, s/he can deduce the other.
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Rees (1985a) gives two basic principal-agent relations of interest as follows:
(i) P  can observe or deduce a and 6, therefore further information z is not 
necessary. In this case, there is no information asymmetry. The principal 
can then pay the agent his/her minimum expected utility. This is known as 
reservation utility (Rees, 1985a). That is, the P  can pay the A the minimum 
level of reward the A requires in order to produce the outcome.
(ii) P  can observe neither a nor 6. In this case, for any fee schedule devised by 
P , A will choose a (action) in order to maximise his/her own expected utility, 
not that of P. P  must take account of the fact that his/her choice of payment 
schedule will affect A ’s actions by adding a constraint (the incentive 
constraint) to the optimisation problem. What this means is that the way in 
which risk is shared between P  and A is not optimal; P  must give an 
additional incentive (that is, pay an additional amount) to A in order to 
influence A ’s choice of action (a). Additional information (z) can be 
incorporated into a contract to increase optimality, although the effect of this 
will depend on the cost of acquiring z (Rees, 1985a).
The principal-agent relationship as defined by choice of optimal fee structures is a 
significantly different approach to that usually considered by economic theory: that 
is, the arms length, fixed price approach to obtaining goods or services in the 
competitive market (Arrow, 1986). In the principal-agent approach, the competitive 
market does not set the price of an agent’s services, and the principal does not simply 
buy a fixed quantity of output from the agent. The variable to be determined is not a 
price but an optimal payment scheme that is a complex functional relationship 
(Arrow, 1986). However, the optimal payment scheme may involve the payment of 
a fixed price to the agent per item of outcome, for example a piece-rate scheme 
(Petersen, 1993).
It is not the aim of this thesis to devise optimal payment structures. The thesis 
addresses instead the issue of how principal-agent relationships in the NHS are 
managed. The underlying assumptions of the basic principal-agent model are used 
as a framework for analysis of these relationships. It is appropriate therefore to 
describe how principal-agent theory has been used in this way in empirical work.
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b) The empirical model of agency
In the empirical literature, two basic models are specified: the hidden-action model 
and the hidden-information model (also called hidden-knowledge) (Barrow, 1996; 
Petersen, 1993). Both consider information asymmetry within principal-agent 
relationships. Arrow (1986) first introduced these distinctions (Petersen, 1993).
This section describes each of these models.
In both the hidden-action and the hidden-information models, five central elements 
of the principal-agent setting are described, each impacting on the way in which the 
relationships operate:
(i) Agent type -  some agents are more able to perform particular tasks, more 
willing to undertake additional training to improve their ability, are more 
trustworthy, or more dedicated than others.
(ii) Agent action -  agents can choose the action (method and level of effort) 
required to carry out the task (a as described above).
(iii) Exogenous, random factors -  the “state of the world” is uncertain and can 
have a positive or negative impact on outcome (0 as described above).
(iv) Outcome -  the goods or services are produced by the agent, and are usually 
observable by both principal and agent (jc  as described above).
(v) Asymmetric information -  not all information is observable by both principal 
and agent all the time. Only the agent observes the agent type and level of 
effort. The principal has a cost of observing agent effort (comparable to z  in 
the notation used above). The agent may sometimes observe exogenous, 
random factors; the principal does not.
i) The hidden-action model
The hidden-action model describes a situation where the principal observes outcome 
but not action. Action (effort) is a disutility to the agent but of value to the principal 
(Arrow, 1986). A typical example is that of patient and physician, with the 
physician being the agent for the patient. The physician has superior knowledge and 
so the patient is unable to verify whether the actions of the physician are as diligent 
as they could be.
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In such situations, the principal must choose how to control the agent to ensure that 
the principal’s objectives are met. The choice is between rewards based solely on 
outcome or rewards based on outcome and monitoring. Monitoring refers to the 
collection of data that conveys information about the unobserved action of the agent 
in addition to that revealed by the outcome (Arrow, 1986). Fees schedules can then 
be made dependent upon both outcome and monitored action. The choice between 
rewarding the outcome, or monitoring and rewarding the action in addition to 
outcome, depends on both the cost and accuracy of monitoring and the relationship 
between the agent’s actions and outcome.
For a fixed payment reward, the agent will have an incentive consistently to decrease 
effort and hence to decrease output, perhaps to zero, without intervention from the 
principal. The reason for this is that the agent will be paid the same no matter what 
level of output s/he produces. This situation is called moral hazard, a term borrowed 
from the insurance literature (Arrow, 1986). Any gains in terms of excess output 
(that is, over and above that required by the principal) go to the principal, but it is 
likely that there will be no excess because the agent has no incentive to produce 
above the minimum.
An alternative system is for the agent to pay a fixed fee to the principal, and to keep 
any output additional to that required by the principal. This removes the moral 
hazard, giving incentives to the agent to increase effort. All gains in this case go to 
the agent. However, all the risk is placed also with the agent (Petersen, 1993).
Hybrid schemes whereby the principal pays a low fixed sum independent of outcome 
to the agent, plus additional payments related to outcome, attempt to solve the moral 
hazard problem by sharing the gains (and risk) associated with production (Barrow, 
1996; Petersen, 1993).
ii) The hidden-information model
The hidden-information model describes the situation whereby the agent has made 
some observation that the principal has not made (Arrow, 1986). The agent uses this 
information in making its decisions, but the principal cannot check whether or not 
this information has been used wisely from the principal’s perspective. For example, 
the principal can observe the agent’s action, but not the exogenous random factors 
and, where agent types differ, not the agent’s type (Petersen, 1993). Again, the
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principal must choose how to control the agent. In this case there is a danger that the 
principal may over reward the agent for output that is due to favourable exogenous 
factors rather than agent effort (Walker, 2000). This arises because the exogenous 
factors are visible only to the agent who chooses his/her action based on these a 
priori observations. The agent has no incentive to share the real situation with the 
principal, that is, s/he has no incentive to let the principal know whether it is 
favourable conditions or high effort that is producing the output (Walker, 2000).
The principal in effect must solve two problems: first, s/he must select the most 
desirable type of agent, and second, must induce that agent to choose the right action 
(Petersen, 1993).
To solve this problem, the principal can do one of two things. First, the principal 
could screen potential agents in an attempt to choose the most suitable type of agent, 
and then set a reward structure such that the agent will perform in the principal’s best 
interests. Examples include the selection of employees based on interviews, 
references and probationary periods (Petersen, 1993).
Alternatively, the principal may devise a choice of payment schemes that encourage 
agents to self-select into the most appropriate scheme for their type (Barrow, 1996; 
Petersen, 1993). One scheme would attract high producers that are risk neutral or 
risk loving (for example a piece rate scheme); the other would attract lower level 
producers that are risk averse (for example a straight salary scheme). In this way, 
agents are forced into being honest about their own type and in addition have no 
incentive to hide what they know about the state of the world.
c) Key elements of principal-agent theory
This section discusses each of the five key elements of the principal-agent model 
described above. In addition, the concepts of monitoring and risk sharing are 
discussed. Each element is explained and then its relevance to PCTs’ relations with 
NHS Trusts and GP practices is discussed.
i) Agent type and choice of agents
Agent type refers to the capacity of the agent to perform the tasks contracted 
(Petersen, 1993). The issue of importance is that an agent may be more or less 
capable of carrying out the tasks required by the principal, and the principal must
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select the agent s/he considers most suitable. Where the principal cannot see in 
advance the type of agent, the principal must devise a contract that attracts an 
appropriate agent. The assumption is that the agent then has a choice of whether or 
not to accept this contract. There is also an implicit assumption that there is more 
then one agent with whom the principal can contract. These are important points 
when considering principal-agent relations in the public sector. Certainly in the 
NHS, neither of these assumptions is true.
PCTs do not have a choice of general practitioner agents; they are defined by 
geographical boundaries and cannot select particular agent types. Neither can 
general practices choose whether or not to accept a contract to work in a PCT. The 
parent trust is fixed. The situation is similar for NHS Trusts as agents for PCTs. 
Although in theory PCTs have a choice of NHS Trusts with which to contract, in 
reality they do not exercise this choice, being constrained by other factors such as 
loyalty, local politics or geography. Neither can NHS Trusts choose to reject a 
contract. Although hospitals have relationships with more than one PCT principal, 
the loss of trade with a PCT could damage the viability of the NHS Trust. 
Furthermore, the community ethos and political environment would not allow an 
NHS Trust to refuse to supply services to the local population. As a result, both GP 
practices and NHS Trusts are tied to PCTs, and vice versa.
Robinson (1997) makes this point in considering contractual networks between 
physicians (as principals) and hospitals (as agents) in the United States. He defines a 
contractual network in health care as a virtual rather than vertical integration of 
primary care-based medical groups with hospitals. He characterises virtual 
integration as integration through contracts and vertical integration as that through 
ownership. Robinson’s point is that the advantages of contractual networks over 
ownership arise from the relative ease of switching between agents in the search for 
better quality or lower prices. These advantages are undermined in health care 
(Robinson, 1997). They are undermined by the lack of choice of hospital. Even 
where there is choice, the cost to primary care physicians and patients of building up 
new relationships is prohibitive. This lack of effective choice of agent increases the 
mutual dependency of physicians and particular hospitals.
Coleman Selden et al. (1999) also raise this issue of interdependency between 
principals and agents in exploring the relationships between city councillors (as
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principals) and city managers (as agents) in the USA. Councillors have 
responsibility for developing and setting policy for their cities, managers for carrying 
out the chosen policy. They suggest that each is dependent on the other to exercise 
judgement in prioritising information and sharing that which is most crucial. Their 
belief is that sharing information both ways (from principal to agent and agent to 
principal) can work to the advantage of both parties. The question then is, without 
explicit incentives to do so, what would motivate the agent to share information, 
given what has been considered about the advantages to the agent of hiding 
information (particularly in relation to the state of the world and the agent type) from 
the principal? The answer may lie in Robinson’s argument; a limited choice of 
principals or agents creates mutual dependency, and where both parties are in 
essence “locked in” to a relationship, information sharing may be more advantageous 
than arms length contract setting (Robinson, 1997). The impact of mutual 
dependency on commissioning secondary care in the NHS is not known.
ii) Agent action and objectives
Whilst the effort of an agent is a key element of the hidden-action and hidden- 
information models, the principal and agent’s utility functions are not mentioned 
explicitly. The different ways in which they maximise their utilities is a fundamental 
component of agency relationships. If the principal and agent’s utility functions 
coincide, with or without information asymmetry, there will be no problem of 
control. The agent will choose a level of action that maximises his/her own utility; 
this level of action will automatically maximise the utility of the principal. If the 
principal and agent’s objectives are different, and there is information asymmetry, 
the control of the agent becomes more problematic. It is assumed also in these 
models that all individuals act in their own best interests (Petersen, 1993; Rees, 
1985a), gaining utility from the money income received from the principal and 
disutility from the effort expended to produce the output (Dixit, 2002).
When considering relationships between primary care trusts and NHS Trusts, their 
utility can be seen as maximised when they meet their main objectives. Both may 
aim to improve the health of patients, but their beliefs about the best ways of 
achieving this may differ. It is possible that these objectives might conflict. For 
example, primary care trusts may prefer to concentrate their efforts on prevention
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and care in the local community, whereas acute trusts may prefer more highly 
technical treatments that build on and increase scientific expertise; both would 
improve patient health. Similarly, general practitioners and primary care trusts may 
have a joint but conflicting objective of improving the health of their patients; for 
GPs, this would be their practices’ patients, whereas for the PCT, it is the health of 
the wider population for which they are responsible.
In the public sector, Barrow (1996) questions the independence of the principal’s and 
agent’s objectives. The profit motive is the driving force of the private sector, with 
both principal and agent wishing to maximise their individual profits. Profits are not 
important in the public sector, although in keeping with the principal-agent model, 
principals and agents may aim to maximise different non-financial objectives. 
Objectives in the public sector may, however, have a degree of interdependency. 
Public sector organisations work for the public good (Barrow, 1996) and as such, 
individuals working within any given organisation are more likely to have a common 
purpose. It may be, however, that principals and agents within a particular public 
organisation have improving the public good as their objective, but their beliefs 
about what constitutes “the public good” are quite different.
Likewise, Walker (2000) suggests that where principals and agents are part of the 
same organisation, similarity of their objectives, understanding of procedures and 
adherence to a common culture are likely to be greater. The example he uses is local 
authority Direct Labour Organisations: in-house providers that compete for local 
government contracts with private firms. He claims that it seems reasonable to 
assume that the Direct Labour Organisations have similar objectives to the local 
authority and understand the systems better than private, external providers. This 
begs the question, however, of the extent to which separate “firms” within a far 
larger umbrella organisation can be considered similar. Some public sector 
organisations are divided into quite distinct component parts, each with their discrete 
tasks. The NHS is a prime example, with the purchaser/provider split designed to 
mimic a market situation with individual firms working to maximise their own best 
interests. Although primary care trusts, general practitioners and NHS Trusts are all 
part of the NHS organisation, and all have improving patients’ health as one of their 
objectives, they cannot be considered to adhere to a common culture or to understand 
common (administrative) procedures. One of problems that total purchasing pilots
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had to overcome was that of different cultures: the GPs had to learn the culture of the 
health authority bureaucracy, far removed from that of the general practice “small 
business” (Mahon et al., 1998).
In contrast to Barrow and Walker, Robinson (1997) assumes that principals and 
agents may have divergent interests but at the same time be dependent on each other 
due to their different competencies. Unfortunately, Robinson does not go on to 
explain what these divergent interests might be. It is possible that there are some 
elements of managers’ and doctors’ objectives that do coincide, for example, the 
desire to produce high quality care, but others that are quite separate, for example, 
meeting target throughputs. Managers are certainly dependent upon clinicians to 
achieve both.
iii) Exogenous, random factors
Exogenous, random factors (the state of the world) are factors that influence the 
outcome produced but are beyond the control of either the principal or the agent.
Both principal and agent have the same a priori beliefs about the probabilities of 
exogenous, random factors. Walker (2000) defines a “strong” form of the principal- 
agent problem as one in which the agent can observe the state of the world as it 
happens and adjust action accordingly. A typical example of a random exogenous 
factor is rainfall in a principal-agent setting comprising a landlord and tenant farmer; 
although both landlord and farmer may have the same expectations of rainfall, only 
the farmer knows what actually falls (Sappington, 1991). Petersen (1993) gives the 
example of a salesperson as agent with his/her sales being affected by the 
(exogenous and random) number of potential customers arriving in a store.
Analogous situations in the NHS may occur when GP practices or an NHS Trust can 
observe an event or series of events that impact on their ability to provide agreed 
care, but which the PCT cannot observe. If such events are detrimental to the 
achievement of the agents, they will inform the principal. If the events are 
advantageous, the agent is able to achieve its agreed outcome with a smaller amount 
of effort than anticipated and is therefore unlikely to inform the principal. An 
example of an unfavourable factor for an NHS Trust might include an outbreak of a 
virus within the hospital that results in closed wards. A favourable factor might be a 
decrease in referrals from primary care.
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In many cases in the NHS, both principal and agent will be able to observe 
exogenous factors, often in advance. For example, policy changes are announced in 
advance and visible to both principals and agents; recommendations by the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) are also visible to both.
iv) Outcome
Outcome refers to the goods or services produced by the agent for the principal. 
Outcome is assumed to be visible to both principal and agent (Rees, 1985a). Indeed, 
this assumption is essential given that rewards are based on knowledge of either 
outcome alone or outcome plus other information derived from monitoring. The 
visibility of outcomes to the principal and their measurability is discussed in the 
literature in relation to monitoring. In general, where some outcomes (or indeed 
actions) are more visible or more measurable than others, it is these that will be 
rewarded and thus the agent may transfer effort from valuable non-measurable 
outcomes to less valuable but easily measured ones (Coast, 2001; Goddard et al., 
2000; Walker, 2000). (These issues are discussed in more detail in the section on 
monitoring.)
In the NHS, outcome is not easy to specify or observe. The final outcome of NHS 
Trusts and GP practices is healthy patients, or at least patients with improved health. 
However, these are difficult to measure. Combined with the multi-faceted nature of 
health care and the ill-defined relationship between health and health care, it is 
unlikely that PCTs or their agents will be able to observe the final outcome. 
Intermediate outcomes such as the number of patients treated are more easily 
measurable, but are also more easily observed by the agent than principal. In fact, 
PCTs are reliant upon NHS Trusts to provide the information by which NHS Trusts 
are monitored. This opens up the option for potential abuse by the NHS Trusts; they 
are in a position to manipulate monitoring figures provided to the PCTs.
v) Information asymmetry
Information asymmetry between agent and principal is a fundamental component of 
principal-agent theory. Without information asymmetry, there would not be a 
principal-agent problem. The principal would be able to observe the agent’s action, 
type, objectives and the exogenous random factors. The principal would then be
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able to devise a payment scheme that encouraged the agent to achieve exactly the 
principal’s wishes.
Information asymmetry is important in the NHS setting if  any of the above factors as 
they relate to NHS Trusts or GP practices are not observable by the PCT.
vi) Monitoring
If an agent’s effort is not observable directly by the principal, the principal may 
decide to undertake monitoring in order to acquire at least some information about 
effort (Mooney & Ryan, 1993) and to allow a degree of direct control. We can begin 
by assuming that agent effort is not observable and the contract is based simply on 
overall performance (Taylor, 2000). If the introduction of monitoring increases the 
principal’s knowledge about effort and the principal can alter the contract to take 
account of this new information, then both overall performance and this new 
information on effort will be used (Sappington, 1991). However, monitoring is not 
without cost. In particular, where the interests of principals and agents are diverse 
(Coleman Selden et a l , 1999), or where the nature of the activity being monitored is 
complex (Taylor, 2000), these costs are highest and monitoring least effective. As 
monitoring becomes less effective and more high cost, principals are likely to offer 
incentive contracts that induce effort but at the expense of direct control (Taylor, 
2000).
If monitoring becomes more expensive as the nature of the monitored activity 
becomes more complex, then one must question whether general practitioner and 
hospital based services can be monitored effectively. These services are not only 
multifaceted and not easily understood by non-medics, but neither is there an agreed 
appropriate level of provision, nor a fully understood relationship between health 
care and health. A danger in attempting to monitor output, where output is 
multifaceted, is that those facets that are most easily observed will be monitored, at 
the expense of those that may be equally or more important but more difficult to 
observe (Barrow, 1996). Walker (2000) agrees that the multidimensional nature of 
“white collar tasks” does not fit easily with monitoring. The result can be that 
production effort is transferred to those observable outcomes that are being measured 
and rewarded (Goddard et a l , 2000). In addition, and particularly important in 
health care where self-interest may not be the only driving factor behind decision­
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making, extensive or inappropriate monitoring may result in reduced motivation 
(Walker, 2000).
Zhang (1998) looks at the size and openness of the public state in China and offers a 
solution to the monitoring problem. He suggests the principal sets a contract that 
provides him/herself with their minimum required welfare and allows the agent to 
retain any additional output. As long as the agent desires this output, or can sell it to 
acquire value, the agent will produce at least the level that the principal requires. 
Zhang claims that this negates the need for principals to monitor their direct agents, 
even within a long chain of principal-agent relations. What Zhang is describing is 
the agent paying the principal for the right to produce as much output as possible; 
that is, the agent pays the principal with a fixed level of output and retains any 
additional output. This system was discussed in the hidden-action model; one 
problem is that all the risk is borne by the agent.
In a health care system based on care free at the point of consumption, and where 
there are ill-defined property rights, this system is not an option. For such a system 
to work, agents (hospitals or general practitioners) would have to buy from the PCTs 
the right to provide services, and then sell those services for a profit. Services in the 
NHS are not provided on a profit-making basis, although within and between 
agencies, funds are exchanged. With a fixed budget constraint in the NHS, neither is 
there a ready supply of buyers who could purchase the surplus output and enable the 
agents to acquire value in exchange.
vii) Risk sharing
The extent to which a principal or agent enjoys taking risks affects the type of 
incentive contract that will give optimal results. Few enjoy taking risks; most 
individuals are averse to risk if the potential losses are high enough. Principal-agent 
theory therefore assumes both parties are either risk neutral or risk averse. Payment 
schedules should aim to pool risks and not to leave the residual risk with the most 
risk averse (Barrow, 1996). For example, if  an agent is risk averse, a fixed price 
contract removes any risk of losses from the agent, leaving all the risk associated 
with lower than expected output with the principal. The principal would also 
however keep any additional gains, but as discussed above, this contract type 
introduces the problem of moral hazard and so reduces the likelihood of gains.
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In the NHS, many early contracts between purchasers and providers were block 
contracts: fixed payments made to hospitals in return for access to specific services 
(Chalkley & Malcomson, 1996). An important point here is that the amount of 
services is not specified in advance and depends on patient demand. Block contracts 
remove all incentives from a hospital by promising to pay a fixed amount no matter 
what level of service is required. The financial incentive for the hospital is to offer 
fewer rather than more treatments. However, the risk of losses as well as potential 
gains is borne in this case by the hospital. Should there be an unexpected rise in the 
number of patients needing treatment, the hospital has agreed already to provide 
access to services and must treat the extra patients; conversely, any fall in expected 
patient numbers will lead to a gain by the hospital.
A further type of contract common in the NHS was a cost-and-volume contract in 
which a baseline level of activity was funded and any additional activity funded on a 
cost-per-case basis (Bartlett & Le Grand, 1993). This provided some security to the 
hospital but also some incentive to increase activity.
Alternatively, a cost-plus contract would pay a hospital its costs plus an additional 
amount as profit (Barrow, 1996). This contract type would remove all risk from the 
hospital and give some incentive to treat more patients, as each additional patient 
treated would result in a proportional increase in profits.
An additional contract type, cost-per-case, involved payment on a case-by-case basis 
and placed all risk from variations in activity with the purchaser (although a provider 
had to be confident that total income would be sufficient to maintain a full range of 
services). The incentives for the provider were again to treat additional patients. GP 
fund-holders used cost-per-case contracts in the NHS for much of their care (Raftery 
et a l , 1996).
d) Key assumptions of principal-agent theory
The previous section discussed the main elements of agency theory. This section 
summarises the main assumptions of agency theory, that is, how these elements are 
assumed to interrelate. These main assumptions are detailed in the following papers 
in particular: Dixit (2002), Sappington (1991), Petersen (1993).
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Objectives are aligned through incentive contracts. This is the basic rationale 
of principal-agent theory. Principals desire an outcome that they are not able 
to produce themselves and so contract with an agent to produce the good for 
them.
Both principals and agents act in their own self-interest, that is, they attempt 
to maximise their own utilities. The utilities of both are a function of output 
and rewards. The agent’s utility is dependent also on action. Self-interest in 
the private sector is defined usually as profit maximisation. In the public 
sector, self-interest may include also consideration of others’ interests.
There is a trade-off between risk and incentives. A high level of risk- 
aversion by the agent dictates weak incentives. In contrast, a high level of 
risk-aversion by the principal necessitates strong incentives. For example, if 
the principal cannot tolerate output below a certain level, the agent will be 
rewarded for attaining or exceeding that level but punished for failing to do 
so.
The principal is indifferent to agent’s choice of action (as long as it is diligent 
and efficient), that is, the principal is concerned only with the outcome, not 
with the way in which that outcome is achieved.
Where there are multiple actions that produce multiple outcomes, and where 
the measurability of actions is different, principals will try to reward those 
actions most closely aligned with the most desired outcome. A danger is that 
high-powered incentives based on an easily observed outcome or action will 
lead an agent to neglect less easily observable goals.
Multiple principals will collude in given circumstances. If principals share a 
common set of information and can commit to share outcomes, they would 
further their interests by offering a joint contract. If they are unable to do 
this, then they should act independently.
Many principal-agent relationships are hierarchical; in such relationships, 
lower principal-agent pairs may collude against higher principals. This 
results if the lowest agent can offer rewards to its direct principal that are 
higher than the rewards for truth telling offered to that principal-cum-agent 
by its direct principal.
viii. Where a principal controls a team of several agents and their output is 
measured jointly, the team as a whole is rewarded. However, this can 
introduce free riding. To solve this problem, the principal can set incentives 
according to tournaments, that is, the best/worst-performing agent in the team 
is rewarded/punished respectively. These incentives apply only to multiple 
agents where those agents are part of the same organisation or team. Where a 
principal contracts with a number of agents but each agent and its outcome is 
independent, then incentives should be set individually.
ix. In long-term relationships where principals observe outcome over many time 
periods, the principal can learn about the agent’s type and action and set 
payments accordingly. If the agent can be punished for past actions, that 
threat of punishment may be sufficient to discourage poor outcomes. If 
agents cannot be punished (that is, they can quit), long-term reputation may 
serve as an incentive. Long-term reputation is important for both agent and 
principal; a poor reputation for a principal will decrease the number of agents 
willing to act for that principal. Likewise, an agent with a poor reputation 
will find few principals offering a contract.
2) Policy background
This section reviews briefly policy in relation to commissioning in the NHS pre- 
1999 and, in more detail, that relating to primary care organisations (PCOs) post- 
1999. The review of policy pre-1999 draws on that in Baxter et a l (2000). Parallels 
between current policy and principal-agent theory are presented.
Hospital services comprise emergency (unplanned) care and elective (planned) care. 
Pre-1991, GPs were free to refer their patients (as emergency or planned cases) to 
any secondary care provider for specialist outpatient review or inpatient admission. 
GPs therefore managed some of the demand for secondary care and their decisions 
had a direct impact on costs. Although GPs acted as gatekeepers to secondary care, 
there was no direct monetary link between the GPs making the referral and the 
payment for the care subsequently received. Not only did GPs refer where and in 
what quantity they chose, they also varied widely from each other in the extent to
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which they made referrals (De Marco et a l , 1993; Fertig et a l , 1993; Hutchinson, 
1993; Wright & Wilkinson, 1996). Therefore, GPs in their traditional gatekeeper 
role managed the demand for care, either by treating patients themselves, or by 
referring them for specialist care. (Once in the secondary care system, the 
management of care transfers to the hospital doctors, who then make treatment 
decisions on the patient’s behalf.)
Meanwhile, health authorities funded hospitals to provide services. However, health 
authorities were funded through a complex capitation formula based on their 
catchment populations, and there was no real relationship between the funding 
hospitals received from health authorities and the variable demands from GPs. In 
effect, health authorities were acting as independent insurers, funding care but 
having no influence over the level of demand (Bevan et al., 2001).
In 1989, the Government White Paper Working for Patients (Secretary of State for 
Health, 1989) changed these roles. The internal market was introduced, purchaser 
and provider roles were split, and a new scheme called GP fund-holding began. This 
scheme gave large general practices the option to manage some budgets, including 
cash limited general medical services (GMS), prescribing and the funds for a 
proportion of elective secondary care. In the first instance, the services were 
restricted (to reduce financial risk from random fluctuations in demand) and budgets 
were small relative to total hospital and community health services (HCHS) budgets. 
Nonetheless, this was a first step towards integrating the two sides of the NHS 
equation -  bringing together the management of patient demand and payment for 
care. Simultaneously, the purchaser/provider split and internal market created a 
system dependent on contracts for the provision of secondary care services; health 
authorities and GP fund-holders agreed contracts with hospital trusts to provide 
services to their patients. Over the following decade, the fund-holding scheme was 
expanded, with the types of services for which budgets could be held increasing and 
the sizes of practices eligible to hold a budget decreasing. Other formal and informal 
schemes, such as locality commissioning, multi-funds and GP commissioning 
groups, developed over the years, each taking a slightly different stance on the basic 
premise of GPs managing their own budgets for secondary care services (see Mays 
& Dixon, 1998 for a full discussion of these schemes).
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In 1994, an NHS Executive letter (NHS Executive, 1994) entitled Developing NHS 
Purchasing and GP Fund-holding announced the expansion of GP fund-holding and 
the start of a new pilot scheme -  total purchasing (TP). TP gave single or multiple 
groups of general practices the opportunity to hold a budget for and purchase all 
HCHS for their patients. This meant that total purchasing pilots (TPPs) could buy 
elective care that was outside the GP fund-holding scheme and buy emergency care. 
This scheme was another major step in integrating the GP demand 
manager/gatekeeper role with the traditional health authority role of insurer. In fact, 
TPPs did not choose to manage all HCHS, but instead managed only the budgets for 
those services to which they wanted to make changes (Mays et al., 1997).
One feature of the TPP scheme was that the aims, objectives and methods to be used 
by the pilots were not stated in advance. There appeared to be a general belief that to 
give GPs more influence over NHS purchasing through a budget was beneficial, but 
beyond that, there was no indication of what TPPs were expected to achieve (Mays 
et al., 1997). Unlike standard fund-holding, TPPs were not permitted to hold health 
authority money in their own right; co-operation between TPPs and health 
authorities was therefore essential. In addition, there was to be no virement of funds 
between standard fund-holding and total purchasing budgets.
With the change of government came another White Paper on the NHS in England in 
1997 (Secretary of State for Health, 1997). This paper, The new NHS: modem, 
dependable, announced a further restructuring, building upon the experiences of the 
previous decade. The aim was to keep the systems that appeared to work (for 
example the purchaser/provider split), but abolish those that were perceived as not 
working or not aligned with New Labour’s philosophies (for example, fund-holding, 
which was perceived as creating a two tier service within the NHS). Although the 
purchaser/provider split was maintained, competition was removed in favour of co­
operation (although markets are still contestable in some areas) and annual contracts 
were replaced with Service Level Agreements.
Instead of voluntary fund-holding, the new NHS comprises large groups of general 
practices, between them holding budgets for GMS infrastructure, prescribing and the 
majority of HCHS. These groups were known as primary care groups (PCGs) or 
primary care trusts (PCTs). Through their budgets, these primary care groups and 
trusts (PCG/Ts) had responsibility for providing some care themselves (for example,
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primary care services) and commissioning additional care from other providers (for 
example, secondary care services). These new bodies could choose to function at 
one of four levels:
1. To advise the health authority in its commissioning of care;
2. To take responsibility for a delegated budget, as a sub-committee of the 
health authority;
3. To become a free-standing body for commissioning health care, accountable 
to the health authority; and
4. To become a free-standing body for commissioning health care, accountable 
to the health authority and in addition, to be responsible for the provision of 
community health services.
The first two levels were known as PCGs, the latter two as PCTs. PCGs were sub­
committees of health authorities and had boards with a GP chair and a GP majority 
membership. PCTs however, as public bodies accountable to their health authorities, 
had a lay chair and a lay majority on their board.
It was expected initially that groups would progress through each level until reaching 
level 4 (Secretary of State for Health, 1997). In practice however, the majority of 
groups began in April 1999 at level 2 PCGs, and many planned to move directly to 
level 4 PCTs in April 2001.
Health Service Circular (HSC) 1998/228 (NHS Executive, 1998b) sets out three core 
functions for which primary care groups and trusts have responsibility:
• the improvement of the health of their community
• the development of primary and community health services
• the commissioning of secondary care services.
In giving primary care groups and trusts responsibility for these functions, and a 
budget from which to provide them, the government placed these primary care 
organisations at the centre of NHS decision-making.
In 2000, the government announced its intention in the NHS Plan (Secretary of State 
for Health, 2000) that all PCGs would become PCTs by 2004. In fact, further 
guidance from the Department of Health (Department of Health, 2001) saw the
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restructuring of local and regional health authorities and greater devolution of power 
to primary care. As a result, all but one primary care organisation became a PCT by 
April 2002 (Wilkin et al., 2002). PCTs were set to become the lead NHS 
organisations for assessing need, planning and securing all health services, and 
improving health. They were to do this through control of up to 75% of the NHS 
budget.
The relationships between PCTs and NHS Trusts can be viewed through the lens of 
principal-agent theory, the central concern of the theory being how a principal can 
persuade an agent to perform in a way that satisfies the principal’s requirements 
(Sappington, 1991). As Ross (1973: 134) indicates, a principal-agent relationship...
...has arisen between two (or more)parties when one, 
designated the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as 
representative for the other, designated the principal, in a 
particular domain o f decision problems.
This can be rephrased in the context of secondary care commissioning as follows.
A principal-agent relationship in commissioning has arisen 
when an NH S Trust, designated the agent, acts for, on 
behalf of, or as representative for the primary care trust, 
designated the principal, in the provision o f  secondary care 
services.
Wilkin et al. (2002) state the principal-agent problem in commissioning as one of 
leverage, with the following factors being important: negotiation, persuasion, target 
setting, contractual demands, incentives, and monitoring of standards and outcomes. 
They maintain that an essential part of the commissioning process is to ensure 
providers “shape their services to reflect the wishes of PCG/Ts”, and define 
commissioning as “a means of procuring, and paying for, high quality community 
and hospital services primarily by way of partnership working between the 
commissioners and providers” (Wilkin etal., 2002: 73).
The parallels between current policy and principal-agent theory are accentuated 
further in policy documents. HSC 1998/198 (NHS Executive, 1998a) discusses the 
allocation of risk (a key concept in principal-agent theory) between a PCT and NHS 
Trust. The suggestion is that the organisation that is able best to control risk should 
bear the financial consequences of such occurrences.
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Activity Fluctuations and Risk Management. Agreements 
should apportion responsibility fo r handling a particular risk 
to the party or parties in the best position to influence the 
event. The financial arrangements should reflect this.
For elective inpatient care, financial and clinical risk should 
be borne by the NHS Trust clinical and management team for  
the specialty or condition, (paragraph 16.4)
Later, HSC 1998/228 (NHS Executive, 1998b) introduces the concept of incentives 
in SLAs, stating that SLAs...
...will incorporate incentives fo r  improving quality, cost 
effectiveness, and appropriateness together with clear 
responsibility for risk management, ensuring activity does 
not get out o f kilter with funding, (paragraph 84)
The guidance given in these circulars has been reinforced recently in Reforming NHS 
Financial Flows (Department of Health, 2002c). Here, the definition of 
commissioning includes specific reference to contracts, incentives and monitoring.
[ Commissioning is a] continuous cycle o f  activities that 
underpins and delivers on the overall strategic plan for  
healthcare provision and health improvement o f the 
population. These activities include stakeholders agreeing 
and specifying services to be delivered over the long-term 
through partnership working, as well as contract negotiation, 
target setting, providing incentives and monitoring, (page 
56)
Annex 5 of Reforming NHS Financial Flows (Department of Health, 2002c) states 
that Service Level Agreements between PCTs and NHS Trusts should...
... clearly set out the understanding between commissioners 
and providers about all o f the key dimensions o f 
commissioning. With the shift o f  power and resources to 
PCTs, the SLA becomes a critical agreement for driving 
performance and change in service delivery. The SLA should 
also be the starting point fo r  enacting financial flows and for  
setting out clear agreements about resources, activity, and 
risk.
These excerpts from policy documents demonstrate clearly that one part of the 
government’s policy for the NHS is to create contractual relationships between PCTs 
and NHS Trusts along the lines of principal and agent.
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In addition, the White Paper (Secretary of State for Health, 1997) introduced unified 
budgets for HCHS, prescribing and GMS infrastructure. The largest element of this 
budget was for HCHS (over 80%) with prescribing accounting for 14% (Regen et 
a l, 2001). Prescribing budgets have been managed by primary care for many years 
and financial incentives are common. Managing the whole commissioning budget is 
new; even total purchasing pilots, that were intended to manage the whole of the 
budget, in fact selected which portions of the budget to control (Mays et a l, 1997). 
The management of the commissioning budget by PCTs is therefore a new area for 
research.
PCTs can be seen as both agents and principals. They are agents for their health 
authorities; health authorities (and ultimately government) have responsibility for the 
health of the resident population, they are the body to which PCTs are accountable 
and they delegate some of their responsibilities to PCTs. PCTs are also principals; 
they are tasked with providing care for their populations, but need to contract with 
medical professionals as agents to provide that care. It is helpful to conceptualise 
health care as primary care (delivered by GPs and other general practice staff), 
community care (delivered by staff in the community or in community hospitals) and 
secondary care (delivered by staff employed by acute hospitals). PCTs as principals 
therefore enter into relationships with two distinct sets of agents: general practices 
and community staff for the provision of primary and community care respectively, 
and NHS Trusts for the provision of secondary and tertiary care. The former are 
both internal agents, the latter external.
Diagrammatically, these relationships can be viewed as in Figure 1 below. The 
arrows indicate the direction of the principal to agent relation. The dashed lines 
represent contractual relationships; the solid lines represent direct control. There are 
also relationships between GPs and NHS Trust clinicians: both are agents, but also 
interact with each other.
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Figure 1: Principal and agent relationships around PCG/Ts
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3) Principals and agents in markets, hierarchies and 
networks
The previous sections have shown the main elements of principal-agent theory and 
its parallels with policy. Implicit in discussions of the principal-agent framework is 
its location within a market or quasi-market structure; principals and agents are 
treated as if they are in a quasi-market. But the language is relevant equally to other 
structures. This section discusses the relevance of the principal-agent language to 
other forms of exchange relations, specifically, hierarchies and networks.
A market is a system of coordination within which buyers and sellers interact to 
exchange goods and services. Quasi-markets differ from conventional markets in at 
least one of the following ways: organisations are non-profit making and compete for 
public contracts, sometimes with for-profit organisations; purchasing is often 
through a single agency or consumer vouchers; and consumers may be represented 
by agents rather than representing themselves (Le Grand & Bartlett, 1993). The 
transactions that take place within such markets are often complex and multi­
dimensional (Robinson & Le Grand, 1994).
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Despite its implicit location within a quasi-market structure, the language of the 
principal-agent framework can be applied equally to a hierarchical structure or a 
network and to between or within firm coordination. The language can be the same; 
it is the methods of influencing the agent that are different in the different structures.
A hierarchy exists where there is a superior-subordinate relationship, or a chain of 
such relationships (Williamson, 1975). Hierarchies are usually associated with 
bureaucracies and characterised by a high degree of central control with limited 
autonomy for the periphery (Exworthy et a l , 1999; Thompson et a l , 1991). The 
markets and hierarchies debate derives from the work of Coase (1937) in discussing 
the nature of the firm. Organisational hierarchies replace market structures in an 
attempt to reduce transaction costs. A transaction cost is “any activity which is 
engaged in to satisfy each party to an exchange that the value given and received is 
in accord with his or her expectations” (Ouchi, 1980). Transaction costs are either 
ex-ante or ex-post (Bartlett & Le Grand, 1993). Ex ante relate to drafting and 
negotiating an agreement, ex post to monitoring and dispute resolution. Coase*s 
original work has been developed and expanded into theories of organisational 
behaviour and new institutional economics (see, in particular, Williamson (1975; 
1981; 1985) and Ouchi (1979; 1980)).
Hierarchies, however, still comprise principals and agents. In a hierarchical model, 
the principal controls the agent via direct measures; in a market model, the principal 
controls the agent through incentive contracts. As Simon (1991: 26) suggests, a 
“fundamental feature of the new institutional economics is that it retains the 
centrality of markets and exchanges. All phenomena are to be explained by ... 
negotiated contracts, for example, in which employers become ‘principals’ and 
employees become ‘agents’”. Indeed, Pitelis (1991) (quoted in Dowling 2000: 17) 
proposed that certain aspects of market relationships are in fact hierarchical and so 
the real choice is between market hierarchies and non-market hierarchies.
A network is less well defined. Networks can be seen as characterised by informal 
organisational forms and a common outlook, based on mutual trust and reciprocity 
(Exworthy et a l , 1999) and extended chains of connections and linkages (Flynn et 
a l , 1996). Networks are often considered to exist within the “grey, intermediate 
area” between markets and hierarchies (Exworthy et a l , 1999). Uzzi (1997) 
considers agency theory is unable to explain network forms as the roles of principal
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and agent are shifting and blurred. He concludes that agency theory is focused 
mainly on “self-interested human nature, dyadic principal-agent ties, and the use of 
formal controls to explain exchange” (Uzzi, 1997: 37), and these methods do not 
conform to network models. Likewise, Toonen (1998) believes that although the 
network concept brings about important insights it has, at the same time, limitations; 
not just any contact or relation should be considered a network. The network 
concept should be “restricted to relations and institutions that imply a form of 
interdependency” (Toonen, 1998: 250). However, Thompson etal. (1991) suggest 
that “if  it is price competition that is the central coordinating mechanism of the 
market and administrative orders that of hierarchy, then it is trust and co-operation 
that centrally articulates networks”. If this is the case then the principal-agent 
language, if not contractual tools, is certainly appropriate.
Networks can be “wheel” or “all-channel” (Williamson, 1975: 45-6). A wheel 
network is a series of simple hierarchies where a single superior controls a number of 
different subordinates. This kind of network is often referred to as a hub-and-spoke 
system in the context of the coordination of organisations. In an all-channel 
network, everyone is connected to everyone else and the absence of hierarchy 
prevails. Goodwin (2000) also makes a distinction between different types of 
network. He discusses research on the centrality of information flows. In networks 
based on authority, the flow of information is from those in the positions of authority 
to their subordinates. In networks based on information, the information flows 
upwards from those providing it to those collecting it for use in decision-making.
This description implies that networks can be hierarchical, perhaps in line with 
Williamson’s wheel network. An expansion of the wheel network from a single 
superior with subordinates to a chain of such relations, that is, where subordinates 
are superiors to other subordinates, is akin to a series of chains of principal-agent 
relations.
The use of the principal-agent language is more difficult to apply to an all-channel 
network as it is not as clear which individuals play the roles of principals or agents. 
However, for a network to be instigated, there must be a reason for its instigation.
The members of the network must have an aim, and each member must either desire 
the end product, or be able to supply it (at least in part), or perhaps a combination of 
both. Therefore, the individual or organisation desiring the product could be called
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the principal (there may be more than one) and the individual or organisation able to 
supply the product (again, there may be more than one) could be conceived of as the 
agent.
The methods of control within each of these structures differ. Within a quasi-market 
structure, the methods of control of agents by principals are financial incentives.
The principal sets an optimal payment schedule for its agent. Within a hierarchy, the 
method of control is generally not through incentives alone but, in addition, through 
bureaucratic rules and procedures associated with approval and decision-making 
(Lapsley & Llewellyn, 1998; Whitley, 1999). Parties to a transaction are able to deal 
with uncertainty and complexity in a sequential and adaptive fashion (Le Grand & 
Bartlett, 1993) and thus limit the effects of uncertainty. In a network, key methods 
of influence have been suggested as altruism, trust, alliance, collaboration, co­
operation, partnership and reciprocity (Exworthy et al., 1999; Thompson et al.,
1991) rather than financial reward or authority.
Simon (1991) considers in detail the relationships between organisations and 
methods of exchange, asking why there appears to be larger organisations and fewer 
market transactions than might be expected. He believes the assumption in 
principal-agent theory that agents will shirk unless their actions increase their own 
self-interest is unrealistic. Moreover, McMaster (1998) questions the completeness 
of agency theory’s assumption that there is a conflict of interest between principals 
and agents with low trust. He argues that convention and trust are important 
influences on agents’ motivations and effort.
Simon (1991) offers thoughts on a number of mechanisms of influence: authority 
(the employment relation), rewards (motivations), loyalty and identification with 
organisational goals, and coordination (“rules of the road”). His conclusion is that 
the new institutionalists’ attempts to explain organisational behaviour solely in terms 
of agency, asymmetric information, transactions costs, opportunism and other 
neoclassical concepts is seriously incomplete as a result of ignoring mechanisms 
such as authority, identification and coordination.
Quasi-markets, hierarchies and networks each employ at least one of the methods 
offered by Simon. There is an argument that each of these elements is integral to the 
more general principal-agent framework. As discussed, the methods by which a
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principal can influence an agent’s actions are not restricted to financial incentives. 
The formal model may assume that this is so, but the application of the framework in 
the empirical world suggests otherwise. For example, Simon’s discussion of the 
authority of the employment relation as a controlling factor sits neatly within the 
principal-agent framework. Indeed, it is well established that within organisations 
control of agents by principals can be implemented via the authority of commands 
and rules.
Loyalty and identification can be treated likewise. Particularly for skilled and 
managerial employees, organisational loyalty and pride are widespread (Simon, 
1991). In the language of principal-agent theory, organisational loyalty and 
identification should bring the objectives of the agent closer to those of the principal. 
An agent’s personal interests (for example pride) could be served by serving the 
organisation’s interests. In this way, the problems associated with principals’ and 
agents’ differing objectives could be reduced.
Finally, coordination. Simon refers to coordination as the removal of the 
indeterminate nature of decisions under uncertainty. He gives an example of this 
indeterminacy as a motorist taking the decision to drive on the same side of the road 
as other drivers, whichever side of the road that is. The side of the road is neither 
correct nor incorrect; it is the coordination between drivers that is correct. He 
expands the argument to justify the growth of large firms within which there is 
division of labour. Each task is interdependent with others and must be coordinated 
to enhance production and efficiency. Simon’s argument is that coordination 
between firms depends almost wholly on economic motivations and rewards whereas 
coordination within organisations depends on loyalty and identification. Using the 
language of principal-agent theory, coordination is what the principal is trying to 
achieve from the agent. In a quasi-market, this is achieved through incentives to 
align objectives. In a network, Simon’s concepts of loyalty and identification may 
be important influences, with key players identifying with the network rather than 
their individual organisations. In a hierarchy, both methods of coordination may be 
used.
In summary, there are different views about what constitutes a principal-agent 
relation and in which types of structures they exist. Exworthy et a l (1999) describe 
the current structure of the NHS as moving away from principal-agent relationships
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between purchasers and providers towards more relational or soft contracting. 
However, as discussed, relational or soft contracts are still methods of managing 
agency relations. Others view principal-agent relationships more broadly. Goddard 
and Mannion (1998) see the use of co-operation and trust as an attempt to solve the 
problems inherent in a principal-agent relationship. Smith et al. (1997) consider the 
methods of aligning objectives in principal-agent relationships as either behavioural 
(through hierarchical chains of command) or outcome-based (through incentives). 
The challenge is to integrate institutional, managerial and network concepts in the 
study of public administration (Toonen, 1998). A principal-agent framework offers 
this degree of integration.
If principal-agent relationships are viewed within the broad framework described 
above, rather than being restricted to the formal model in which financial incentives 
within payment schedules are the only form of agent control, and if they are 
envisaged in different structural forms, then, whether purchasers and providers are 
separated or exist within a single organisation, principal-agent relationships are still 
present.
4) Principal-agent and other theories as frameworks
for evaluation
This section reviews first the use of principal-agent theory as a framework for 
evaluation, and, second, considers briefly two other frameworks, those of new 
institutional economics and trust.
a) Principal-agent theory as a framework of analysis
Petersen (1993: 289-290) suggests that agency theory...
"... has much to offer in the study o f organisations. ...[the] 
selection o f agents..., motivation devices, output-based 
versus input-based reward systems, direct incentives such as 
piece rates versus indirect incentives such as bureaucratic 
career incentives, risk sharing and more. ”
However, it has not generated as large an empirical literature as other areas of the 
economics of organisations. Petersen suggests that this may be because the formal 
theorising of agency problems uses complex mathematics, something that is not
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readily accessible. For a contract to work, it has to be understood by both the 
principal and the agent. If it is not understood, then the incentives within the 
contract will not have the intended effect. Few principals, he suggests, would 
consider taking advice from optimal contracting formulae; few are applied 
mathematicians and neither are their agents. Arrow (1986) agrees that even where a 
principal-agent model seems clearly applicable, there is little trace of it in reality.
Despite these concerns, many analysts believe that the basic structure and the logic 
behind the formal model do provide a useful framework to illustrate a range of issues 
relevant to everyday relationships (see Dixit, 2002; Sappington, 1991; Audit 
Commission, 2000). Others also are confident that agency theorists are moving 
beyond sparse mathematical models with unrealistic assumptions towards more 
“complete and nuanced” pictures of organisations and are accepting the complex and 
hybrid nature of organisations (Kiser, 1999; Shortell, 1997). Recent developments 
within agency theory include inter-temporal aspects, multiple outcomes, team 
working and multiple principals (see Dixit, 2002 for a review).
The general framework has been used extensively in the literature for the evaluation 
of a variety of relationships. These include publicly provided services (Barrow,
1996; Coleman Selden et al., 1999; Walker, 2000; Zhang, 1998), health care 
organisation (Coast, 2001; Goddard e ta l,  2000; Hagen, 1997; Propper, 1995; 
Robinson, 1997; Sheaff & Lloyd-Kendall, 2000; Smith etal., 1997) andpatient- 
doctor relationships (Gafni et a l, 1998; Robinson, 1999; Scott & Vick, 1999). In the 
latter, it is notable that formal contracts do not exist, yet the framework is still 
applicable (Mooney & Ryan, 1993; Rees, 1985a). The ubiquitous nature of 
principal-agent relationships means that the framework has been applied in the 
evaluation of less obvious interactions as well (see Munro, 2001 for an example of 
agency relations within families).
Whilst mainstream economists have analysed agency theory formally, in health 
economics it had been used more often to describe relationships rather than to devise 
optimal contracts (Mooney & Ryan, 1993). Few studies have used a principal-agent 
framework explicitly to investigate commissioning relationships in the NHS. Many 
use the terms principal and agent as labels to refer to organisations, patients and their 
doctors, and relationships between them. Others use the general nature of agency 
relationships to assess incentive structures. Propper (1995) assessed the structure
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and potential effect of incentives created by the quasi-market reforms in the NHS in 
1991. She visualised the reforms as creating a series of overlapping principal-agent 
relationships with the government as principal. Similarly, Hausman and Le Grand 
(1999) compared the incentive structure with respect to the primary-secondary care 
interface under the fund-holding system with that created by the 1997 White Paper 
(Secretary of State for Health, 1997).
Principal-agent theory has been used explicitly as a framework for analysis of 
commissioning by the following authors: Smith et al. (1997), Goddard et al. (2000), 
Sheaff and Lloyd-Kendall (2000) and Levaggi (1996; 1999). Levaggi uses a formal 
model of agency to develop optimal contracts under risk and information asymmetry. 
The others use a principal-agent framework to help understand and categorise 
relationships between health care organisations.
This remainder of this section discusses how these papers use principal-agent theory 
as a framework for analysis.
Smith et al. (1997) use principal-agent theory to analyse the transfer of funds 
between different sections of health care systems in different countries. They look at 
three issues around finance: the raising of finance, the transfer of funds to hospitals, 
and spending by hospitals. In their descriptive model, they define two principals and 
one agent. Principal 1 is the government or other fund raising body. Principal 2 is 
the governing board of hospitals. In some cases, for example health maintenance 
organisations, principals 1 and 2 are the same body (Smith et al., 1997). The agents 
in this model are the hospital operational managers and doctors. They are treated as 
a single agent although in reality this is not the case. A natural source of conflict in 
their model is that the agents serve two principals: the funder and the hospital board 
(Smith et al., 1997). A further source of conflict is that clinician and management 
agents themselves have different objectives (Crilly, 2000). Figure 2 is a simplified 
version of Smith et al. ’s model of these relationships.
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Figure 2: Funding, financing and typical principal-agent relationships (adapted 
from Smith et a l (1997))
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Applying this model to the current English system, although PCTs do not raise their 
finances directly from patients, they could be regarded as principal 1, defining 
political goals, access and quality for their local populations. Principal 2 would be 
the NHS Trusts* governing boards. When considering community services, PCTs, 
which provide these services in addition to primary care services, would act as 
principals 1 and 2 jointly. The agents would be the clinicians and directorate 
managers within hospitals; these would be under direct control of principal 2. Smith 
et a l look only at the funding and provision of care by hospitals. Their model could 
be expanded to include the provision of primary care services. This would add an 
additional agent to the model. General practices and GPs would be agents 
(equivalent to hospital operational managers and clinicians). Their principal (the 
PCT to which they belong) would be a single body that would have a dual role: as 
funder and governing body.
In the model shown in Figure 2, there is no direct relationship between principal 1 
and principal 2. When transposing this model onto the English system, principal 1 
and principal 2 are involved directly with each other. If principal 1 is the PCT, and 
principal 2 the NHS Trust, then principal 2 is in fact an agent for principal 1. (This 
relationship is acknowledged by Smith et a l but not shown.) That is, principal 1 
raises funds to provide services for its patient population, but contracts with principal 
2 (now an agent) to supply these services. These relationships are therefore more 
realistically modelled as a series of overlapping principal-agent relationships as 
shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Funding, financing and principal-agent relationships in the English NHS 
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Smith et al. ’s (1997) paper was written before the 1997 White Paper “The new NHS: 
modem, dependable” (Secretary of State for Health, 1997), so considers the UK 
NHS of the internal market/fund-holding era. However, because they look at 
relationships between hinder and hospitals (in effect purchasers and providers), and 
because the purchaser/provider split has been kept in the new NHS, their 
observations are still relevant. As well as considering the principals and agents in 
the system, they suggest a number of ways of characterising the possible objectives 
of hospital boards/managers (principal 2 in their terminology):
1. “Surplus maximising” -  Hospital boards are keen to win contracts for which 
marginal price is greater than marginal cost. They expose the hospital to some 
degree of financial risk and are keen on cost-per-case contracts.
2. “Stability seeking” -  Here the hospital is keen to retain existing contracts and 
seeks to gain purchasers’ trust. There is considerable concern by the hospital 
with quality, less with costs. The hospital is happy to earn “normal profits”.
3. “Revenue maximising” -  These boards seek out as much new business as 
possible, perhaps offering “bargain contracts” to attract new purchasers. By 
doing this, they burden their existing purchasers with the extra costs of attracting 
new purchasers.
4. “Health rationing” -  Such hospitals would deliver care only to patients satisfying 
some cost/benefit ratio. They would look similar to purchasers that operate 
under a fixed budget.
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5. “Resource use maximising” -  These hospitals would attempt to win business that 
maximised the use of existing resources whilst disposing of unwanted resources. 
Cost-per-case work may be sought to use up slack capacity.
They conclude that a full analysis of the incentives implicit in current remuneration 
schemes (that is, contracts) would require an examination of hospital objectives, 
something that at the time had not received much attention (Smith et a l, 1997).
Since then, Crilly (2000) has examined the objectives of hospital managers and 
doctors. She concludes that their objectives are different, with managers placing 
more emphasis on achieving financial balance and doctors on maintaining service 
quality, with doctors’ objectives being dominant in times of conflict with managers. 
This may suggest that hospitals’ objectives are wider than the purely financial ones 
suggested above by Smith et a l (1997). It may mean also that the agents within 
hospitals (doctors) are more powerful than their principals (managers). The 
approach emphasised in the academic literature is for principals to design optimal 
incentive schemes. Perhaps an equally productive way forward is to align more 
closely principals’ and agents’ objectives through co-operation and behavioural 
rather than contractual means (Goddard et a l, 2000; Smith et a l, 1997).
Whilst Smith et a l (1997) use principal-agent theory as a framework for describing 
relationships and comparing methods of transforming funds into services, Sheaff and 
Lloyd-Kendall (2000) and Goddard et a l (2000) use the theory in slightly more 
formal, although still descriptive, ways. Both Sheaff and Lloyd-Kendall (2000) and 
Goddard et a l (2000) use qualitative data collection methods. Goddard et a l (2000) 
are more formal in their use of agency theory; they set out a simple model that 
illustrates the effects of the issues they wish to consider, and then explore whether or 
not these issues are embodied in practice. Sheaff and Lloyd-Kendall (2000) do not 
make predictions in advance, but analyse through interviews and documentation the 
content of contract agreements.
Sheaff and Lloyd-Kendall investigate Personal Medical Service (PMS) pilots to see 
how far they embody principal-agent relationships, and consider the implications for 
relational and classical theories of contracting. PMS pilots were new ways of paying 
GPs for providing primary care. They entailed a contract being agreed between the 
health authority or PCT, and general practices. PMS has now been adopted as part 
of policy. Goddard et a l (2000) look at NHS performance measurement and use a
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formal model to illustrate the effects that such measurements have on principals and 
agents. Their main question is whether using measurable targets to increase 
standards will detract effort from non-measurable but equally important 
performance. They conclude that this is the case.
In addition to this finding, Goddard et a l (2000) use a framework of organisational 
control mechanisms set out by Ouchi (1979). This is given in Table 1.
Table 1: Information requirements and efficient governance conditions (adapted 
from Goddard et a l (2000))
Knowledge of transformation process
Perfect Imperfect
Ability to measure 
outputs
High Markets/hierarchies Markets
(rely on prices and 
purchasers)
Low Hierarchies
(rely on rules and bureaucratic 
procedures)
Clans
(rely on traditions and peer 
review)
The rows show the extent to which outputs are measurable. The ability to measure 
output would be high, for example, for vaccinations given. It would be low for an 
outcome such as “improvement in health status”. In the columns, knowledge of the 
transformation process can be perfect or imperfect. Perfect means that the way in 
which inputs are transformed into outputs is known, that is, the mix of the factors of 
production and the process of production is well known. If it is not clear, then this is 
imperfect. Goddard et a l describe the NHS as having moved from clan and 
hierarchical control pre-1991, through market and hierarchy from 1991 to 1999, to a 
mix of all three modes from 1999. It is noticeable that although the principal-agent 
language is used in this paper, it is applied equally to markets, hierarchies and clans.
Sheaff and Lloyd-Kendall (2000) describe PMS contracts as the shifting of GP 
contracts from a form of reimbursing GPs to a means of constructing and managing a 
principal-agent relationship between the NHS and GPs. It should be noted, however, 
that even where GPs are reimbursed directly for providing care, there is still a 
principal-agent relationship between the funding body and the GPs. Sheaff and 
Lloyd-Kendall explore whether these principal-agent relations are managed through 
classical or relational contracting, that is, through contracts that are complete 
(specifying all eventualities in advance) or more flexible (‘agreeing to agree’ about
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changes in circumstances). One would expect that, using Ouchi’s terminology 
above, if these principal-agent relationships are organised in a hierarchical or clan 
system, then contracts may be more relational than classical. Sheaff and Lloyd- 
Kendall (2000) come to similar conclusions to Goddard et a l ; the NHS today is a 
mix of previously tried methods, with neither classical nor relational theories 
describing fully NHS contracting.
Smith et a l (1997), Goddard et a l (2000) and Sheaf and Lloyd-Kendall (2000) use 
principal-agent theory descriptively. Levaggi (1996) is the only author to date to 
model principal-agent relationships formally for the NHS, although Dusheiko et a l
(2001) are in the process of exploring formal models of the impact of budgetary 
devolution on NHS activity and expenditure through principal-agent and public 
choice models.
Levaggi*s most recent work of direct relevance to the NHS is from 1996, prior to the 
introduction of the current NHS system. She assumes purchasers and providers can 
be modelled as single entities (rather than organisational groups) and that purchasers 
are neutral agents, that is, they pursue the interests of the population for whom they 
buy health care. Levaggi looks at risk and information asymmetry, then at optimal 
contracts when there is a budget constraint on the purchaser’s side. She then 
considers competition between agents (hospital providers) and shows that it is 
advantageous for the purchaser to hold a lottery to choose their agent. Within the 
NHS, this is not a realistic scenario; choice of agent is often not exercised. She 
concludes also that the choice of contract depends on risk aversion and contracting 
experience. Block contracts can result in the lowest levels of output (Levaggi,
1996). If block contracts are used in the long-term, the purchaser will not be able to 
observe the state of the world, even ex post, and that may limit contracting power in 
the future (Levaggi, 1996).
In more recent work on government procurement, Levaggi (1999) shows that with a 
binding budget constraint, output may be reduced. In traditional principal-agent 
settings this is not a problem, as the principal aims to maximise net gain, that is, the 
difference between the value of the output and the reward paid to the agent. In 
government procurement this is more of a problem as the principal aims to maximise 
output for a given budget, not net gain.
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Commissioners in the NHS can now negotiate long-term agreements with their 
providers. This should mean that there is a move away from the annual contracting 
round towards more long-term planning. Commissioners and providers are expected 
to work together, in partnership, to fund and provide services. It is hard to say which 
of the assumptions underlying Levaggi’s models is most appropriate. Are PCTs 
procuring services -  aiming for maximum quantity perhaps at the expense of 
efficiency? Are they working within fixed budget constraints, or are budgets more 
flexible? Can purchasers and providers be treated as single entities? It seems 
unlikely; they consist of managers and clinicians each with their own agendas.
b) Other frameworks as analytical tools
Many researchers have evaluated the NHS reforms according to policy aims such as 
efficiency, quality, equity, accountability and responsiveness (see Le Grand et a l , 
1998b for a review). Others have taken specific frameworks as their starting point. 
One trend has been the use of new institutional economics to understand transaction 
costs and classify contract types. More recently some commentators have begun to 
use the concept of trust to evaluate interactions between organisations. This section 
reviews briefly the use of these two frameworks.
New institutional economics is a comparative institutional approach to the study of 
economic organisations in which the transaction is the basic unit of analysis and in 
which special emphasis is given to the study of governance (Williamson, 1985). It 
can be applied to a wide range of problems. Transaction cost economics is related 
closely to the principal-agent problem. The agency problem is how to control the 
agent; the transaction costs problem is to assess the costs of choosing and controlling 
external versus internal agents. If the costs and risks associated with trade are too 
high, then an organisation will choose vertical integration rather than trade.
The new institutional economics framework has dominated the analysis of quasi­
markets in the UK welfare sectors (Roberts et a l , 1998). The main topics of concern 
have been the impact and content of contracts and associated transaction costs (see 
Allen et al., 2002; Allen, 2002a; Dawson & Goddard, 1999; Flynn et al.t 1995; Place 
et a l, 1998; Posnett et a l, 1998; Raftery et a l, 1996; Robinson et a l, 1998; Robison 
e ta l, 1998; Robison, 1998; Street e ta l , 2001).
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The costs and risks of transactions can be affected by interactions between 
uncertainty, bounded rationality and opportunism. Bounded rationality refers to the 
inability of players to take into account uncertain future events. Opportunism refers 
to self-interest with guile; that is, breaking the rules of the game in order to further 
self-interest. As a result of these problems, fully defined contracts are rare. More 
often, contracts are relational, that is, parties “agree to agree” later in the event of 
unforeseeable circumstances (Sheaff & Lloyd-Kendall, 2000).
The consensus with respect to contracts in UK quasi-markets is that they cannot be 
complete due to the problems of bounded rationality, uncertainty and opportunism. 
However, despite this incompleteness, contracts are considered instrumental in 
achieving change. Robison’s (1998) study of total purchasing pilots and Allen et 
a l ’s (2002) evaluation of the management of infectious disease-related risk both 
concluded that contracts provided a basis for building relationships through initiating 
dialogue and also provided purchasers with the financial leverage to meet their 
objectives. Allen (2002a) found in addition that relational contracts were not an 
appropriate representation of NHS contracting in district nursing. Contracts were 
incomplete, but a lack of trust between the parties suggested that relational contracts 
were not evident. Instead, relationships between purchasers and providers were 
continuing within a hierarchical structure on which a market system had been 
imposed.
There is currently a shift towards long-term contracting in the NHS. Whilst 
Chalkley and Malcomson (1996) believe this will make the alignment of objectives 
between provider and purchaser easier because of the provider’s concern to maintain 
a reputation for high quality, Dawson and Goddard (1999) have questioned its 
economic justification. They conclude that the move may be a way of reinforcing 
the government’s commitment to partnership and collaboration. They suggest that a 
danger may lie in the trade off between the benefits of such collaboration and the 
difficulties of managing the price adjustment mechanisms necessary in long-term 
commitments. Moreover, if contracts are not complete but rely on some form of 
relational contracting that to date has not been evident, the transaction costs in terms 
of continuing negotiations associated with long-term contracts are likely to be high.
In their study of community health services, Flynn et al. (1995) conclude also that 
market contracts are not suitable due to high levels of uncertainty and associated
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transaction costs. Furthermore, they suggest the hierarchical model, often assumed 
to be an effective replacement for the market in such situations, is not appropriate 
either. They decide that network models describe best relationships between 
purchasers and providers in community health services. Others agree that there is a 
move towards more relational networks of organisations, or “soft” quasi-markets 
(Roberts eta l., 1998: 276).
Evaluations using the framework of trust to explore these networks are beginning to 
emerge. Trust-based relationships substitute for the need to use sophisticated 
governance arrangements in contracting (McMaster & Sawkins, 1996). The 
development of trust enhances co-operative behaviour so that providers deliver high 
quality services without the need for costly monitoring (Bartlett et a l , 1998b). 
Bartlett et al. (1998a) bring together papers relating to different welfare sectors that 
conclude, amongst other things, the importance of trust and collaboration.
Many authors debated the role of trust and collaboration within networks soon after 
the election of the New Labour government in 1997 (Exworthy et al., 1999; 
Kirkpatrick, 1999; Toonen, 1998). No UK health care-related research using trust as 
an evaluative lens has been published to date, although there are studies underway 
(Eastham & Ferguson, 2003; Kuhn et al., 2003). It seems, however, that where trust 
is being used as an evaluative framework, it is being applied to either purchaser or 
provider networks rather than networks that bring purchaser and provider together in 
a commissioning context.
This section has illustrated how principal-agent theory and other frameworks have 
been used to provide insights into health care organisations. Although the language 
of principals and agents has been used extensively in research, agency theory as a 
framework for evaluation has been little used in the analysis of health care systems.
It has not been used yet to analyse relations between PCTs and NHS Trusts. 
However, the literature to date has shown the number and complexity of, and 
different organisational settings for, principal-agent relations in health care, and 
illustrated the use and effect of different contract types. In addition, although the 
theory of trust relations is immature in terms of evaluative research in health care, 
the use of a transaction cost framework to evaluate health service reforms in the UK
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has been extensive. The insights most pertinent to a principal-agent analysis of 
PCTs’ commissioning relations are as follows: there a numerous overlapping 
relationships that may result in conflicts, possibly as a result of different objectives; 
direct and contractual relations exist; organisations are hybrids, containing elements 
of hierarchies, clans, networks and quasi-markets; incomplete contracts are the norm; 
block contracts may not be advantageous; and the transaction costs of managing 
long-term contracts may be high.
5) Commissioning by primary care organisations
This section discusses first, briefly, the evidence about the roles of standard fund- 
holding practices as principals and NHS Trusts as their agents in the purchasing of 
secondary care services. The majority of the section reviews the evidence from total 
purchasing pilots and evidence to date about PCG/Ts as commissioners of secondary 
care.
a) Fund-holding
With regard to a principal-agent view of fund-holding, GPs were the principals and 
NHS Trusts their agents. GP fund-holding was not subject to national evaluation but 
has been researched extensively (see Dixon & Glennerster, 1995; Glennerster et a l , 
1994; Glennerster & Matsaganis, 1993; Goodwin, 1998; Gosden & Torgerson, 1997; 
Yule et al., 1994). A large proportion of the literature evaluating fund-holding has 
focused on what changes were made rather than how changes were made, and 
debating the pros and cons of the scheme (see Bain (1994); Bowie and Harris (1994); 
Iliffe and Freudenstein (1994); and Keeley (1993)), but offering little in the way of 
evidence.
One area in which there is evidence about change and the use of incentives in fund- 
holding is prescribing (Gosden & Torgerson, 1997; Paris et al., 1994; Stewart- 
Brown et al., 1995). Practices managed prescribing within cash-limited budgets.
The freedom to retain savings from that budget acted as an incentive to decrease 
expenditure. The national incentive scheme for prescribing is now well established. 
The use of incentives in this and other clinical areas has been shown to be effective 
(Gross e ta l , 1996; Hillman, 1990; Hillman, 1991; Iliffe & Munro, 1993; Mooney, 
1994). If incentives are effective in these areas, then they may also be so in others.
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However, the effectiveness of incentives per se is not in question here. The 
relationship between principals and agents (including how incentives are used to 
help manage these relations) is the focus of interest.
Another major topic of research, and one where there has been a confused story, is 
GP referrals to outpatient care (see Faulkner et a l , 2003; Goodwin, 1998; Gosden & 
Torgerson, 1997). The conclusion to date has been that there is not enough evidence 
to make a judgement about the impact of fund-holding on referral patterns or costs. 
Some studies have shown an increase in referrals (Howie et a l , 1993), others have 
shown few or no changes (Comey, 1994; Dixon & Glennerster, 1995). The majority 
of referrals have remained at the local hospital (Whynes & Reed, 1994). However, a 
recent study by Dusheiko et a l (2003) shows that the fund-holding related incentives 
of a budget and explicit prices reduced fund-holder elective admission rates by 3.3%.
One interesting study that considered why changes took place is Whynes et a l
(1996) who undertook an analysis of GPs’ choice of referral destination and showed 
that price (assumed to be key to fund-holding practices) was not an important factor. 
The proximity of the hospital and clinical factors played a more important role than 
price. Glennerster et a l (1994) make a similar point; loyalty, professional and 
personal links, and sympathy for hospital colleagues make GPs reluctant to change 
referral destination. This suggests that, although GPs may not be dependent on their 
local providers, they do not often exercise their choice of alternative agents.
Whynes et a l (1996) give a number of reasons why price was an unimportant factor 
in the choice of referral destination. First, GPs did not feel that their fund-holding 
budgets were binding. Second, concerns about the doctor-patient relationship and 
public image may have resulted in GPs being disinclined to tell the researchers that 
price was an important issue. Third, the real price of changing to a cheaper 
alternative was prohibitive. The real price of change included costs such as patient 
dissatisfaction and of establishing relationships with new providers. Robinson
(1997) makes the same point (discussed in the section “Key elements of principal- 
agent theory” on page 21) when considering the effectiveness of contracts in relation 
to primary and secondary care physicians in the United States. A further reason why 
price was not important in the referral decision may be that the GPs who were asked 
to complete the questionnaire on which this research is based were not aware of the 
costs of their referrals and thus did not consider this in their decision-making. The
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questionnaire was sent to senior partners; fund-holding lead GPs could have given 
very different answers. If it is the case that these GPs were not aware of price issues, 
this is important, given that one of the assumptions of fund-holding was that GPs 
would be able to make cost-effective referrals. For PCTs, where GPs’ roles arguably 
change from being principals (with NHS Trust as their agents) to being agents 
themselves for their PCTs, this is worthy of note. If GPs are not aware of the costs 
of care and are not aware of incentive schemes then PCTs’ control of GPs by these 
means will fail. The same applies to the influence of hospital doctors.
For fund-holding, there appears to have been a forgone conclusion that the 
contracting process was effective in instigating change. Fund-holders were assumed 
to have power over their hospital providers by virtue of holding a budget.
Although in the early days of fund-holding, practices were able to shift services 
between hospitals with little danger of destabilisation (Comey, 1994), when the 
scheme was expanded to cover more services and more practices, shifts of contracts 
were harder to achieve. Howie et a l (1993) and Wisely (1993) claimed that it was 
greater communication with consultants as a result of the contracting process that 
enabled GPs to achieve change, not shifting contracts elsewhere. In some areas, 
dialogue between fund-holders, consultants and managers was the only method of 
achieving change due to local monopolies (Howie et a l , 1993). No details are given 
in these papers about the process of negotiations or how agreements were eventually 
reached.
More recently, waiting times for elective surgery have been shown to be shorter for 
fund-holders’ than non-fund-holders’ patients (Dowling, 2000). The tool to achieve 
this change was being seen by providers as having the potential to refer patients to 
alternative providers for treatment, and hence to remove payments. Propper et a l
(2002) agree that fund-holders’ patients’ waiting times were reduced. They found 
that where doctors could choose the hospital for referral but did not pay for the care, 
waiting times were rarely reduced. Both studies, therefore, suggest that it is the 
ability to remove payments that is the key to achieving such changes. If that is the 
case, then the ability of PCTs to provide financial incentives or sanctions to NHS 
Trusts and to shift services should be important tools.
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b) Total purchasing pilots
The role of GPs in any form of multi-practice led purchasing is hard to define in 
terms of agency theory. In the strictest sense, when a GP is sitting on a TPP board, 
s/he is playing the role of principal, deciding on the TPP’s objectives and form of 
contract and monitoring with both external and internal providers. When that same 
GP is treating patients and making decisions on their behalf, s/he is acting as an 
agent (both for the patient and for the TPP).
A collaboration led by the King’s Fund undertook the national evaluation of first and 
second wave total purchasing pilots (see Mays et al., 2001b). Four pioneer sites 
were subject to local evaluations, the most prominent of these being the evaluation of 
the Berkshire Integrated Purchasing Project (BIPP), undertaken by the Health 
Services Management Centre (HSMC) at the University of Birmingham (see Walsh 
et al., 1999). Each evaluation explored a number of basic issues related to the 
structure, process and, to a limited degree, the outcomes of total purchasing.
Despite concentrating on the structure and process of the total purchasing system, the 
national evaluation did not explore in detail how the purchasers (principals) 
encouraged the providers (agents) to work in the purchasers’ best interests. Many of 
the evaluation’s reports describe structures and processes related to the internal 
organisation of the TPPs, to GPs’ roles and to relationships between the GPs, TPPs 
and health authorities. These relationships, from a principal-agent perspective, are 
concentrating on principals only: how new principals develop their roles, and how 
the multiple stakeholders within principal groups work together. In the BIPP 
evaluation there is concentration on the division of labour between GPs within and 
between practices, but this division of labour is related to the purchasing 
(principal’s) role rather than that of GPs as agents (Walsh et a l, 1997).
One reason for this concentration on principals may be that in many cases the TPPs’ 
main objectives related to changes in primary not secondary care (Malbon et a l, 
1998). As a result of this, relationships with secondary care agents were of less 
importance. Indeed, in the preparatory, first and second live years of purchasing, 
only 15% to 28% of total transaction costs were due to TPPs’ NHS Trust related 
functions (Place et a l, 1998). The remaining costs were accounted for by internal 
and health authority related functions.
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Research by Baxter et a l (2000) is an exception to the assumption that the role of the 
GP is to act as principal to NHS Trust agents. They attempt to explore the extent to 
which GPs as agents are encouraged to maintain activity and expenditure within 
budgetary limits. The research looked at how GPs were informed about the TPPs’ 
aims, and to what extent GPs were managed and monitored by the TPP in order that 
the TPP achieved its aims. However, this paper does not give details of how GP 
agents were managed by their TPP principals. The research was based on a 
questionnaire survey and shows that although all GPs were made aware of 
expenditure and referral levels for the standard fund-holding element of purchasing, 
in over half the pilots, the lead GP (that is, the GP who was on the TPP board and 
hence played a role as principal) was the only GP to be given this type of monitoring 
information.
The BIPP first year report (Walsh et al., 1997) also made some effort to explore the 
control by the TPP of GPs’ referrals. They give the example of non-urgent extra- 
contractual referrals (ECRs). ECRs are usually referrals for rare and expensive 
conditions that need to be treated at a specialist hospital outside the local area, with 
which there is no predetermined contractual arrangement. In BIPP, the non-urgent 
ECRs were discussed at the TPP’s Purchasing Forum, a monthly decision-making 
board. A GP representative from the practice wishing to make the referral led the 
discussion, with advice given by the public health representative from the health 
authority on efficacy of treatment. Consensus decisions were made on the grounds 
of clinical efficacy and costs.
Thus, there is limited evidence from TPPs about the ways in which TPP principals 
engaged their GP agents and monitored them to ensure that their objectives were 
achieved. The information that is available from the BIPP evaluation suggests that 
GPs are able to step in and out of their roles as agents and principals as necessary.
The majority of evidence relates to GPs as principals.
The national evaluation team (Mays et a l , 1997) asserted that it would be fascinating 
to see whether a “commissioning” or a “fund-holding” approach would be the most 
successful in bringing about change. A commissioning approach was considered to 
be one where the purchasers and providers worked together to achieve joint aims. 
From a principal-agent perspective, this requires principals and agents to work
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together to agree a strategy, how this strategy should be met and to meet it. The 
alternative fund-holding approach was for the principal to decide upon its own aims 
and to impose these requirements on the agent through a contract, and to monitor 
that contract to ensure that the aims were met to a satisfactory standard.
Findings show that there was a lack of commissioning skills in TPPs and a resistance 
to change by NHS Trusts and health authorities (Mays et al., 1998). It is likely that 
the TPPs were using their fund-holding expertise to attempt to bring about change, 
but that this method of purchasing was inappropriate for the range of services 
required. The implication of this is that the principals and agents were not good at 
working together, possibly due to inexperience and a poor understanding of each 
others’ needs. Some TPPs did use a commissioning approach: “rather than merely 
negotiating a contract [they] participated with Trusts in service development or 
regular quality assurance meetings.” (Place et al., 1998: 19). In addition, one of the 
second wave TPPs instigated “tripartite meetings” where GPs, health authority 
managers and managers from the acute trust met once a month to discuss the TPP’s 
strategic plans (Malbon et al., 1998). Walsh et al. (1999: 77) found that although 
“BIPP was set up in the fund-holding mode”, over time, GPs changed their input into 
the contracting process from one of squeezing out more activity for no more cost to 
one of looking jointly at how service change could be introduced.
Conversely, the BIPP first report (Walsh et a l , 1997) notes how this pioneer TPP 
was different to the majority of its first and second wave cousins in that, from the 
beginning, providers were included in the project’s development. Members of the 
Project Board (an advisory group for BIPP strategy) included providers. GPs were 
keen to have provider representation on the Board as they had learnt through their 
fund-holding consortium that this was a way of influencing their relationships and 
thus securing service change. The purchaser-provider spilt in the BIPP model was 
“far less distinct than in the centralised health authority approach to purchasing” 
(Walsh et a l , 1997: 63). NHS Trusts as agents were therefore quite active in 
developing their principal’s objectives. This model has similarities with that 
described by Coleman Selden et a l (1999), discussed earlier. They considered the 
involvement of city council managers in their elected councillors’ priority setting 
decisions. Agents were categorised as being “active” or “passive”. Active agents 
(those choosing to be involved in strategic decision-making) were more enthusiastic
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and successful in implementing these strategies than their counterparts who chose to 
play a pure management role and have strategy decisions imposed upon them. This 
suggests that where NHS Trusts are active in the health community’s decision­
making, the implementation of agreements may be more successful.
Whilst the BIPP style of involving agents in decision-making may have helped to 
achieve some aims, it was not totally successful. Both principals and agents had 
problems changing their “mindsets” (Walsh et al., 1997); some NHS Trusts found it 
hard to accept contracts based on activity where previously they had been block, and 
some requests from the GPs were considered unrealistic. Although initially it was 
felt that there was a common agenda, this partnership feeling did deteriorate and 
there were frustrations, as illustrated by the following quote from a GP who was
“...fed up with the [Trust] controlling the agenda...our needs 
seem to accommodate theirs ...change will happen only i f  it 
suits... ” (Walsh etal., 1997: 42)
This suggests that without incentives or sanctions to ensure change was effected, 
NHS Trusts seemed to have the power to choose when and how to implement 
change.
One tool that might have helped TPPs to overcome any difficulties in engaging NHS 
Trusts and delivering change was the contracting process. In particular, the national 
evaluation team considered holding a budget and contracting independently from the 
health authority important in achieving change (Mays et al., 1998). However, it is 
not clear which aspect of the contracting process delivered change. In fact, having 
the ability to contract, and being seen to have that ability, may have been more 
important than the actual contracting process. Mays et al. (1998) state that where 
TPPs held their own budgets (rather than handing these back to their health 
authorities) and so had the ability to contract (and therefore, in theory, to change 
services or providers), this led to better joint working between TPP and NHS Trust, 
and as a result, changes in service delivery. The contracting process can therefore be 
viewed as a catalyst for change, with the “carrot” being the chance to have closer 
working relations and the “stick” being the power (rarely used) to remove contracts 
(Mays etal., 1998).
Sticks were used in a limited way by BIPP. Where information requirements were 
specified but not delivered, the NHS Trust was penalised (Walsh et al., 1999). BIPP
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also introduced a number of different contract currencies, including occupied bed- 
days and banded lengths of stay. Banded lengths of stay meant that the longer a 
patient stayed in the NHS Trust, the less BIPP paid. This payment method should 
have resulted in an incentive to the NHS Trust to discharge patients earlier. The 
evaluation team found no evidence that this happened to a greater extent than for 
other local purchasers. It was not clear why this was the case. Walsh et a l (1999) 
conclude that contracting had not been a very effective means of changing activity 
for BIPP.
In contrast, Robison et a l (1998) report for the national evaluation that the 
contracting process was seen as “very important” as a mechanism for change by 39% 
of TPPs with independent contracts in 1996/7. Independent contracts are defined as 
those negotiated separately from health authority contracts. This figure fell to 30% 
in the following year. The percentage of TPPs having problems in making 
agreements also fell from 82% to 41%. The reasons why the contracting process 
was considered very important initially were to do with communication and power; 
TPPs were given the opportunity to communicate with clinicians and to negotiate 
from a “position of strength with financial leverage over providers” (Robison et al.9 
1998: 40). However, there was also a realisation that effective communication went 
beyond contracting. GPs in BIPP came to value clinician-to-clinician contacts inside 
the strategic forum as a way of moving forward clinical issues (Walsh et a l, 1999). 
One of the reasons given by Robison et a l for the decrease in percentage of TPPs 
considering the contracting process very important was that a greater degree of trust 
had developed between the TPPs and NHS Trusts, with a more collaborative and less 
confrontational approach. This emphasises the need for the principals and agents to 
communicate with each other, to have a good rapport and to build up trusting 
relationships over time (Goodwin et a l, 2001). TPP principals did not decide on 
their objectives alone, and then set a contract for an agent to deliver these objectives; 
the process was a joint one. NHS Trusts were active agents.
Some TPPs chose not to have independent contracts, but to contract jointly with their 
health authorities. In many cases, the TPPs were passive partners (Robison et a l,
1998). This method of contracting is in effect merging two principals (the TPP and 
the health authority). The reasons why these principals chose to work together are 
not clear, but one TPP stated that “changes in service configuration had made it too
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complex to proceed independently” (Robison et a l , 1998: 47). This is an example of 
the principal being overwhelmed by the decision-making, and reverting to a more 
experienced (and possibly more powerful) principal rather than negotiating more 
fully with the agent.
In negotiating and achieving service change, it was not always the management level 
within an NHS Trust that reached agreements with the TPP management. In an NHS 
Trust that had a local monopoly, the Trust management were not willing to talk with 
the TPP about changes to service delivery unless other budgetary issues were agreed 
first (Robison et a l , 1998). The TPP therefore talked direct to the hospital 
clinicians, who did agree to certain service changes, outside the contracting process.
It is not clear from the report whether it was the TPP managers or the TPP GPs who 
talked to the hospital clinicians. It is likely that these discussions entailed a mix of 
principal, agent, management and clinical agendas.
The monopoly position of many NHS Trusts may also influence the degree to which 
the principals are able to achieve their objectives through these agents. Goodwin et 
a l (2000: 55) report that “provider reluctance to release funds to TPPs has been 
widespread”. Good working relationships may alleviate these problems. Gask et a l 
(1998) report on TPPs working with mental health providers. They show that where 
there is a history of joint working between the GPs and the managers of the mental 
health providers, there is a comparative advantage in developing contracts and 
agreeing service change over those TPPs where relationships are not well developed. 
BIPP also found difficulties in extracting finances from a local NHS Trust for a 
planned reconfiguration of health promotion services (Walsh et a l , 1997). This 
problem seems to have been overcome by dividing the finances into separate 
envelopes of funds for core activities and for BIPP project work.
The quality of routinely supplied information on services was poor (Walsh et a l ,
1999) and in some cases hard to obtain (Goodwin et a l , 2001; Robison et a l , 1998). 
Poor activity and cost data hampered attempts by TPPs to make service changes 
(Mahon et a l , 1998). In addition, it meant that monitoring was hard to achieve. As 
a result, outpatient activity in BIPP was not well controlled (Walsh et a l , 1999). 
Outpatient services were provided from the fund-holding and not the total 
purchasing budget, but the principle of control is the same. Both the NHS Trust and 
the GPs claimed that they could not control throughput. The NHS Trust attempted to
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pass the financial problems resulting from this over-activity back to its purchasers, 
with the effect that the health authority had to solve the problem because it was the 
only body with statutory responsibility to do so. This example shows the potential 
power of the agent over the principal. Where there is a combination of poor 
information which means that the principal is not able to monitor the agent 
adequately, where the principal has not set incentive contracts to encourage the agent 
to control its own activities, and where there are insufficiently strong lines of 
accountability, the agent can take advantage by extracting additional funds from the 
principal.
Some TPPs relied heavily on their project managers to build good personal 
relationships with NHS Trusts and health authorities (Mays et a l , 1998). In one case 
it was suggested that the health authority provided legitimacy by adding its approval 
to a proposed service change (Goodwin et a l , 2000). Legitimacy is an important 
point raised by Kiser (1999) who reviews agency theory from the perspective of 
economics, political science and sociology. The notion of legitimacy in agency 
relations arises from analyses of the relationships between rulers and their 
administrative staff. Kiser gives legitimacy as one of the main differences between 
economic and sociological approaches to agency. Officials are more likely to 
comply with a ruler’s directives if they see that that ruler has a right to give orders 
and that they, the officials, have a duty to obey. Simon (1991) makes a similar point. 
He argues that, within principal-agent relations between an employer and employee, 
there is a “zone of acceptance” within which the employee is expected to obey 
orders. An incomplete contract contains implicit and explicit limitations that set the 
boundaries of the “zone of acceptance”. This may be important for PCTs as 
principals. The legitimacy of the principal in the eyes of the agent is usually 
provided by the choice by the agent to act as an agent for that principal. In the NHS, 
there is no market in which this choice is exercised. PCTs are taking on a new role. 
They are taking over from health authorities as the main principal commissioning 
care from NHS Trust agents. It is doubtful that NHS Trusts will be quick to accept 
the legitimacy of these commissioning groups.
In summary, over the lifetime of total purchasing pilots, the style of purchasing 
began to change from one of activity-based contracts to joint discussions between 
clinicians and managers from the TPPs and NHS Trusts. Information was often
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poor, making monitoring difficult. TPPs relied quite strongly on their health 
authorities to provide experience and legitimacy.
c) Primary care groups and trusts
PCG/Ts are similar to TPPs in their principal-agent relationships. PCG/T Boards 
and Executives can be seen as principals with two sets of agents: GP practices and 
NHS Trusts.
Two national evaluations of PCG/Ts have taken place. One (the Tracker Survey) 
was co-ordinated from Manchester (Wilkin et a l, 2000; Wilkin et al., 2001; Wilkin 
et al., 2002) and the other from the University of Birmingham’s Health Services 
Management Centre (Regen et a l, 1999; Regen et a l, 2001; Smith et al., 2000).
The Tracker Survey was based on interviews and postal questionnaires with Chief 
Officers, Chairs and health authority leads from 72 nationally representative PCGs 
and PCTs. Dusheiko et a l (2000) report in more detail on budgets and incentives in 
these 72 PCG/Ts. The HSMC study evaluated twelve PCGs. The evaluation began 
in 1998 and was based originally on a larger study of 40 GP commissioning group 
pilots. PCGs in this study should therefore have been commissioning (or planning to 
commission) secondary care services since April 1998.
In addition, the Audit Commission (2000) undertook an early survey of 12% of PCG 
Chief Executives between July and September 1999 and interviewed PCG board 
members. It provides descriptions and recommendations for future action, rather 
than evaluation of progress.
Each of these reports offers a description of PCG/Ts and their many functions. The 
aims of the reports were to identify lessons to be learned (Regen et a l, 2001), to 
provide “a baseline against which progress in future years can be judged” (Dusheiko 
et a l, 2000: 30) and to describe how core functions were tackled and to identify 
features associated with success (Wilkin et al., 2002). The reports vary in the depth 
of their analysis of why or how achievements are being made. In general, PCGs and 
PCTs were seen to have made slow progress in terms of commissioning secondary 
care services (Audit Commission, 2000; Regen et a l, 2001; Smith et al., 2000; 
Wilkin et al., 2002).
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As with the evaluations of TPPs, the findings can be categorised into those 
concerned with GPs as agents and those concerned with NHS Trusts as agents.
In relation to GPs as agents for the PCG/Ts, the Audit Commission (2000) report 
found that there was a lack of involvement by GPs and that some refused to share 
data between practices. They recommend increasing the degree of ownership by 
practices by devolving some planning and decision-making to clusters of practices. 
Such a policy would in fact introduce an additional layer of agency. Fifty three 
percent (32/60) of PCGs planned to introduce practice-level indicative budgets for 
HCHS (Dusheiko et al., 2000).
Some GPs, particularly single-handed ones, saw clinical governance as the start of a 
take-over by PCG/Ts (Smith et al., 2000). This may be a serious issue for PCG/T 
boards to overcome. If GPs are to be effective agents, they must first accept that 
their principals have a legitimate right to devise and demand compliance with 
contracts. GPs are independent contractors and are accustomed to managing their 
own small businesses. As such “PCGs cannot direct; only (in partnership with other 
bodies) advise, educate, and apply peer pressure” (Audit Commission, 2000: 38). 
Management by collaborative boards comprised of lay people and other health 
professionals may not be accepted easily.
There is a varying commitment to board work by GPs and also a significant gap in 
understanding and engagement with PCG priorities between board member GPs and 
other GPs (Smith et al., 2000). Fifty percent of GPs who responded to Smith et al. ’s 
questionnaire had never attended a PCG sub-group meeting. This begs the question 
of why non-board GPs are not involved. It may be that board members have a 
defined role (as principals) whereas other GPs are unsure of their roles. In effect, 
they are agents for the PCG/T boards. This may open debates about the power 
relations between groups of GPs and the legitimacy of control (as referred to above).
There are few details with regard to the methods of control of GP agents. Most 
PCG/T Chairs reported that, for primary care development, they favoured rewarding 
improved performance and investing in poor performing practices rather than 
withdrawing funds (Wilkin et al., 2000). If this is the case for controlling GP agents, 
it may be the case also for other agents, that is, NHS Trusts. Baxter et a l (2001, and 
see Appendix 1 for summary of study) showed that, in relation to commissioned
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services, financial incentive schemes for practices were not widespread. Peer 
pressure, informal feedback on practice and GP activity, and written feedback on 
practice activity were the most common methods of influence. Few PCG/Ts 
supplied information to their practices or GPs on the cost of activity in secondary 
care.
Recently, the Health Service Journal has reported that eight or nine PCTs at the 
forefront of developments have begun to manage their GPs’ referrals to hospital and 
hospital waiting lists (Davies, 2003). Their aims are to eliminate waiting lists and to 
divert patients to care in a more appropriate setting than hospital. The same article 
cites an Audit Commission report that found 23% of PCTs in 2002 were attempting 
to manage their referrals to secondary care.
In summary, research to date suggests that there is little realisation by PCG/Ts or by 
GPs that GPs are agents for their PCG/Ts in relation to commissioning, and methods 
of control are not well developed.
With regard to commissioning secondary care, progress by PCGs had been limited 
by insufficient management support, inadequate information and a perceived “lack 
of financial clout” (Regen et al., 2001: 17).
Few PCG/Ts have member practices with experience of “collaborative 
commissioning”, most have the different styles and skills needed for single practice 
GP fund-holding (Audit Commission, 2000; Wilkin et al., 2000). The Audit 
Commission report suggests specifically that the “commissioning experience of 
former fund-holding practices ... is of less direct relevance” than that of 
collaborative commissioning such as through GP commissioning group pilots (Audit 
Commission, 2000: 16). In their study, more than a third of PCGs contained no 
general practices with experience of collaborative commissioning. With regard to 
viewing PCTs as principals and NHS Trusts as agents, the implication is that the 
relationships between the two should become more co-operative.
Co-operation between principals will be tested by lead commissioning arrangements. 
Where PCTs are working together, NHS Trust agents will face fewer principals.
This may make it easier for the agent to provide services, but could bring problems 
to the principals in terms of group collaboration and decision-making.
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Collaboration between PCG/Ts for commissioning was common, particularly for 
specialist services (Regen et a l , 2001; Wilkin et a l, 2002). A third of PCG/Ts in the 
Tracker Survey operated joint commissioning groups with other PCG/Ts and the 
majority of those in the HSMC evaluation participated in collaborative 
commissioning arrangements. Whether or not PCG/Ts commissioned services alone 
was related only loosely to the size of the PCG/Ts (Wilkin et al., 2002). The HSMC 
evaluation showed that collaborative commissioning arrangements usually involved 
one PCG/T taking the lead role with certain providers on behalf of other PCG/Ts.
Most PCG/Ts participated also in health authority-wide commissioning groups that 
included representatives from PCG/Ts, the health authority and local providers 
(Regen et a l, 2001). In 1999/2000, all the PCG/Ts for which there were data had a 
main Service Level Agreement that covered more than just their own PCG/T. By 
2000/1, two out of twelve had Service Level Agreements that were limited to their 
own groups. There were examples also of SLAs becoming more consistent with 
PCG/Ts’ wishes.
Working together with other PCG/Ts was seen to increase the leverage of the 
PCG/Ts over the NHS Trusts (Wilkin et a l, 2002). This advantage was perceived as 
very important as a lever, second only to issues around economies of scale and 
expertise. For those PCG/Ts in the HSMC study, collaborative working was seen as 
a method of reducing financial risk (Regen et a l, 2001).
Financial incentives were not used routinely in SLAs for commissioned services 
(Wilkin et a l,  2002). Only 12% of PCG/Ts used financial incentives in 2001/2, 
whereas in the previous year 17% had done so. Where incentives were used, they 
were non-recurring bonuses to reward the meeting of waiting time targets. It may be 
that PCOs felt that they did not have sufficient funds available to offer rewards for 
achievements, or that withholding funds from NHS Trusts if they did not achieve 
may damage their ability to function. It may also be that the quality of information 
was not sufficient to allow PCG/Ts to monitor whether or not rewards should be 
paid.
Whilst almost a quarter of PCG/Ts felt that they had substantial leverage over their 
providers, almost half perceived they had little leverage (Wilkin et a l, 2002). There 
was no difference in these perceptions between PCGs and PCTs, that is, PCTs were
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not consistently more or less powerful vis-a-vis their providers. “Financial clout” 
was also a major problem for some PCGs (Regen et al., 2001). Many believed that 
transferring to PCT status would improve this. Some felt that as providers of 
community services, PCTs would be brought closer to secondary care providers with 
the potential for increased integration and communication.
From 1999/2000 to 2000/1 PCG Chief Executives became more aware of the need to 
manage a budget for commissioning (Regen et a l , 2001). Two strategies were 
adopted to manage risk: the use of block contracts with providers and the sharing of 
risk with other PCGs (Regen et a l , 2001). However, two thirds of PCG/Ts did not 
plan to make any shifts in expenditure between different elements of the unified 
budget; the other third planned to expand their spending on GMS by reducing HCHS 
or prescribing expenditure (Dusheiko et a l , 2000).
Not all PCGs had a delegated budget and, for those that did, the average amount 
delegated was 67% (Smith et a l, 2000). All of the PCGs studied by the HSMC team 
“acted collectively” in commissioning their main service agreement. It is not clear 
from the report whether the health authority commissioned these service agreements 
on behalf of the PCGs, or whether the PCGs themselves played an active role. The 
Tracker Survey (Wilkin et a l, 2000) gives similar results; 89% of PCG/Ts were 
involved in some sort of collaboration in the commissioning of community health 
services, 99% for hospital services. The evidence for total purchasing pilots 
suggested that contracting independently from the health authority was one of the 
key factors in achieving service change, although it is not clear why this was the 
case. If part of the success related to individual TPPs being small enough to 
negotiate change without destabilising providers, then this advantage may be lost 
through collaborative purchasing. The advantages of contracting as a catalyst to 
improve communication may also be lost if relationships become more remote as the 
size of the purchaser increases.
Some PCG/Ts in the HSMC study felt that their health authorities were attempting to 
“hang on to commissioning” by deliberately failing to provide the support and 
information needed (Regen et a l, 2001). In a survey of PCG/Ts in 2001, Baxter et 
a l (2002) found that about a third of PCG/Ts were still relying on their health 
authorities to commission services. In addition, some NHS Trusts had not accepted 
PCGs as their commissioners and were perceived to be likely to go “running back”
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to the health authority if they did not like something about the PCGs’ commissioning 
(Regen et a l , 2001: 55).
In fund-holding, the option of exit, that is, to change providers, has been shown to be 
a tool for achieving change in the form of lower waiting times (Dowling, 2000). For 
PCG/Ts, there was little evidence of attempts to improve services by changing 
providers (Wilkin et a l , 2002). One PCT had changed providers for orthopaedic 
services; there were no other examples. For the major acute specialties, most 
PCG/Ts had a choice of main provider, but did not activate this choice.
In most PCG/Ts, PCG/T and health authority managers rather than clinicians led the 
commissioning process (Regen et a l , 2001). Hospital managers were not considered 
to be influential in commissioning decisions, but hospital clinicians were (Wilkin et 
a l , 2002). This is interesting given the general desire to increase clinicians’ 
involvement, in particular, clinician-to-clinician discussions about service priorities 
and developments. Where these discussions had taken place, they were seen to have 
increased the levels of trust between the organisations and fostered better 
relationships (Regen et a l , 2001).
In summary, the knowledge to date about NHS Trusts as agents suggests that 
financial levers as methods of influence by PCG/Ts are limited and that PCG/T 
managers are only beginning to come to terms with their role as commissioners. 
Collaboration between commissioners is common and a commissioning rather than 
purchasing approach considered most appropriate.
6) Summary
This review has outlined the economic theory of agency and shown how closely it 
parallels current policy with regard to commissioning. It has illustrated also the 
ubiquitous nature of principal-agent relationships in health care in hierarchical and 
network, as well as quasi-market, structures. The principal-agent framework has 
been used as a lens for investigating a variety of relationships in health care and 
other settings. Other frameworks, above all new institutional economics, have shed 
light on different aspects of commissioning, in particular, contracts and transaction 
costs.
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To date, research relating to PCG/Ts and their commissioning has been 
predominantly large scale, providing insights into the pace and scope of progress. 
PCTs’ relationships with both NHS Trusts and GPs are immature. The findings of 
this review suggest that PCT/NHS Trust commissioning relationships are developing 
more quickly than PCT/GP relationships with respect to commissioned services. 
Within PCTs, internal systems and levers are not well developed, to the extent that 
research to evaluate both internal and external methods of control by PCTs would 
not be productive at this stage.
With regard to the commissioning by PCTs of secondary care, the main findings to 
date beget further questions. For example, there is limited evidence on how 
organisations relate to each other. How are commissioning agreements reached? Do 
PCTs consider themselves principals and NHS Trusts consider themselves agents? 
Evidence shows that incomplete contracts are the norm. So are PCTs setting 
contracts designed to influence NHS Trusts’ behaviour? If not, then how are PCTs 
trying to influence NHS Trust behaviour? Whilst joint planning and collaborative 
commissioning are becoming more common, research demonstrates that overlapping 
principal-agent relations may cause conflicts in objectives. This begs the question of 
how distinct the different organisations’ roles are, and how multiple PCTs work 
collaboratively. Information has been shown to be of poor quality and as a result 
there is a concern that the transaction costs of managing long-term contracts may be 
high. The question then arises of how either PCTs or NHS Trusts can act in 
accordance with their commissioning requirements whilst informed by a possibly 
inadequate information base. Reliance up to now on health authorities to aid or even 
lead the commissioning process has been high. It remains to be seen whether PCTs 
are powerful enough or have the appropriate experience and legitimacy to 
commission services independently. The closeness of PCTs to their main providers 
should mean that they are in a better position than health authorities to set and 
monitor contracts. However, problems in measuring or specifying multiple 
outcomes, or both parties possessing very similar objectives, may mean that 
contracts are not considered critical. Indeed, the use of financial levers thus far 
appears to be minimal. If these levers are not being used, what methods of influence, 
if any, are they being replaced with? If PCTs and NHS Trusts do not consider 
themselves principals and agents, or do not act as if they are, then the effectiveness
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and indeed purpose of a policy based on contractual relations, and the methods of 
reaching agreements within such a policy, are not immediately obvious.
Commissioning relationships between PCTs and NHS Trusts are new. Despite 
earlier forms of commissioning and purchasing, commissioning by PCTs is the first 
time that such large groups of general practices have been convened in a non­
voluntary manner to commission secondary care. As such, they pose an interesting 
and new area for study. As Wilkin et a l (2001) assert, little is known about the 
extent and nature of commissioning activity. The remainder of this thesis fills part 
of this gap in knowledge by providing an in-depth analysis of the nature of these 
commissioning relationships.
The next chapter states the aims and objectives of this research and gives details of 
the methods employed to answer these questions.
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Chapter Three: Aims, Objectives and Methods
Chapter two reviewed the use of principal-agent theory in health care research and 
the current level of knowledge about commissioning by primary care organisations. 
This revealed important factors, including the complex but ill-defined nature of 
PCOs’ relationships with both NHS Trusts and GPs. Both sets of relationships were 
shown to be embryonic and the use of incentives not well developed. The role of 
GPs, in particular, as agents for PCOs is very immature. What is missing from the 
available body of research is an in-depth understanding of how and why PCTs 
manage their relationships with respect to the commissioning of secondary care 
services from NHS Trusts.
This chapter gives the aims and objectives of the research, followed by a statement 
of its originality. Sections three to six give the research strategy, the selection, 
recruitment and characteristics of the three case studies. Sections seven to nine 
detail the methods of data collection, coding and data analysis.
1) The aims and objectives of the research
The aim of the research is to provide an in-depth analysis of primary care trusts as 
commissioners of secondary care services using the underlying assumptions of 
principal-agent theory as a lens for investigation. The specific objectives are as 
follows:
1. To show the extent to which PCTs and NHS Trusts act as principals and 
agents respectively, and how they enact these roles.
2. To investigate the importance of objectives, information asymmetry and risk 
to the commissioning process.
3. To show if and how Service Level Agreements and incentives are used to 
manage relations between PCTs and NHS Trusts.
4. To demonstrate how commissioning negotiations are used to align NHS 
Trusts’ objectives with PCTs’.
5. To illustrate the impact on commissioning styles of external and contextual 
factors such as multiple principals and vertical tiers of principals and agents.
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2) The originality of the research
Silverman (1993) maintains that theories are neither true nor false, but provide sets 
of explanatory concepts that offer alternative views of the world. As shown in 
chapter two, a principal-agent view of the world of relationships between health care 
organisations can offer useful insights. To date, the principal-agent framework has 
not been used to evaluate primary care trusts as commissioners of secondary care 
services. A significant amount of research has focused on one aspect of 
commissioning relationships: contracts. In particular, the focus has been on whether 
or not contracts are complete and on the measurement of transaction costs associated 
with contracting. In addition, large-scale surveys have been used to study the overall 
impact and development of recent reforms in the NHS. Although valuable, they 
cannot offer an in-depth understanding of commissioning by PCTs.
This study fills a gap in current research knowledge. It considers the wider issues of 
how PCTs and NHS Trusts play their roles of principals and agents within the 
complex web of such relationships in the English NHS. The key elements and 
assumptions of the principal-agent framework are used as a basis for the analysis of 
relationships between PCTs and their secondary care agents. It may be that some 
aspects of the framework illuminate characteristics of these relationships not 
previously considered in detail. Others may not be realistic or relevant in this 
context.
Formal modelling in agency theory pays attention to important issues for public 
policy, such as multiple dimensions and multiple principals, and this is giving useful 
insights into reality (Dixit, 2002; Levaggi, 1999). Dixit (2002) suggests that 
empirical research on principal-agent theory in the public sector should not seek 
sweeping universal findings of success and failure of performance-based incentives. 
Instead, he suggests researchers should try to relate successes and failures to specific 
characteristics such as multiple dimensions and principals, and observability of 
outputs and inputs.
My own research relates characteristics such as multiple dimensions, multiple 
principals, and the observability of outputs and inputs to the process of agreeing 
commissioned activity and of controlling agents. My research will therefore use 
agency theory to offer a new perspective on devolved budget holding in the NHS. It
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demonstrates to PCTs and NHS Trusts, in detail, the ways in which their 
counterparts in three case studies relate to each other with respect to commissioning 
secondary care services. It draws out the common factors that affect the attitudes 
towards and processes of commissioning. PCTs, NHS Trusts and other 
organisations that take part in commissioning processes will be able to use the 
findings of this research to develop their own commissioning styles in an informed 
manner.
3) Research strategy
This section outlines the broad plan of the research and explains its appropriateness 
to the research question. The strategy brings together case study research, qualitative 
methods and “realistic evaluation” (Pawson & Tilley, 1997).
Yin (1994) defines a case study as an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in context, where the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of 
data are used. Case studies can be used to answer particular types of research 
questions, specifically, where a “‘how’ or ‘why’ question is being asked about a 
contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin, 
1994: 20).
Qualitative research is often termed interpretative research and can be defined as an 
attempt to interpret phenomena such as interactions or behaviours, in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Pope & Mays, 2000). 
Qualitative research is concerned with taxonomies and classifications, seeking to ask 
“what is X, how does it vary in different circumstances, and why?”. Quantitative 
research, in contrast, seeks to measure “how many Xs are there, and is X associated 
with Z” (Pope & Mays, 2000). Other distinguishing and key features of qualitative 
research are that it studies people in their natural settings and can use a number of 
different methods. These different methods include watching people in their own 
territories (observation), talking with people (interviews or focus groups) and 
reading what people have written (analysis of documents). Qualitative research may 
be used entirely independently, or in conjunction with quantitative research to 
illuminate or explain statistical findings (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994).
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Qualitative research methods have long been used in the social sciences (Pope & 
Mays, 2000) and their use is growing in health economics and the study of health 
care organisations (see Coast, 1999; Coast, 2001; Goddard et a l, 2000; Griffiths & 
Hughes, 2000; O'Hanlon et al., 1994; Peck et a l , 2002; Robinson et a l, 1997). A 
feature of much qualitative research is that there is no specific hypothesis at the 
outset; often hypotheses are produced through the research (Silverman, 1993). The 
aims of qualitative research are numerous, and include in-depth exploration of an 
issue, understanding processes, explaining why and showing how phenomena occur, 
and the generation of new ideas. When used as stand-alone research, qualitative 
research can uncover social processes or access areas of life that are not amenable to 
quantitative research (Pope & Mays, 2000).
In applied policy research, qualitative methods are used to meet a number of 
different objectives, often categorised into four groups: contextual, diagnostic, 
evaluative and strategic (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). These are not mutually 
exclusive. Contextual objectives include identifying the form and nature of what 
exists. Questions to be addressed are those such as “What is the nature of people’s 
experiences?” and “What elements operate within a system?”. Diagnostic objectives 
examine the reasons for, or causes of, what exists. Areas to be considered could 
include “Why are decisions or actions taken (or not)?”. Evaluative objectives 
appraise the effectiveness of what exists. For example, “How are objectives 
achieved?” and “What affects the successful delivery of programmes?”. Strategic 
objectives identify new theories, policies or actions. Questions to be addressed could 
include “What actions are needed to make programmes more effective?” or “What 
strategies are required to overcome newly defined problems?”.
The purpose of qualitative research is to seek explanations. Qualitative research 
does not make predictions about what will happen, but attempts to explain the 
reasoning behind the occurrence of certain events. Cicourel (1964) (in Silverman
1993) draws attention to how purely mathematical logic may neglect the common 
sense reasoning used by participants; following logical formulae to arrive at results 
may give correct results (given certain assumptions), but will not help to explain 
how or why those results came about. Woo (1986: 104) agrees: “.. .the laws of 
nature, and for that matter, the laws of human or social reality, cannot be formulated
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as an axiomatic, deductive, formal and unambiguous system which is also 
complete.”
Pawson and Tilley (1997: 220) characterise “realistic evaluation” as investigating 
how programme outcomes are generated by specific mechanisms and contexts in 
order to identify what works for whom in specific contexts. They consider the 
relationship between phenomenon and context by encouraging evaluators to search 
beneath the visible inputs and outputs of a programme. They stress the importance 
for research of remembering that a range of macro and micro social forces generate 
outcomes and that the balance of power and resources of actors limits their capacity 
for making choices.
Both case study and qualitative research gain their validity from analytic or 
theoretical generalisability rather than from sample to population generalisability 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). The purpose of case study research is to 
generalise a particular set of results to some broader theory through replication (Yin,
1994), not to generalise to populations or universes. Likewise, qualitative research 
aims to reflect the diversity within a given population, rather than reflect statistical 
generalisability (Barbour, 2001). Qualitative research aims to improve the 
understanding of complex human issues (Marshall, 1996) and be analytically 
generalisable to existing or new theories (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
The generalisability of case studies occurs at what Yin (1994) refers to as Level One 
not Level Two. He defines Level Two generalisation as that obtained from statistical 
inferences about a population that can be made from a sample of that population. In 
case study investigations, Level One generalisability comes from using a previously 
developed theory as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the 
case study.
Where more than one case study exists within the same research investigation, each 
should be treated as a separate investigation rather than, for example, as an 
additional respondent to a survey. The similarities and differences between the 
dimensions of chosen case studies allows the testing of ideas in a conceptual 
framework and general statements about core processes and dynamics (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). Pawson and Tilley (1997) agree that, instead of replicating 
interventions in anticipation of the same results, subsequent evaluations should be
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seen as an opportunity for focusing on the fine-tuning of programmes to adapt them 
to local circumstances. Whilst Yin claims that where more than one case study 
supports a theory (particularly if neither support a rival theory) “replication may be 
claimed” (1994: 38), Pawson and Tilley (1997: 217) believe that researchers should 
use the accumulation of evidence to generalise about programmes to create “middle 
range theories” to interpret similarities and differences between programmes. 
Qualitative research’s external validity is often referred to as transferability or 
fittingness (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The generalising process is perceived as 
more of a bringing together of data through the translation, refutation and synthesis 
of two or more studies, rather than merely “adding up” their results.
In addition to the choice between a single or multiple case studies, the choice should 
also be made between single or multiple units of analysis (Yin, 1994). This choice 
refers to the level at which analysis will take place, for example, in an investigation 
of an organisation, will data from different departments within that organisation be 
treated together or separately? This relates closely to the mechanisms and contexts 
discussed by Pawson and Tilley. To understand fully how a programme works it is 
necessary to understand “for whom and in what circumstances” a programme works 
and through what mechanisms (Pawson & Tilley, 1997: 216).
I chose to explore by in-depth study of three case studies, using multiple levels of 
analysis (main PCTs, other PCTs, NHS Trusts, managers and clinicians) the 
commissioning relationships between primary care trusts and NHS Trusts. I used 
multiple sources of data (observations, interviews and documents) that were 
analysed using qualitative techniques to give insights into theory and policy.
4) Selecting the case studies
The sample of case studies for observation and interview was selected purposively to 
generate pertinent data (Mason, 2002). Purposive sampling requires prior 
knowledge of the research population and the subject of study. My research 
population comprised all PCTs and NHS Trusts. My subject of study was the 
relationships associated with the commissioning of secondary care by primary care 
trusts and the lens through which I was viewing these relationships was principal-
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agent theory. My prior knowledge of the research population was gained from 
recent literature and my own work (see Baxter et al., 2001; Baxter et al., 2002).
The main assumptions of principal-agent theory are that there is information 
asymmetry between principal and agent (the agent is better informed) and that 
principal and agent have different objectives (both aim to maximise their own self- 
interest). In this respect, agents are in a position of power relative to the principal 
because they can use this information asymmetry to their own advantage. The 
challenge was to select case studies that differed in aspects that could affect 
information asymmetry, objectives and relative power.
I selected case studies with different characteristics to each other but that mapped the 
characteristics of the wider population of all PCT/NHS Trust commissioning 
relationships. These case studies do not represent all possible models of 
commissioning, but do include particular circumstances that affect commissioning 
and are likely to be found in other examples of such relationships. The mixture of 
dimensions affecting how the case studies worked was unique to each. The 
dimensions that are shared or contrasted, however, enable the testing of ideas and 
allow general statements to be made about the core processes at work (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). For example, there may be a small number of NHS Trusts 
working within severe financial constraints and with a large number of PCT 
commissioners, but many NHS Trusts have severe financial constraints and many 
have a large number of PCT commissioners. Findings about how these factors affect 
the commissioning relationships are therefore of interest to many other 
organisations.
I chose a two stage sampling procedure. First I selected the case studies, each 
comprising an NHS Trust and at least one PCT. After detailed observations of 
commissioning meetings, I selected interviewees from within and outside those 
meetings. This method provided me with an in-depth understanding of how these 
organisations worked together and was preferable therefore to a random sample of 
managers and clinicians from a greater number of organisations.
a) The sampling frame
A sampling frame was developed and case studies selected in July 2001. A sampling 
frame is a resource from which a sample can be selected (Mason, 2002). The nature
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of data required for the sampling frame was informed in part by a survey of PCGs 
and PCTs undertaken in February 2001 (see Baxter et al., 2001; Baxter et a l , 2002).
The sampling frame consisted of the following data:
• size of PCO - the number of practices, GPs and patients
• the percentage of patients classified as rural
• distance from target financial allocation
• number of potential providers per PCO
• number of PCOs per provider.
The National Database for Primary Care Groups and Trusts (Wagner & Baker, 
http://www.primarv-care-db.org.uk/) provided data for PCOs in 1999/2000 for the 
first three items listed. The latter two were estimated from information given on 
PCOs’ web sites; this information was taken into account only for those PCOs 
considered in the final selection process.
Each of these factors and the reasons why they are important from a principal-agent 
perspective is explained below.
• The size of the PCT. Size can be measured as the number of practices, GPs 
or patients. Size was considered important for a number of reasons. First, a 
large PCT may be considered more powerful than a smaller one due to its 
larger share of an NHS Trust’s services. An NHS Trust is more dependent 
upon a single large commissioner than each of a number of smaller ones. 
Second, a small PCT may be considered more powerful than a larger one due 
to its flexibility in terms of shifting contracts to alternative providers. Third, 
a large PCT may be less able than a small PCT to represent the needs of all 
its member practices and offer a coherent policy to external organisations.
It was therefore important to choose at least one large and one small case 
study. Size was defined as the number of practices in a PCO. The number of 
patients is reported also for the chosen case studies.
• The urban/rural mix of each case study was considered important. A 
geographically compact urban PCT would have different population needs 
compared to a sparsely populated rural PCT, for example in terms of
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community services. As such, the secondary care objectives of a rural PCT 
may differ more from its NHS Trust than those of an urban PCT, for example 
in the type and location of care.
It was therefore important to have a predominantly rural and a predominantly 
urban PCT in the sample.
• The distance of the PCO’s financial allocation from their target fair share. A 
national funding formula is used to calculate the equitable level of funds that 
each health authority and PCO should receive. This target allocation is 
compared with current allocations. The difference between the current and 
target allocation is known as the distance from target (DFT). PCOs can be 
over or under their target allocation. Over time, it is planned that the annual 
funding for each PCO will move towards the target level, either through the 
awarding of additional growth money for those under funded or through a 
reduction in growth money for those currently over funded.
If the principal’s budget is low, they will in turn have to pass on lower 
payments to their agents. This is likely to lead to conflicts where an agent’s 
objective may be to maximise financial gain, and a principal’s is to minimise 
expenditure. Where the budget is low, the PCT may have to use strong 
financial incentives to control the NHS Trust’s spending, but at the same time 
feel unable to do so because insufficient funds are available for incentive 
payments. In addition, if  a PCT is under target, it is likely that the health 
community in the past has been under target and the NHS Trust may have 
financial problems.
The PCTs were chosen to reflect different levels from their “target 
allocations”: one under, one over, and one approximately on target.
• The number of potential NHS Trust providers per PCO. The standard 
assumption is that principals and agents operate within a contestable market; 
principals can “shop around” for the agent of their choice. With regard to 
hidden-action, a higher number of agents with which the principal has 
contracts suggests that it would be more difficult for the principal to observe 
each agent closely enough to determine their effort. For example, if a PCO 
has SLAs with four or five hospitals, the PCO’s ability to observe each
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hospitals’ effort in achieving the PCO’s aims may be lower than if a single 
SLA were held with just one hospital. There is more likely to be a greater 
range of exogenous factors (both positive and negative) with a greater 
number of agents. Again, the greater the occurrence of exogenous factors, 
the less able will be the principal to observe them all. With regard to agent 
type, a principal with a large number of agents will be less likely to know 
each well enough to determine their type.
The market contestability of each NHS Trust was therefore important. The 
factor chosen to reflect this was the availability of other NHS Trusts within a 
30-minute travel timea. At least one case study should have competitors and 
at least one should not.
• The number of PCOs per provider. In 2001/2,45% of PCOs with a sub­
group for commissioning operated this sub-group jointly with other PCOs 
(Wilkin et al., 2002). A third of PCOs in the southwest region delegated 
commissioning responsibility to neighbouring PCOs in 2000/1 (Baxter et a l , 
2002). A hospital that is contracted to work for a number of PCOs is likely 
to find that each principal’s requirements differ in terms of effort, and that 
each principal monitors effort to different degrees. An agent acting on behalf 
of a number of principals may find that one principal’s request affects the 
agent’s ability to meet another principal’s requirements.
It was therefore important to choose a case study in which the NHS Trust had 
one main commissioner and also one in which the NHS Trust had a number 
of commissioners.
3 Propper (1996) found that less than 10% o f hospitals had no competitor within a 30-minute travel 
time.
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The sampling quota is given in Table 2. 
Table 2 Sampling quota
Factor Requirement
Size One large, one small PCT
Urban/rural mix One urban, one rural PCT
Distance from target allocation One above, one below target
Number of providers per PCT One PCT with a choice of providers, one with no 
choice
Number of PCTs per provider One NHS Trust with many commissioners, one 
with a single main commissioner
The PCOs were ranked according to size, DFT and urban/rural mix. The average 
size of a PCO at the time was 19 (range 5 to 68). Many of the PCGs had merged 
since the database had been compiled and so in reality the sizes of PCTs were larger. 
In 2000/1 the average size was 22 (range 5 to 85).
The number of NHS Trusts with which PCOs could contract and the number of 
PCOs contracting with an individual NHS Trust were considered only for those 
PCOs that seemed most appropriate in the other categories.
Deprivation was not considered to be an important issue per se in terms of 
differences in principal-agent relationships in commissioning. However, given the 
range of deprivation levels in the country, it seemed appropriate to mirror that with 
at least one deprived area. This was also a secondary consideration, taken into 
account after the PCTs had been chosen according to the other main factors.
It was not practical to select case studies according to the type of contract used; this 
information was not readily available. In addition, a questionnaire survey of PCOs 
in the southwest had shown that half of all PCOs used simple block contracts as 
Service Level Agreements (Baxter et a l , 2001). Furthermore, the focus of the thesis 
was to evaluate relationships and decision-making, not contract types.
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5) Recruiting the case studies
An invitation to take part in the research was sent to the Chief Executive of the main 
PCT in each potential case study. The research was described as a study of 
commissioning, specifically, how primary care organisations work with NHS Trusts 
to achieve their goals of securing patient services from secondary care.
Three PCOs were approached to take part in August 2001. One was small (13 
practices), one average (19 practices) and one larger than average (27 practices).
The larger than average PCT agreed in September to take part in the research. This 
was PCT C. The other two declined.
One PCG (19 practices) declined to take part in the research because it was in the 
process of merging with another PCG and felt that the research would be too much 
for them to take on at the time. Although small at the time of recruitment, this PCG 
would have become larger than average sized after the merger. An average sized 
PCT (23 practices) was approached as a replacement. This PCT (PCT A) agreed in 
September to take part.
The small PCT (13 practices) that was approached agreed to take part but two 
neighbouring PCTs that commissioned jointly for services at the same NHS Trust 
were not happy for meetings to be observed. They had two concerns. First, the 
commissioning process was too sensitive because of its infancy and their main 
priority was to ensure the system was working appropriately. Second, the number of 
attendees at commissioning meetings was small and they were concerned that the 
presence of an observer would change the dynamics of the meetings. The small PCT 
therefore withdrew from the study.
By this stage (October 2001), two PCTs (PCT A and PCT C) had agreed to take part 
in the research; one was average sized (23 practices) and one larger than average (27 
practices). Due to the apparent difficulties in recruiting a small PCT and the national 
tendencies towards mergers, the decision was made to approach a very large PCT 
instead. The first large PCT that was approached agreed in December 2001 to take 
part. This was PCT B with over 35 practices.
As a result of these refusals, none of the case studies includes a very small PCO as 
the main commissioner. However, some of the PCTs commissioning jointly with the
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main study PCTs were small (between 14 and 18 practices). The possible effects of 
this are considered in the section on study limitations in the discussion chapter.
Each PCT that did agree to take part responded by directing me to a series of 
meetings that they considered most appropriate for gaining an understanding of the 
current commissioning processes. These meetings are described fully below, in the 
section on data collection.
Specific details of the recruitment in each case study are given below.
a) Case study A
The PCT Chief Executive agreed in principal to take part in the research but stated 
that the Health Authority (HA) took the lead role in commissioning. I was directed 
therefore to the Health Authority Director of Finance for further discussions. The 
Health Authority Director of Finance gave permission for the research to go ahead 
and became the main contact for the research. He contacted the Chief Executive of 
the NHS Trust to gain his agreement to take part.
I was invited to visit a number of key people at the health authority in order to 
understand the history and context of that health authority and its commissioning 
systems. I had meetings with the Director of Finance, the Director of Primary Care 
Performance, a Specialist Commissioning Manager and a Capacity Planning 
Manager. I also visited the PCT and had discussions with the Chief Executive and 
the Director of Finance. I attended one of the public board meetings of the PCT 
where I was able to meet the Chair and some of the GP members of the PCT. These 
preliminary meetings took place in October and November 2001.
To observe the commissioning process in practice, the Health Authority Director of 
Finance suggested I attend the Planning and Performance Review Meetings between 
the health authority and each of its PCTs and NHS Trusts. Initially, I attended three 
meetings between the health authority and organisations that were not part of the 
case study. These enabled me to understand the format and content of the meetings 
prior to observing three case study meetings.
84
b) Case study B
In case study B, the Chief Executive of the PCT agreed to participate in the research. 
This agreement was reached in December 2001. She discussed the research with me 
at length over the telephone and suggested I contact the PCT Director of 
Commissioning for details of commissioning meetings.
The PCT Director of Commissioning explained that the commissioning process for 
2002/3 had just begun with a meeting between PCT and NHS Trust clinicians at 
which clinical priorities for 2002/3 had been discussed. This meeting had been held 
in the first week of December 2001. I was invited to attend part two of this meeting 
the following week. Part two was a continuation of discussions for which there had 
not been time in part one. This meeting was followed the next day with the first of a 
series of monthly meetings at which the Service and Financial Framework (SaFF) 
2002/3 would be discussed. I attended this and a further four of these meetings.
PCT B was approached to take part in the research later in the year than PCT A or 
PCT C. This was because another PCO had been approached first but after initial 
agreement, declined to take part (see above for details). As a result of this late 
approach, I was not able to carry out any preliminary visits to case study B before 
the research began. The first meetings that I attended took place less than a week 
after the final agreement to participate had been given.
c) Case study C
In PCT C, the Director of Intermediate Care and Commissioning responded to the 
letter to the Chief Executive and agreed on behalf of the PCT to take part in the 
research. She suggested that I discuss the research with the newly appointed Project 
Manager for Recovery for the health community. At the time, the Project Manager 
was based in the PCT, but moved later to the NHS Trust to become Director of 
Operations.
I visited the Project Manager in October 2001 and she outlined the commissioning 
procedures used in the area and the plans for changes in the future. I also discussed 
the commissioning process with the PCT Deputy Director of Commissioning and 
attended one of the public board meetings of the PCT. The health community had 
used a “collegiate system” whereby most of the local community’s NHS
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organisations met to agree ways forward. Although this system was to continue, the 
structure and role of the sub-committees was to change and there was to be less 
emphasis on the term “commissioning” and more on “service redesign”. I attended 
the first meeting of the new Operational Group that had as its main responsibility 
commissioning. I attended a further four of these meetings.
6) Characteristics of the sample
The characteristics of the case studies in the final selection are given below.
a) Case study A
PCT A became a level 4 PCT in April 2001. It is of average size, with 23 practices, 
91 GPs and 132 000 patients. A fifth of its patients (19.6%) were classed as rural. 
Geographically, the PCT was quite large and covered two sizable towns. It was 
classed as “over resourced”, with a distance from target allocation (DFT) in 2000/1 
of 5.57%. Its host health authority was 2% over target.
There was one main acute trust that the majority of patients attended for secondary 
care services. A neighbouring PCT also used this hospital but the two PCTs did not 
work together. Another NHS Trust was situated approximately 15 miles away but 
was rarely used by PCT A.
b) Case study B
PCT B went live in April 2001. It was the largest PCT in its region and one of the 
biggest 5% in the country, with more than 35 practices, over 100 GPs and over 200 
000 patients. It was an urban PCT, with only 1.8% of its patients classed as rural. 
Geographically, it covered a large city, but very little of the surrounding area. It was 
classed as slightly “over resourced”, with a DFT in 2000/1 of 1.03%. Its host health 
authority was 2% over target.
There was one main acute trust that provided secondary care and also tertiary care. 
Another PCT from the same health authority and a PCG from a neighbouring health 
authority also used this hospital.
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c) Case study C
PCT C became a level 4 PCT in April 2001. They were a slightly larger than 
average group with 27 practices, over 100 GPs and 184 000 patients. It was 
predominantly an urban PCT, with only 8.6% of its patients classed as rural. 
Geographically it was quite compact. Almost half the PCT patients lived in a city of 
approximately 80 000 people; the remainder lived in four smaller towns about ten 
miles from the main city. The PCT at the time was classified as “under resourced”, 
with a DFT in 2000/1 of -4.52%. This was one of the most under target PCTs in its 
region, with only two others similarly under-resourced. The host health authority 
received approximately 1% under its target budget.
The PCT had one main NHS provider for secondary care services; this NHS Trust 
also provided some tertiary services. PCTs from three health authorities used the 
NHS Tmst. A sizeable minority of patients used a neighbouring NHS Trust 
approximately 10 miles away.
Table 3 summarises these characteristics.
Table 3 Characteristics o f the case study sites
Name of case study Case study A Case Study B Case Study C
Number of practices in main 
PCT
23 >35 27
Distance from target 
allocation (%)
>5% over 1% over >4% under
Rural patients (%) 19.6% 1.8% 8.6%
Potential alternative NHS 
providers
Yes No Yes
Number of PCTs using main 
NHS Trust
2 3 4
Size of NHS Trust deficit Small Medium Large
7) Data collection
Data were collected from three different sources. These sources were observations 
of meetings, interviews with managers and clinicians, and documentary evidence 
including copies of SaFFs and SLAs. This method of “triangulation” (Barbour,
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2001; Mays & Pope, 1995) was used in order to capture as wide as possible a view 
of the commissioning process and to increase the validity of the findings through 
comparison of the different sources of data (Yin, 1994).
a) Observations of meetings
For each of the case studies, I attended a series of meetings. The meetings I attended 
were in all cases the main meetings (as defined by the case study members 
themselves) for agreeing the SaFF for 2002/3. They were also the forums for 
reviewing performance in 2001/2. These were the meetings that the PCT and health 
authority contacts suggested I attend to gain an understanding of how commissioning 
was carried out. I did not ask specifically to attend the SaFF meetings, but to 
observe the commissioning process. I attended three meetings in case study A and 
five each in B and C. The meetings took place between November 2001 and March 
2002. Other meetings that were related to the SaFF process took place in addition to 
these meetings, for example to prepare for the main meetings. It was neither 
possible nor necessary to follow the whole process by attending all the meetings in 
each case study.
The purpose of attending the meetings was to obtain insights into the commissioning 
processes, not to follow the entire process for each case study. I wished to gain a 
general understanding of the commissioning process, to witness specific discussions, 
to learn about the methods of reaching agreements between the organisations and to 
select participants for interview. I was able also to use my knowledge from the 
meetings to help develop the topic guide (see page 117) for the interviews and to use 
the notes made during the observed meetings as an additional source of data. 
Moreover, my attendance at the meetings allowed the potential interviewees to 
become accustomed to my presence (Mays & Pope, 1995).
The dates and general content of the meetings are outlined below for each case 
study, followed by a series of tables that compare across case studies the types of 
managers and clinicians attending these meetings.
i) Case study A
I  attended three meetings in case study A. Each meeting was called a “Planning and 
Performance Review ” meeting. One was between the Health Authority and NHS 
Trust A; the other two were between the Health Authority and PCT A. The meetings
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between the Health Authority and PCT A were concerned primarily with the PCT’s 
own provision o f services, not with commissioned services. Details o f the meetings I  
attended are given in
Table 4 below.
Table 4 Dates and purpose o f observed meetings in case study A
Date Title and Purpose
November 2001 Planning and Performance Review Meeting between HA A and 
NHS Trust A. The purpose of this meeting was to review the 
performance of the NHS Trust in 2001/02, to consider plans for 
2002/3 and to ensure that the targets set out in The NHS Plan 
were achieved.
November 2001 Planning and Performance Review Meeting between HA A and 
PCT A. The purpose of this meeting was to review the 
performance of the PCT in 2001/2, to consider plans for 2002/3 
and to ensure that the targets set out in The NHS Plan were 
achieved.
January 2002 (not 
observed)
Service and Financial Framework Meeting between HA A and 
NHS Trust A. I was not permitted to attend the second meeting 
between the HA and the NHS Trust. The HA considered that 
tensions between the participants were too high and that the 
attendance of an observer may alter the dynamics of an already 
difficult meeting.
January 2002 Service and Financial Framework Meeting between HA A and 
PCT A. The purpose of this meeting was to finalise the 
agreement of the SaFF for 2002/3, building on the agreements 
reached in the previous meeting.
ii) Case study B
I attended five meetings in case study B. Each of the main meetings was a 
“Recovery and Modernisation” meeting attended by NHS Trust B, PCT B,
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neighbouring PCTs that commissioned services from NHS Trust B, and on occasions 
the local ambulance NHS Trust and the host health authority. Details of these 
meetings are given below in Table 5.
Table 5 Dates and purpose o f observed meetings in case study B
Date Title and purpose
December 2002 Primary and Secondary Care Clinical Review and SaFF 
Priorities Meeting. The purpose of this meeting was to 
discuss clinical priorities in the current and future year. 
Clinicians and managers from three PCOs and NHS Trust B 
attended.
December 2002 Recovery and Modernisation Group Meeting. This was an 
ongoing monthly meeting to discuss current and future 
provision of services and finances, and to agree the SaFF for 
2002/3. Many of the same people attended that had attended 
the previous night’s Clinical Review Meeting.
January 2002 Recovery and Modernisation Group Away Day. The purpose 
of this meeting was to agree the first cut SaFF. The usual 
monthly meeting was also held in January but I was not able 
to attend. That meeting discussed the first cut SaFF and how 
to move forward with discussions on the second cut SaFF.
February 2002 Recovery and Modernisation Group Meeting. The purpose 
of this meeting was to discuss the second cut SaFF.
March 2002 Recovery and Modernisation Group Meeting. The purpose 
of this meeting was to agree the final SaFF.
In addition to the commissioning related meetings detailed above, I observed one 
meeting between PCT B and three other PCTs from the same health authority. The 
purpose of this meeting was to discuss joint commissioning issues. The majority of 
the meeting was spent discussing issues to do with allocation of resources between 
the PCTs.
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iii) Case study C
I observed five meetings in case study C. The majority of meetings were planned to 
be of the Operational Group consisting of commissioning managers from PCT C and 
three other local PCTs and the operations manager from NHS Trust C. On a number 
of occasions the Finance and Information Group joined the Operational Group. The 
Finance and Information Group consisted of Directors of Finance from the PCTs and 
NHS Trust. Table 6 gives details of these meetings.
Table 6 Dates and purpose o f observed meetings in case study C
Date Title and purpose
November 2001 Health Community Operational Group Meeting. This was 
the first meeting of this new group. The purpose was to 
agree terms of reference and plan future meetings and 
actions. The meeting was attended by PCT C’s 
commissioning lead, three other PCTs’ commissioning leads, 
the Project Manager for Recovery and a planning manager 
from NHS Trust C. Future meetings were to be held 
monthly.
Mid-January 2002 Joint meeting between the Operational Group and the 
Finance and Information Group. The purpose of this meeting 
was to discuss the investment framework and the SaFF 
process. At the November meeting, a decision had been 
made to keep the service development issues (discussed by 
the Operational Group) and the finance issues (discussed by 
the Finance and Information Group) separate. Many of the 
meetings were, however, joint.
Late-January 2002 Joint meeting between the Operational Group and the 
Finance and Information Group. The purpose of this meeting 
was to discuss the investment framework and the SaFF 
process.
February 2002 Operational Group Meeting. I was told that the purpose of 
this meeting was to finalise the draft SaFF for inclusion in
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the franchise plan for the new Strategic Health Authority. 
The meeting was chaotic. Three people arrived at 2.30, two 
arrived at 3.20 (they had been delayed in a previous meeting) 
and one arrived at 3.30. There was no agenda and no 
consensus as to the purpose of the meeting. At least two 
meetings had been held since the late-January meeting that I 
observed.
March 2002 Operational Group Meeting. This was another chaotic 
meeting. The usual members of the Operational Group were 
present but the meeting was referred to as a capacity- 
planning meeting. The meeting began 45 minutes late due to 
late arrivals from other meetings. A member of one of the 
neighbouring PCTs attended this meeting even though she 
was not part of the Operational Group. She was due to travel 
back to the PCT with a colleague who was in this meeting, so 
decided to attend the meeting as well. There was no agenda. 
The first half hour of the meeting was spent discussing the 
purpose of the different groups and meetings. The remainder 
was spent discussing the SaFF. The meeting ended after two 
hours (6.15pm) when half the people had drifted away.
The SaFF was due to be submitted two days after the March meeting. A further two 
meetings were scheduled provisionally for the following week but, at the time the 
March meeting ended, it was not clear which groups would be meeting or what they 
would be discussing. Some of the main participants of the meetings had planned 
leave over the following weeks and would definitely not be attending any meetings. 
My attendance at five meetings had given me insights into how the case study 
organisations functioned with regard to commissioning. As a result of this 
knowledge, the submission of the SaFF document, and the confusion about the 
purpose of future meetings, I felt that my attendance at any future meetings would be 
unlikely to provide me with any new insights and I chose therefore not to attend any 
more meetings.
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iv) Attendance at the SaFF meetings
The style of the meetings differed across the case study sites in terms of the number 
and type of people and the organisations attending.
Table 7 shows which health authority members attended the meetings. It is notable 
that in case study C, no member of the host health authority attended any of these 
meetings.
Table 7 Health Authority members that attended the SaFF meetings
Case Study A Case Study B Case Study C
Number of meetings 3 5 5
Chief Executive November PCT 
meeting
February meeting None
Director of Finance All meetings December, January & 
February meetings
None
Director of Primary 
Care Performance
All meetings None None
Specialist
Commissioning
Manager
November NHS 
Trust meeting
None None
Performance & 
Development Manager
None All meetings None
Table 8 shows the PCT members attending the observed meetings. The Director of 
Finance and Director of Commissioning were common to all case study meetings. 
The Chief Executive attended meetings in case studies A and B but not C. In fact, 
the Chief Executive of PCT C made an appearance for about 20 minutes at one 
meeting to explain an issue around a particular service development. Only case 
study B had a GP present at all meetings. The Director of Operations in PCT A was 
in charge of internal PCT operations and attended a meeting that discussed PCT 
provision of services rather than commissioned services.
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Table 8 PCT members that attended the SaFF meetings
Case Study A Case Study B Case Study C
Number of meetings 3 5 5
Chief Executive All meetings All meetings None
Director of Finance All meetings* All meetings All meetings
Director of 
Commissioning
All meetings* All meetings All meetings
Director of Operations November meeting None None
Head of Planning & 
Performance
January meeting
General Practitioner January meeting All meetings None
* In case study A, the Director o f  Finance was also Director o f  Commissioning
Table 9 gives details of the NHS Trust members attending meetings. In case study 
C, the Chief Executive did not attend any meetings. In each case study, the Director 
of Finance attended at least some meetings. Case study B was the only one to have a 
clinician present at any meetings.
Table 9 NHS Trust members that attended the SaFF meetings
Case Study A Case Study B Case Study C
Number of meetings 3 5 5
Chief Executive All meetings All meetings None
Director of Finance All meetings All meetings January
meetings
Director of Operations None All meetings All meetings*
Clinician None December & February 
meetings
None
*This NHS Trust Director o f  Operations was initially the Director o f  Recovery for the health 
community (see Table 10 below)
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Table 10 shows which other people attended the SaFF meetings. The Director of 
Recovery in case study B attended meetings late in the SaFF process, but his role 
was primarily to discuss long-term modernisation issues rather than the more 
immediate commissioning issues. The Director of Recovery in case study C was 
appointed Director of Operations at NHS Trust C part way through the study period. 
A new Director of Recovery was appointed after completion of the observations. In 
case study C, a Performance Manager from the regional office attended the final 
three meetings observed. Her role was to ensure the SaFF process was completed.
In case studies B and C, Chief Executives, Directors of Finance and Directors of 
Commissioning from neighbouring PCTs or PCGs that commissioned services from 
the main NHS Trust also attended the meetings. This was not the case in case study 
A. The health authority there met with these organisations separately. A member of 
a neighbouring PCT’s health authority attended and chaired one meeting in case 
study C. In case study B, members of the ambulance trust attended two meetings 
and in case study C a member of a community trust from a neighbouring health 
authority attended one meeting.
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Table 10 Other attendees at the SaFF meetings
Case Study A Case Study B Case Study C
Number of meetings 3 5 5
Director of Recovery N/A Two meetings All meetings*
Performance Manager, 
Regional Office
None None Three meetings
Neighbouring PCT Chief 
Executive
None All meetings One meeting
Neighbouring PCT Director 
of Finance
None All meetings All meetings
Neighbouring PCT Director 
of Commissioning
None All meetings All meetings
Neighbouring PCG 
representative
None All meetings All meetings
Neighbouring HA 
representative
None None One meeting
Neighbouring provider None Two meetings One meeting
*This Director o f  Recovery was later appointed as NHS Trust Director o f  Operations (see Table 9 
above)
b) Interviews with managers and clinicians
One purpose of observing these meetings was to select key players in the 
commissioning process for in-depth interview. In addition to the managers involved 
directly in the commissioning process, I interviewed two GPs and two consultants 
from each case study.
i) Selecting the interviewees
The purpose of the interviews was to elicit a wide range of views about the 
commissioning process. As one of the central themes of the research was to consider
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the actions and beliefs of principals and agents, I needed to sample from a range of 
organisations. The main organisations of interest were the case study PCTs and 
NHS Trusts, but also neighbouring PCTs and health authorities. Within these 
organisations, potential interviewees were either managers or clinicians.
I chose to sample as fully as possible from the case study populations. The people 
attending the SaFF meetings provided the initial population from which the sample 
of interviewees was chosen. The roles that interviewees played in the 
commissioning process were at least as important as their job titles. I began by 
interviewing the same types of players from each case study (for example, Directors 
of Finance) and followed these with interviews with other key players individual to 
each case study (for example, the Director of Recovery in case study C). In addition 
to key members that participated in the meetings, I chose to interview members that 
were noticeably absent, for example the Chief Executives in case study C. Despite 
the fact that the number of interviewees was in effect selected in advance and the 
maximum number possible was fixed according to who was involved in the 
commissioning process, saturation point in the data (Marshall, 1996) was reached.
Those key players that attended the majority of commissioning meetings in each case 
study were almost exclusively managers. Clinicians did not play a significant role in 
the SaFF process in these case studies but are key to the delivery of services. It was 
considered likely that the clinical training and patient focus of clinicians would result 
in them having systematically different views on commissioning from those of 
management. As such, clinicians could provide important negative (or “deviant”) 
views, and new factors not considered important by management, to help strengthen 
my interpretations (Barbour, 2001; Mason, 2002). Clinicians can also be considered 
agents for management and thus encompass a further set of principal-agent relations 
for both PCTs and NHS Trusts. To exclude clinical views would have been to 
exclude an important element of the commissioning process. To aid my 
understanding of commissioning relationships, I decided therefore to interview both 
GPs and surgeons. Further details of these interviewees and their selection are given 
in the section “characteristics of the clinical interviewees”.
ii) Characteristics of the management interviewees
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Table 11 gives the job titles of the managers interviewed. All except the Chief 
Executive of PCT C attended the SaFF meetings. A new Chief Executive of NHS 
Trust C was appointed during the research period. He did not attend any of the 
meetings and was not available for interview. Table 12 to Table 14 give details of 
the management interviewees in case studies A to C respectively.
In case study A, five managers were interviewed between April and June 2002. One 
was from the Health Authority, two from the PCT and two from the NHS Trust. No 
one refused to be interviewed. All interviewees were male. The Chief Executives of 
the PCT and the NHS Trust had both followed the NHS Management Training 
Scheme and worked in a variety of, predominantly acute, posts across the country. 
The NHS Trust Chief Executive had an exclusively acute background whereas the 
PCT Chief Executive had experience in other organisations as well. The HA and 
both NHS Trust interviewees had worked in their current posts for over a decade. 
Both PCT interviewees had been in post for less then 18 months and were appointed 
from outside the local area.
The Health Authority Director of Finance was chosen for interview because he 
played the main role in commissioning services from NHS Trust A. I observed a 
single meeting between the HA A and NHS Trust A. Two other HA members 
attended this meeting, but played minor support roles to the Director of Finance. In 
the two meetings I observed between the HA and PCT A, the Director of Finance 
also played the lead role for the HA. The Chief Executive of the HA was not 
interviewed. He attended one meeting between the HA and the PCT, and voiced 
some strong opinions, but the chair of the meeting and the main player was the 
Director of Finance.
Neither the Chief Executive nor the Director of Finance of PCT A attended the 
meeting between the HA and NHS Trust A. However, this was due to the style of 
commissioning chosen by the host HA. I considered it important to interview both 
the PCT Chief Executive and the Director of Finance for two reasons, first to 
consider their views about not being involved directly in discussions with NHS Trust 
A and second, for a degree of consistency across the case studies. Other members of 
the PCT attended the meeting between the HA and the PCT. They played a minor 
role, particularly in relation to the provision of secondary care services, and so were 
not interviewed.
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The Chief Executive and Director of Finance of NHS Trust A both attended the 
commissioning meeting with the HA. No other member of the NHS Trust attended. 
The Chief Executive appeared to play the main role for the NHS Trust in the SaFF 
discussions, but the Director of Finance also played a major role.
Table 13 gives details of eight managers (five male and three female) interviewed in 
April and May 2002 in case study B. The Director of Finance of the NHS Trust 
declined the invitation to be interviewed. He was relatively new to the NHS Trust 
and although he had attended two of the SaFF meetings I had observed, he suggested 
I interview the previously Acting Director of Finance and the Senior Assistant 
Director of Finance instead. He considered they had been more involved in the 
process at the time. No one else refused to be interviewed. As in case study A, both 
Chief Executives had followed the NHS Management Training Scheme and held a 
variety of management posts previously. Again, similar to case study A, the Chief 
Executive of NHS Trust B had experience predominantly in the acute sector whereas 
the Chief Executive of the PCT had a more varied background, including acute 
hospital management. The Directors of Finance and Commissioning in the PCT 
both had acute hospital management experience. The NHS Trust finance managers 
both had HA as well as acute trust experience. Two directors began their careers as 
nurses: the Director of Commissioning in the PCT and the Director of Operations in 
the NHS Trust. The Director of Commissioning in the neighbouring PCT was the 
only interviewee to have a predominantly primary care sector background. The 
interviewees from the PCT had been in post for approximately 18 months. The 
Chief Executive was new to the area on appointment. The NHS Trust Chief 
Executive and Director of Operations were both new to their posts; the Director of 
Operations was also new to the local area.
The interviewees were chosen because they all played an active role in the meetings 
to agree the SaFF. The Director of Commissioning and Director of Finance in PCT 
B, and the Chief Executive and Director of Operations in NHS Trust B played the 
most active roles. The Chief Executive of PCT B played a supporting role to her 
directors. She chaired some of the meetings but occasionally stepped out of the 
Chair’s role to put forward a view of behalf of primary care. The finance managers 
from NHS Trust B played a less active role and often commented on specific issues 
only.
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I wanted to interview at least one member of a PCT that was not the main PCT in the 
case study to gain an alternative view of the SaFF process. There were members of 
two other PCOs present at the meetings. One was a PCT from which the Chief 
Executive, Director of Finance and Director of Commissioning attended. The 
Director of Commissioning was the most active member and so he was selected for 
interview. The other PCO was a PCG from which two managers attended. No one 
from this PCG was approached for interview because they considered themselves 
present as observers only and rarely made any contribution to the debate.
The Performance and Development Manager from the local HA attended all the 
meetings, the Director of Finance attended three, and the Chief Executive one. A 
member of the regional office attended two meetings. With the exception of the 
Chief Executive of the HA, the involvement of these individuals in the meetings was 
predominantly to support discussions relating to the recovery and modernisation of 
the health community, not the agreement of the SaFF for 2002/3. The Chief 
Executive of the HA attended the meeting on the day the second draft SaFF had to be 
submitted. He chaired the meeting but did not put forward his views on specific 
issues. None of the HA staff were interviewed. Throughout all the meetings, it was 
the NHS Trust and PCT staff that steered the discussions.
Table 14 gives details of interviewees from case study C. Eight managers were 
interviewed between May and September 2002. Three were from the main case 
study PCT, two from the NHS Trust, one from the regional office and two from 
neighbouring PCTs involved in the SaFF meetings. All except the Acting Director 
of Finance at the NHS Trust were female. No one refused to be interviewed. Unlike 
the other case studies, none of the interviewees were graduates of the NHS 
Management Training Scheme, although both Directors of Finance had trained as 
accountants through the NHS. The Chief Executive of the PCT had a financial 
management background but had latterly become involved in project management. 
The Director of Operations in the NHS Trust also had a recent history of project 
management but had originally trained in nursing. Both NHS Trust interviewees had 
spent a number of years in the private health care sector. The commissioning 
managers from the neighbouring PCTs were relatively new to the NHS, although one 
had some experience of fund-holding management. The interviewees from PCT C, 
the regional office and a neighbouring PCT had worked for many years in the
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immediate local area. Both NHS Trust interviewees had worked for less than a year 
in the local area.
The interviewees were chosen partly because they attended all the SaFF meetings 
that I observed, and partly for consistency across the case studies. The Chief 
Executive of PCT C did not attend the whole of any of the meetings that I attended. 
On one occasion, she summarised an agreement reached in another meeting that had 
just finished, but left immediately after this. Despite this, she was interviewed, 
primarily to understand why she did not feel the need to attend the SaFF meetings. 
The Director of Commissioning appeared to take the lead role in the SaFF meetings 
for PCT C. On occasions when the commissioning and the finance teams met 
jointly, the Director of Finance also played a dominant role. Both were interviewed. 
The Director of Operations played the lead role in the SaFF process for the NHS 
Trust, sometimes accompanied by the Acting Director of Finance. Both were 
interviewed.
To gain a view of the SaFF process from individuals not from PCT C, I interviewed 
the commissioning managers from two neighbouring PCOs. One was a PCT, the 
other a PCG. The commissioning manager from the PCG, however, on occasions 
represented another PCT as well. She was therefore an active member of the group, 
although in practice contributed little.
The Performance Manager from the regional office was selected for interview some 
time after the other respondents had been approached. She began to attend the SaFF 
meetings part way through the process with a remit to ensure that an agreement was 
reached. Respondents later termed this action as a “hijacking” of the process. I 
considered it important therefore to elicit her views of the process and her role in it.
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Table 11 Management interviewees
Case Study A Case Study B Case Study C
PCT Chief Executive PCT Chief Executive PCT Chief Executive
PCT Director of Finance PCT Director of Finance PCT Director of Finance
PCT Director of 
Commissioning
PCT Director of 
Commissioning
NHS Trust Chief 
Executive
NHS Trust Chief 
Executive
NHS Trust Director of 
Finance
NHS Trust Senior 
Assistant Director of 
Finance
NHS Trust Director of 
Finance
NHS Trust Head of 
Finance
NHS Trust Director of 
Operations
NHS Trust Director of 
Operations
HA Director of Finance Regional Office 
Performance Manager
Neighbouring PCT 
Director of 
Commissioning
Neighbouring PCG 
Commissioning Manager
Neighbouring PCT 
Waiting List Manager
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Table 12 Characteristics o f  interviewees in case study A
Organisation Job Title Date of 
interview
Setting Gender Background
Health
Authority
Director of Finance 
and Performance
May 2002 Interviewee’s
office
Male Accountant. Worked in the same HA in NHS for 16 years. 
Previously worked in private manufacturing business.
PCT Chief Executive June 2002 Interviewee’s
office
Male National Management Training Scheme. Predominantly 
acute sector experience (General Manager in DGH, HA 
Purchasing Director, HA Chief Executive, Regional Office 
purchasing) before joining the PCT.
PCT Director of Finance 
and Commissioning
May 2002 Interviewee’s
office
Male Worked for 10 years in the NHS in finance posts in various 
locations, initially in HAs, recently in PCTs. Commissioning 
role is relatively new.
NHS Trust Chief Executive April 2002 Interviewee’s
office
Male National Management Training Scheme. Exclusively acute 
sector background (various management and administration 
posts then General Manager in DGH). Current post for 
approximately 10 years.
NHS Trust Director of Finance April 2002 Interviewee’s Male Background in acute sector and HAs. Current post for 11
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office years.
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Table 13 Characteristics o f  interviewees in case study B
Organisation Job Title Date of 
interview
Setting Gender Background
PCT Chief Executive May 2002 Interviewee’s
office
Female National Management Training Scheme. Mixed background 
includes Deputy Manager of DGH, Regional Office purchasing, 
Deputy Director of Commissioning in HA, Mental Health & 
Community Trust Director posts. Previous appointment was 
outside the local area.
PCT Director of Finance April 2002 Interviewee’s
office
Female NHS posts for 10 years. Previous posts include NHS Trust 
Deputy Director of Finance & Ambulance Service Director of 
Finance. Area of previous post not known.
PCT Director of 
Commissioning
April 2002 Common
room
Male Worked previously as a nurse, then moved into management in 
an acute trust, followed by HA management posts. Previous 
post was in the local area.
NHS Trust Chief Executive May 2002 Interviewee’s
office
Male National Management Training Scheme. Recently 3 years as 
Chief Executive of Community Trust but mainly acute sector 
management. In current post for approximately 18 months. 
Previous post was in the local area.
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NHS Trust Senior Assistant 
Director of Finance
April 2002 Meeting room Male Accountant. Private practice then NHS for last 10 years. 
Finance & commissioning posts in local HA, 3 years in current 
post.
NHS Trust Head of Finance April 2002 Meeting room Male Previously Director of Finance in an HA, was Acting Director of 
Finance in NHS Trust B during SaFF process. 5 years in current 
post.
NHS Trust Director of 
Operations
April 2002 Interviewee’s
office
Female Worked previously as a nurse, then moved into management. 
Masters & PhD level management studies. Director level posts 
in acute trusts for 10 years. 1 year in current post. Previous post 
was outside the local area.
Neighbour
PCT
Director of 
Commissioning
May 2002 Meeting room Male 10 years in the NHS. Predominantly primary care. Began in 
FHSAs then Regional Office fund-holding management.
Recently managed a locality-commissioning pilot. Previous post 
was in the local area.
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Table 14 Characteristics o f interviewees in case study C
Organisation Job Title Date of 
interview
Setting Gender Background
PCT Chief Executive July 2002 Interviewee’s
office
Female Predominantly Director of Finance roles at Regional Office & HA. 
Other HA roles as Programme Director for Mental Health, Patch 
Director then Project Manager for current PCT area.
PCT Director of 
Finance
May 2002 Interviewee’s
office
Female Accountant trained through NHS. Worked in all types of NHS 
organisation. Managed fund-holding consortium in local area for 5 
years, then HA finance role before current post.
PCT Director of 
Commissioning
May 2002 Interviewee’s
office
Female Posts in publishing company before joining NHS. Trainee 
manager & business manager in local acute trusts, commissioning 
posts in 2 local HAs, then Chief Officer of PCG (now PCT).
NHS Trust Acting Director 
of Finance
May 2002 Shared office Male Accountant trained through NHS. Mainly NHS posts (Director of 
Finance at RO, HAs & acute trusts), 2 years in private sector, now 
financial consultant. Acting Director posts at all types of NHS 
organisation. Previous post outside current area.
NHS Trust Director of 
Operations
July 2002 Interviewee’s
office
Female Worked previously as a nurse, 8 years for BUPA, became Director 
of Nursing, returned to NHS 10 years ago to general management.
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Exclusively acute background, Deputy Chief Executive of acute 
trust, project management posts of acute & community trust 
mergers. Seconded as Project Manager for Recovery for health 
community, transferred to NHS Trust C, currently acting as lead 
for Performance Management and for Planning as well as 
Operations. Previous post outside immediate area but within the 
same region.
Regional
Office
Performance
Manager
Sept 2002 Empty office Female No information on previous roles. At time of interview was based 
in SHA, soon to move to local PCTs as shared Director of Capacity 
and Modernisation.
Neighbour
PCT
Commissioning
Manager
May 2002 University
office
Female 4 years in NHS. Previous posts in a HA as Audit Facilitator for 
primary care and Specialist Commissioner. New to area.
Neighbour
PCT
Waiting List 
Manager
May 2002 Interviewee’s
office
Female MBA graduate, worked in private sector before becoming fund- 
holding manager for group of practices in local area. Current role 
includes commissioning; as a small PCT they do not have Director 
of Commissioning.
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iii) Characteristics of the clinical interviewees
Table 15 gives the job titles of the clinicians who were interviewed. Interviewees 
were selected to provide views from clinicians not involved in the commissioning 
process as well as those who were involved. In all cases, the relevant Chief 
Executives, Directors of Operations or Directors of Commissioning were asked for 
the names of Clinical Directors of Surgery, GP Professional Executive Committee 
Chairs, and orthopaedic consultants and GPs not involved directly in commissioning. 
Chief Executives or Directors of Operation gave permission for these clinicians to be 
approached for interview. The Clinical Directors, after their interviews, were asked 
also to suggest consultant orthopaedic surgeons not involved directly in 
commissioning who they considered would be appropriate for interview.
For each PCT, the Chair of the Professional Executive Committee and a GP involved 
in PCT issues but not involved directly with commissioning was approached for 
interview. The existence of the Commissioning Lead in case study B was discovered 
after the other two interviews had been arranged and so this GP was interviewed 
also. None of the Chairs refused to be interviewed. Three other GPs declined 
interview; one was too busy (PCT C) and two felt that they did not have enough 
knowledge of the commissioning process to have any views about it (PCT B).
For the NHS Trusts, the choice was made to interview surgeons rather than medical 
doctors. This choice was made primarily because, in the majority of NHS Trusts, 
despite pressures to meet access targets in surgical specialties, long waiting times 
remain. Surgical waiting times were a priority area in SaFF discussions in these case 
studies. Consultant surgeons that were not involved in commissioning discussions 
would still have been aware of, and be able to provide views about, the pressures to 
meet targets. Clinical Directors of Surgery were approached because they were most 
likely to be involved in the commissioning process or the internal management 
processes associated with commissioning decisions. To explore the views of those 
not involved directly in the commissioning process, orthopaedic surgeons were 
chosen. Orthopaedics is one of the specialties that have notoriously long waiting 
times in many NHS hospitals and all of the case study NHS Trusts had discussed in 
the SaFF meetings or in the interviews the problems they had in reducing their 
access times for orthopaedics.
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Table 15 Clinical interviewees
Case Study A Case Study B Case Study C
GP Chair of Professional 
Executive Committee
Chair of Professional 
Executive Committee
Chair of Professional 
Executive Committee
GP Ex-Chair of 
Professional 
Executive Committee
Clinical Governance 
Lead
Professional 
Executive Committee 
member
GP Commissioning Lead
Consultant
Surgeon
Clinical Director of 
Surgery
Clinical Director of 
Surgery
Clinical Director of 
Surgery
Consultant
Surgeon
Consultant 
Orthopaedic Surgeon
Consultant 
Orthopaedic Surgeon
Consultant 
Orthopaedic Surgeon
Table 16 to Table 18 give details of the characteristics of the clinicians who were 
interviewed in case studies A to C respectively.
In case study A, two GPs and two consultant surgeons were interviewed between 
August 2002 and January 2003. All interviewees were male. Both GPs had been in 
non-fund-holding practices in HA A. HA A had used a locality-commissioning 
model. The NHS Trust Director of Surgery had been in his post at the NHS Trust 
for 12 years. The orthopaedic surgeon was in his first consultant post and was new 
to the NHS Trust. He had experience of public and private sector hospitals abroad. 
Neither consultant felt that they played a role in commissioning.
The Chair of the Professional Executive Committee was chosen for interview partly 
because he was the Chair and partly because he was the only clinician to attend any 
of the SaFF meetings with the HA. The other GP interviewee was chosen because 
he was the previous Co-Chair of the Professional Executive Committee and 
remained on the Committee in a more general role.
The Clinical Director of Surgery was chosen because his job title meant that he was 
most likely to be involved in commissioning. Two orthopaedic consultants declined
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interview. The third agreed; he was described by the Director of Finance as new and 
enthusiastic, willing to discuss ideas and likely to agree to interview.
In case study B, three GPs and two consultant surgeons were interviewed between 
May and November 2002. One GP interviewee was female. One GP was from a 
previously community fund-holding practice, the other two were from non-fund- 
holding practices. None had any management training; two were involved directly 
in commissioning. One surgeon was involved in the commissioning process; the 
other was not. One was a surgeon for the armed forces; the other had a busy private 
practice.
The Chair of the Professional Executive Committee was chosen for interview in part 
for consistency across the case studies, but also because he attended all the SaFF 
meetings. The commissioning lead GP attended one SaFF meeting and the clinical 
priorities meeting. The clinical governance lead was chosen because she was the 
chair o f one of three geographical sub-groups of the PCT. The other two chairs of 
these sub-groups had declined the interview request.
The Clinical Director of Surgery was approached and agreed to the interview. He 
and the Director of Operations at the NHS Trust suggested two orthopaedic surgeons 
who might speak to me. I approached the consultant most likely to agree, and he 
did.
In case study C, I spoke to two GPs and two surgeons between October and 
December 2002. One of each was male, one female. None considered that they had 
any direct involvement in commissioning. Both GPs were involved in other aspects 
of service development within the PCT. The Director of Surgery had been a 
consultant at NHS Trust C for nine years but was quite new to the Director’s post. 
The orthopaedic surgeon was a newly appointed consultant and new to NHS Trust C. 
She had undertaken a management course elsewhere.
Again, the Chair of the Professional Executive Committee and the Director of 
Surgery were chosen because of their job titles. Neither attended any SaFF related 
meetings. Both agreed to be interviewed. A second GP agreed to be interviewed but 
was not able to agree a date within the research deadlines. Another GP was 
approached and was subsequently interviewed.
I l l
The NHS Trust Director of Operations provided names and gave permission to 
contact two orthopaedic consultants. One refused to be interviewed. The other 
agreed to be interviewed but was unable to commit to an interview date (three were 
cancelled). He supplied the names of a further three orthopaedic consultants who 
could be contacted. Two refused to be interviewed. One agreed and was 
subsequently interviewed. Those refusing to be interviewed had no interest in 
commissioning and no available time.
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Table 16 Characteristics o f  clinical interviewees in case study A
Organisation Job Title Date of 
interview
Setting Gender Background
PCT Chair of Professional 
Executive Committee
August 2002 Meeting 
room in PCT
Male GP for 15 years. Large non-fund-holding practice. 
Involved in locality commissioning model covering area 
that became PCG.
PCT Ex-Chair of Professional 
Executive Committee
August 2002 Board room 
in PCT
Male GP. Chair of PCG. Non-fund-holding practice. Involved 
in locality commissioning model covering area that became 
PCG.
NHS Trust Clinical Director of 
Surgery
October
2002
Meeting
room
Male General Surgeon. 12 years in current post. No direct 
involvement in commissioning.
NHS Trust Consultant Surgeon January
2003
Meeting
room
Male Orthopaedic Surgeon. 1 year as consultant. Worked in 
public and private sectors abroad. No direct involvement 
in commissioning.
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Table 17 Characteristics o f clinical interviewees in case study B
Organisation Job Title Date of 
interview
Setting Gender Background
PCT Chair of Professional 
Executive Committee
May 2002 Interviewee’s 
office in PCT
Male GP from small practice. Became a community fund- 
holding practice as soon as size rules allowed it. Was Chair 
of PCG.
PCT Clinical Governance 
Lead
September
2002
Meeting room in 
PCT
Female GP. Chair of Local Care Group (a geographical sub­
division of PCT). Previously mental health lead. Member 
of Professional Executive Committee. No direct 
involvement in commissioning.
PCT Commissioning Lead September
2002
Meeting room in 
practice
Male Previously a GP in armed forces. Joined NHS 5 years ago. 
Interest in PCG issues led to commissioning role. No 
previous commissioning experience & no management 
training.
NHS Trust Clinical Director of 
Surgery
September
2002
Meeting room Male General Surgeon. Employed by armed forces. Honorary 
post with NHS Trust B for 7 years. Involved in 
management, commissioning and SaFF issues.
NHS Trust Consultant Surgeon November Interviewee’s Male Orthopaedic Surgeon. Clinical Director of Orthopaedics.
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2002 office in 
outpatient area
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Involved in planning for new Diagnostic & Treatment 
Centre. Busy private practice. Chairman of private hospital 
Medical Advisory Committee. No direct involvement in 
commissioning.
Table 18 Characteristics o f clinical interviewees in case study C
Organisation Job Title Date of 
interview
Setting Gender Background
PCT Chair of Professional 
Executive Committee
October
2002
Interviewee’s 
office in PCT
Male GP. Involved in Service Development Groups that discuss 
clinical aspects of services. No direct involvement in 
commissioning.
PCT Professional 
Executive Committee 
member
October
2002
Interviewee’s 
office in practice
Female GP. Ex-PCG Board member. Chair of city based Clinical 
Governance meetings. Involved in various service 
development working groups. No direct involvement in 
commissioning.
NHS Trust Clinical Director of 
Surgery
December
2002
Interviewee’s
office
Male General & Vascular Surgeon. 9 years with NHS Trust C, 18 
months as Director of Surgery. No direct involvement in 
commissioning.
NHS Trust Consultant Surgeon December
2002
Shared office Female Orthopaedic Surgeon. 6 months as consultant. Previous 
training posts and a management course. No direct 
involvement in commissioning.
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iv) Topic guides
A topic guide is a prompt sheet for the interviewer to use in interviews. It covers all 
the main areas of interest that the interviewer wishes to be discussed during the 
interview. It is not a list of questions, but a list of relevant topic areas. The purpose 
of the case study interviews was to allow the respondents to give their perceptions of 
the commissioning process, placing emphasis on the issues they considered most 
important. Although the main areas of interest in the topic guides were developed 
from principal-agent theory, the aim was to allow respondent rather than interviewer- 
led experiences to be elicited. For these reasons, topic guides were chosen in 
preference to more restrictive semi-structured interviews. All the interviews were 
based on topic guides. There were some small differences in the topic guides used 
for principals and agents and for managers and clinicians. An example of a topic 
guide is provided in Appendix 2.
The topic guides covered five areas of interest. The areas were based on principal- 
agent theory and my knowledge from the meetings I had observed. The first area of 
interest was general background about the respondent, for example, the length of 
time they had been in their current post and their career history.
The second section asked about the objectives of the organisations; each respondent 
was asked about their own organisations’ objectives as well as their perceptions of 
the other organisations’ objectives. It is assumed in principal-agent theory that the 
agent has objectives that are different to the principal. The purpose of this section 
was to determine how, if at all, the objectives of the PCTs and NHS Trusts differed 
and how any differences were reconciled. For example, respondents were asked how 
they tried to ensure their own objectives were met and their responses were probed 
further to draw out views about the relative strength of objectives and the risk 
sharing associated with not meeting objectives.
The third section asked about information for commissioning. The general aim of 
the section was to determine the extent to which respondents felt that information 
and decisions were shared between organisations, and their attitudes to unshared 
information. Principal-agent theory assumes that the agent has information not 
readily available to the principal and the agent will hide this information in order to 
gain advantages. Among other things, NHS Trust respondents were asked to give
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the circumstances where they might be tempted to hold information back from the 
PCTs (and vice versa), and where relevant, respondents were asked about incidents 
that had been discussed during the observed meetings, such as the unilateral 
initiation or discontinuation of services.
The fourth section asked about the roles that the different organisations perceived 
themselves as playing, how they felt about these roles and any changes they would 
like to see in the system. Many of these prompts arose from the political science and 
sociological concepts of agency. For example, PCT interviewees were asked how 
they felt about discussing NHS Trusts’ provision of services and finances whilst 
NHS Trust interviewees were asked how it felt from their position being monitored 
and scrutinised by PCTs. This was an attempt to discover how legitimate the 
respondents felt their organisations’ roles were without prompting them directly to 
discuss power relations or legitimacy.
The final section asked about monitoring and external influences on commissioning. 
Agency theory assumes that the principal is indifferent to the agent’s choice of 
action as long as it is diligent and efficient; the principal is concerned only with 
outcome. However, where incentives are not in place and outcomes not easily 
measured, the principal may monitor the agent’s actions more closely. This section 
asked respondents to describe, for example, the extent and ease of monitoring 
commissioning agreements. Responses were probed further to extract perceptions 
about how it felt as PCTs to be monitoring NHS Trusts, and how it felt as an NHS 
Trusts to be monitored by PCTs.
The content of the topic guides was not followed in strict order. The respondents 
moved between sections and discussed issues that they felt were most important as 
they arose. However, all topics on the guide were covered in all interviews.
Most interviews lasted between 45 minutes and an hour. The shortest lasted for 30 
minutes. This was planned and the main areas of interest were covered in sufficient 
detail; the interview was with a surgeon who was due back in clinic. The longest 
interview lasted for an hour and fifteen minutes. This was with a PCT Chief 
Executive.
In one case the tape recording failed. I made extended notes on the interview 
immediately after its completion. In two cases the tape recording was at times of
118
poor quality. Again, I made detailed notes on some of the missing information as 
soon as the interviews were completed. For the remaining thirty-one interviews, the 
tape recordings were of excellent sound quality.
I transcribed both tapes that were of poor sound quality plus another four tapes. 
University administrative staff transcribed the remainder. I listened to all the tapes 
after they had been transcribed to correct any mistakes and to fill in any gaps.
Finally I read each transcript and marked all names and words that could be used to 
identify the case studies or respondents. These were replaced in the transcripts with 
confidential codes known only by myself. The transcripts were then formatted for 
use with a qualitative data management software package.
c) Documentation
Copies of the Service and Financial Framework and the Service Level Agreements 
were obtained from each case study. Some respondents provided other documentary 
evidence not requested specifically. These were used for background information.
8) Data coding
This section details the method I used to apply codes to the transcripts of meetings 
and interviews.
Qualitative data management software called Atlas.ti (www.atlasti.de) was used.
This package allows the researcher to annotate, code and search the transcripts and to 
draw diagrams that relate quotations and codes to each other. Summaries of the 
main features of the package are given below.
Codes -  Codes are labels applied to quotations in order to be able to retrieve those 
pieces of text with similar meanings or referring to similar events. They are 
equivalent to keywords or indexes. Codes are created as a result of reading the text.
Free codes -  Free codes are codes that are created in abstract from the text. They 
may refer to issues that the researcher expects to find within the text.
Super codes and queries -  A query is a search using Boolean operators for 
quotations labelled with a combination of codes. A query can be saved for future
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use. A saved query is known as a super code. For example, a super code W could 
refer to all quotations labelled with code X and code Y but not code Z.
Free quotations -  A free quotation is a piece of text that is considered important 
enough to be noted but does not fit into any pre-existing code and where the 
researcher does not consider it appropriate to create a new code. Free quotations can 
be labelled with a new or existing code at a later stage.
Memos -  Memos are a form of electronic notebook. They allow the researcher to 
makes notes throughout the coding and analysis. Memos can refer to any aspect of 
the research, for example, the past or planned analysis strategy, emerging theories or 
unexpected insights. These memos can be linked to codes, quotes or other memos, 
but can also stand alone.
Links -  Codes, super codes, quotations and memos can be linked to each other.
There is no limit on the number of links that can be made. The links can be observed 
visually in diagrams called networks. For example, a memo that comments on a 
particular code can be linked to that code; symbols for both the memo and the code 
can then be seen in a network, linked by a line.
The principal-agent framework guided my research questions and the selection of the 
case studies. Consistent with this approach, I developed codes for the data in a 
number of stages. I created “free codes” prior to my analysis. These codes covered 
the main elements of principal-agent theory. I expected that these issues would arise 
in the course of the observations and interviews. Whilst reading and re-reading the 
texts, I created codes appropriate to those texts. Some codes were created in-vivo, 
that is, using terminology used by the interviewees; others I devised myself. I 
created memos during the analysis. Some memos related to analysis plans, others to 
my thoughts about associations between codes and others to how issues related to the 
principal-agent framework. Observations and interviews were coded and analysed 
together so that the same coding frame was applied to each set of data. Some of the 
codes were purely factual, labelling examples of events; others were subjective, 
labelling interviewees’ beliefs and my interpretations of their beliefs. Some codes 
fulfilled both roles.
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a) Free codes created prior to analysis
The creation of these initial codes was based on principal-agent theory. The codes 
created were as follows.
Objectives -  Principal-agent theory assumes that the agent has different objectives to 
the principal. Separate codes were created for the objectives of the PCT(s) (that is, 
the principal), the NHS Trust as agent, and the Health Authority (as a principal 
higher up the principal-agent chain). These were descriptive codes attached to 
quotations that stated what the perceived objectives of the organisations were. Later 
in the analysis, codes for the objectives of the government and of clinicians were 
added. The final set of codes relating to objectives were objectives -  PCT, objectives 
-  NHS Trust, objectives -  HA, objectives — government/must do’s, objectives — 
clinicians.
Information asymmetry - Principal-agent theory assumes that the agent has access to 
information additional to that which the principal can access. Initially, two codes 
were created: information asymmetry and information asymmetry - uncertainty/state 
o f the world. Later, information asymmetry was divided into codes for hidden 
action/effort and hidden information/knowledge. These codes were sub-divided 
again to become the final codes of behaviour -  shared information, behaviour -  
unshared information, behaviour -  shared decisions and behaviour -  unshared 
decisions. Two further codes (iinformation asymmetry -  agent type/adverse selection 
and information asymmetry -  agent effort) were introduced for the quotations that 
did not fit within the behaviour codes.
Incentives - Principal-agent theory assumes that the principal aligns the agent’s 
objectives with its own through the use of incentives. Initially, the code was simply 
incentives. Later this was revised into two codes: incentives -  
incentives/levers/sanctions (used to show financial or other incentives) and 
incentives -  threats from above (used to show verbal pressure in particular as an 
influence). These codes were used to show examples of incentives used as well as 
interviewees’ general views about incentives and perceptions of their effectiveness.
Power -  Although the principal in principal-agent relationships controls the agent 
through a contract, the agent is generally considered to be the most powerful because 
of its potential gains from information asymmetry. Initially, two codes were created:
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power -  agent and power -  principal. Power -  professional and power -  other were 
added later. Again, these codes referred to examples of one party showing its power 
over the other as well as interviewees’ perceptions of their own or other 
organisations’ power.
Contracts -  Principal-agent theory assumes the principal sets a contract for the agent. 
Initially, codes of output and activity levels were created. These were later merged 
to become behaviour - output relevant/process irrelevant. This code related both to 
actions taken in meetings and interviewees’ perceptions of appropriate behaviour in 
monitoring agents. Two further codes relating to beliefs about the importance of 
contracts were added later: contracts do matter and contracts don’t matter.
Agent involvement and agent action -  Principal-agent theory assumes that agents are 
passive takers of contracts. They choose to accept or reject contracts but are not 
involved in their development. Two codes (agent -  active and agent -  passive) were 
created to show examples of agents’ involvement in contract design. It became 
apparent during the analysis that contracts were not as important as expected so 
agent -  active was used to illustrate active involvement by agents in any aspect of 
the commissioning decisions. Agent -  passive was harder to apply. It was intended 
to show examples of the agent playing a passive role in accepting decisions imposed 
by the principal. In fact, unless the agent explicitly stated that this was the case, this 
code was hard to apply. Agent action was denoted using the codes effort and 
effort/outcome relationship.
Risk - The payment schedules devised by the principal should share risk between the 
principal and agent with the most risk averse being subject to a smaller risk level. 
Too little risk to the agent introduces moral hazard; too much risk means the agent 
refuses the contract. A single code risk was created to denote any discussion of risk 
sharing or any examples of shared risk.
Other issues that appeared important in the literature were the impact of pressure 
groups on decisions, the reliance of principal and agent on each other in monopoly 
situations and the rights of the principal to play that role. The following codes were 
therefore created: external/third parties, dependency, multiple principals, 
multiple/choice o f  agents and legitimacy.
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b) Codes created during analysis
As the coding frame was refined, additional codes were created. Most of these were 
categorised eventually into the following general areas: agendas, attitudes, 
behaviours, conflicts, context, definitions .feelings .finances, information, people, 
responsibilities, system and targets.
The codes were used to mark text that was either subjective or objective in nature. 
For example, finances -  funding constraints contained quotations showing 
perceptions of the effects of funding constraints...
... it doesn't change the problem, because there is no more 
money. So we all understand much better how we are and 
where we are but it doesn't stop the problem and therefore it 
doesn't solve the tension...
.. .as well as examples from the observed meetings of particular constraints...
A PCT Chief Executive asked i f  the modem matrons were 
new posts or renamed positions already in post. An NHS 
Trust representative responded that they were not new posts, 
but new roles. It was “not affordable ” to have new posts.
Other codes related solely to the transcripts of meetings and denoted factual details 
such as who was leading a debate or what the debate was about, for example meeting 
-  manager agent and meeting -  outpatients.
Codes that did not fit in the general areas given above included barriers to sharing, 
catalysts to sharing, immature organisations, managing expectations, organisational 
sophistication, principal-agent role reversal, PCT’s own services/agents, private 
sector and status/hierarchy.
This list of codes is not exhaustive. For a full list, see Appendix 3.
c) Super codes
Queries and super codes were used to group codes together.
For example, a super code methods o f influence grouped together quotations coded 
with the following codes: incentives - incentives/levers/sanctions, incentives - threats 
from above, contracts do matter, objectives - government/must do's, behaviour-  
monitoring, behaviour - micro-management, private sector and multiple/choice o f  
agents.
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Super codes were developed in part by making obvious connections between the 
codes (for example, incentives - incentives/levers/sanctions is an obvious part of the 
super code methods o f influence) and in part by searching for codes that had been 
applied to the same or overlapping pieces of text.
d) Free quotations
Free quotations were used initially to label quotations that did not appear to fit an 
existing code or to justify the creation of a new code. I revisited free quotations 
regularly and where groups of meanings became apparent, a new code was created to 
which the free quotations were assigned. By using this method, I minimised the 
chance of “losing” important quotations. At the end of the coding stage, all 
remaining free quotations were very short quotes comprising phrases that used 
descriptive language, such as “ostrich management”, “straight jacket”, “hijacked” 
and “P45 issues”.
e) Memos
I created memos to build up my own interpretation of the data as I was coding the 
texts. In the main, these memos comprised thoughts, insights and questions relating 
to the data. These memos were altered, added to and merged throughout the coding 
and analysis process. They became the high level themes that emerged from the 
data.
An example of a memo is “multiple principals”. This memo noted that interactions 
between the PCTs in case studies B and C were different, it questioned why there 
appeared to be a power vacuum in C and why the PCTs in B managed to collaborate 
more effectively, as well as speculating that the difficulty in ring-fencing services for 
particular PCTs’ patients might add to the problem, and that it might be useful to 
explore relationships between the codes multiple principals and dependency.
9) Data analysis
The SLA documents for each case study were scrutinised for use of incentives or 
other methods of influencing the agent. A summary of the main sections of the
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documents, the finances available and the activity expected is given in the results 
section.
The data management software allows each transcript to be searched on its own, with 
all other transcripts or with a sub-set of transcripts. I labelled each transcript type as 
(1) interview or (2) meeting and as (1) case study A, (2) case study B or (3) case 
study C. For interview transcripts only I gave the following additional labels: (1) 
clinician or (2) management interviewee and (1) principal or (2) agent. Using these 
combinations I was able to search different sub-sets of transcripts, for example, all 
manager interviewees from the agent organisation in case study B. This allowed me 
to undertake the multi-level analysis (Yin, 1994) described earlier.
Although my coding had been led initially by the expectations of principal-agent 
theory, my analysis was led also by the main themes that had arisen from the data 
and that I had noted in the memos. These were issues around “multiple principals”, 
“tiers of principals and agents”, “engagement and disillusionment” and “micro­
management”. I followed the same format for searching the transcripts for each 
topic area of interest. This format consisted of speculating about associations 
between memos and codes, creating queries and super codes to test for the existence 
of these associations and searching for any contrasting or unexpected associations.
For example, during the coding, I had created a memo for multiple principals and 
linked a number of related codes to this memo. This memo contained a series of 
notes about the ways that the PCTs in case studies B and C worked together and 
questions about why they were different to each other. Principal-agent theory 
predicts that where there are multiple principals, they will collude if they have the 
same objectives and equal access to information about their shared agent. My search 
for data followed a series of questions related initially to the predictions of principal- 
agent theory, for example, do the PCTs have the same access to information about 
the NHS Trust? To determine the answer, I searched the data for quotations labelled 
by the factual codes information -  good, information -  poor, and information -  use 
o f  and the subjective codes information -  desired, information overload and 
information vacuum. This search strategy was carried out for meeting transcripts, 
then management interviews and finally clinician interviews. For example, I 
searched for relevant quotations from case study B meetings, then PCT B managers
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followed by NHS Trust B managers, then PCT B clinicians followed by NHS Trust 
B clinicians and so on.
For the example given, I searched next using codes related to objectives, power, 
partnerships, boundaries, responsibilities and sharing/not sharing. The resulting 
quotations for each case study were considered separately to produce a picture of 
events and attitudes. In this way, I ensured that the searches followed a consistent 
pattern and any negative cases (for example, clinical viewpoints) were included in 
the analysis.
In addition, during the coding phase, some quotations had been linked with others 
that either supported or contradicted them. Where these quotations arose in the 
search and analysis phase, the links were investigated and contradictory or 
supportive quotations presented where appropriate.
The next chapter presents the results. Contrary to convention, I have labelled each 
quote with a respondent type label and a code number but, to retain anonymity, I 
have not linked these labels or code numbers to individual interviewees. For 
example, the respondent type is given as Manager PCT A rather than Director of 
Finance PCT A. This is because there is only one Director of Finance at PCT A and 
labelling them as such would make their comments identifiable within that case 
study. Similarly, the code number refers to the quotation’s reference number in the 
data analysis package, and so can be traced, but does not identify the respondent to 
the reader.
Where the respondent is from a PCT that is not the main case study PCT, a lower 
case “n” is used to denote that they are from a neighbouring PCT (for example 
“nPCT A”). Within quotes, names of individuals, organisations and places have 
been removed to retain anonymity. Place and organisation names have been 
replaced with “n” for a neighbouring organisation and N, S, E or W to indicate the 
direction from the main case study area, for example, “nHA to E” indicates a 
neighbouring health authority to the east of the case study area. The health authority 
in case study A played a prominent role and is referred to throughout as the “Health 
Authority”. All other references to health authorities use small case letters.
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Where sections of text within quotes have been removed for the purposes of clarity 
and brevity, they have been replaced with three full stops (...)• The meaning 
conveyed by the quote remains the same.
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Chapter Four: 
Principal-agent relationships in practice
This chapter describes the main areas of interest that arose from the analysis of 
documents, observations and interview data from the three case studies. The results 
are presented as four themes. Issues pertinent to each theme are described in relation 
to each case study and compared with relevant aspects of the other case studies (Yin, 
1994).
I consider first a basic assumption of agency theory, that principals are active in 
attempting to align agent’s objectives to their own through incentive contracts. I 
consider this assumption as two separate issues, first that a principal sets a detailed 
incentive-based contract for its agent, second, that a principal is active in attempting 
to align its agent’s objectives with its own. This separation allows an exploration of 
methods other than formal incentive contracts used by the principal to align the 
agent’s objectives with its own. I then describe and discuss evidence around the case 
of multiple principals and a common agent, and of tiers of principals and agents and, 
in each case, how these affect commissioning.
The remainder of the chapter therefore considers the following:
1. Did principals set incentive-based contracts for their agents?
2. Were principals active in aligning agents’ objectives to their own?
3. What was the effect on commissioning of multiple principals and a common 
agent?
4. What was the effect on commissioning of tiers of principals and agents?
In each sub-section, descriptive data are presented. In sub-sections (3) and (4) these 
descriptions are followed by an exploration of why there are differences between the 
case studies. A fuller discussion of these issues in the context of the wider literature 
and policy requirements is presented in the discussion chapter.
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1) Did principals set incentive-based contracts for 
their agents?
In this section I present details of the Service Level Agreements between PCTs and 
NHS Trusts, and explore, using views expressed by respondents in interview, 
whether or not these are incentive-based contracts. If SLAs were being developed as 
incentive contracts, one would expect respondents to comment on the use of 
incentives, the alignment of objectives through incentives, monitoring of agreements 
and the sharing of financial risk.
a) Case study A
In case study A, a three way Service Level Agreement for 2002/3 between NHS 
Trust A, PCT A and the Health Authority was signed in April 2002. The SLA set 
out the “agreed financial framework and principal delivery targets for 2002/3for  
INHS Trust A f \  It was stated in the preface that the SLA would inform the 
preparation of the business plan for NHS Trust A and the performance framework 
being developed by the Health Authority. The SLA was set out in two main 
sections. One detailed the allocation of funds and the other the targets required to be 
met.
A table listed the amount of funds available on a recurring and non-recurring basis.
In addition, funds were split into a “baseline allocation” and “additions”. The 
baseline allocation comprised 92% of the total. Of the additions, 4% was provided 
on a recurring basis to fund mandatory cost pressures, 2% was recurring to fund 
service developments and 2% was to fund mandatory cost pressures but on a non­
recurring basis. The 2% for service developments was to be released in April 2002, 
the start of the financial year. An additional sum of money (equivalent in size to 
another 2.5%) was to be released for previously approved developments once their 
timetables and programmes for implementation had been approved. This was the 
only sum of money that was to be withheld at the beginning of the financial year.
The section of the SLA labelled delivery targets re-iterated many of the targets given 
in the NHS Plan, National Service Frameworks (NSFs), other national and local 
documents. An appendix stated the maximum expected waiting times, numbers of
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patients waiting and cancelled operations, and the minimum inpatient activity 
numbers.
The meeting of these activity requirements was not linked directly to the release of 
finances. No incentives for achieving any of these requirements were included in the 
SLA. However, one of the targets to be met was to achieve a 2% cost improvement 
programme out of which all “unavoidable non-mandatory cost pressures” should be 
met. A further target, under the heading of performance management, was to 
“review and develop incentive arrangements to promote high levels o f performance”. 
No other details were given.
This SLA was not an incentive-based contract of the form assumed to be set in 
principal-agent theory. From discussing SLAs in the interviews, it transpired that 
none of the respondents considered incentives to play a large role, and in fact, many 
considered that negotiated agreements no longer existed.
The SLA was seen as more of a “direct accountability agreement” than an incentive- 
based contract.
The Service Level Agreement is then a more detailed 
expression o f that agreement [the SaFF], in terms o f a direct 
accountability agreement between one organisation and 
another, so it would basically put the requirements o f what 
that organisation is expected to deliver. (Manager HA A 
23/4)
As already shown, the SLA gave no details about how agreed activity was to be 
delivered or paid for.
Respondent: But, you know, to me, i f  you’ve got a target and 
the NHS plan says that orthopaedic operations should be 
done to 6 months by the 31st March so and so, you know, 
that writes the Service Level Agreement for you. The only big 
issue for discussion is well, how do you do it? But the Service 
Level Agreement is very clear.
Interviewer: Do those "how do you do it" things go into the 
SLA?
Respondent: No, no. (Manager HA A 23/53)
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Commissioning was considered essentially as a joint process of planning. 
Performance management played an important role, perhaps replacing incentives, 
ensuring that people “do what they say they will do”.
...there are a variety o f ways in which the SAFF process can 
work.. . [it] is about forecasting your costs, matching those 
or otherwise to funding streams and determining from that 
what you 're able to achieve.... (Manager NHS Trust A
22/ 1)
...what we ve got to actually do is ensure that we are 
delivering services on behalf o f  all our population. ...is [NHS 
Trust A] actually delivering in terms o f the acute services 
and is [neighbouring PCT] delivering in terms o f mental 
health. (Manager PCT A 24/1)
I  would define commissioning now as a process where the 
community agrees a plan, the community then allocates 
responsibility for delivering it and then the community then 
has a performance system in place to make sure people do 
what they say they will do - to me that's commissioning.
(Manager HA A 23/80)
Another view (predominantly from clinicians) was that PCTs could have an 
important level of control over the NHS Trust, but hospital clinicians had not yet 
realised this.
... the surgeons do not appreciate what potentially is the 
importance o f Primary Care Trusts to their own work, the 
commissioning o f their work. It hasn’t sunk in at all.
Interviewee: Importance in terms of?
Respondent: Well, what I  would call control, influence, those 
sorts o f  things. A driver, you know, we want this done. It s 
control and influence are the probably the two aspects to call 
it. (Clinician NHS Trust A 84/5)
Clinicians’ views appeared divided over the importance of SLAs. One view was that 
their importance was “huge”. This consultant was the only respondent of any kind to 
mention a relationship between activity and funding.
Huge, because activity is our biggest thing and a lot o f our 
money depends on us achieving our activity targets, which is 
fine, as long as it's achievable. (Clinician NHS Trust A 
84/6)
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The other view of SLAs was that they had no teeth.
. . . I ’ve been through so many years with these kind o f  
agreements and quite a lot o f  the time they're not worth the 
paper that they are written on, so in other words, i f  an 
agreement is not adhered to what happens? The tradition has 
been that there has been very little under that to pin it down.
(Clinician PCT A 35/56)
This view was perhaps aligned more with those that performance management was 
the key, not incentive contracts. This was summed up by a Health Authority 
manager who considered that commissioning no longer existed.
I  mean in my view there is no such thing as commissioning, 
because basically what we 're all here to do now is to deliver 
the NHS Plan. Commissioning implies some sort o f 
negotiation and local interpretation. (Manager HA A 
23/93)
The inference here is that the NHS as perceived in this case study was a top down 
hierarchy; the NHS Plan drove all NHS organisations towards the same objectives 
with little room for local manoeuvre.
In summary, the SLA was being used as part of the performance management 
framework with little significance in terms of providing incentives for activity. The 
Health Authority in case study A appeared to be the principal.
b) Case study B
At the time of writing (July 2003), the Service Level Agreement for 2002/3 between 
NHS Trust B and PCT B was available in draft form only. The document covered 
services provided by NHS Trust B to PCT B, but in fact it included also services 
provided to two neighbouring PCTs for which PCT B took the lead commissioning 
role. Importantly, these neighbouring PCTs were not those that attended the SaFF 
meetings; they were more distant PCTs that used NHS Trust B to provide only a 
minimal level of services. PCT B did not share a contract with the PCTs that did 
attend the SaFF meetings. The SLA consisted of seven pages labelled “General 
Agreement” followed by nine annexes that gave detailed spreadsheets covering 
finances, and activity and monitoring information.
132
The General Agreement had a number of short sections beginning with definitions of 
terms, and the aims and philosophy of the agreement. A large part of the philosophy 
was the commitment to joint working by the PCT and NHS Trust B, including a 
statement that PCT B recognised the pressures faced by NHS Trust B and would 
work with them to resolve those pressures. A section on Service Specification 
explained Annexes 1-7. These detailed the assumptions (referrals, removals, activity 
and conversion rates) agreed by both parties, services not provided and services for 
which a specified volume had been agreed. The Financial Agreement section gave 
the total contract price and an additional sum for which brokerage had been 
requested (an additional 2.1% of the total contract price). Procedures for dealing 
with variations in the agreed contract then followed. There was little detail in the 
section on Information Exchange and Monitoring; this merely committed both 
parties to introducing an adequate monitoring system in the future. Similarly, a 
section on Quality and Governance committed both parties to developing a new 
scheme. The Risk Management Arrangements specified that neither party had 
reserve funds on which to draw, but stated some expected risks, for example, that 
waiting list targets may be breached due to clinical vacancies, high referral levels or 
excess emergency pressures. NHS Trust B had signed the SLA, but PCT B had not.
The spreadsheet showing the draft finances was arranged as follows. The 2001/2 
contract price was given. Recurrent variations agreed for that year were then added; 
these amounted to 0.3% of the value. A further 5.4% of the value of the 2001/2 
contract was then added; this covered agreed cost base changes (recurring funds such 
as excess pay awards and cancer drugs) (5.8%), earmarked funding (1%, recurring), 
further recognised pressures (1.1%, mainly non-recurring), and technical and 
slippage adjustments (-2.6%, a mix of non-recurring and recurring). The 5.4% of 
funds that made up these adjustments were the SaFF funds for 2002/3. Other 
technical and inflation adjustments raised the value of the 2002/3 contract to 106.6% 
of the 2001/2 contract value. However, this level was then reduced to 105% of the 
previous year’s contract as a result of a “non-recurring income gap” that the PCT 
must “find in year”.
There were no details in the contract of incentives such as funds withheld at the 
beginning of the year or additional funds given if targets were reached. As stated,
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neither party had any reserves. The annex detailing limited volume procedures gave 
the specialty, procedure, contract currency (although not price) and agreed volume.
From interviews with respondents, the general view appeared to be that the SLA was 
a detailed “contract specification” or a “mechanism of agreement”. Again, none of 
the respondents mentioned the role of incentives in SLAs or links between funding 
and activity. Some did, however, mention monitoring.
I t ’s all about exclusions and terms and conditions and 
monitoring requirements... (Manager PCT B 33/107)
The SLA then puts the flesh on those bones [o f the SaFF] and 
just sews up what you are actually getting fo r  the investment 
and how it will be monitored. (Manager PCT B 26/5)
The Service Level Agreement is normally a speciality or 
client group specific and it is a contract specification which 
says this is what we will do fo r  this amount o f  money to this 
quality standard with these governance issues, with these 
access targets met etc, so that is very precise and much more 
as a contractual arrangement. (Manager NHS Trust B
31/5)
They ’re mechanisms o f agreement, they ’re mechanisms to 
say well this is what you agreed to do. (Manager NHS 
Trust B 83/2)
The cost of monitoring SLAs was raised specifically by one GP who was 
interviewed after the publication of Reforming NHS Financial Flows (Department of 
Health, 2002c). She described a recent meeting at which the PCT Director of 
Finance had outlined the new system.
...she was saying that [the new payment system] could 
potentially be a big problem in that you are going to have all 
these invoices, and people ticking o ff number o f hips done 
and putting a whole layer o f clerical staff in there that you're 
going to have to pay for whereas now we just hand the 
money over and say get on and do the job. (GP PCT B 
88/ 11)
As far as the GP was concerned, the system was “going back to fund-holding”.
There was perceived to be a choice between two systems: the current and the new. 
The current system involved handing over a fixed level of funding and relying on
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discussions with the NHS Trust to ensure that appropriate care was delivered as 
agreed; this system was seen to have low administration costs. The new system was 
seen to involve setting complex contracts with incentives and sanctions. The belief 
was that this alternative should ensure that the PCT’s objectives would be met, but 
there was the assumption that to make the system work, the PCT would be expected 
to provide additional funds to enable the NHS Trust to monitor and report on their 
activity. Administration costs would therefore be higher. As far as this GP 
understood it, the Director of Finance would rather follow the current system of 
relying on informal agreement with the NHS Trust to meet requirements than 
potentially creating a “big problem” through relying on incentives and monitoring.
Another GP described SLAs in their current state as not helpful, very short and not 
detailed (PCT B Clinician 29/35) and a PCT manager compared the value of an SLA 
to that of a job description.
A good job description you actually get out o f the drawer to 
see what are you meant to be doing. I  think a Service Level 
Agreement should be like that and I  don't think they are.
(Manager nPCT B 34/108)
Having SLAs at all was not viewed as essential (a view perhaps confirmed by the 
fact that the SLA had not been agreed even after the end of the financial year). The 
value of the SLA was not seen necessarily as the end product, but as the discussions 
and solutions that arose out of debates about the agreement. Both of the following 
respondents could see the benefits of a good agreement but were concerned that in 
their current state, SLAs were a remnant from the internal market. The fact that the 
organisations developed SLAs even though they described them as remnants and felt 
they were just “going through the motions” suggests that the importance of being 
seen to be following policy requirements was greater than the actual value of the 
documents.
I  suppose at the end o f the day they could not sign it. They 
could sign it and not do the thing that they don’t like. ... I  
mean, that was- let’s face it, that was part o f the problem 
with the internal market. All these blinking quasi contracts 
when at the end o f the day they were meaningless because 
you can’t go to law on it and let somebody else thrash it for  
you. You’ve got to keep going until you get the issues 
resolved. (Manager PCT B 26/4 7)
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I ’m not totally convinced that that is distilling out the 
absolutely, the really important things. Are we just slightly 
going through the motions? ... I  suppose it serves some 
function but I ’m slightly doubtful, le a n ’t really energise 
myself to take it that seriously unless we can turn it into 
something different which really works for us and that people 
look at because it's helpful. (Manager nPCTB 34/110)
Unusually, the NHS Trust took the lead in developing the SLA. One reason for this 
was that it was used as an internal NHS Trust performance management document. 
Again, respondents used the term performance management, not incentives or 
contract.
... most o f what constitutes the Service Level Agreements at 
the moment are actually our performance management plans 
... which are developed by our performance management 
development department here. (Manager NHS Trust A
83/4)
I  think in the past [NHS Trust B] has led because then that's 
their sort o f internal agreement with each o f their 
directorates and we sign it o ff with them. (Manager PCT B 
33/107)
Although, as shown above, both NHS Trust and PCT could see the logic of the NHS 
Trust developing the SLA, some respondents from both organisations found the fact 
that the NHS Trust took the lead a little strange.
It's unusual as I  understand it for provider Trusts to be 
drafting service agreements. (Manager NHS Trust B 28/48)
... [it] is mainly written by the hospital, which sounds slightly 
odd to me. Shouldn't it be mainly written by commissioners?
I  don't know! (Manager nPCT B 34/109)
The development of an SLA as an internal performance management document for 
the NHS Trust may have been a pragmatic response to a policy requirement in which 
few people saw value. By using an SLA in this way, the organisations could be seen 
to be complying with policy at the same time as gaining some value themselves.
In summary, both organisations saw the SLA as an agreement pertaining to the 
activity, finance and quality of services to be delivered. Its usefulness as a contract 
between the PCT and NHS Trust was uncertain but the NHS Trust used the SLA
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instead as an internal performance management document. The SLA contained no 
incentives but the supply of some services was limited in volume. There were 
concerns expressed about the future use of incentives and monitoring and their 
associated costs.
c) Case study C
PCT C did not develop a Service Level Agreement with NHS Trust C for 2002/3. 
They decided instead to use their SaFF as an SLA. The attitude was perhaps similar 
to case study A; the HA manager there suggested that “i f  you ’ve got a target and the 
NHS Plan... that writes the Service Level Agreement for you”.
The document as supplied to me as the SLA was labelled “Service and Financial 
Framework 2002-2003” and included a general background to discussions, an 
Investment Plan (comprising four annexes), a Summary of Developments (including 
one annex), Areas Not Addressed, Risks and Next Steps. All of these sections 
described discussions and agreements between NHS Trust C, PCT C and other PCTs 
that used the services of NHS Trust C.
Two versions of the SaFF were presented. One gave a position of financial balance 
but failure to meet many national targets; the other presented the costs of achieving 
all targets but at the expense of significantly increasing the community’s deficit. A 
main table showed the income and expenditure for NHS Trust C, and PCT C’s share 
of that. (The PCT had to provide slightly less than half the required funding for 
NHS Trust C; the remainder was provided by neighbouring PCTs.) The “recurring 
baseline” was shown as 95% of the total funds available, the remaining 5% was 
provided for Category 1 (that is, unavoidable) cost pressures such as inflation. There 
was no funding for Category 2 cost pressures, given as, for example, external audit 
fees. These figures allowed for financial balance but failure to achieve many 
national targets. An extension to the table showed the cost of proposed service 
changes in order to meet national targets. These costs were the equivalent of 11% on 
top of the total funds available. There were negligible resources shown as available 
for funding these service developments. The tables were supported by a verbal 
description of “key priority areas” and a summary of key targets that would not be 
achieved within the existing plans.
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There was no mention in the SaFF/SLA of any incentive arrangements. The 
document was purely a plan of action and costs.
In the interviews with both managers and clinicians, there was confusion about the 
purpose of an SLA, and whether or not the SLA and SaFF were different documents.
There must be a distinction! SLAs and SAFFs can be terms 
that are used interchangeably, but the SAFF is the Service 
and Financial Framework and I  guess, maybe you can 
correct me i f  I'm wrong, is there a right or wrong answer? ...
I  don't know. ... I  don't know. You might have an SLA with a 
small organisation which isn't necessarily included... I  don't 
know, I  don't know. Sorry. (Manager nPCT C 38/3)
This confusion was justified given that in this case study the documents were the 
same. However, there is also the implication here that the value of an SLA is 
limited. Perhaps, as in the other case studies, the organisations were just “going 
through the motions” in developing a document called an SLA.
... they're just a document. They're pieces ofpaper. ... I'm 
not quite clear what the purpose o f a Service Level 
Agreement is anymore. It was all- it's a hangover from the 
days o f  contracting. (Manager PCT C 32/50)
I  have to say, as regional office we asked for Service Level 
Agreements and nobody anywhere ever provided them for us, 
it's not just a [case study C] thing. So I've never seen one... I  
don't entirely believe that they exist... (Manager Regional
Office C 80/63)
An NHS Trust respondent was certain that an SLA did not exist.
...w e have no agreement on the funding... we have no 
Service Level Agreements in place with our commissioners. I  
don ’t think w e’ve probably ever really put together proper 
Service Level Agreements which have been monitored.
(Manager NHS Trust C 39/16)
In contrast, there were some quite specific ideas about what SLAs ought to include, 
although it was notable that no one expected incentives to be included in the 
agreements.
The Service Level Agreements should be an expression o f the 
Service and Financial Framework on a specific organisation 
basis. (Manager PCT C 36/2)
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A Service Level Agreement to me is their contracting 
arrangements between- so it's everything historically plus 
whatever was agreed in this year's SAFF round becomes a 
Service Level Agreement. (Manager Regional Office C 
80/63)
The latter quote serves as a reminder that the majority of service delivery by an NHS 
Trust is dependent upon historical activity. Annual negotiations are around marginal 
changes only.
In summary, respondents were not sure whether or not an SLA existed, but if it did, 
considered it as an expression of the SaFF rather than a means to influence 
behaviour. The SLA in this case study was, in fact, the SaFF.
This section has shown that incentives were not being used in SLAs. There was 
little consideration of incentives by either principals or agents and few discussed the 
direct relationship between funding and commissioned activity. SLAs tended to be 
used as performance management and monitoring agreements, either between 
principals and agents or as internal documents for agents. SLAs did not include any 
specific statements pertaining to the sharing of financial risk.
2) Were principals active in aligning agents’ 
objectives to their own?
Theory suggests that alignment of objectives is achieved through incentive contracts. 
The previous section showed that incentives were not used in contracts. Service 
Level Agreements were merely expressions of what organisations had agreed they 
should deliver. So how were these agreements reached?
I consider here if and how principals attempted to align agents’ objectives with their 
own. I do this through describing the commissioning related meetings that I 
attended at each case study. Chapter three gave details of the meetings attended. I 
consider also whether agents were passive or active in this process, and indeed, 
whether roles were reversed and the agents attempted to align the principals’ 
objectives with theirs. This would be possible if the agents were more powerful or 
able to hide information from the principal.
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a) Case study A
It was the Health Authority (rather than the PCT) in this case study that played the 
role of principal. There were few examples of NHS Trust A being active in its 
meetings with the Health Authority. The following illustrates where individuals 
from the Health Authority or NHS Trust were active in attempting to steer discussion 
to meet their own interests. The Director of Finance from the Health Authority acted 
as chair. The Health Authority had set the agenda and the meeting was held in the 
Board Room of the Health Authority.
i) The principal led the discussions
From the very beginning of the meeting, the HA Director of Finance demonstrated 
his position of relative power and his expectation that the NHS Trust would meet the 
HA’s requirements. He opened the meeting in a formal manner and summarised the 
agenda items, in particular the areas he wanted to discuss in detail. The Director of 
Finance from the NHS Trust attempted to question an issue about revenue, but was 
stopped and told by HA Director of Finance that this issue would be picked up later.
A few minutes later, the Chief Executive of the NHS Trust was asked to give an 
“honest assessment” of the NHS Trust’s position in relation to meeting activity 
targets for that month. The Trust Chief Executive spoke in some detail and for some 
time (10 minutes) about the difficulties of managing waiting lists and times. The HA 
members appeared to be listening intently, but as soon as the Trust Chief Executive 
finished, the HA Director of Finance re-iterated his original question. This pattern, 
of allowing the Trust members to put forward their views but returning to the 
original questions to ensure that the answers supplied the information the HA wished 
for, was repeated throughout the meeting. (This style was also prevalent in meetings 
that I attended at this HA with other NHS Trusts, not reported on here.)
ii) The agent depended on the principal for leadership
At a point almost half way through the two hour meeting, the NHS Trust members 
appeared to be unsure whether they were still discussing the current year’s 
performance, or if they were planning the following year’s requirements. The Trust 
Director of Finance relied on the HA Director of Finance to clarify the position. The 
NHS Trust members seemed to be playing a subordinate role, accepting that the HA
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was in the driving seat, steering the meeting in the direction desired by the HA, 
whilst the NHS Trust merely supplied the appropriate information as required.
There did not appear to be any attempt by the NHS Trust to change the emphasis of 
the meeting or to negotiate on any of the issues raised.
iii) The principal was not prepared to negotiate
The second half of the meeting concentrated on commissioning for the following 
year. The HA Director of Finance continued in the leading role by explaining to the 
NHS Trust the financial framework within which they were expected to work. There 
did not appear to be any expectation (by either party) that the NHS Trust would 
negotiate about the financial framework. Indeed, in introducing the issue, the HA 
Director of Finance stated that in the previous year, a two year financial framework 
had been agreed with the other NHS Trusts in the area, but not with NHS Trust A.
As a result, the HA had assumed two year costs for NHS Trust A, and they now 
wished to agree on the remaining year. The HA Director of Finance took 10 minutes 
to explain the details of the financial framework, and did so on a flip chart at the 
front of the room. Throughout the process, both the Director of Finance and Chief 
Executive of the Trust made notes. On numerous occasions the HA Director of 
Finance signalled quite explicitly to the NHS Trust how they were expected to act:
“ We really need you to...” and “/  think there’s two things...”. The HA seemed to 
have decided in advance what they required of the NHS Trust and were using this 
forum as a means to convey those requirements. One concession was a statement by 
the HA Director of Finance that they were not being “precise " about how the money 
was spent as long as the targets were met. This links back to the previous section on 
SLAs which showed that there were no incentives, merely an expectation that 
agreements would be delivered.
A debate ensued that was essentially an NHS Trust wish list of new developments.
As earlier in the meeting, the HA Director of Finance appeared always to be in 
control of the debate, and summed up at the end of the meeting by explaining again 
what he expected the NHS Trust to be doing and the finances it would have to 
achieve these things. At all times, the NHS Trust remained inactive, seeming to 
accept the legitimacy of the HA’s requirements.
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A follow up meeting was arranged for February 2002. I was not permitted to attend 
this meeting as it was felt by the HA that the discussions would be too sensitive, in 
terms of personalities and behaviours rather than the topic areas discussed. I 
attended instead two meetings between the HA and PCT A.
iv) The "higher" principal dominated the "lower" principal
The first of these meeting was exactly the same format as the meeting described with 
NHS Trust A: a review of performance to date and plans for the following year. The 
HA Chief Executive attended this meeting, along with three other HA members and 
three PCT members. It was held in the HA Board Room. Again, the HA Director of 
Finance chaired the meeting and, as with the NHS Trust, the PCT appeared to accept 
a subordinate role. The issues being discussed were the PCT’s performance and the 
plans for the PCT’s provision of services the following year. There was little 
mention of the services the NHS Trust was providing.
The second meeting, to finalise plans for the PCT’s provision of services in 2002/3, 
was held in the PCT Board Room. Three HA members and four PCT members 
attended. The HA Chief Executive did not attend. The HA Director of Finance once 
more acted as Chair. Although the HA Director of Finance was again quite 
dominant, the dynamics of this meeting seemed a little different. The PCT Chief 
Executive and in particular the PCT Director of Finance appeared to take the leading 
roles more so than in the first meeting, with the HA Director of Finance adjusting his 
strategy to what the PCT members had to say.
v) The "higher" principal protected the "lower" principal
In the second meeting, the HA Director of Finance appeared to be trying to protect 
the PCT from the possibility of strategic moves by a local mental health trust. The 
HA Director of Finance delved a little deeper for details in a discussion about 
management costs. The situation was that the local mental health trust had been 
trying to initiate discussions with the PCT about additional funding. The HA 
Director of Finance explained that, at the time, the HA was the sole funding body for 
the mental health trust and as such the mental health trust should not be coming 
through the “back door " for funding from the PCT. The PCT should ensure that the 
mental health trust was directed back to the HA for any funding discussions. This
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event illustrates the hierarchical structure within this HA, the dominant role of the 
HA and the legitimacy the HA appears to have in playing this role.
In summary, the discussions and format of these meetings illustrate a number of 
important issues. First, the HA did not allow the PCT to work directly with its agent. 
The agent in the last example (albeit a different agent to NHS Trust A) was acting in 
a strategic manner, relating to the PCT as if it were principal, and the HA was 
refusing to allow this to take place. Second, the HA was acting as principal to NHS 
Trust A, rather than acting via PCT A. Third, the HA’s objectives appeared to 
dominate; it was assumed without question that the NHS Trust would meet the 
objectives of the HA.
b) Case study B
The Chief Executive of PCT B chaired the first two meetings that I attended (plus an 
evening priority setting meeting). The Chief Executive and the Performance 
Manager of Health Authority B respectively chaired the final two meetings I 
attended. Eighteen or nineteen people from up to seven NHS organisations usually 
attended these meetings.
Perhaps because of the monthly nature of these meetings, there was less definition 
than in case study A about what the outcome of each meeting should be. Many of 
the agenda items were ongoing debates, appearing on the agenda for each meeting. I 
describe here some of the key debates that illustrate the ways in which the PCT 
attempted to align the NHS Trust’s objectives to their own, and how the NHS Trust 
was active in putting forward its own interests.
i) The agent refused to agree with the principal
On many occasions, the PCTs put forward their plans for service delivery only to 
have the NHS Trust refuse to agree to it.
For example, a framework for restructuring services was discussed in the December 
meeting. The community’s Director of Recovery, not the PCT, had produced the 
framework. The framework showed where the same services could be supplied for 
less money, and where more services could be supplied for the same money. It 
applied to both primary and secondary care services. Members of NHS Trust B 
refused to agree to the framework, stating that it would be “stupid to agree” when
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they didn’t know if they could achieve what was proposed. They refused to sign up 
to the framework before getting internal NHS Trust agreement. The result was that 
the framework was left without agreement and was not discussed again at any of the 
meetings I attended.
On another occasion (January 2002), there was an absolute refusal by NHS Trust B 
to discuss any issues to do with a particular pot of funding (over £0.5m). The 
general debate was about agreeing service priorities for 2002/3.
The history behind the funding problem (as explained by PCT B) was that in the 
previous year, the NHS Trust had been given non-recurrent funds to help reduce 
waiting times in one specialty. NHS Trust B had spent these funds in part on 
reducing waits, but in part on other priorities. NHS Trust B claimed that the funds 
were recurrent, and that they could spend these funds as they wished in 2002/3. In 
fact, they had already planned the use of these funds and had assumed that they were 
an addition to their funding envelope. No one appeared to be entirely clear about 
whether these funds were recurrent or not. According to the PCT, even if they were, 
the NHS Trust should have assumed they were part of the overall recurrent funding, 
not an add on. As a result of the NHS Trust’s assumption that they were additional 
funds, their deficit would have to increase by over £0.5m. A heated debate ensued, 
but, throughout, the NHS Trust member present (Director of Operations) refused to 
discuss the issue. As far as the NHS Trust was concerned, there was nothing to 
discuss.
The end result was an acceptance that the situation was “virtually impossible” and 
the funds in question would be added to the whole community’s deficit. Later in the 
same meeting, the PCT suggested that in return for allowing the NHS Trust to treat 
the funding as additional and recurrent, they should ensure that they met their 21- 
week and 1-year waiting time targets. Again, the NHS Trust refused to agree before 
undertaking the modelling to show this could be done. On this occasion, the NHS 
Trust’s refusal to co-operate had achieved a result in the NHS Trust’s favour.
ii) The agent was resigned to the principal's wishes
In contrast, there were occasions when the NHS Trust agreed to the PCT’s wishes 
without discussion as they considered any discussion fruitless. Part of the meeting in 
January 2002 concentrated on agreeing how funds would be spent in 2002/3. Each
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organisation had been allocated a funding envelope within which it must work. Each 
funding envelope would allow approximately a third of each organisation’s wish list 
to be funded. The general idea was to begin with the total wish list and remove or 
cut down services until the funding required met that available. (It is important to 
remember that the funds being discussed in all these meetings were growth funds; 
the bulk of annual funding was allocated on a historical basis, without further 
discussion.) A member of the Health Authority and a member of PCT B chaired this 
part of the meeting jointly. There were a further five PCT members and just one 
NHS Trust member present. All other participants at this monthly meeting had 
chosen to break off to discuss long-term financial recovery rather than commissioned 
services for 2002/3.
Within minutes of being asked to make suggestions, the single member of NHS 
Trust B present appeared to be in despair, asking “what’s the point? ” given that 
achieving their access targets alone would cost more than their allocated funds. The 
PCT members made suggestions for reductions. They also corrected what they saw 
as an error in the NHS Trust’s calculations. The NHS Trust had included £150k as 
essential costs for a new cataract theatre. The PCTs claimed that the funding had 
been given for that particular development in the previous year and as a result they 
cut £150k off the NHS Trust’s estimated costs. The NHS Trust accepted this but 
insisted the PCT take responsibility for providing the additional funds if it transpired 
that they had not in fact been given previously.
A further 35 minutes of debate followed when each item on the wish list was 
discussed in turn. One of the PCTs realised part way through the debate that in fact 
the size of the funding envelopes had been calculated incorrectly and that the NHS 
Trust would be given even less than originally planned. The NHS Trust member 
appeared somewhat demoralised nearing the end of the debate, not really considering 
the implications of the decisions being made -  “just put fifty [thousand pounds] into 
peads and fifty into nursing” and “just cut what you like”. The result was that the 
agent agreed to a series of decisions about service delivery with what appeared to be 
little serious thought about how these promises were to be delivered or the impact on 
service quality and targets of making such reductions. This was in marked contrast 
to debates in previous meetings where the NHS Trust had refused to make hasty 
agreements.
145
iii) The agent threatened the principal with increased costs
During the same debate in January on how to pare down the wish list, a new cataract 
theatre was discussed. NHS Trust B stated that some of the funds they were 
requesting were to set up a new theatre that, although expensive in the short term, 
would in the longer-term reduce waiting times. This was backed up with a warning 
that if the new theatre was not funded, patients would have to be sent from the NHS 
Trust to a private provider in order to meet the waiting time targets, and that would 
end up costing even more. The PCT did not agree to fund the new theatre (they 
claimed it had been funded previously -  see discussion above). A final decision was 
made to allocate the NHS Trust only the amount that had been ring-fenced nationally 
for cataract surgery.
The agent in this case had threatened the principal with higher costs in the future. It 
was able to do this in part because the financial deficits were shared across the 
community and also because the NHS Trust (not the PCT) had responsibility for 
commissioning private care. Any increases in costs incurred by the NHS Trust 
would impact therefore on the whole community. There would be no way of the 
PCTs knowing whether the private care was essential or could have been avoided. 
The PCT did not succumb to this pressure.
iv) The agent ensured the principal's actions benefited the agent
In both the January and February meetings, the NHS Trust made efforts to ensure 
that planned changes to services provided by the PCT would be in the NHS Trust’s 
favour.
In the January meeting to decide on priorities, not only did the NHS Trust have to 
pare down planned services, but the PCTs had to do so as well. One of the areas of 
discussion was the number of community physician supervisors employed. The PCT 
wanted to increase the number of supervisors in order to meet the requirements of 
the National Service Framework for Older People and to have an adequate 
community care service. Without the increase, they claimed, more people would 
have to stay as inpatients at the NHS Trust. The NHS Trust member wanted to know 
exactly how many additional patients the NHS Trust would be able to discharge as a 
result of the extra community physicians. The PCT was not able to give any figures, 
but justified the plans by quoting them as one of the most popular proposals agreed
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at the December evening clinical priorities meetings. The NHS Trust again 
questioned the PCT, wanting them to guarantee that their investment in community 
physicians would mean no “corridor waits” for the NHS Trust, and wanting to know 
how many physicians would be appointed and the result in terms of quicker 
discharges. The PCT was not able to answer these questions and would give no 
guarantees. Eventually, the PCT decided the number of appointees on the basis of 
the funds available, not the impact on the NHS Trust.
This example shows the principal appearing to justify to the agent some of the 
principal’s own plans for service development. The reason this happens is that, 
unlike in standard principal-agent relationships, the actions of the principal affect the 
agent as well as vice versa. Because they serve the same population, they are 
dependant upon each other’s actions. It is interesting also that the principal used the 
same tactics on the agent as the agent did on the principal. The tactic was threats of 
the form “if you do not allow us to have our way, it will impact adversely on you”. 
The agent attempted to take advantage of this situation by obtaining guarantees from 
the principal about benefits to the agent. The principal, however, gave no such 
guarantees.
v) The agent made financial gains by refusing to change plans
On a number of occasions, the PCT and NHS Trust had misunderstandings about 
some financial issues that appeared more fundamental than any attempt to align 
service objectives. Two examples occurred in the February meeting. This was a 
long meeting (scheduled for three but lasting three and a half hours), chaired by the 
Chief Executive of the Health Authority. The aim was to agree a draft SaFF to be 
submitted to the regional office by the end of the day. PCT B was responsible for 
composing the SaFF. From early on, tensions were high, after the PCT revealed that 
the NHS Trust had presented them with a bill for private care to meet waiting time 
targets, a bill that had “arrived on the table last night”. In addition, the NHS Trust 
had presented its figures showing a £2m deficit of which the PCT was not aware.
The NHS Trust was asked about this deficit.
Part of the deficit was due to the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST).
The CNST works like an insurance scheme for negligence claims. NHS Trust B 
paid premiums of around a million pounds. A debate followed in which the NHS
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Trust insisted that these payments were “a category one cost pressure” and as such 
should be included in the SaFF (and therefore the deficit) like all other category one 
pressures, pressures outside their control. The PCT and HA wanted to see a strategy 
to remove this cost. The NHS Trust insisted that it was “not [their] strategy” to 
remove these costs. The PCT Chief Executive reminded everyone that at the 
previous meeting they had agreed the finances and pared down their development 
plans in line with the financial agreement. It was not possible now to add to the 
agreed deficit or cut the planned developments. NHS Trust B insisted that this figure 
was not new - “We 're not adding to it!!”.
Later in the same meeting, the Director of Finance at PCT B suggested that the NHS 
Trust had “double counted the slippage”. The issue here was that the PCT had 
presented in the SaFF table the cost of its developments over a full year, and then 
adjusted this figure for slippage, assuming that developments would not in fact begin 
until half way through the year. This meant that the expected costs would be only 
half the full year costs. NHS Trust B had calculated the cost o f their developments 
over half a year, already allowing for slippage. The PCT had taken the NHS Trust’s 
development costs as given, presented them in the table with their own full year 
costs, and applied 50% slippage. The result was that all of the NHS Trust’s 
development costs had been reduced to allow for slippage twice.
In response to the accusation of double counting, the NHS Trust insisted that it was 
not them, but the PCT, that had made the mistake. The PCT was angry, the NHS 
Trust was in despair - “Well that’s a major problem for us”, but adamant it was the 
PCT that had got things wrong. The HA Chief Executive attempted to mediate and 
suggest it was sorted out at a later date. The PCT refused; they wanted it agreeing 
there and then. Another HA member suggested they go back to previous papers to 
check the slippage, and asks if everyone is clear about its impact. “About as clear as 
mud” was one response.
At the end of this meeting there was no clear decision about either of these issues: 
the clinical negligence payments nor the slippage.
Whether deliberate or accidental, the agent had succeeded in adding to the overall 
deficit of the health community (principals and agent) without reducing their own 
development plans. Despite efforts by the principal to force the agent to reconfigure
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its services to allow for (what the principal saw as) the agent’s mistake, the agent had 
again refused. The fact that the HA Chief Executive had chaired this meeting 
suggests that the PCTs did not have the legitimate power to achieve the required 
agreement.
vi) Principal and agent agreed joint responsibility
In addition to these conflicts, there were many occasions when the PCT and NHS 
Trust agreed joint responsibility for issues and showed a shared commitment to 
service delivery.
In the March meeting, there was a discussion about “in-year pressures”, in particular, 
who had the responsibility for agreeing funding for additional high cost/low volume 
cases. The scenario presented was of a patient requiring treatment, but the patient 
was the twentieth that year, when funding had been agreed for only nineteen. The 
debate centred on the roles of a clinical group and a commissioning group that both 
fed into the current meeting. All parties agreed that the final say would come from 
themselves after discussion at these monthly meetings.
On an earlier occasion in January, the minutes of the meeting that I did not attend 
show that the PCT and NHS Trust had agreed to communicate jointly with GPs and 
others in telling them that some services had been stopped due to the funding 
position.
These examples illustrate a shared ethos between the organisations; despite the 
different roles they have been given to play, the main broad aim of all of them is to 
provide good patient care.
In summary, these meetings showed genuine debates between the principal and agent 
about services and finances. At all times the organisations had been attempting to 
agree a way forward. On many occasions, the agent played a powerful role. It is not 
clear whether, on the whole, the principal was trying to align the agent’s objectives 
to its own, or vice versa, or if the many organisations within the health community 
were influencing each other equally. At times, the agent appeared to treat the 
principals as legitimate funding bodies, but at others it did not treat them with the 
respect that a legitimate body might expect.
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c) Case study C
In case study C, I attended five meetings (see chapter three for details). The 
organisation of meetings deteriorated throughout the period of observation. 
Attendance at the meetings by neighbouring PCTs declined over time. Many of the 
meetings had little focus and consisted of discussions of what progress people had 
made in the previous week or two, usually related to improving the quality of 
information.
i) Neither principals' nor agent's objectives were explicit
In the majority of the meetings, attendees appeared to have few explicit objectives. 
The four PCTs did not have the same objectives (this is discussed in the section on 
multiple principals), and none made it absolutely clear to the NHS Trust what they 
expected. One of the possible reasons given for this was that the health authority 
was sending out conflicting messages.
In the first of the meetings of the Operational Group, held in November 2001, there 
was a discussion about which targets the organisations could meet in 2002/3. An 
NHS Trust manager asked the PCTs which targets they expected the health 
community to reach successfully. The Director of Commissioning at PCT C 
responded that the organisations should have a common set of targets, but that PCT 
C would only be able to reach those it was currently reaching or could reach through 
service reconfiguration at no additional cost. They did not have the finances to 
achieve any more. She continued that she believed the health authority was sending 
out separate messages to the NHS Trust and the PCTs. They were telling the NHS 
Trust that they must hit their targets whilst they were telling the PCTs to reach 
financial balance. She believed that the health authority was “working in silence” 
and did not know it was sending out these conflicting messages.
It may have been that the principals and agent were reliant on a higher level principal 
(the HA), and if  they did not receive clear messages they could not give clear 
messages themselves.
ii) The principal and agent worked as one
The Director of Commissioning from PCT C played a prominent role, although 
second to the NHS Trust Director of Operations in the earlier meetings. The Trust
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Director of Operations and PCT Director of Commissioning appeared to have 
discussed in advance of the meetings a lot of the issues covered. For example, in the 
first meeting, the Trust Director of Operations explained the history of the 
commissioning group, then referred to the PCT Director of Commissioning to add to 
that. The PCT Director of Commissioning explained the complexities of four PCTs 
commissioning services from the NHS Trust and from each other, and the financial 
position of NHS Trust C. The Trust Director of Operations then resumed with the 
minutes of the last meeting, but again referred to the PCT Director of 
Commissioning to fill any gaps. This shared process was evident in all of the 
meetings.
These directors did not seem to be playing the roles of principal or agent. The 
degree of collaboration was as if they were working for the same organisation. In 
particular, in the March meeting, the NHS Trust Director of Operations made a 
comment “with my [NHS Trust C] hat on, I  suppose that’s the only one I  wear these 
days...” The extent of collaboration between PCT C and NHS Trust C appeared to 
be greater than that between PCT C and the other PCTs present.
iii) The "higher" principal did not act as principal
Likewise, the higher principal (in this case, the regional office) did not play a strong 
principal role. The purpose of the March 2002 meeting was to agree a draft SaFF. A 
member of the regional office chaired the meeting. Unlike the HA in case study A, 
this regional office representative did not direct the other participants to achieve 
particular objectives. Her role was to ensure that each item within the SaFF was 
discussed and agreement on funds and subsequent achievement of targets was 
reached.
One of the first debates in this meeting was about how the target relating to a 
maximum wait of four hours in A&E could be achieved. The regional office 
representative stated that although this target was for 100% of patients and was not 
negotiable, NHS Trust C would be able to achieve only 75%. She stated that they 
should be “upfront’ about this in the SaFF and “see what happens to us”. It is 
interesting that the regional office, as a principal higher up the principal-agent 
ladder, referred to “us”, the health community, as if the organisations were all 
equally responsible.
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Later in the same meeting, the regional office representative made a similar 
comment in a debate about nurse consultants. The PCTs were not convinced that 
nurse consultant posts in NHS Trust C were a priority. The regional office 
representative commented that the health community may “be told we have to” 
introduce nurse consultant posts.
Throughout this meeting, the regional office representative reminded the other 
participants of priority areas and non-negotiable targets, but did not impose the 
region’s own objectives. She was acting as a catalyst for agreement of the SaFF, not 
as a high-level principal imposing high-level objectives.
iv) The principal did not steer the agents
In the February meeting, it became clear that none of the organisations knew what 
the others were planning to invest in. A local community trust had been invited to 
attend the meeting to discuss its capacity modelling system and how this could help 
NHS Trust C. It transpired during the discussion that both the community trust and 
NHS Trust C were planning to invest in gastroscopy nursing staff. This overlap in 
intentions appeared to be discovered by chance. It was agreed that only one 
organisation should invest in the service improvements, although to my knowledge 
this issue was not discussed again. The SaFF/SLA document (discussed in the 
previous section) mentioned this issue briefly. It stated that NHS Trust C had 
submitted to the PCT a number of proposals that the NHS Trust considered top 
priority. One of these was additional capacity for gastroscopies. The only comment 
in the SaFF/SLA that related to this meeting’s discussion was that “discussion is 
required to consider whether this work could be undertaken in community hospital 
facilities
Given that two agents had set funds aside to develop a similar service, and the 
decision had been made that only one would do so, one would expect that the 
principal would lead a debate about the alternative use of the released funds. This 
did not happen. This could mean that the principal did not have strong enough 
objectives to debate clear alternatives or that it did not feel such a debate was within 
its legitimate rights. Alternatively, it could mean that there was a high level of trust 
between the principal and agents; the principal may have trusted either agent to use 
the released funds in the best interests of the health community.
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v) The agent did not take advantage of its dominance
In the initial meetings of this group, a member of staff from NHS Trust C organised 
the meetings, set the agenda and chaired the meetings. This was a similar role to that 
of the HA in case study A. This member of staff had been employed to begin with to 
work on behalf of the whole health community and was based in PCT C, but was 
seconded to and then became the Director of Operations at NHS Trust C. Later, a 
member of the regional office chaired these meetings.
At the first meeting in November 2001, the NHS Trust Director of Operations asked 
if everyone was happy for her to “co-ordinate” the meetings. Everybody was happy 
and the Trust Director of Operations continued to set the agenda throughout the 
SaFF process. As expected, the majority of items appeared to relate to NHS Trust C 
achieving its targets. All meeting attendees were able to add items to the agenda 
prior to the meetings. On more than one occasion, the Trust Director of Operations 
struck an item off the agenda at the start of the meeting, the reason being that the 
NHS Trust had not completed its preparation. On none of these occasions did the 
PCTs object.
In general, it appeared that the agent had the opportunity to control the meetings and 
to ensure the items discussed resulted in actions in their own favour, but did not 
always take advantage of this opportunity. Moreover, the principal did not make any 
attempt to impose its own agenda.
One debate shed some light on this issue. The debate took place in one of the 
January 2002 meetings. The specific issue under debate was the release back to the 
PCTs of funds from NHS Trust C as a result of the PCTs decreasing their level of 
service use. The underlying issue appeared to be the fairness with which NHS Trust 
C treated the different PCTs. There was a view that NHS Trust C was treating the 
different PCTs differently in relation to funding and service use. NHS Trust C 
responded they were not doing this; their systems were not sophisticated enough to 
do so.
It is interesting that the principals thought the agent might be using its knowledge to 
differentiate between the principals, but in fact the agent confessed to the principals 
that it was not capable of this. This suggests that although the agent may have
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wished to pursue its own objectives, it was not able to do so in a way that was 
deliberately detrimental to individual principals.
vi) The principals felt that the agent was dominating the agenda
As illustrated above, the agent did not feel that it was able fully to exploit its 
potential dominance. However, the PCTs felt that it did dominate the SaFF agenda. 
In the March meeting in which the draft SaFF was finalised, PCT C complained that 
the draft SaFF was “aw [NHS Trust C] lis t ,  not a health community list. NHS Trust 
C Director of Operations responded that it was not just a hospital list. The regional 
office representative commented that all the finances would go to NHS Trust C 
anyway so what they should concentrate on was how they were to achieve the 
community’s priorities. The debate continued for another 20 minutes, with each 
item on the list being discussed in turn. Tempers rose after one of the newer 
members of the group asked where community investment decisions were made.
The NHS Trust Director of Operations became defensive, complaining that it felt as 
if  everyone was “scrutinising” NHS Trust C and yet not producing their own 
priorities. Two PCTs responded that they had “zeroed community investment. The 
Trust Director of Operations then questioned the level of funds NHS Trust was 
receiving compared to primary care; primary care was receiving a 10% increase 
whereas the average across the health community was just 5.6%. (This issue was 
raised again in the interviews). One PCT claimed that their SaFF and investment 
plans had always been available to NHS Trust C but that there was very little to look 
at, and that the 10% increase in funds was for prescribing only. The debate 
continued with a discussion about each item on the SaFF list but few further 
comments about whose priorities the list comprised. Members of one PCT left the 
meeting shortly after this exchange.
This exchange showed a lack of trust between the principals and agent; the principals 
felt that the agent was driving the agenda to its own advantage and the agent felt that 
the principal was favouring itself in the allocation of funds. The agent, however, 
appeared to believe that it had fallen to the agent to drive the agenda because the 
principals were not doing so.
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vii) The principals refused to agree to the agent's objectives
In the March meeting, the participants debated the introduction in NHS Trust C of a 
Rapid Assessment Team (RAT) on admission, an Integrated Assessment Team 
(IAT) for discharge and a consultant nurse post in A&E. The Winter and Emergency 
Services Team (WEST) had identified the RAT and IAT teams as priority 
requirements.
The Trust Director of Operations justified these expenditures as being part of the 
WEST action plan. One of the PCTs twice stated that her PCT did not “recognise” 
these plans as something they had worked through. (The word “recognise” was used 
to mean acknowledge rather than be familiar with.) PCT C Director of 
Commissioning commented also that she did not believe a nurse consultant post in 
the NHS Trust was helpful when the community’s plans were to treat more patients 
outside hospitals. After further debate, a third PCT expressed concern that if the 
nurse consultant post and the RAT/IAT proposals were agreed together, then priority 
1 and priority 2 funding was being merged. This would mean that external pressures 
to fund priority 1 issues would advantage the agent by being linked automatically to 
an innovation of lesser priority. A decision was made by the PCTs that the priority 1 
RAT/IAT proposals should be funded but the nurse consultant post would not.
This is one of the few examples in these meetings where the principals refused to 
agree with the agent. This meeting is also the only meeting that I attended where a 
Chief Executive of one of the PCTs (not PCT C) was present throughout. It may 
have been the presence of the Chief Executive or the pressure of the SaFF deadline 
that prompted more definition than previously in the roles of the organisations, that 
is, the PCTs acted in what they saw as the community’s interest rather than the 
interest of the NHS Trust.
In summary, the principals and agent in this case study appeared to have less distinct 
roles than in the other case studies. The agent often spoke of a whole health 
community approach despite the SaFF agenda being dominated by the agent’s 
issues. This domination may have been due more to the local context (this case 
study was the most under target of the three in terms of finances, NHS Trust C had a 
large deficit and it was struggling to meet many national targets) than to deliberate 
manipulation by the agent.
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On the whole, the principals attempted to align the agents’ objectives with their own 
through negotiation but were not always successful in doing so. NHS Trust A was 
the least active agent; it appeared willing to accept the objectives of its principal (the 
Health Authority) with little question. NHS Trusts B and C were more active and at 
times attempted and succeeded in forcing their own objectives on their principals. 
The agent was more powerful than the principals in case study C and at least as 
powerful in case study B. In case study A, the principal was more powerful. 
Although the agents may have been able to hide information about their costs, there 
was no evidence that they did so deliberately.
3) Multiple principals and a common agent
The previous two sections have shown that incentives were not used in contracts and 
that principals were sometimes but not always successful in aligning agents’ 
objectives to their own in other ways. I turn now to the first of the main themes that 
arose from the data, the case of multiple principals and a common agent.
Agency theory offers two predictions for the case of multiple principals and a 
common agent. One is that the principals will collude if their objectives and access 
to information about the agent are the same; the other is that they will act 
independently if their objectives and access to information are different. If acting 
independently, principals may set competing incentive contracts that weaken each 
other.
A number of general questions arise: do the multiple principals in the case studies 
have the same objectives and access to information from their common agents; what 
factors encourage them to collude; and what are the results of any collusion? These 
factors have been considered separately for case studies B and C only. Case study A 
was selected specifically because PCT A was not involved in joint commissioning 
with other PCTs. It is therefore not appropriate to discuss case study A in this 
section. This section presents data labelled with the codes related to multiple 
principals, objectives, agendas, information, partnerships, boundaries, 
responsibilities, sharing and power.
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My argument here is that the predictions are borne out to a certain extent, but not for 
the reasons expected. In case study B, principals collude and become more powerful 
vis-a-vis the agent. In case study C, principals do not collude as strongly (although 
they attempt to do so) and appear less powerful vis-a-vis their agent. This is as 
expected. The loss of power in C, however, is not due to principals setting contracts 
that weaken each other, but is due to an attempt to collude when in fact the principals 
have different and unclear objectives and a lack of trust in each other. The result is 
that the agent retains power.
a) Case study B
This section illustrates how the principals in case study B worked together. The 
evidence presented is based on my own perceptions of meetings that took place as 
well as interviewees’ perceptions of the commissioning process.
The PCTs appeared to present a united front to the NHS Trust. Their broad 
objectives were similar and information for commissioning was available equally to 
all the PCTs. The NHS Trust provided this information. The PCTs supported each 
other in discussions and seemed to have a shared understanding in terms of attitudes 
and desires. Although the PCTs colluded in negotiations, they did not share a 
contract with the NHS Trust. The result of their collusion was seen by them and the 
NHS Trust to be a position of greater power. However, the PCTs felt that they could 
work together better and there were signs of tensions between the PCTs as they 
became aware of their different needs. Interestingly, the PCTs professed that they 
colluded in order to try to support the development of the NHS Trust and benefit the 
whole health community rather than to gain power over the NHS Trust.
i) Principals had broad objectives: "to improve the health of the 
population"
Two sets of broad objectives emerged for PCT B and the neighbouring PCT 
interviewed. One set related to internal objectives and the other to commissioned 
services. The PCTs’ internal roles were to improve the health of their populations 
and be good employers.
...the PCT is here to improve the health o f the population.
(GP PCT B 29/4)
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.[a] whole lot o f things like to be a very good employer. 
(Manager nPCT B 34/60)
... developing primary care, commissioning services, 
improving health and local inequalities and improving the 
workforce, the role o f our staff within the organisation.
(Manager PCT B 33/2)
The commissioning objectives were to meet the government’s agenda.
...ourpriority's around meeting the national targets 
(Manager PCT B 33/75)
The first line has to be to meet the various Government 
directives. (Manager nPCT B 34/18)
The NHS Trust agreed with these general objectives of the PCTs.
One is to promote health and well-being in their 
environment, you know, for the catchment population they 
serve, i f  you like. Second is to provide good quality primary 
and community care services... (Manager NHS Trust B
83/15)
I  think the P C T -you  know, their objectives are, would be 
about increasing access for their population to some o f the 
services that we offer. (Manager NHS Trust B 31/30)
These stated objectives were, however, very broad. It may be that the generality of 
these objectives helped the PCTs to maintain cross PCT agreement for 
commissioning issues. In the interviews, there was little mention of any measurable 
objectives that related to commissioned services. Some of the GPs did discuss 
specific issues (for example drug abuse services and prescribing) but these were 
associated mostly with primary not secondary care. As primary care issues they 
were related to individual PCTs, and so, in considering the issue of multiple 
principals and a common agent, are not relevant.
ii) Principals had equal access to information: "It's shared 
information"
Principal-agent theory suggests that principals should have similar objectives, but 
also shared information to make collusion beneficial.
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There was no doubt that what information was available about NHS Trust B for 
commissioning purposes was available equally to all the PCTs. The access that the 
PCTs had to information about the performance of NHS Trust B was generally 
considered to be good.
Yes, it's shared, it's shared information so we all understand 
what's happening around GP referrals and how that's going 
to affect [NHS Trust B ’s] ability to perform (Manager 
PCTB 33/60)
I  would say we get very good information about the numbers 
o f things that are done and how long people have to wait for  
them. (Manager nPCTB 34/67)
The NHS Trust supplied the information to the PCTs. One interviewee at the NHS 
Trust provided me with a copy of their monthly performance report. As described 
below, this gave detailed information about activity and trends by practice and 
specialty. The perception was that this information was provided to the PCTs as a 
free service, rather than as an integral part of the NHS Trust’s role as an agent.
We also supply information by practice and by PCT with 
trends, graph trends about additions to lists, by speciality 
etc. waiting times, benchmark data and we supply that for  
day cases, outpatients and emergencies, monthly to each 
P C T ... and we do that as a free service. (Manager NHS 
Trust B 31/35)
...around activity and waiting list modelling, monitoring, 
planning, my team out here provide all the information for  
all the local community. (Manager NHS Trust B 28/95)
... [the PCTs] should know about referral rates, should know 
about DNA rates at outpatients clinics, should know about 
waiting lists, should know about changes in waiting lists, 
should know about financial costs on a month to month basis 
and where the problems are, all these things are shared with 
the PCTs... (Surgeon NHS Trust B 89/69)
There were areas of missing information, but there is no reason to believe that these 
were different for the different PCTs, and that is the important factor under 
consideration here. Despite the claim by the surgeon above that financial costs on a 
month-to-month basis were available to the PCTs, this PCT manager spoke about the 
desire to understand exactly what the hospital’s costs were.
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A real understanding o f cost and capacity structure, 
probably largely by speciality, ... what the nature o f  their 
cost structure is like and where they are at any time on it, on 
their cost curve. (Manager PCT B 26/61)
Similarly, the neighbouring PCT manager wanted to see more information given 
about the services actually being provided and the quality of the care.
We ought to have information about the services, the range 
o f services that is offered by [NHS Trust B] and that is not 
very good. ... I  think that we need information about 
performance o f the services ...W e get almost no information 
at all about the quality or the outcome. Those are the two 
really major gaps. (Manager nPCT B 34/62)
Whether or not this information was appropriate or timely for the commissioning 
process is a different question. The important point here is that the PCTs perceived 
that on the whole they were receiving good information from the NHS Trust and that 
they were all receiving the same information.
This evidence suggests that the PCTs were in a good position to collude: they had 
similar (albeit broad) objectives and equal access to information. They therefore 
should have colluded, setting joint contracts to increase their power relative to the 
NHS Trust. However, this happened only to a degree. The PCTs worked together 
during negotiations but did not have a joint SLA. However, their separate SLAs 
were very similar.
I  think it's very much the same, 98% the same, and there are 
bits on the back which show activity for our PCT and so on, 
a few  numbers and things for us. And the [neighbouring 
NHS Trust] one is going to be the same. (Manager nPCT B 
34/112)
iii) Principals had a shared understanding: "they may not he quite 
seamless but it's pretty close"
The PCTs had agreed when they were set up that each would represent the others in 
negotiations in certain clinical areas. As a result, PCT B led in discussions with 
NHS Trust B on surgical matters and the neighbouring PCT led on all issues to do 
with medical specialties.
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...we ve divided up the divisions at [NHS Trust B] so we lead 
on particular ones, so I  do medicine division. (Manager 
nPCTB 34/92)
... they have made good inroads into developing a sort o f 
collective approach to commissioning ... so i f  we have a 
conversation around something in surgery with [PCTB 
commissioning director] then I ’m happy that h e 's either 
speaking on behalf o f the other two or i f  he can’t agree 
something, he says I ’m going to have to go back and talk to 
him about this because I  don ’t know what they think.
(Manager NHS Trust B 28/58)
Despite this organised division of responsibilities, PCT B, as the largest, tended to be 
viewed as the lead PCT for all commissioning with NHS Trust B. PCT B certainly 
considered itself to be in the lead.
I  think there is a hierarchy there. Between the PCTs I  would 
see [PCT B] as being the top, simply because o f  our size and 
our capacity. So we do often take the lead on PCT issues, 
commissioning. (Manager PCT B 33/108)
...we've got a bigger budget and a bigger need to interface 
with [NHS Trust B[. I  think our budget spend in [NHS Trust
B] is what 50-60% o f their budget so we actually are the 
major purchaser... (GP PCT B 82/95)
The was also a view from the NHS Trust that the smaller PCTs felt that it treated 
PCT B as the lead, although the NHS Trust was not sure that this was the case.
... /  think there is a sense in the two smaller PCTs that we 
tend to jump more to [PCT B ’s] tune than theirs. I ’m not sure 
we do particularly but I  think there is a feeling amongst them 
that we do. (Manager NHS Trust B 28/61)
One of the most prominent examples of the PCTs sharing an understanding of the 
commissioning process and providing support to each other in meetings was the 
discussion about double counting the slippage (see previous section for details). The 
NHS Trust clearly had a different understanding to the PCTs. Each of the three 
PCTs involved had calculated their finances in the same way. One of the PCT 
managers made a comment during interview that may have been referring to this 
incident, and certainly makes the same point.
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...all o f the commissioners coming away with an 
understanding and [NHS Trust B] simply not having the 
same understanding and I  don't know how that happens.
(Manager PCTB 33/87)
The NHS Trust shared the view that the PCTs worked well together.
I  think with the services that involve us they work quite well, 
they may not be quite seamless but it’s pretty close.
(Manager NHS Trust B 83/62)
The PCTs had supported each other against the NHS Trust during many debates in 
the SaFF meetings. The meeting when the NHS Trust refused to discuss the 
recurrent or non-recurrent nature of a half million pound pot of money is a prime 
example. The PCTs all agreed on the status of the funds; the NHS Trust didn’t. On 
other occasions when the NHS Trust wanted guarantees about the impact on them of 
PCT activity, the PCTs were united in refusing to give any guarantees.
iv) Principals increased their power vis-a-vis the agent: "We'd be out­
voted"
Theory suggests that principals increase their power in relation to their shared agent 
if they work as one.
There was a generally held view that the simple fact that the PCTs held the budgets 
made them powerful. Respondents commented on this power base in a general way 
and did not relate it specifically to the fact that the PCTs worked together. Clinicians 
and managers in the NHS Trust felt that the balance of power between them and 
primary care had changed already in favour of primary care.
...consultants are put in a kind o f kneeling position and the 
GPs are the ones saying ‘yes you can have that ’ and ‘no you 
can't (Manager NHS Trust B 31/76)
I  think the Primary Care Trust has very much been 
empowered by the fact that they hold the budgets nowadays 
and that has very powerfully changed the relationship 
between the Primary Care Trusts and the Hospital Trust, so 
now the Hospital Trust takes a lot more notice o f  what the 
PCTs are saying. (Surgeon NHS Trust B 90/11)
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Primary care respondents, however, were less likely to believe that they had begun to
use this new power, although they were aware that it existed and they would be able 
to use it in the future.
Increasingly PCTs, and [PCT B], is beginning to spread its 
wings and to think actually we have some real power in this 
system, ... because o f what we can do with our 
commissioning budget and ... also the role we've been 
mandated to take on. ... Power is something that we don’t 
ever like to talk about in relationships but I  think we are in a 
more powerful position. (Manager PCT B 33/112)
They see that we've got the muscles but we haven't shown any 
sign particularly o f using them. I  suspect that they are 
probably slightly wary o f the time we do but perhaps slightly 
reassured that we haven't shown any inclination to do so, so 
far. (Manager nPCT B 34/41)
There were a number of comments specific to the power gained by the PCTs through 
working together. Theory suggests that this power is achieved through the use of 
incentives set jointly; these data suggest that it is achieved by more simple means, 
through voting and the advantage of greater numbers in negotiations. The NHS 
Trust Chief Executive was seen as the most powerful individual in commissioning 
negotiations but his power was countered by the collaboration between the PCTs. 
Numbers carried more weight than personal power.
... at the end o f the day we are one Acute Trust and there are 
three Primary Care Trusts so i f  it came to a vote, we ’d be 
out-voted. (Manager NHS Trust B 30/12)
... the most powerful individual is on one side o f the fence 
but on the other side o f the fence there are actually three 
other organisations ... it's two voices against six i f  you've got 
Directors o f Finance and Chief Execs, so it doesn't really 
matter how good your Chief Exec, on the acute side is ... i f  
you've got six people coming back at you and only two going 
that way it can actually be quite an unbalanced debate.
(Manager NHS Trust 28/56)
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v) Principals felt they could collude better: "N ot enough, it's very 
sad"
Despite appearing very organised to the outside world, within the PCTs there was a 
view that their level of collaboration was poor. There was a feeling that even within 
the PCTs, they were not communicating and agreeing as a single unit as effectively 
as they could. One of the problems was considered to be the difficulties in 
developing corporate objectives for an organisation that was made up out of a 
number of previously independent bodies, that is, PCTs that had developed out of a 
mix of PCGs and community trusts.
The view from a neighbouring PCT was that PCT B gave out confused messages to 
the other PCTs because it could not agree its internal objectives.
... they have quite different objectives and they haven’t 
sorted out what their corporate objectives are. ... I  can 
have a meeting with one fairly senior person and get one 
view and have another meeting with another fairly senior 
person and I  get almost the opposite view. (Manager 
nPCTB 34/116)
The PCTs had planned to meet regularly to discuss issues of concern to them in both 
their commissioning and providing roles. I attended the first one of these meetings 
in January 2002. Seven people attended; they were from four PCTs and were all 
finance managers. The majority of the discussion was a technical discussion about 
the levels of funds available to the PCTs to commission services. There was also a 
heated discussion about whether or not it was the responsibility of PCT B to ensure 
that NHS Trust B met its targets within the funds provided by the PCTs. There was 
no conclusion to the discussion at this meeting. These PCT only meetings faded out 
not long after they had begun. These types of meetings appeared to be missed by 
both managers and GPs. The following comments were made after being asked 
about how PCTs worked together.
Not enough! Not enough, it's very sad. We started having 
some meetings ...we thought well we ought to be getting 
together to agree our common front sometimes without [the 
NHS Trust], but we hardly ever meet. We were meant to have 
a meeting o f that this week but when we had the main 
meeting everybody had to rush o ff and we never got round to 
it. (Manager nPCT B 34/25)
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...we used to have meetings, ...just being the GPs and GP 
managers sitting down before the combined meeting with 
secondary care, so what our goals, targets, aims were for  
that meeting and how we wished to move things forward.
(GP PCT B 82/23)
There were also examples of a PCT making “unilateral crunch decisions” that 
affected the other PCTs adversely and show a breakdown in collaboration.
...[nPCT to east] has decided to commission, to purchase 
additional ultrasound activity and that has slightly 
destabilized the provision o f ultrasound in [NHS Trust B], 
which means that [nPCT to west] and [PCT B] have a 
slightly diminished ultrasound service because one primary 
care organization has moved ahead without perhaps as much 
consultation as might have taken place. So in terms o f  
working together we are not working together perhaps now 
as efficiently as we have in the past. (GP PCT B 82/25)
vi) Tensions between local needs and collusion: "referral rates are 
different and that can have a big impactJt
At the same time as stressing the need to work together, there was an awareness that 
the different organisations had different local needs and agendas, and despite 
collaboration, these differences should not be forgotten.
...they all have their own agendas which are subtly 
different... (Surgeon NHS Trust B 89/81)
As one respondent commented, the original purpose of PCGs and PCTs was to have 
“local care for local people”. There was a view that by working too closely 
together, important differences in population needs would be lost.
... half the idea o f the PCGs was to have local care for local 
people and for us to work in a very unified way doesn ’t 
actually carry the philosophy o f PCGs through ...we need to 
have different services because we ve got different 
populations with different needs. (GP PCT B 82/26)
The management view tended to be that these differences were important, but should 
not obstruct collaboration between the PCTs. Although remaining aware of different 
needs, they appeared happy to look for shared broader issues rather than search out
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differences. The manager from a rural PCT was aware of the different population 
needs of his PCT compared to urban PCT B, but could see similarities as well.
I  think there is bound to be a difference just from the urban 
nature o f the city. Although we may have some common 
objectives say with the deprived areas ... (Manager 
nPCTB 34/24)
Different local care needs could manifest themselves in differences in quantity rather 
than type of service and so the solution to discrepancies was merely to remain aware 
of any changes in service use.
Where it does become an issue is i f ... the referral rates are 
different and that can have a big impact on [NHS Trust BJ.
We have to sort o f dis-aggregate the information to 
understand our own PCT’s perspective and that's the 
dilemma when we ’re working as both health communities 
which would cover the 3 PCTs and as an organisation. The 
information that you get for a health community needs to be 
dis-aggregated so you can understand each individual PCT’s 
position, so you do in fact have differential performance.
(Manager PCT B 33/104)
vii) Principals colluded to help the agent: "Another layer of 
complexity”
Whatever the extent of collusion, one would expect PCTs to collude in order to gain 
an advantage over the NHS Trust by increasing their relative power, or to prevent 
being disempowered by the actions of other PCTs. Neither of these reasons 
appeared to be the case. It appeared that the PCTs felt that they colluded to help the 
NHS Trust rather than themselves, and the NHS Trust allowed the PCTs to do so 
because it was advantageous to the Trust.
PCT B felt that the system for commissioning was complex enough and that it would 
be unfair for the NHS Trust if the different PCTs imposed different demands for 
service provision on them.
...there ’d be nothing worse for [NHS Trust B] i f  we all 
wanted something slightly different, or yes they can do such 
and such with [PCT B] patients but no they couldn’t for  
[neighbouring PCT], I  mean that just adds another layer o f  
complexity into the system which, you know, the system’s got
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enough complexity as it is, so, yeah I  think i t’s important we 
try and keep it as simple as possible. (Manager PCT B
27/27)
It was suggested also that the NHS Trust might prefer the PCTs to work together, 
that is, the agent may prefer collusion by the principals. Both the PCTs and the NHS 
Trust held this view.
I  think a key objective o f [NHS Trust B] is to have a 
consistency o f approach from its commissioners, rather than 
being say a [PCT to west] approach, a [PCT B] approach 
and a [nPCT to east] approach, all o f which are different. At 
their present state o f development, I  don ’t think they could 
cope with that. (Manager nPCT B 34/30)
...in the past with health authority [to the west] we almost 
had a completely separate discussion process with [them] 
and often ended up by doing quite different agreements... I  
think now [nPCT to west] will see themselves as part o f [the 
main area] ...so  that we can agree reasonably similar 
arrangements across the patch. I  think that’s actually an 
advantage to us. (Manager NHS Trust B 83/61)
Other respondents supported this view, but the desire for equity of access for PCTs’ 
patients was also considered an important reason for collaboration between the 
PCTs.
I  think there’s an issue about making sure that we provide 
some continuity between the PCTs because we wouldn ’t want 
to develop differential access targets or differential types o f  
service as you had in fund-holding days where acute units 
were having to have different, twenty five different 
agreements with different fund-holders. (Manager PCT B 
33/103)
The implication of these views is that the NHS Trust could not cope with a diversity 
of approaches and demands, although there were contrasting voices from the NHS 
Trust. Compared to the era of fund-holding, being commissioned to provide services 
to three PCTs was not considered a problem.
Well, you know, when we had GP fund-holding we would 
have 50 practices to contract with, so 3 is fine. ... doesn ’t 
make a difference really. (Manager NHS Trust B 31/67)
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In addition, and in contrast to the view from the PCTs that it was they who were 
collaborating to help the NHS Trust, there was a view from the NHS Trust that part 
of the success of the PCTs* collaboration was a result of the NHS Trust choosing not 
to take advantage by dividing and ruling. This suggests that the NHS Trust could 
choose to divide and rule if it suited.
... we do meet with all three o f them, we don ’t sort o f divide 
them and say we 7/ meet with [PCT B] and discuss [PCT B] 
and then we 7/ nip o f f ... then go back to [nPCT] and say 
come on. (Surgeon NHS Trust B 89/81)
A lone GP voice suggested that the collaborative approach used by the PCTs might 
not have been permanent; the seemingly successful collusive system that these PCTs 
had developed may not have been planned as a strategic move, but instead was 
something they felt they had no choice in at the time and may alter in the future.
Things might change, places like [nPCT to west] have really 
said we don 7 want to spend any more money, stop. ... there 
are some slight changes in the philosophies between the 
primary care organizations, perhaps as they mature they 
want to do things slightly differently whilst when we started 
this PCG game to begin with none o f  us knew quite what we 
were doing and therefore we had to come together and work 
very closely. (GP PCT B 82/20)
In summary, these PCTs did have shared access to information and shared broad 
objectives although their local objectives differed slightly. The PCTs were therefore 
in a position to collude, and did so in negotiations. They did not share contracts 
although their contracts were very similar. Although their collusion was motivated 
more as a way to keep commissioning simple than to gain any kind of advantage 
over their shared NHS Trust agent, the PCTs were empowered through voting 
together on contentious issues. This is an important finding as PCT B had no 
alternative NHS provider and as such NHS Trust B may have considered itself in a 
very powerful position and taken advantage of this.
b) Case study C
This section discusses how the principals in case study C worked together. The 
PCTs appeared to follow the motions of presenting a united front, but without any
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underlying conviction. It did not appear as if the PCTs had planned a joint strategy 
or agreed which PCT would act as the lead. At times, there did not seem to be any 
obvious reason why the PCTs were meeting as a group with their shared NHS Trust. 
Although the quality of information provided was poor, it was available equally to 
all PCTs. The reasons why the PCTs tried to collude seemed to be the perceived 
pressures to use a collegiate commissioning system, a concern about taking 
responsibilities for commissioning decisions and a culture of sharing.
i) Principals' objectives were different or unclear: "Different PCOs 
with different focuses"
The high level objectives of the PCTs were understood well. These objectives are 
those set out in the NHS Plan and the National Service Frameworks.
... to secure services for the population, secure health 
services, improve health and provide services. The high level 
objectives are clear. (Manager PCT C 32/30)
Achieving the key national access targets ... (Manager 
PCT C 36/12)
...you're set objectives aren't you, your waiting time targets, 
cancer targets, CHD targets and other processes about 
trying secure the delivery o f the targets. It isn't as simple as 
that but, that should be the intent. (Manager PCT C 91/7)
Interestingly, each of these quotes is from a member of PCT C. The Chief 
Executive, Director of Finance and Director of Commissioning all spoke of the 
clarity and importance of the nationally set objectives. From the point of view of the 
other PCTs and the NHS Trust (both managers and clinicians), however, the 
objectives of the PCTs appeared at best different, at worst very confused and 
unclear.
...the priorities weren't clear around what people were 
deciding. (Manager nPCT C 41/10)
... there isn't [a] common agenda ... (Manager Regional
Office 80/6)
Feels like there's four or five groups wanting something from  
us! (Surgeon NHS Trust C 95/27)
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I  think part o f the problem that we've got [is] the lack o f one 
focus or at least one or two visions that we accept as the way 
forward, I  think we've got different PCOs with different 
focuses that don’t see the priorities in the same way as each 
other. (Manager NHS Trust C 39/32)
And later the same interviewee responds...
I  think going back to my point - fo u r  PCTs, no-one taking the 
lead, everybody having different objectives is horrible! Let's 
have one way o f doing it. That's what Ifee l like because I ’m 
sitting in the middle o f it all. (Manager NHS Trust C 39/82)
The other NHS Trust manager had no idea what the PCTs’ objectives were and could 
not expand.
I ’ve no idea, (pause) I ’ve no idea. (Manager NHS Trust 
37/22)
Despite shared and clear views about the high level objectives, PCT C did accept 
that, at a lower level, different objectives existed and the different PCTs perceived 
the best way to meet these objectives differently also.
...there can also be different service priorities in different 
areas ... The objectives are the same it's just that the mode o f  
delivery might be, there might be a different perception about 
the mode o f delivery. (Manager PCT C 91/17)
This is an important point. It shows an acceptance by the PCTs that although they 
may all be trying to get to the same point, they are trying to get there in different 
ways. Similarly, the timeframes over which the different PCTs wanted to plan were 
also different. PCT C focused more on the immediate needs of meeting targets 
(something that the NHS Trust considered realistic) whereas a neighbouring PCT 
was looking at how to improve health over the long-term.
I  think [nPCT to east], fo r example, is focusing on health 
improvement and wanting a longer-term strategy for dealing 
with how we improve health so they don't need operations in 
the future. Whereas [PCT C] is more realistic I  think, and 
says well how the hell are we going to get through to the end 
o f this year and not to get 12 month waiters. (Manager 
NHS Trust C 39/34)
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There were also feelings of jealousy and mistrust between the PCTs, although this 
first example is from a GP who accepted that he did not understand how the system 
worked.
The other thing that I  personally feel quite miffed about... is 
there are quite a few  things that as a PCT we are funding 
and some o f the other PCTs aren't paying their share ...
(GP PCT C 93/51)
However, one of the PCT managers shared this view. She expressed a concern that 
for PCT C (which is predominantly city based), the only option for development of 
services was with NHS Trust C. The other PCTs that also used NHS Trust C as a 
main provider had access to their own network of community hospitals and so could 
initiate developments in them that were accessible only to their own patients. Any 
development in NHS Trust C was accessible to all patients, not just those of PCT C. 
PCT C felt that it was footing the bill for developing new services that other PCTs 
were then using.
... i f  we, [PCT C], decide we want to develop a service at 
[NHS Trust C] the reality is you can't stop it being accessed 
by anybody else really. It's easy for the [nPCT to E] 
community hospitals because you are very self-contained ... 
anything developed at [NHS Trust C] will by default be 
available to the whole population. (Manager PCT C 91/21)
Similarly to case study B, there was a general acceptance that each PCT was 
different and had different needs.
We've got a big provider arm here, which a lot o f PCTs 
don't... Quite different. In fact, I  suppose by default you can't 
be the same because you're all, you've all got different 
aspects to your own PCT then there isn't one size jits all 
really. (Manager PCT C 91/64)
Here the NHS Trust manager confirms that it is the different agendas that make the 
collegiate style commissioning fail. The view is that the whole health community 
should agree a joint agenda, not just the PCTs. The agent here is in effect rejecting 
the principal-agent approach.
...the commissioning arrangements haven't worked because 
everybody's got a different agenda. We've never sat in a 
room and agreed as a health community our objectives are 
"x", our outputs will be "y" and this is how we are going to
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get from where we are today to doing that. We've never done 
that. (Manager NHS Trust C 39/35)
Others agreed that there had never been an attempt to focus on commissioning 
objectives. The main focus for each PCT was on community care and that meant 
that there was never a common commissioning agenda.
...there's a real lack o f focus as to where we're supposed to 
be going and what our objectives are. It's very kind o f  
partnership, community type side driven and the acute stuff 
seems to be kind o f right we'll just go along with what the 
objectives o f the host PCT are. (Manager nPCT C 41/8)
This respondent was the only one to mention the term “host P C T \ The term host 
may have been used to indicate that NHS Trust C was situated within the 
geographical boundaries of PCT C. The respondent was also the only one to imply 
that the host PCT set objectives with which the other PCTs were happy.
ii) Principals had equal access to poor information: "We're walking 
blind"
None of the interviewees gave examples of good quality information available from 
NHS Trust C. One of the main concerns from the PCTs and the NHS Trust was the 
inadequacy of the information. There were, however, discrepancies about whether 
this was due to a system problem or a people problem.
...resolving the information systems is quite difficult and 
that's a people problem and it's a technical problem. It's 
about i f  you put rubbish in you get rubbish out but its also 
about the systems not being designed for modern day health 
care.... (Manager Regional Office 80/40)
The information systems in [NHS Trust C]... they have an 
adequate system but they don't know how to use it...
(Manager PCT C 32/68)
I  mean we've produced pretty awful information. I  think the 
whole health community feels that what comes out o f [NHS 
Trust C] is not accurate in terms o f information.
(Manager NHS Trust C 39/95)
...well the information systems are terrible, absolutely 
dreadful, and that's where there's a need fo r  change.
(Surgeon NHS Trust C 95/35)
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Whatever the reason, the result was little or no information being available to the 
commissioners or the provider.
[There’s] just a complete information vacuum.
(Manager nPCT C 38/42)
We're walking blind. (Manager NHS Trust C 39/1)
I  just started to remember sitting in those rooms and 
everybody saying "we've got no information to work with, we 
need information ”... (Manager Regional Office 80/36)
Only one respondent commented on the lack of sharing of information, but she was 
referring to a commissioning process from a previous year. At the time of this study, 
it seemed that the NHS Trust was very open about its information.
[PCT C] in particular has been through the books in great 
detail and whilst they don't like what they see, they now 
understand and believe what they see... (Manager NHS 
Trust C 37/3)
There was even a view that the NHS Trust was “baring a ir  whilst the PCTs just did 
their own thing behind closed doors. This raises the issue of whether or not the NHS 
Trust has a right to know what the PCTs are providing.
I  always describe it that [NHS Trust C] has to, sort of, walk 
around naked in front o f  the PCTs and bare everything and 
the PCTs keep all their clothes on and I've no idea what they 
get up to. (Manager NHS Trust C 39/2)
There was a view from a neighbouring PCT that they were provided with too much 
information from the NHS Trust, but not sufficient analysis of that information. 
Whether analysis is the responsibility of the NHS Trust or the PCT is another 
question.
...in terms o f my limited time I  probably feel, in a way, that I  
get too much information. I  get lots o f information and not 
much analysis in terms o f what does that mean.
(Manager nPCT C 38/37)
Despite what appeared to be good sharing of information between the NHS Trust 
and the PCTs, each PCT seemed to be undertaking its own monitoring and 
information collection. This PCT manager described a process in a different health
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authority in which she had worked previously. There, there was a process of pulling 
together performance-monitoring information on each specialty and each consultant, 
describing referrals, waits and activity. (This information appears to be similar to 
that provided by NHS Trust B to each of its PCTs.) The respondent found this very 
helpful for the commissioning process and would have liked to see something 
similar here.
[It] would be much better i f  we were working together, i f  our 
information teams were working as one, because what tends 
to happen is that we all, each PCT is doing their own little 
bit, [NHS Trust C] are doing their own little bit and actually 
we are probably all using a lot o f resources to do broadly the 
same sorts o f data searches, which i f  we worked, worked a 
bit smarter, it could actually get much better, true, really 
good performance information out o f the system and 
monitoring information. (Manager PCT C 91/24)
iii) Principals failed to work together: "Nobody agrees"
The PCTs appeared to go through the motions of trying to work together but did not 
follow this up with a conviction to make it work. The evidence presented in the 
previous section on aligning objectives showed that the PCTs had met to discuss 
issues, but they had done this with the NHS Trust present and to the extent that they 
could not face any more meetings.
We're meeting-ed o u t!... the endless meetings with, it feels at 
times, dishearteningly little results. (Manager nPCT C 38/29)
There was a feeling of frustration by some PCTs with their PCT partners. The host 
HA of one of the PCTs was based in what would become a different StHA to the 
others. The HAs worked to different timescales, with the StHA that encompassed 
NHS Trust C allowing service redevelopment proposals to be submitted later in the 
financial year than its neighbour. As a result, one PCT missed its own HA’s 
deadlines for proposals for funding and was therefore unable to contribute to service 
redevelopment in NHS Trust C.
...they missed all the Programme Board deadlines, I  didn't 
feel in a position to say 'don't be silly, let's just take a 
decision otherwise it's going to be February and we're going
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to be scrabbling around trying to implement these things at 
the eleventh hour'. (Manager nPCT C 38/24)
Perhaps as a response to the slow progress in agreeing service redevelopment 
objectives, another PCT began unilateral discussions with NHS Trust C, with no 
prior agreement to do this from the wider PCT community.
...we're hearing again, despite the fact we’re meant to have 
this collegiate approach to commissioning, that [NHS Trust
C] are having separate discussions outside o f that process 
with the PCTs in [nHA] about developing specific services 
for that PCT. So we've heard that through the grapevine...
(Manager PCT C 91/33)
The provider capacity of the PCTs was different also. A new model of elderly care 
at NHS Trust C had been under consideration for two to three years. One of the 
PCTs concerned had decided that it would rather invest in its own community 
hospitals’ services than those at NHS Trust C. They had therefore stopped their 
investment in elderly care at NHS Trust C. Later, they had realised that a lot of 
elderly patients entered the system via emergency admissions and they could not 
stop their patients using the new facility at the NHS Trust. They therefore needed to 
re-invest in the service, but the money had already been spent on other priorities.
Whilst the PCTs were failing to agree objectives and work together, there was a 
tendency for NHS Trust C and PCT C to collaborate and take joint decisions. The 
example given shows how PCT C and NHS Trust C decided to make a joint 
appointment even though the other PCTs had been approached and decided against 
it.
...at the moment we have four PCTs all o f which run their 
own performance management systems relating to [NHS 
Trust C] and [NHS Trust C] runs its own performance 
management independently. Now, it doesn't take a genius to 
say, why don't we have one system... [PCT C] and [NHS 
Trust C] have made a joint appointment, a single post, to do 
some work around that. Couldn't get any other PCT in yet, 
but I  think they will come in. (Manager PCT C 36/55)
Despite these joint initiatives with NHS Trust C and the frustrations shown by each 
of the PCTs when others acted too quickly or too slowly for the group as a whole, 
the general view was still that the PCTs should work together.
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I  don't think we have sorted the messes very well really and 
they've ended up being antagonistic rather than, you know, 
we should be working together really. (long pause) The 
danger is that you don't get any service development do you, 
because nobody agrees. (Manager PCT C 91/21)
iv) The agent stepped into the power vacuum: "We're going to send it  
to the PCTs and tell them"
The result of these attempts at collusion was weak PCTs. The PCTs did not attempt 
to weaken each other deliberately by setting competing incentives for the NHS Trust 
(as predicted by principal-agent theory), but they did, according to the NHS Trust, 
seem weak.
I  have not come across this degree o f dis-functionality 
anywhere else. (Manager NHS Trust C 37/96)
So no real agreement on what the commissioners were 
commissioning, no Service Level Agreement on the levels o f  
activity or the timescales that it was going to be delivered in 
...So altogether no process in my view at all. (Manager 
NHS Trust C 39/19)
The NHS Trust felt that it was trying to create an appropriate level of dialogue with 
all of the relevant PCTs, but that not all of them were receptive. The Trust was 
particularly concerned about PCTs from a neighbouring HA. The NHS Trust 
provided a substantial amount of services to them, but the PCTs did not enter into a 
full dialogue with the Trust.
...we should have a better dialogue and understanding with 
the [nPCTs] than we do for the amount o f activity and I  think 
that's not fo r want o f trying from our part. (Manager 
NHS Trust C 39/52)
The NHS Trust was incredibly frustrated at the current lack of agreement between 
the PCTs with regard to commissioning decisions and as a result one manager took 
matters into his own hands. He was developing a spending plan to present to the 
PCTs for agreement. The NHS Trust was forced into taking on a more powerful role 
in terms of leadership than it might otherwise have done.
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...the longer the decisions are deferred', the longer wephaff 
around not being clear about what the position is, the more 
extreme the consequences will be. Ifind  it extremely 
frustrating! I ’m used to having agreement with people about 
what is expected o f the organisation in the coming year. ... in 
frustration we're currently sort o f setting out our 
understanding o f the position and we're going to send it to 
the PCTs and tell them, these are the figures that we're 
working to, this is the money that we're going to spend.
(Manager NHS Trust C 3 7/18)
The view from NHS Trust C was that the PCTs had declined to negotiate with the 
NHS Trust.
...we’ll end up making that decision I  think without the 
support o f PCTs because they've effectively declined the 
opportunities to discuss it with us. (Manager NHS Trust C 
37/40)
This could have been a show of strength: the PCTs did not wish to give funds and 
were not prepared to debate issues any further. It could also have been a weakness: 
they were not able to agree. From comments by the PCTs, it appears that their lack 
of clear direction and co-ordination was a weakness that they acknowledged.
I'm sure that it's frustrating fo r  [NHS Trust C] feeling that 
there’s lack o f clarity for them as to who it is they're 
supposed to askfor. No one's telling them what to do.
(Manager nPCT C 38/82)
This respondent went on to predict that the appointment to a co-ordinating role 
within the health community of a known strong leader from a local health authority 
would end this confusion. It implies that a strong leader is important, whether or not 
that leader is a principal or agent.
There was a single example of the PCTs appearing quite strong in relation to 
allocating funds to NHS Trust C. This manager felt that the PCTs were strong 
enough to choose not to give the Trust as much money as it felt it was entitled to. If 
the PCTs were weak, one would assume that the NHS Trust would be able to extract 
sufficient funds from them. This example shows also that the NHS Trust believed 
that the PCTs were favouring themselves in terms of funding allocations.
The extra money we \ e  had this financial year is something 
o f the order o f 7.5% extra for the Trust. So something's
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getting a higher priority than secondary care ... GPs are 
referring masses o f extra patients to this hospital and we 
have to treat them more quickly than we've treated them 
before and we're not getting a fair slice o f the money.
(Manager NHS Trust C 37/47)
The reality was that, despite the PCTs trying to work together, they were seen as un­
coordinated and lacking in direction. This left a power vacuum. The NHS Trust 
appeared reluctantly to fill this vacuum.
v) Principals' roles were unclear: "Who works where and who does 
what?"
One of the reasons why the NHS Trust perceived the SaFF process with these PCTs 
as confusing may have been that the PCTs themselves were confused about their 
roles. There was confusion within the PCTs about who was the spokesperson for 
commissioning issues in neighbouring PCTs.
I  just think there's lack o f clarity as to what the process is 
and what it is that various people are supposed to be doing...
(Manager nPCT 38/78)
It varies between [three names given], and then we get [other 
name] who was one o f them before. ... But I  think [other 
name] works for [a different PCT]. We get confused about 
who works where and who does what. ... And we don't know 
whether she speaks for both or just for one. We think she 
actually speaks for both but then you get someone saying 'oh, 
we don't agree to that ’... (Manager PCT C 91/65)
Although all the PCTs were involved directly in the commissioning process, they 
still did not understand their roles and did not perceive any one PCT as a leader.
I  actually think that part o f the problem has been lack o f  
clarity on who is leading. (Manager nPCT 38/75)
The NHS Trust viewed the lack of a single lead PCT as one of the main problems.
Well as things are at the moment it's not working at all well.
I  think part o f that is because we've haven't got a lead 
commissioner. (Manager NHS Trust 39/62)
PCT C tried to play the lead role in commissioning. It appeared that some viewed 
PCT C as the lead by default, purely because NHS Trust C was located
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geographically within its boundaries. Some PCTs seemed happy with that 
arrangement, some not. Unlike in case study B where the commissioning 
responsibilities had been divided up between the PCTs, PCT C was trying to take the 
lead for all specialties.
One PCT implied they were at fault themselves for leaving everything to PCT C; 
they were too “woolly” about their own needs.
I  think we need to be clearer as a PCT around our objectives 
and what our needs are fo r  our population ...a t the moment 
I  just feel it's very woolly and we just go along and listen and 
say yes or no. (Manager nPCT C 41/30)
A more detached view from the regional office was that the lack of clarity over roles 
had led to misunderstandings, with each PCT relying on another to carry out tasks. 
On a more worrying note, the NHS Trust perceived this as a lack of trust in each 
other rather than a simple lack of organisation.
I  suspect it might have something to do with having four 
PCTs so the- they all thought the other one was doing it or 
something like that. (Manager Regional Office 80/61)
...from my point o f view [it] would be really helpful that we 
would have one dialogue with one organisation, but I  don't 
think the other PCTs would trust them to be able to do that 
alone. (Manager NHS Trust C 39/92)
Despite claims by the NHS Trust that they tried to negotiate with all of the PCTs, 
they did see PCT C as their main focus.
...our main focus ought to be with [PCT C] because we are 
their major provider. (Manager NHS Trust C 3 7/77)
I  think [PCT C] could potentially be our last ally i f  we’re not 
careful... they're much more heavily dependent onus ...
(Manager NHS Trust C 39/58)
This may have given PCT C a feeling of superiority that resulted in it not trying as 
hard as it otherwise might to align its objectives with the other PCTs. Certainly 
there was a very strong view from one PCT C manager that the PCTs and NHS Trust 
C should all sign up to PCT C’s vision of shared decision-making and planning. The
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concept referred to is one of having a clinical champion to lead service 
developments.
I  have to say that I'm not sure that I've got everybody signed 
up to this concept yet, this is my concept, which the local 
PCTs are sharing, which we are promoting ... we've got to 
get everybody, and particularly [NHS Trust C]... the 
clinicians in [NHS Trust C], the managers in [NHS Trust C] 
have to believe that that's the way to make change happen as 
well. (Manager PCT C 32/113)
None of the other PCTs mentioned this concept.
vi) Principals would not take responsibility: "Ostrich managemenf'
Not only was it seen as too difficult to agree on decisions where PCTs had different 
objectives, but also there was a view that taking some important decisions was seen 
as too worrying by the PCTs. Both NHS Trust managers agreed that people were 
hiding from the difficult decisions that had to be made, hoping that they would go 
away because they could not bear any conflict. Everyone was perceived as hiding 
from these potential conflicts, but especially the PCTs.
I  think there is a sort o f ostrich management going on, put 
your head in the sand and hopefully it won't happen...
(Manager NHS Trust C 37/14)
I  think we hide behind difficult decisions ... people just can't 
bear the conflict so don't talk about it and pretend it's not 
there and put it on the back burner. I'm absolutely sure o f it.
(Manager NHS Trust C 39/43)
PCT C agreed.
...you try to avoid that situation o f winners and losers and 
actually I  think it's why we haven't done very w e ll... because 
we’ve skirted the issues actually rather than tackle them.
(Manager PCT C 91/19)
There was also an example given of one PCT worrying about an unexpected surplus 
of funds. The PCTs had on this occasion agreed a list of developments they could 
afford and had allocated the funds. They were surprised then to discover that they 
had funds remaining. The decision to allocate these funds to other developments had
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to be postponed whilst the accuracy of the figures was investigated by one of the 
PCTs.
[Ch Exec o f nPCT] felt that she wanted to look at it in more 
depth because she couldn’t believe that it was that simple and 
thought that we must all have been missing something.
(Manager nPCT C 38/23)
In tandem with avoiding decisions, the NHS Trust saw the PCTs blaming it for the 
health community’s problems.
...the PCTs had said it’s all down to [NHS Trust C], crap 
management, don't know what they're doing, it's all your 
fault [NHS Trust CJ. (Manager NHS Trust C 39/87)
In contrast, the NHS Trust viewed the PCT management as failing to deliver difficult 
decisions because they were too afraid of accepting their mandated role.
There has been a lot o f complaint from PCTs in the past that 
they're not involved in the decision taking process and 
they're now being fully involved in the decision taking 
process. ... I  think it's coming hard. Well, OK, you want to be 
involved in decision taking process, you have to take 
decisions and some o f the decisions are very difficult.
(Manager NHS Trust C 37/43)
...both [neighbouring PCTs] won't send representatives to 
meetings when you think they are going to when you are 
trying to make a decision, so you can't make a decision ... I  
sometimes wonder whether that's, I  shouldn't say this really, 
but whether it's done on purpose so the decisions don’t have 
to be made. (Manager NHS Trust C 39/44)
Towards the final stages of the SaFF process, a member of the regional office and a 
member of a local health authority were drafted in to take charge of the process by 
arranging and chairing meetings. However badly the PCTs and NHS Trust had been 
managing alone, the NHS Trust did not consider this “hijacking” helpful. This is 
perhaps an illustration of the organisations higher up the NHS organisational 
hierarchy not trusting the lower organisations to perform their mandated roles 
satisfactorily.
We set up a process that was what I  would call hijacked 
because ofpeople’s anxieties locally, in terms o f would the 
PCTs and [NHS Trust C] manage to do it on their own.
(Manager NHS Trust C 39/3)
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vii) Principals and agents rejected organisational boundaries: "Does 
i t  really matter who leads?"
A further reason why the collaboration between the PCTs did not appear to be 
successful was that there was a deep feeling that the whole health community should 
be working together; there should not be a split along organisational lines. PCT C 
(like PCT B) had a desire to work in collaboration with the other PCTs not for 
themselves but for the benefit of the NHS Trust. However, as discussed, this desire 
was not carried out in practice. The PCTs, and PCT C in particular, may have been 
so keen to work well with NHS Trust C that they neglected the process of working 
well with the other PCTs. As described earlier, the managers in NHS Trust C 
portrayed being in the middle of different commissioning systems from four PCTs as 
“an absolute nightmare”.
It may be that some of the apparent weakness of the PCTs came about from a belief 
that it was not the role of the PCTs to be the leaders, that is, the PCTs were not 
necessarily legitimate principals. PCT C was very sure in its view that the most 
appropriate person should be the “champion” for a service, and that it did not matter 
to which organisation that champion belonged.
...ifyou think about the future and I  think we're blurring the 
edges now o f commissioning and providing. We’re back to 
the old fashioned planning model. ... what we actually need 
is a champion. You need a clinical champion and you need a 
manager to work alongside them to deliver change. I  don't 
really care whether the manager is an operational manager 
or a commissioner, all I  care about is that they know how to 
champion service change. (Manager PCT C 32/27)
In summary, the PCTs in case study C appeared to be acting independently from 
each other but at the same time trying to create an illusion of working together. PCT 
C seemed more dedicated to joint working and joint agendas. The managers from 
PCT C were keen to develop along whole health community lines and to take joint 
decisions. NHS Trust C appeared to have the same view. The other PCTs had their
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own agendas and placed a lot of the blame for problems with the NHS Trust. The 
result was a chaotic process with weak PCTs.
c) Why were PCTs in B more successful in joint working than 
PCTs in C?
Both case studies B and C comprised a number of PCTs working with a single NHS 
Trust. In each case, the PCTs and the NHS Trust met collectively to discuss 
commissioning. However, the PCTs in case study B appeared to show a more united 
front and work as a team, whereas those in case study C seemed to be pulling in 
opposite directions. Both sets of interviewees claimed they were working in 
partnership across the whole health community (that is including PCTs and the NHS 
Trusts), yet tensions seemed to be higher in C than B.
There are two questions to be addressed here. First, why was the collusion between 
the PCTs in case study B more successful than in C? Second, why did the attempts 
at collusion in C weaken the PCTs relative to the NHS Trust?
i) Why was collusion more successful for PCTs in case study B?
The professed purpose of the PCTs working in partnership in both case studies was 
to keep things simple and to work for the benefit of the health community.
However, the provision of services by an NHS Trust is complicated if its 
commissioners cannot agree on delivery but still attempt to work together. If success 
is defined as reaching a SaFF agreement after following a shared and consistent 
process, the PCTs in case study B were more successful than in case study C.
There are a number of reasons for this. They are discussed under the following 
headings: objectives, information, systems, personalities and leadership, and trust.
Objectives
The inability to agree objectives meant that the PCTs in case study C were pulling in 
different directions and therefore not able to work together. But were the objectives 
in case study B’s PCTs more similar than those in C?
The answer is no. The objectives of case study B’s PCTs were similar to those in C. 
Very broadly they appeared to be the same, but on a more local level they were quite 
different, partly due to the different urban and rural mix of the PCTs. PCT B and
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PCT C served predominantly urban populations. In both case studies, the 
neighbouring PCTs served predominantly rural populations. Although many of the 
differences in the populations’ needs were manifested at primary or community 
service level, respondents in both case studies discussed differential performance in 
secondary care.
The underlying issues were the same in both case studies; different levels of service 
infrastructure in both local communities impacted on demands for secondary care. 
For example, the neighbours of both PCT B and PCT C had access to community 
hospitals. This meant that the level of service they required from the NHS Trusts 
was different to the more urban PCTs with fewer community facilities. PCTs in C 
did not seem to be able to agree exactly what services they wanted NHS Trust C to 
deliver, or in what form the service should be delivered. PCTs in case study B were 
aware of their differences but had either resolved them or masked them. As 
reported, the PCTs in B had at one stage worked together to agree joint objectives. 
The PCTs in C had not done this and were not able to agree which objectives were 
priorities.
The PCTs in case study C held different beliefs about how commissioned secondary 
care services should be delivered, whilst those in case study B were less concerned 
with different modes of delivery but more aware of different levels of activity. In B, 
the PCTs appeared more able to agree to disaggregate activity data and accept what 
they termed differential performance.
Information
A further reason why PCTs in case study B seemed to collaborate more successfully 
than in C may have been the quality of the information. The quality of information 
available in case study C was considered to be very poor. The quality of information 
available in case study B was considered to be of a high standard. The poor 
information available in C was not to do with a reluctance to share information, but 
with poor systems and the poor use of systems. This lack of data for the 
commissioning process could have forced the PCTs in case study C to try to work 
together. They were perhaps not able to negotiate separate activity levels or separate 
delivery systems because they were unaware of their current and historic usage or 
the costs of this activity. This may explain why they were going through the
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motions of joint working rather than being committed fully to it. PCTs in case study 
B had access to good quality information and data were disaggregated by PCT. This 
enabled the PCTs to make a positive choice to appoint a lead for each specialty to 
work on behalf of the others.
One justification for choosing a collaborative or network model of working in 
preference to undertaking separate negotiations could be to reduce transaction costs. 
Place et a l (1998) estimated the transaction costs associated with total purchasing by 
investigating the number of meetings related to contracting and calculating the 
budgetary cost of staff involvement. They included both the ex-ante costs of 
negotiation and the ex-post costs of monitoring and enforcement in their calculations. 
If the frequency of contracting meetings is used as a crude estimate of transaction 
costs in the case studies, then the number of SaFF-related meetings in case study C 
suggests that these costs were high. It should be remembered, however, that these 
case study meetings related to the ex-ante costs of information searching and 
negotiations, but not the ex-post costs of contract enforcement. Higher ex-ante costs 
may result in lower ex-post costs and vice versa. The use of meetings is not a 
sufficient measure of transaction costs unless this trade-off is recognised and 
accounted for. The point, however, remains that, in case study C, instead of 
choosing voluntarily to remove detailed contracting and monitoring to reduce 
transaction costs, it may be that detailed contracting and monitoring were not 
possible due to information deficiencies. The PCTs may have been forced into a 
collaborative model with each other and NHS Trust C. As a result of the information 
deficiencies, the collaboration was dysfunctional, at least in terms of agreeing a 
framework for the delivery of services and their costs. Case study C may have been 
going through the motions of colluding as principals in the wrong circumstances and 
for the wrong reasons.
Systems
One major difference in the commissioning methods of the two case studies was the 
way the finances were allocated. In case study B, NHS Trust B had been given their 
fair share of development funding at the start of the process with the proviso that if 
they failed to deliver services and meet targets from that funding, they could not 
return to the PCTs for more or blame them for not providing sufficient funds. All 
funds had been allocated equitably in advance. At all times during the SaFF
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meetings, each organisation was discussing the provision of services from within this 
pre-defined financial envelope. This system was very similar to that employed by 
the Health Authority in case study A. It is interesting to remember here that case 
study C was a historically under-funded area whilst B was on target and A over 
target. Although case study C could expect a gradual increase in funding, at the time 
of the research, there was still a gap between the actual and a fair level of funding.
Case study C employed a different system to B. The PCTs provided the level of 
development funds that they considered were appropriate for NHS Trust C. The 
NHS Trust thought that they were not being given their fair share. From the start, 
this meant that there was an underlying tension between the NHS Trust and PCTs in 
case study C. The NHS Trust believed that the PCTs were allocating themselves a 
greater proportion of funds at the expense of the NHS Trust.
In addition, the area in which case study C was based had a history of different 
systems. The NHS Trust was sited on a boundary between health authorities. Each 
had their own systems and this caused some problems for the PCTs when they tried 
to work together. As one member put it, “you feel that you're sort o f adding up 
apples and oranges and then you have convert the oranges back to apples”
(Manager nPCT C 38/84). Each PCT thought that their own system worked best. 
None was willing to compromise and this undermined joint working.
Personalities and leadership
The majority of the directors in PCT C and their neighbouring PCTs had known each 
other for a number of years and worked in the area previously in different roles.
More so than in the other case studies, they were very friendly with each other, to the 
extent that some believed they were not prepared to make difficult decisions that 
might damage those relationships. Friendship had become more important than 
achievement. The same people had been appointed to different posts in the health 
community each time the system had changed. This appeared to have resulted in an 
over familiarity called embeddedness (Uzzi, 1997). (It is interesting to note that this 
had not happened in case study A. There, the same people had been in the same 
posts for a number of years, despite system changes, but the familiarity had 
manifested itself by allowing these people to predict the actions of the others and 
plan in advance how to deal with differences.)
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Case study B had some similarities with C in that a number of managers in the PCT 
and NHS Trust had worked previously in the area in different posts. However, there 
was a mix of new faces and old in each of the organisations, more so than in C, and 
the SaFF meetings in case study B were organised differently. They were bigger, 
with two or three representatives from each organisation at each meeting. In C’s 
meetings only one person per organisation attended. In B, the feelings of loyalty to 
their own organisations seemed to be stronger than in C. There appeared to be some 
personality clashes between some PCT and NHS Trust members in B. They had 
respect for each other’s capabilities, but did not appear close friends.
One of the relatively new faces in C (the NHS Trust Director of Operations) had 
been based initially in PCT C, with responsibility for the whole health community’s 
development. The other newcomer (NHS Trust C Director of Finance) was in a 
temporary post and it was noticeable in the SaFF meetings that he was comfortable 
with asking difficult questions.
A major difference between the two case studies is illustrated by these comments 
from their PCT Chief Executives. PCT B’s Chief Executive provided strong 
leadership that empowered individuals to take decisions, and allowed them to act 
independently of the NHS Trust.
... we are actually the commissioners so we can stand back 
from the debate and make a decision about how we're going 
to spend our resources ...m y job is about making sure that 
my team are empowered to do tha t... it is their role to make 
the decision... (Chief Executive o f PCT B)
PCT C’s Chief Executive did not believe distinctions should be made between the 
PCT’s role and that of the NHS Trust.
The idea that the commissioner is in charge is silly ... I  do 
wonder why we get so upset about some o f the words we use, 
you know. "If the PCT's leading on this it's outrageous, we're 
the people who do it”, and I  think does it really matter who 
leads on it? (Chief Executive o f  PCT C)
Except for one member of NHS Trust C, all the regular attendees at the 
commissioning meetings were female. The Chief Executive of PCT C was female, 
as were those of two of the neighbouring PCTs. Many of the PCT finance directors 
were male, but they met at different times to the commissioning team. Case study B
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organisations were each represented by a mix of genders. The role of gender in 
leadership is considered in the discussion chapter.
Trust
The lack of trust is another reason for the failure of PCTs in C to collude as well as 
in B. Despite a great deal of respect for some of the individuals involved, none of 
the PCTs in case study C trusted each other to act in the interests of the whole 
community, rather than in their own self-interest. This was despite the fact that they 
aimed to work in the community’s interests. The lack of trust undermined any 
attempt at joint working.
In case study B, each PCT led in commissioning a broad specialty area. This lead 
PCT in effect acted as an agent for the PCT group as a whole. The PCTs in B voted 
with a united voice. This did not happen in case study C. The directors in PCT C 
had closer relations with the directors in NHS Trust C, particularly the Director of 
Operations, than with the other PCTs. PCT C was more likely to agree with NHS 
Trust C than the other PCTs on many issues. This seemed very unlikely to happen in 
B, although relations between the PCT and NHS Trust B were very good.
ii) Why did attempts at collusion weaken PCTs in case study C?
The second question to consider in this section is why attempts at collusion appeared 
to weaken the PCTs in case study C but not B. There are three reasons for this: a 
lack of clarity in roles, a feeling of being disempowered by higher principals and the 
pressures of policy expectations.
First, the PCTs in C were so unclear about their roles that the NHS Trust did not 
know to whom to turn for important decision-making. As a result, the NHS Trust 
made its own decisions.
Although the PCTs in B did not think that they worked together in a strong enough 
way, they had tried to do this and NHS Trust B perceived them to have achieved it. 
Those in C had never tried to agree roles. Some members of PCT C did not know 
the names or roles of their opposite numbers in the neighbouring PCTs.
In addition, attempts to blur the organisational boundaries, in particular between the 
NHS Trust and the PCTs, resulted in confused responsibilities and a lack of 
decision-making power. PCT C saw a need for clinical champions. The idea was
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that it would not matter which organisation housed these champions. The 
appointment of clinical experts to lead in the development of service areas would 
have provided that focal point that the organisations were looking for. However, the 
inability and slowness of the organisations in agreeing leaders and in agreeing which 
organisations the leaders should be from, resulted in more ambiguity over roles.
Light (1998) suggests an idea that is consistent with but not identical to PCT C’s 
idea of clinical champions. He suggests that NHS Trusts should have “supreme 
commanders” in the form of respected consultants who control everything “from 
work up to discharge”. He believes that giving this commander the financial and 
organisational power to do this, and allowing teams to keep any savings, would 
remove any professional games. The difference is that Light’s supreme commanders 
would be hospital based and funded, PCT C’s clinical champions would be whole 
health community based and funded. This arrangement could create problems over 
boundaries and responsibilities.
Second, members of case study C felt that the commissioning process had been 
“hijacked” by the regional office. As a result, the responsibility for success in 
commissioning was shifted to an external organisation. This undermined the roles of 
the PCTs and NHS Trust by giving out a signal that they could not be trusted to carry 
their roles out successfully. The participants felt angry and de-motivated. As 
discussed already, the PCTs in this case study appeared to be struggling with the 
legitimacy of their roles. Although the Chief Executive of the Health Authority in 
case study B had attended one of the SaFF meetings, none of the respondents 
suggested their responsibilities had been removed or compromised in any way.
In addition to questioning the legitimacy of the organisations’ roles, these external 
interventions resulted in a certain degree of individualistic behaviour from the 
organisations. NHS Trust C had become so concerned at the lack of decisions within 
the commissioning network that its managers had decided to act independently and 
inform the PCTs of their intentions. This desire to achieve came in part from the 
pressure to do so from the regional office. Some of this pressure was undoubtedly 
due also to the financial context of this case study. It may be that a certain amount 
of pressure can play a positive role, but too much reduces the chances of success.
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Third, the pressure from government policy to work in partnership within collegiate 
systems of commissioning may have forced the PCTs in case study C into a system 
for which they were not prepared or for which the circumstances were not 
appropriate. The PCTs were trying hard to create the illusion of a smooth running 
collegiate commissioning system when their hearts were not in it and the local 
context was wrong: their objectives were different and information inadequate.
In summary, the main issues that shaped PCTs’ inabilities to work together included 
difficulties in agreeing objectives, a lack of good quality information, mistrust over 
the allocation of funds, overembeddedness and a lack of trust. Ambiguity over roles, 
confusions over organisational boundaries and responsibilities, and government 
pressure for partnership working in inappropriate circumstances all contributed to a 
reduction of power for the PCTs in case study C. These issues are explored at a 
macro level in the discussion chapter.
4) Tiers of principals and agents
This research set out to investigate the role of PCTs as commissioners of secondary 
care services. It aimed, therefore, to study a single principal-agent relationship, that 
between the PCT and the NHS Trust. However, it became apparent during the 
research that the strength of the principal-agent tiers immediately above or below 
that of PCTs and NHS Trusts affected the commissioning process and compliance 
with agreements. Managers stressed the importance of government and health 
authority roles, and clinicians commented on their lack of engagement in the SaFF 
discussions but the impact of the SaFF decisions on them. As a consequence, this 
section presents data on the respondents’ perceptions of principals at three different 
tiers within the principal-agent chain: the government as principal, the PCT or HA as 
principal and the NHS Trust management as principal.
Typical elements of the principal-agent chain for commissioning secondary care 
services at the time of the research can be visualised as follows.
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GovernmentI
Regional Office 
Health Authority
I
PCT 
NHS Trust
IConsultant firms
Theory suggests that the lower levels of a principal-agent chain collude. One would 
expect this to be even more prevalent if the lower levels are from one organisation 
and the higher from another. That is, one would expect that consultant firms and 
NHS Trust management would agree strategies for meeting their own organisation’s 
objectives in preference to that of their PCT principal.
This analysis was undertaken using data related to the codes covering the concepts of 
multiple tiers, objectives, agendas, incentives, systems, targets, power, creeping 
commissioning and micro-management.
a) Case study A
In general, managers thought that the pressure to meet national targets was the most 
important driving factor for all organisations, but that this was not necessarily a bad 
thing. Clinicians felt the same pressures, but were more concerned with quality.
The NHS Trust clinicians felt they were being used to meet management targets and 
as a result, there was a real danger that the clinicians would abandon the proper 
processes for agreeing new developments. The result would be developments 
occurring without prior agreement from the NHS Trust management, and certainly 
not the PCT.
Case study A was a special case in that there was a strong feeling that PCTs and 
NHS Trusts were equals, working to achieve the targets set by the Health Authority.
The health authority's there to hold both Primary Care 
Trusts and NHS Trusts to account, and to set the strategic 
framework that we are working to. So, that's a very clear
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hierarchical arrangement. Next question. Is there a 
hierarchical arrangement between Primary Care Trusts and 
NHS Trusts? It may develop but it doesn't currently exist, in 
process or in psychological terms. (Manager NHS Trust A 
22/33)
... NHS Trusts are accountable to the health authority, and 
primary care trusts are accountable to the health authority.
So i f  you look at the straight accountability framework, then 
basically it must be the decision o f the health authority. And 
an NHS Trust and a primary care trust must basically work 
within that framework. (Manager HA A 23/14)
As a result, the PCT played virtually no role in the commissioning of secondary care 
services. The HA played the role of principal. This was illustrated earlier in the 
accounts of the SaFF meetings. The three tiers in the principal-agent chain in case 
study A are therefore Government to HA, HA to NHS Trust, and NHS Trust to 
consultants.
i) Tier 1: The government as principal: "the only view that matters is 
the view of the Government"
The predominant view was that government targets were driving the NHS. This 
view was held by managers and clinicians alike, and from all organisations. There 
was agreement from the managers that, as a political body, it was legitimate that the 
NHS should aim to reach politically set targets. There was also agreement that the 
national targets and standards were helpful although at times too controlling. Both 
GPs and consultants appeared less convinced of the merits of the targets and were 
more likely to view the targets as overwhelming and the central direction as 
interfering. The emerging divide in opinions was between the professions (managers 
and clinicians) rather than between, as might be expected, organisations (principals 
and agents).
NHS Trust and PCT managers put forward a view that, as a publicly funded body, 
the NHS should deliver what the elected government asked of it. If the government 
laid down clear targets, the NHS should deliver those targets.
There's a view that says the only view that matters is the view 
o f the Government because it is the Government that is 
elected on mandate to do whatever it says it’s going to 
achieve for the NHS. It raises the tax and it gives us the tax
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funding to achieve objectives which it lays down very clearly 
fo r us. That's what we need to do. (Manager NHS Trust 
22/14)
...w e are a political organisation, a national service, I  think 
a lot o f us would actually welcome the fact that for the first 
time in most o f  the history o f the NHS we've got national 
plans, national frameworks, national targets and you know, 
we do want to deliver. (Manager PCT A 85/19)
Whilst the importance of delivering the national targets was not in doubt, the validity 
of some of them was considered less than ideal.
... how do we measure access for elective surgery in 
hospitals -  the number o f  people waiting. How silly an 
example is that? How silly a measure? Well, extremely silly 
because it doesn't matter how many are waiting, it's how 
long they wait. (Manager NHS Trust A 22/38)
There were views that the targets were too “command and control and complicated 
the planning process on the ground.
... /  think at the moment people would generally feel that the 
whole NHS is too centrally driven really, would be a view.
(Manager HA A 23/76)
...with the recent changes, very much a command and 
control, lots more for command and control... (Manager 
PCT A 85/13)
...we're constantly reacting to central new directions. ... 
throughout the year they're coming up with new white 
papers, initiatives, targets, which cut right across the 
planning process and make it a challenge. (GP PCT A
86/68)
The large number of targets was considered a problem. Questions were raised about 
the feasibility of organisations meeting such a range of objectives.
...you could say there are two targets: one, to deliver the 
NHS Plan and the other is to deliver the financial stability.
But within those, there ’re a whole raft o f targets. And that is 
where I  think organisations find it difficult, because it is 
actually difficult to deliver over 500 different targets, you 
know, what other businesses will have that range o f 
scattergram approach? I  mean most businesses would focus
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on ten core objectives. And I  think that does present a 
problem. (Manager HA A 23/21)
However, managers suggested also that the result of such strong targets was a lot 
more clarity about what the NHS was attempting to do. This clarity meant that 
organisations were less likely to fail, and as a result of meeting their national targets, 
were more likely to be able to deliver local ones.
...there is this strong target approach ... I'm not saying that's 
bad in any way because I've seen other places in action and 
you could say the failure is because there isn't any targets.
So it's good to get something that you can actually drive 
through and you can drive the quarterly agenda home with 
that. So I  think it is a good approach. (Manager PCT A 
24/25)
I  firmly believe that i f  you deliver your central targets you've 
then got the space to develop your local targets. The problem 
is i f  you're not delivering your central targets you'll never 
have the space to deliver your local ones... (Manager
PCT A 23/76)
An NHS Trust manager described the benefits of the targets well. He compared 
making decisions on standards of provision ten years ago with the present day. His 
conclusion was that today the objectives are a lot clearer and so the decisions a lot 
easier to make.
... coronary heart disease, in the early 1990s you could sit 
down, scratch your head and say I  wonder what standards o f  
provision we ought to be aspiring to and ensuring that we 
meet? ... now we've got a national set o f standards and 
frameworks that set out what we ought to be aspiring to.
...it's made it a lot clearer, what it is we're trying to do.
(Manager NHS Trust A 22/9)
Despite focusing on measurable topics, the targets were, on the whole, welcome.
So our energy, i f  you like, has been directed into achieving 
waiting lists and waiting times that are very high profile, as 
opposed to perhaps some o f the more touchy, feely type 
things that our GPs might feel is good and we might all feel 
is a good direction to aim in future years. ... it is welcome as 
well. That’s the long and short o f it. (Manager PCT A
24/20)
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Perhaps because the “more touchy feely type things ” were not prioritised, neither 
GPs nor consultants mentioned any positive aspects of the targets.
ii) Tier 2: The health authority as principal: "[the PCT is] a front 
organisation... for the health authority"
The PCT did not play the role of principal to the NHS Trust in this case study. The 
PCT was considered at the time to be a very new organisation that was still finding 
its feet, and there was a view that the NHS Trust did not yet understand the role of 
the PCT.
...they’re not sure what these PCTs are about and they do see 
them as second rate or new boys or whatever, new kids on 
the block... (Manager PCT A 85/76)
Certainly the NHS Trust clinicians felt that the pressure on the NHS Trust to achieve 
did not come from the PCT, but from the Health Authority.
Our pressure actually doesn ’t come from the PCT, again i t ’s 
the Strategic Health Authority that’s saying these are the 
rules. The PCT does what i t ’s told in relation to us. I t ’s a 
front organisation (laughs) at the moment, for the health 
authority. (NHS Trust A Clinician 84/1)
The PCT was an agent for the Health Authority in the same way as the NHS Trust. 
Therefore, quotes from PCT managers and GPs about their perceptions and 
experiences of the Health Authority as their principal are included here to help 
illustrate the style with which the Health Authority carried out its role. In general, 
the Health Authority was considered a strong leader, re-enforcing, and driving the 
local NHS in line with, government priorities.
I f  you look at our business plan and our Service Level 
Agreement, you can see a clear trail back to the SHA's 
priorities, ... and all Trusts basically have to live within 
that... (Manager PCT A 85/11)
...that as far as I'm concerned is led really by our Trust 
trying to meet government demands but that may well mean 
that our Trust are being leaned on by the local PCTs but I  
don't think that that’s the case because my understanding is 
that [health authority chief executive], who is sort o f Chief
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Honcho, ...he has very strong objectives. (Surgeon NHS 
Trust A 87/8)
The perception that the Health Authority acted as a direct agent for the government 
was supported by the views put forward by Health Authority representatives in one 
of the performance meetings with the PCT. The PCT Chief Executive had expressed 
a concern that the PCT board members felt that the agenda was being driven by 
managers, not professionals, and by the NHS Plan, with many decisions being taken 
outside board meetings. This meant that many local issues were not being 
addressed. The Health Authority responded that the purpose of the PCT board was 
to focus on what they could achieve within given limits “They do not have the gift o f  
choice... their role is not to rule the world...” (meeting code 3/30).
There was a strong feeling that the sheer number of targets set by the HA was 
overwhelming. One NHS Trust manager described the Health Authority’s focus on 
access targets as like a “straight jacket”. A GP talked about an avalanche and, as 
illustrated above, even the Health Authority respondent described a raft of targets.
...there's been an avalanche o f  those at the moment, it's 
getting ... the rate, the numbers of, the speed with which 
they're coming seems to be increasing. (GP PCT A 86/66)
There was some discrepancy over the actual number of targets, but the perception 
was that there were too many, up to “eight hundred and fifty” (GP 86/15). The 
Health Authority acknowledged that the targets they imposed were demanding and 
drove the process.
...targets and priorities, we actually focus probably on three 
things really which is financial balance, inpatient waiting 
times and outpatient waiting times ... and I  think we do that 
very well (HA PCT A 23/63)
The PCT managers agreed. In their role as agent for the Health Authority, they 
accepted that they had little choice in their priorities; some things were “must do’s”.
...there is this strong target approach and that's the driver 
behind all this. (Manager PCT A 24/24)
You know, you were at that mid-year review meeting and you 
may remember that we said two things we would like to focus 
on this year were access and intermediate care, I  admit we
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didn't have much choice about that: access is a 'must do'. 
(Manager PCT A 85/101)
The PCT Chief Executive posed a question at the mid-year review meeting referred 
to in the quote above. He asked what the Health Authority’s attitude was to “must 
do’s” such as inpatient menus. The response from the Health Authority was swift 
“You must do them”. There was no debate.
In considering the levers used by the Health Authority to extract high levels of 
performance from the NHS Trust and PCT managers, managers mentioned threats to 
their job security as an important influence.
...personal and organisational performance are now closely 
linked and so, you know, i f  your organisation is assessed say, 
as a nought star, or i f  you get a bad CHI report or you're had 
up for fiddling waiting lists, ... those will directly affect your 
own, your own job security. (Manager PCT A 85/22)
Clinicians perceived the method as bullying. One consultant referred to the term 
“corporate bullying” as a tactic used to pressurise managers into achieving targets. 
This term had been used on a recent radio programme. Another respondent referred 
to the use of “quiet words in corridors and Friday night phone calls”.
What was deftly referred to on the news was I  suppose the 
process of... people regard it almost like corporate bullying 
really. You know, it's that sort ofpressure ...for the 
Executives, you know, they're just told you’ve got to achieve 
this whatever and it’s been part o f the process. (Surgeon NHS 
Trust A 84/44)
The PCT was aware that it should be taking on a more pro-active role as 
commissioner in the future, but was aware also that the NHS Trust may find invasive 
the PCT’s level of interest in their actions.
...they don't want to be micro performance managed to 
death. ...there’s a danger that we do ask them for too much 
information, we've got an interest in things that the health 
authority never did have ... I  mean for them, changing a few  
clinics, it’s pretty small beer s tu ff... (Manager PCT A 
85/75)
There was unanimous agreement that the Health Authority in its role as principal 
was very strong and that it mirrored the drive to meet government imposed targets.
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This implies that the Health Authority was a good agent for the government; the 
Health Authority’s objectives were the same as the governments and it passed these 
objectives on to the next layer of the principal-agent chain using strong formal levers 
(such as threats to job security) usually associated with managerial bureaucracies 
(Whitley, 1999).
iii) Tier 3: NHS Trust management as principal: "...without a doubt; 
our objectives are slightly different
As discussed, the aim of the research was not to look at how NHS Trust management 
acted as principals to their consultant agents. However, the consultants and GPs 
expressed very strong opinions about how these relations fitted with the 
commissioning system. This section therefore discusses the role of NHS Trust 
managers alongside their consultant agents.
Consultants perceived the objectives of NHS Trust management and themselves as 
different. Managers were seen as chasing government targets. Clinicians were 
concerned with quality and equity.
Without a doubt, our objectives are slightly different. The 
Trust is interested in numbers. Numbers, numbers, numbers, 
without a doubt. (Surgeon NHS Trust A 87/23)
The result of these differing objectives was that the clinicians were often refused 
permission by NHS Trust management to make clinical developments because they 
did not help meet the financial and access targets. This consultant wanted to 
introduce a bone bank and already had part of the funds needed. However, he felt 
that the Trust was too afraid of committing any funds to the project and so it was not 
going to happen.
...there are some projects which I'm trying to get o ff the 
ground ... like I  want to start a bone bank but I'm having 
difficulty doing that because o f immediate financial, the Trust 
is afraid o f spending immediate money although I've got 
funding for a fridge and funding for a nurse etc but they don't 
want to... (Surgeon NHS Trust A 87/13)
The same surgeon continued to talk of another area that he was going to have to stop 
because of funding problems. He wanted to introduce a new type of resurfacing in 
hip replacements but had been told he could do no more in the current financial year.
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... the Trust is saying no. I ’ve been doing some here, I  know 
my colleague in [town] hasn’t been able to do any yet but I ’ve 
been told that I  can't do anymore in this financial year, 
although I  have patients booked to have them done and that's 
going to be a problem. (Surgeon NHS Trust A 87/13)
There were, however, two sides to the coin and the clinical director appeared to see 
both. On the one hand, he understood the clinicians’ desires to develop new 
techniques and use new operations. On the other hand, he could see from the Trust 
management’s point of view that these high cost operations could have major 
financial impacts. He implied that it would be better to have a more robust internal 
management system than at present to stop clinicians starting initiatives that would 
become too costly, but he didn’t want a “Stalinistic regime”. The role of the PCT in 
controlling new developments was not mentioned.
... there's a lot o f  concern at the Trust board level how this is 
controlled. Because at the moment it's not really controlled.
Suddenly someone's doing this operation, you know, and it 
happens. And there's not a robust system that says well you 
can’t do it. There never has been in the sense- one way you 
don't want to have too much o f a Stalinistic regime. But at 
the same time i f  you are suddenly doing no procedures and in 
the next year you have done 30 procedures o f a very complex 
major operation which incurs an additional cost o f five to ten 
thousand pounds potentially per patient or something, the 
ramifications o f  that are quite enormous aren't they? So they 
have not got their handle on that but they are certainly very 
aware o f it- or we are as a Trust. (Surgeon NHS Trust A 
84/31)
A colleague commented on the same issue. However, he did feel restrained by the 
NHS Trust’s controls on decisions and felt demoralised because he was not able to 
learn and implement new techniques.
... it sort o f puts me off, I  mean there are so many new 
procedures, which I  want to learn how to do but it puts me 
o ff going to learn to do them i f  Ifeel that I'm not going to be 
allowed to do them because I  can't have the prosthesis, which 
Ifind  is slightly frightening. (Surgeon NHS Trust A 87/19)
When I asked what happened if new developments were introduced without prior 
agreement, he responded that the NHS Trust management reacted, not the PCT.
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Respondent: You get lots o f letters, because I  know that my 
colleague did this and had lots o f cross letters and things.
Interviewee: Cross letters from?
Respondent: From the Trust, the Trust board, from the 
financial director etc.
Interviewee: The NHS Trust?
Respondent: Yes, the NHS Trust, exactly. (Surgeon NHS Trust 
A 87/17)
One of the reasons why the consultants made changes without approval (in the case 
below, a new development, but the logic works equally well for removing services) 
was that the effort of going through the appropriate channels for approval, and the 
disappointment if approval was not given, combined with seeing colleagues ignoring 
the proper channels and being successful in initiating new developments, was 
demoralising. These unapproved changes can be seen as the result of having too 
much of a Stalinistic regime.
...I had to write a business plan with evidence proposing why 
I  was doing something, costings, costings o f  alternate 
treatment, I  had to provide sort o f some justification for why 
I  was doing it and I  sort o f provided them with the recent 
NICE report... and I've done all that and my problem is that 
colleagues who have tried to introduce things in the past 
have ignored all these policies and just introduced them and 
managed to do it and I  did what I  was told to do and I've had 
considerable difficulties having spoken to a lot o f  senior 
people in the Trust about it, so I  think in the future the best 
way to do something is just to do it. (Surgeon NHS Trust 
A 87/14)
It was not clear from the data why the consultants who were interviewed perceived 
different levels of control over their decisions. One respondent was a clinical 
director, the other a consultant within that directorate. It may be that the clinical 
director imposed stricter controls in his directorate than the NHS Trust management 
imposed on him. Whatever the reasons, the result was the same: the introduction of 
new treatments without management approval. Weak control by NHS Trust 
management allowed new treatments to be introduced without approval. Strong 
control from clinical directors demoralised consultants and could encourage them to 
bypass the system.
In addition, there appeared to be an “us and them” attitude within the NHS Trust. 
Both consultants and GPs recognised this.
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They [the consultants] see themselves working in a hospital, 
not as part o f it. (GP PCT A 35/32)
The hospital doctors often referred to “the Trust”, meaning the NHS Trust 
management rather than the organisation as a whole. Some non-consultant 
respondents viewed the consultants as difficult to manage and the managers as trying 
hard to work with the PCT whilst the clinicians were not.
... there's a very strong conflict o f interests. . . . I  think the 
managers are trying very hard in the hospital to get the 
waiting lists down. I  think there’s a fairly strong resistance to 
change with some o f the clinicians. (GP PCT A 86/43)
In one of the meetings between the Health Authority and the PCT, there was a 
discussion about how some of the NHS Trust’s consultants had been “most 
unhelpfuF. There was a claim (by the Health Authority management) that some 
consultants undertook more private than NHS work and fitted their NHS clinics into 
lunchtime slots between their private sessions (meeting code 5/10).
The NHS Trust managers had slightly different views to each other about controlling 
consultants. One view was that the consultants had incentives to undertake less 
activity than under the internal market system because of the pressures to meet 
access times. To stop access times being breached, consultants were asked to do 
more private work; the incentive was therefore to undertake less NHS work in order 
increase the risk of breaching targets and so attract more private work. This manager 
commented also on the consultants’ use of a local community hospital theatre. The 
theatre was underused. His belief was that the consultants preferred to use the 
newer facilities in the main hospital and so made excuses that the patients were not 
appropriate to be treated in the satellite facilities. He did not mention any ways in 
which the management tried to control this.
An alternative view was that the direct employment relationship helped the NHS 
Trust management to control the consultants. This manager was describing how the 
relationship between NHS Trust management and NHS Trust clinicians had moved 
on since the 1990s when consultants had perceived themselves as “autonomous 
practitioners with clinical freedom”.
We have moved that relationship on to something that is 
much more legitimate bearing in mind we spend one and a
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half million pounds ofpublic money a week, which says the 
public has got reasonable expectations o f what we can 
achieve ... and you, senior clinical staff, [your] job, the 
reason that you are paid is to deliver that, right?
(Manager NHS Trust 22/31)
Both GPs interviewed were frustrated with consultants who had refused to discuss 
changes or share decisions. One described a consultant not only refusing to share the 
workload in a community theatre with a GP, but also refusing to allow his own 
management to manage his waiting lists.
... as long as he keeps his waiting times high, presumably 
that keeps his private income high so there’s all sorts o f 
vested interests... (GP PCT A 86/45)
Another GP commented on the lack of discussion before changes. He made two 
points: it is quite common for a consultant to decide to stop providing a service 
without consultation, and consultants do not appear to realise that their decisions 
impact on others. The latter suggests that it may not be deliberate hiding of 
information that causes rifts, but a simple lack of understanding.
...the consultant decided he was closing a clinic. This is a 
common thing. I'm not going to do an outpatient clinic any 
more down in, you know. And you think, hang on a minute, 
nobody's actually mentioned that to anybody else. They’ve no 
concept really o f any o f the impacts on anybody else. I  
understand why because why would they think o f  it, it's not... 
but it's like starting out. I  think I'll start a clinic in [local 
town], but you actually forget that the whole thing needs 
support. It sounds like really simple stuff but it makes major 
impacts on everyday life. Discussion doesn’t happen. (GP 
PCT A 35/28)
In summary, the influence of the government on the Health Authority and the Health 
Authority on the NHS Trust in case study A seemed strong. Both tiers were target 
driven in a command and control style. The Health Authority control over the NHS 
Trust was characterised by strong leadership. However, the commissioning system 
broke down to some extent at tier 3; although the hospital management had agreed 
with the Health Authority to meet the government objectives, the hospital clinicians 
did not necessarily follow the same agenda. The management and clinicians had 
different objectives. The internal NHS Trust processes for gaining approval for new 
developments seemed to be strict but not well enforced. Consultants were frustrated
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and their enthusiasm dampened by frequent disappointments. As a result, there were 
calls for a more robust internal management system at the same time as there were 
threats to bypass the system for being too restrictive. There was no mention of the 
use of incentives in any tier. There was a reliance instead on the power of 
employment relations: NHS Trust management were threatened with job security 
and consultants expected to conform as employees of that management. Although 
many respondents viewed consultants as deliberately awkward, a lone voice 
suggested some problems might be the result of a simple lack of understanding of 
the impact of their actions on others.
The principal-agent chain illustrated below corresponds to respondents’ perceptions 
of control in case study A.
Government 
Health Authority
NHS Trust
V
Consultant firms
The solid arrows between the government and Health Authority, and between the 
Health Authority and NHS Trust represent strong management. The fine-lined arrow 
between the NHS Trust and its consultants represents weaker control. The PCT in 
this case study did not enter the hierarchy in relation to commissioned secondary 
care services.
b) Case study B
Views in case study B were similar to A but more likely to be negative with respect 
to targets. The respondents felt driven but also trapped by the national targets. They 
felt that there was little room to develop other issues of local importance. Although 
it might be expected that these negative feelings would result in clinicians becoming 
more demoralised than in A, and hence initiating more un-agreed developments, in 
fact, this was not perceived as the case.
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i) Tier 1: The government as principal: "The first line has to he to 
meet the various Government directives"
The overwhelming view, as in A, was that the organisations had to meet the 
government targets before anything else. The most well known targets were 
associated with secondary care services (predominantly access targets).
I  think clearly the top o f the list in terms o f  objectives is 
delivering access targets and those key targets identified in 
the national plan. (Manager PCT B 33/14)
The first line has to be to meet the various Government 
directives. That can be a bit frustrating because they 
consume more than all your mental energy and more than all 
your finances. (Manager nPCT B 34/19)
It was not just the PCT that felt trapped by the pressures of the national targets.
NHS Trust management felt equally trapped and recognised the difficulties the PCTs 
faced as a result of the whole health community’s problems.
...the overwhelming thrust is to meet the "must do" targets 
fo r  the Government... The whole health community finds 
itself in an horrendous stressful position whereby it's having 
to pick up an underlying deficit from previous years, so the 
bulk o f  the resources gets eaten up by the deficits and then 
whatever's left is really available to hit the "must do" targets.
(Manager NHS Trust B 30/8)
...we have those which are P45 issues... These are national 
things and they're non negotiable, P45s are sacking offences.
Although the NHS Plan came out with three or four hundred 
objectives, there were some which are P45 issues and there 
were others where locally we have to make a decision as to 
whether we think that we can do it, or we can't do it and why 
we can't. (Manager NHS Trust B 37/1)
Although management accepted the targets, they were not necessarily considered to 
reflect the most important aspects of care. The implication in the first quote below is 
that national pressures result in local developments being squeezed out. Indeed, the 
second quote is from a GP who stated specifically that local objectives were being 
neglected in the SaFF.
... the things that we will be judged for at the end o f the year 
as an organisation are whether we are balanced financially
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or whether we've hit our waiting list targets. ... I  think there 
is a difference between what any o f us individually believe to 
be an important thing to be spending money on and what's 
most important in terms ofperformance management from  
the centre to us. Those are the only things that anybody ever 
loses any sleep over, the only things we ever get asked about.
(Manager NHS Trust B 28/9)
Locally, there are one or two things which we have to do, so 
substance misuse services in [city]. Through the SaFF we 
didn't find some money but through another route we've 
identified funding, and I  think i f  we hadn’t done that ...a lot 
o f GPs would be saying why have we become a PCT, which 
has got to be about making local decisions for local 
problems... (GPPCTB 27/33)
There were no comments from any of NHS Trust B’s management or clinicians that 
were positive about the national targets. Unlike in case study A, no one said they 
helped focus objectives. None of the GPs referred to any clarity from the targets 
either. The PCT managers, however, did have a few positive words.
... the national stuff is about shorter waiting times and 
getting a consistent standard and I  think that’s helpful...
(Manager PCTB 27/32)
...can we just take as red that as managers when we talk 
about meeting targets and providing services we are actually 
assuming that that is the right thing to do for patients. So 
that's at the backdrop o f it all, we don't forget that meeting 
the targets aren't the end all. You have to assume the targets 
are a proxy for a better service. (Manager PCT B 26/12)
Increasingly, the pressures felt by both PCT and NHS Trust management were 
shared. Although respondents viewed the PCTs as principal, they discussed briefly 
the roles of the regional office and StHA. The roles were as bodies to which the 
respondents were answerable.
The waiting list targets are increasingly becoming seen as 
part o f their problem as well as ours, although I  think there 
is still a bit o f movement in that direction to be had. I  mean it 
isn’t the PCT Chief Exec, that gets the calls from the regional 
office saying what’s the position going to be like at the end o f 
the month on the waiting list front. (Manager NHS Trust B 
28/13)
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The PCT actually felt that they would be held to account more than the NHS Trust if
the agreed targets were not met.
...strictly speaking we’re all accountable to the Strategic 
Health Authority but i f  we weren’t delivering our 
accountability agreement, I  have no doubt both 
organisations would be called to account and we'd be asked 
to stay behind and called to account a bit more...
(Manager PCTB 33/113)
ii) Tier 2: The PCTs as principal: "where are you going to put the 
money? ...in  your own..."
The consensus appeared to be that the PCTs had a right to commission services but 
not to manage the NHS Trust. Their commissioning should be in a hands-off 
manner. Not all respondents perceived this to be the case and there was a degree of 
mistrust on both sides.
There was a feeling that the general public saw the job of PCTs as commissioning 
secondary care services. Secondary care targets dominated the primary care agenda.
I'm sure i f  you asked people locally what does the PCT do,
I'm sure most o f them would say they commission services 
from acute hospitals. So it feels fine that that's what we do 
but I  do feel it dominates the agenda more than I  would like 
it to do. (Manager PCT B 33/83)
However, the NHS Trust had an agenda that included developing tertiary services in 
addition to secondary services. This caused some tensions in the commissioning of 
secondary care services as the PCTs felt that the NHS Trust was more concerned 
with tertiary than secondary care.
As a Trust we've also got a big agenda in terms o f developing 
tertiary services ... And that to an extent creates a bit a 
tension within the process [between] us and the PCTs ... that 
is an objective that is very different from the PCTs.
(Manager NHS Trust B 28/10)
The PCTs appeared to be very aware that they had no managerial responsibility for 
the running of NHS Trust B.
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... it's not our job to run the hospital... (Manager nPCT B 
34/86)
...a t the end o f the day I  have actually no managerial 
responsibility fo r the way in which they spend money, and 
that would be getting into what they call micro-management.
(Manager PCTB 26/36)
However, they planned to become more involved in the detailed management of the 
Trust if the Trust was failing to meet its targets.
...if things are going well they get more space, i f  things are 
going badly they must expect us to take more interest in the 
detail. (Manager nPCT B 34/99)
Contrary to these intentions to remain at arm’s length, the PCTs did want to know in 
detail what the Trust was doing to deliver its targets. Both the NHS Trust 
management and clinicians were concerned about the PCTs’ tendencies for micro­
management.
...it feels people in a primary care commissioning position 
are trying to manage a hospital, make decisions, or more 
often not allow us to make decisions, which are about how 
we run the hospital. ... the Trust management team [need to 
be] free to manage a hospital within a broad framework 
agreed with the PCT and don't have to get every "i" dotted 
and "t" crossed ... (Surgeon NHS Trust B 83/24)
There was an acceptance that perhaps the PCTs were appearing to take on more of a 
management than commissioning role, but that the process was new and they all had 
to begin to understand their roles relative to each other.
I  think at times it must feel to them that we're trying to 
manage their organisation because we're really in there 
quite a lot and that's some o f the feedback that we've had is 
that actually we're there to commission not to manage. But 
it’s also about [NHS Trust B] and us all beginning to 
understand what it’s like to have a PCT commissioning 
services and that we are trying to make some decisions 
jointly rather than just let a particular unit go o ff and do 
whatever they feel is best and the real issues are around 
replacement consultants and job plans and closure o f beds, 
ward re-configuration, all o f those things which we insist on 
knowing about and that can feel a little bit close to them, I  
think, because it starts to take away some o f their previous 
freedoms. Before perhaps they didn't have to ask or seek
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agreement around the configuration o f consultant posts or 
funding new posts. (Manager PCT B 33/71)
Despite the views from the NHS Trust that they did not want the PCTs interfering 
with operational matters, one PCT respondent explained having to turn down an 
invitation to meetings that were operational.
I  was invited to a series o f fortnightly meetings about A & E  
services, and I  just had to say that anything that's happening 
fortnightly is operational We can only help them change 
over a timescale that you measure probably in years, 
certainly months. (Manager nPCT B 34/98)
There was an alternative view from the NHS Trust management that the PCTs did 
not engage with them in terms of monitoring their agreements as much as they 
should. The NHS Trust was surprised by this and did not think it would reflect well 
on the PCTs if the NHS Trust failed to achieve the agreed targets.
We have a twenty-minute chat about [the] waiting list 
position and how it's going about once a month, i f  that, but 
it's all pretty informal. Now I'm surprised by that - 1 know 
other areas in the country, the performance monitoring 
meeting between the Trust and the commissioners is a, you 
know, pretty major bun fight every month where the great 
and good turn out and dust o ff their best suits. ... I  think 
maybe giving us the freedom to get on with it is good but 
perhaps even within that they're slightly more hands o ff with 
everything than they should be. ... It's a difficult balance but 
I  think we're too far towards the laissez faire end o f the 
spectrum at the moment. (Manager NHS Trust B 28/67)
Notwithstanding this concern, other members of the NHS Trust management team 
were adamant that the PCTs had no right to ask questions about how the NHS Trust 
was trying to achieve its targets, and if they did ask questions, they would receive no 
answers.
... i f  I  want to appoint a couple o f nurses to a ward, I ’m not 
going to go and ask their permission for it, ... but they may 
want me to, but I  wouldn't, because I  see it as internal 
business. I  think they have a right to say "and what are you 
delivering, what are you doing around that service, you are 
not meeting the target, you're not doing x, I  want to know 
why". No problem with tha t... i f  we agree a target that we 
will do 1000 inpatients in this speciality, say, that’s what I  
expect them to monitor us on, in terms o f the 1000 and i f  we
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go wrong on that, then they can ask for more information.
What I  don't expect them to do is to say and how are you 
going to do it? Because I  think the how you are going to do it 
is our business. (Manager NHS Trust B 31/4 7)
The GPs felt that there was some jealousy from the secondary care clinicians and a 
culture of blame. This issue is exemplified by a comment that some of the rivalry 
between secondary and primary care was caused by primary care having control of 
the funds.
I  think there is antagonism a little bit because we've got the 
money and the secondary care doesn't. (GP PCT B 82/84)
There was a concern that in the health community as a whole there was a tendency to 
blame the PCTs if services could not be prioritised due to financial limitations. One 
GP raised the interesting point that all the organisations had the same objectives (to 
improve health care) but placed different priorities on how this should be achieved 
and it was that, linked with the way in which funds were controlled by the PCTs, 
which resulted in the tendency for blame. Despite belonging to one organisation (the 
NHS) with one broad set of overriding objectives, the different units of the 
organisation had different ideas about how to meet specific objectives. This issue 
had arisen also in relation to the joint working of the PCTs in case study C.
I  think there is now still a culture o f blame. "You can't, you 
can't have that because the PCT won't fund it”, is something 
that we're using. “You can't have that because it is not a 
health community priority ” is the message, not because the 
PCT won't fund it! We're all in health care, and we're trying 
to get the best health care improvement fo r  the population, 
and you know, there are other more important priorities is 
the overall, well that's the message. (GP PCTB 29/16)
In addition to this culture of blame, the NHS Trust management showed a degree of 
mistrust about how resources were prioritised by the PCT.
... i f  you’ve got the money to buy services fo r  a whole health 
community and you, yourself actually provide some o f the 
services, where are you going to put the money? ... You’re 
going to put in your own, aren't you? Because they're your 
staff, all those staff workfor you, all those doctors work for  
you. Are you going to go and put it in an organisation 10 
miles away? ... It's human nature that you're likely to be
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drawn to do something even though it may not be the right 
thing to do. (Manager NHS Trust B 31/78)
This mistrust was possibly held only at management level. A theory held by one of 
the GPs from PCT B was that clinicians communicated well across the primary- 
secondary care interface and had a good understanding of each other’s needs. The 
problems, he believed, arose when the NHS Trust management became involved in 
discussions.
I'll tell you just one little theory I  have about this. You get 
clinicians talking to clinicians, and you get a good 
understanding. And you tend not to have any throwing o f toys 
out o f  prams. What seems to go wrong is when the PCT 
clinicians communicate with the secondary care clinicians 
via management, and particularly via [NHS Trust B] 
management. (GP PCT B 29/13)
iii) Tier 3: NHS Trust management as principal: "the management 
hasn't come to grips with managing clinicians''
NHS Trust doctors perceived the NHS Trust management to be following a different 
agenda to the clinicians. They saw their management as more constraining than that 
in general practice, whereas the GPs saw it as less constraining. The GPs perceived 
the financial control problems in the NHS Trust as a consequence of having weak 
budgets for directorates, whereas the clinical director perceived his management of 
these budgets as very strong.
There was a feeling by the hospital clinicians that the NHS Trust management had 
little interest in them. The management were concerned only with issues important 
to themselves.
I  think doctors perceive they're working fo r  a Trust but they 
would like to think that the Trust is doing something for  
them, but their perception is probably that they're working 
for the Trust and the Trust has no interest in them.
(Surgeon NHS Trust B 89/57)
What is considered to be important by management is 
monitored but what is considered important by clinicians 
isn 't monitored. (Surgeon NHS Trust B 90/36)
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Perhaps part of the reason for this gap was that the management and clinical agendas 
were different.
I  don't think we actually sit down and identify the differences 
in agendas. ... I  don't think people have really grasped the 
nettle. We push it away. ... /  think those two things are 
different and I  think unless you're, i f  you're rowing the boat 
in different directions, the boat ain't going to go is it?
(Surgeon NHS Trust B 90/18)
There was a perception that management were driven by targets, and consultants felt 
this management drive interfered with their clinical practice. The result was a 
perception by consultants that the management saw them as un-co-operative.
A hospital manager summed up the trade offs between the management and clinical 
priorities; the NHS Trust was going to be iicrucifled,'> if it did not meet access targets, 
but the really important concerns from a clinical point of view were about providing 
timely advice to GPs on difficult patient management issues. However, these were 
not government, and therefore not NHS Trust management, priorities.
... we've got all the waiting list targets that we’re going to be 
crucified i f  we don’t achieve but there are a lot o f other 
things that the GPs and the doctors here believe to be 
clinically important, things like endoscopy waiting times and 
MRI and CT and all those sort o f things, which don’t form  
part o f something that will get, you know, a caning for  
nationally... (Manager NHS Trust B 28/3 7)
There was a perception from the hospital doctors that they were constrained by their 
management and the finances available for developments, more so than GPs. One 
consultant talked about the frustrations caused by the relative lack of freedom that 
hospital clinicians had over the use of their budgets. He believed that the 
management in the NHS Trust controlled the budget and that was frustrating.
... we're much more tied to an institution ... which has quite 
a strong managerial structure. General practice is more o f a 
loose affiliation o f self-employed practitioners, it’s changing 
to some extent, yes, but you do have more control over your 
own budget... (Surgeon NHS Trust B 89/29)
In contrast, there was a view from primary care that the NHS Trust management 
were not strong and were not managing their clinicians appropriately.
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I  do feel still that still in [NHS Trust B] the management 
hasn't come to grips with managing clinicians. It's a very 
difficult thing to do. We, clinicians, are very individual 
people but i f  it can happen in some Trusts, and they don't 
have these enormous waiting lists, I  would have thought it 
should be able to happen over here. (GP PCT B 88/14)
In addition, the problems were perceived as worse in the NHS Trust precisely 
because the consultants did not have control over their budgets. Whether it is true or 
not, the perception that hospital doctors do not have control over their budgets is a 
factor that added to the discord between primary and secondary care.
Consultants do not get given a budget fo r  their particular 
department or their particular directorate ... I  really do feel 
that i f  they were given a budget to run their department, the 
financial side o f things in a big hospital would be far  
improved because they'd have responsibility fo r what they 
did and they wouldn't be able to go and put in ten new hips 
with a particular metal in it because their budget wouldn't 
run to it that year, they would have to look at ways o f saving 
money before they did that. (GP PCT B 88/34)
Another view, analogous with that put forward in case study A, was that it was just 
too difficult to get a decision made by going through the appropriate channels. 
Whereas in case study A, the process was viewed as time consuming and 
demoralising because requests were turned down when they did not help to meet 
targets, here, it was the middle managers who were perceived as too afraid to make 
decisions.
There’s concern that there's forever more tiers o f  
management going be put into the system ... it slows the 
process down, it adds more to the sort o f  treacle layer and... 
my concept o f a treacle layer is you have this layer o f  
management who won’t make decisions because they're 
afraid to, so i f  you're sitting below the treacle layer you have 
to break through that and it's treacle because it's very 
difficult to break through because there’s a lot o f  people 
saying oh, I  can't do that, and I  can't do that, because they 
won't take responsibility because they're afraid to...
(Surgeon NHS Trust B 89/1)
This frustration by clinicians with management was augmented by the perceived use 
of sanctions rather than incentives as a means of control.
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All we get is sticks ... rather than carrots. We're told that i f  
we do not achieve this, XYZ management people will lose 
their job, the hospital will lose money ... it's all stick, stick, 
stick, rather than i f  you achieve this we'll get a new nurse, we 
will get the new equipment, we will be able to do new 
procedures, ... it's continually no, you can't have this, no, you 
can't have that. ...W e all know you can't talk to intelligent 
people with sticks. They fa ll about laughing. (Surgeon NHS 
Trust B 90/24)
Whether these sticks came from the management directly or were implemented by 
the heads of the directorate was not clear. One consultant had strong views about 
what he called “creeping commissioning”. This term referred to the introduction of 
new services or techniques without the prior agreement of the NHS Trust 
management. The reason he referred to it as creeping was because once services had 
been started, it was hard to stop them and they crept into the steady state of 
commissioned services in the following year. He saw one of the reasons for 
creeping commissioning as enthusiasm for innovations.
... a new procedure on the operating side o f  things, people 
start saying, I'll just botch it together and I'll borrow a bit o f  
kit from the drug company and they'll fund the first couple o f 
implants or bits and pieces and then by the time the third 
patient comes along they say well I've done two, you know 
we're doing this. And it's very difficult then as manager or 
the clinical manager to turn round and say well hang on a 
second. (Surgeon NHS Trust B 89/26)
The only way he saw of controlling these developments was to be a very tight 
manager. As a clinical director, he saw it as his role to say no to developments that 
had bypassed the funding system. He was in effect siding with the NHS Trust 
management against the desires of his fellow clinicians.
I  make myself not the most popular person by preventing 
these things from taking o ff until we've got them properly 
funded. So I ’m probably perceived as quite a tight clinical 
manager from that point o f view. I  say I'm sorry, until we've 
got this right, in spite o f all the frustrations, we're not going 
to do [it]. (Surgeon NHS Trust B 89/33)
In summary, the managers in case study B were target driven but less convinced than 
those in A that the targets reflected best care. The PCT and NHS Trust shared the 
responsibility for meeting the targets. The PCT had a tendency to try and micro­
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manage the NHS Trust but was not seen to engage fully in monitoring progress. The 
NHS Trust did not feel that the PCTs had a right to know how the Trust was 
working, only whether or not it was achieving its agreed activity. There was a 
degree of mistrust and jealousy between primary and secondary care by both 
managers and clinicians, despite a counter claim that clinicians worked well together 
when management was excluded. The NHS Trust management concentrated on 
different objectives to their clinicians and blamed this difference on government 
pressure. In general, primary and secondary care clinicians did not appear to 
understand the worlds in which each worked: both saw the others as having greater 
financial freedoms. Secondary care clinicians complained of a lack of positive 
incentives and the inability of management to make decisions, although directorate 
management was strong.
In case study B, the drive to meet the national targets was just as strong as in case 
study A. The control by the PCTs of NHS Trust B was not as strong as that by the 
HA in case study A. Incentives were not used at any level. The methods of control 
from the NHS Trust management to the consultants were seen as weak by primary 
care but strong by consultants. New treatments had been introduced without prior 
agreement, but the control at clinical director level was seen as strong.
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c) Case study C
Similarly to case study B, respondents in case study C saw the national targets in a 
predominantly negative way. They too felt trapped by the demands of the national 
agenda and few said anything positive about them. The hospital surgeons felt they
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were being driven by a management agenda and as a result claimed to be constrained 
in their service developments.
i) Tier 1: The government as principal: "the targets are generally not 
negotiable"
As with case studies A and B, the predominant view was that of being driven by the 
national agenda.
...hitting the targets because, I  know I  keep going on about it 
but that's actually what matters to Government ministers...
(Manager NHS Trust C 39/102)
Everybody's really only aiming at national targets.
(Manager Regional Office 80/69)
...the targets are generally not negotiable... (Manager
PCT C 36/19)
One of the results of the national agenda was that there was no time and no 
inclination to discuss other issues of importance. Although many people were eager 
to plan for a better local service, the opportunities were not there because of the 
needs to meet the national requirements.
We should be looking at development o f services, looking at 
pathways and all that sort o f thing but it gets squeezed out, 
that's the problem. (Manager PCT C 92/6)
...untilyou can get beyond 'do we have any "waiters" after 
15 months', it's very difficult, or patients waiting on trolleys 
or not even getting as far as waiting on trolleys, waiting in 
ambulances because there's no trolleys available, it's very 
hard to move beyond th a t... it's sort o f like talking about 
what will happen when you win the lottery, well first you 
need to win! (Manager nPCT C 38/32)
Just as in case study B, targets were not necessarily seen as pushing in the right 
direction and were seen to be irrelevant to but taking priority over local needs.
...that comes down from the politicians very much so and it 
doesn't seem to actually bare any relation to what's needed in 
the local community, it's about hitting the, the fifteen and 
twelve month targets that we all think are a croc. (GP 
PCT C 93/5)
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In a very similar vein to one of the comments from a manager at NHS Trust A, there 
were concerns about the point of some targets, in particular in having a target that 
counts the number of people waiting for treatment or targets that seem to have little 
meaning for patient care.
How many people are on the waiting list? Now what 
meaning does that have? I  don't care how many people are 
waiting for a hip replacement i f  I'm waiting fo r  one. It has 
absolutely no relevance whatsoever. But, national target.
(Manager PCT C 36/50)
And a lot o f them have been very ill thought I  think, by the, 
but not by the management here obviously but by the 
government and they are unrealistic targets and they're, and 
they're targets that a lot o f the time don't actually have a lot 
o f meaning in terms ofpatient care. (Surgeon NHS Trust
C 94/38
The theme that central control was too strong emerged again. In talking about the 
freedom to develop patient pathways of care, this GP felt that it was not possible, 
due to the constraints of the national agenda.
...it's almost given to you on a plate, you know, go and 
commission services, this is what we have to go and 
commission. (GP PCT C 92/76)
The PCT managers had very little to say about clarity in the targets. One PCT 
manager suggested that focusing on the “must do” issues improved achievements but 
there were no other comments in this vein.
...the job tends to get done better but it tends to be focused 
on achieving targets because that's what we are told are our 
'must do ’s'. (Manager PCT C 91/9)
One comment suggested that the general direction of policy provided some clarity, 
but not the targets themselves.
...actually a lot o f that is taken out o f our hands because the 
Government's very clear about what the next 5 priorities are 
-  cancer, coronary heart disease, mental health, access and 
you know, can’t remember the fifth -  older people. So we 
know what our priorities are. ... Policy development comes 
from the National Plan. We've got a policy. (Manager 
PCT C 32/12)
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The NHS Trust managers made limited comments on the helpfulness of the national 
targets, but they could see their value as long as they remained stable.
[They] give it a sense o f purpose and direction. Very clear 
about what we've got to do, how we do it. I  think they leave 
us some flexibility on the "hows" and just tell us what the 
"what" is. So I'm quite glad as long as the framework 
remains the same and doesn't get changed and comes out at 
a reasonable time. (Manager NHS Trust C 39/132)
The NHS Trust clinicians gave no positive comments about the targets.
ii) Tier 2: The PCTs as principal: “...we [the PCT] don't trust them 
[the NHS Trust]"
The PCTs in this case study did not play an active role as principal. Many of the 
comments from the interviewees were about the lack of involvement of the PCTs in 
commissioning decisions. Despite the collaboration apparent between some 
members of PCT C and NHS Trust C shown in the previous section on multiple 
principals, there was a feeling that the NHS Trust and the PCT management did not 
work well together. In fact, the management of PCT C did not trust the NHS Trust.
There was a view from PCT C that part of the role of NHS Trust C’s management 
was to ensure that the NHS Trust met the PCT’s objectives rather than those of its 
own clinicians.
I f  I  thought [NHS Trust C] had an organisational culture 
which ... conspired with pockets in order to subvert the PCT, 
that's when I  would start talking about [NHS Trust C] as a, 
you know, as not running the way I  want. ... I  don't think it's 
got the ability to do that kind o f  deliberate subversion. We're 
back to the role o f the Chief Executive, and the role o f the 
Chief Executive in [NHS Trust C] is to work with me to make 
sure that doesn 't happen. (Manager PCT C 32/131)
Despite this view, none of the respondents discussed how the PCTs attempted to 
achieve this alignment of objectives. There seemed to be an underlying assumption 
that it would just happen. However, contradicting this, the PCT did not trust the 
NHS Trust to meet the PCTs’ objectives.
...we don't trust them. We need to be honest about that, and 
I'm honest- it's because we don't think they have got the same 
agenda as us. Because we think we've got a population based
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agenda and a whole systems approach. ... we've got this 
sense that they're still in the Acute Trust model and that what 
they believe on is delivering more beds in the Acute Trusts 
because that's what the clinicians are interested in and that 
really they are about building the service in the hospital.
(Manager PCT C 32/77)
Given this desire for alignment of objectives and the lack of trust in the NHS Trust, 
one would expect that the PCTs would introduce a contract with strong incentives.
As we saw earlier, they did not. Instead of using incentives, the PCTs appeared to be 
restricting the funds available to the NHS Trust. In the section on multiple 
principals, NHS Trust management views were reported that showed the PCTs were 
perceived as allocating more funds to themselves than to the NHS Trust. Here, a 
consultant makes a similar point, that developments were being stifled through lack 
of funding.
And in terms o f resource as well it's things like trying to 
persuade the purchasers that we need more consultants here 
because that’s one o f the other problems we have in surgery.
We’re not - looking at the national average -  we're actually 
quite understaffed in terms o f consultants and we're finding 
it quite difficult to actually get any funding for new 
consultants. (Surgeon NHS Trust C 94/26)
The NHS Trust management felt that the PCTs were not engaging with them either 
to make decisions or to monitor progress.
I  mean it's not that the PCTs have been saying "come on, 
we've got to set this up and have a performance monitoring 
meeting in place", they haven't, they have done nothing along 
those lines... (Manager NHS Trust C 39/62)
We saw earlier that the NHS Trust felt that it had to make decisions itself about the 
amount of funds it would be spending in the absence of effective negotiations with 
the PCTs. In a specific example, this NHS Trust manager described the Trust’s 
plans to purchase a three-dimensional computerised scanning and planning system 
for patients with cancer. The NHS Trust had the funds to pay for the equipment but 
needed the PCTs to support the running costs. The PCT had refused to discuss the 
issue with the NHS Trust. The NHS Trust management were frustrated that, on the 
one hand, the PCTs complained that the NHS Trust initiated new developments 
without discussing them with the PCTs, but on the other, when they tried to discuss
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these issues, the PCTs did not want to be involved. The result was that the NHS 
Trust management were going to introduce the new system without PCT approval. 
This is exactly the situation the PCTs were trying to avoid.
There were no claims in this case study that the PCTs were trying to micro-manage 
the NHS Trust. This might have been because the information available to do so was 
so poor. However, the fact that the commissioning group that negotiated the SaFF 
was called the Operational Group suggests that the PCTs were very close to the 
internal operations of the NHS Trust.
iii) Tier 3: NHS Trust management as principal: "we are actually 
working for the management so they reach their targets"
This section illustrates how the surgeons in NHS Trust C felt strongly that their Trust 
was expected to meet the national agenda. As a result, management and clinician 
priorities differed and the managers were seen to have a poor understanding of 
clinical work. Some services had been introduced via the “back door”.
[Tjhe Trust just wants to break even really, which you can 
understand, because that's what they're, er, forced to do by 
the government really. (Surgeon NHS Trust C 95/25)
Part of this force was perceived to be a fear by the NHS Trust management of being 
disparaged by the Department of Health.
Obviously at the moment we have to comply with hitting the 
targets, but I  think the Trust is more interested in hitting 
certain deadlines so that they won't be penalised and 
targeted, you know, the subject o f derision by the Department 
o f Health. (Surgeon NHS Trust C 95/10)
Importantly, there was a feeling amongst clinicians that it was the clinicians that 
must meet the requirements of the management, but the management that would be 
penalised if the targets were not met.
...it does feel as though we are actually working for the 
management so they reach their targets in a way and i f  they 
don't reach their targets then in fact they're going to be the 
ones that suffer... (Surgeon NHS Trust C 94/37)
There was, however, a view that the pressures from targets were advantageous and 
empowering to NHS Trust clinicians. An NHS Trust manager in case study A also
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expressed this view. The hospital doctors knew that the government was so keen to 
meet its own targets that money would be found from somewhere to ensure they 
were met. There was therefore little point in the hospital doctors trying hard to meet 
the targets themselves or to modernise services.
... orthopaedics, the PCT, unless they get their waiters down, 
you know, the management's all going to be sacked and 
there's going to be a load o f special measures and things, so 
the orthopods know that money will come in and they can 
carry on working as slowly as they want to because the 
patients will be taken elsewhere to hit the targets. (GP 
PCT C 93/44)
The objectives of the clinicians were different from management. Clinicians wanted 
to deliver the best clinical care they could. Although some aspects of good clinical 
care coincided with access targets, a specific target on access was not considered 
priority.
Our objective is really to offer a good service and be 
clinically the best we can be. ... we don't want to have a long 
waiting list, [but] I  think we would not have a specific target 
on that. (Surgeon NHS Trust C 95/9)
Although there was no animosity shown towards the Trust management, there was a 
feeling of uncertainty about accountancy driven managers running a clinically based 
organisation and a suggestion that management were entirely separated from the 
clinical staff. This suggests that not only were the different objectives important but 
equally so were the different experiences and understanding of how clinicians (as 
agents) worked.
... a lot o f the clinicians still feel that the management is a 
completely separate entity ... they're running an organisation 
that involves medical treatment and they're not, and they 
don't know anything about medical treatment as such.
They're more on a sort o f financial and accountancy type o f  
basis and not the practical side o f things so they're running a 
team o f doctors or clinicians and they don't know what it's 
like to be a clinician. (Surgeon NHS Trust C 94/34)
Clinicians felt that they were subject to very strong financial constraints. There was 
an understanding that unless a change was cost neutral, it would have to be approved 
through the internal NHS Trust system.
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. . . i f  it involved minimal change and was cost neutral I  think 
we would perhaps get on with it. But most things seem to cost 
money! (Surgeon NHS Trust C 95/14)
However, the view from outside the NHS Trust was that the organisation as a whole 
was so de-compartmentalised that it was analogous to a set of organisations within 
an organisation. As such, the constraints were not equally strong in all departments 
and each was able to make independent decisions, the impacts of which may not 
have been considered at the higher level. Not only were different departments 
independent, but also decisions made at a higher level were not always 
communicated effectively.
...discussions take place at the very senior level and it hasn't 
cascaded through the organisation so they're being unclear 
about what they're meant to be doing ... people develop their 
own little closed walls between each department, don't they?
... it's been a series o f organisations within the organisation.
(Manager PCT C 91/40)
...it has been very departmentalised and, yes, all the 
departments are compartmentalised so, you know, for  
example the diabetologists want more diabetologists and 
don’t want any more general physicians. (GP PCT C 93/21)
The PCT wanted the NHS Trust management to be strong enough to control its 
clinicians, but as shown earlier, did not want it to be so strong that it was able to 
conspire with its clinicians to its own benefit rather than the health community’s.
... they need to be influential because they have the day-to- 
day relationship with the clinicians and they can influence 
the clinicians into this model o f we're all in it together.
(Manager PCT C 32/87)
The consultants did not mention any form of “creeping commissioning”. However, 
one PCT member recalled her experience of a number of methods used by 
consultants to avoid the formal process of approval for developments and to 
introduce treatments by the “back door”. One method was to apply direct pressure 
to the PCTs by referring to cases previously approved and the inequity of then 
refusing to treat additional cases. The other method was the application of pressure 
via patients, blaming the PCTs for not funding their treatments.
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...when an individual patient who would be suitable for this 
treatment comes along then they bring it to the attention o f  
the PCTfor individual approval and then, sort o f get in by 
the back door because once you've approved four, how could 
you not approve the fifth. Or the consultants sometimes say 
things to patients like “here's a treatment that I  would love to 
be able to give to you but your PCT won't pay for i t”. Or, 
they'll say helpful things like “here's the treatment I  would 
love to offer to you but it is not available on the NHS but you 
can have it privately”, and all these sorts o f  things which 
twist one's arm and make it very difficult and very unpopular 
to say no to. (Manager nPCT C 34/56)
In summary, targets in case study C were seen as restraining and unhelpful by many 
respondents, although a few felt that they gave some direction. Perhaps related to 
the poor financial context of this case study, government scrutiny was seen by many 
to drive objectives. The NHS Trust management’s objectives in particular were seen 
to be different to their clinicians. This is similar to case study B. The PCTs 
expected NHS Trust C to meet the PCTs’ objectives but did not trust it to do so. 
However, they did not introduce incentives to encourage this. Instead, the PCTs 
were seen to rely on restricting the funds available to the NHS Trust and refusing to 
engage in discussions. These methods appeared to encourage creeping 
commissioning at the NHS Trust level, rather than at the consultant level.
Consultants felt that they faced and complied with strong financial constraints, but 
the PCTs gave examples of methods used to initiate unapproved developments. As 
in case study A, consultants were seen to have been given greater power as a result 
of government pressures to meet targets.
Case study C was more similar to B than A. The pressures from the targets were felt 
throughout the organisations, but again, the clinicians did not admit to trying to 
bypass the system, although the PCTs believed they did. The control in tier 2 was 
very weak.
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d) How did the strengths of the principal-agent tiers affect 
compliance with commissioning decisions?
A principal-agent chain arises when an organisation (X) is a principal with another 
organisation (Y) as its agent, but organisation Y is also a principal with its own agent 
(Z).
Principal-agent theory predicts that principals and agents in the lower and middle 
tiers are likely to collude by hiding information from those in the higher tiers. A 
common example given in the literature is that of a legislative body responsible for 
monitoring and regulating an industry. The legislature employs an industry regulator 
to carry out this function. The firm that the regulator is monitoring has an incentive 
to collude with the regulator in order to hide its real costs from the legislature and so 
avoid profit cutting regulation or taxes. Efficiency is therefore reduced unless the 
legislature sets incentives for the regulator to be truthful.
In the context of commissioning, we would expect clinicians to collude with NHS 
Trust managers against their higher principals, the PCTs. We would expect 
clinicians to work with NHS Trust management to hide information about costs, 
activity and productivity in order to advance the consultants’ objectives. A result of 
this would be so called “creeping commissioning”, that is, the introduction of service 
developments without the approval of the PCT. To counteract this tendency, PCTs 
should ensure that the incentives faced by the NHS Trust management to achieve the 
PCTs’ objectives are stronger than their incentives to collude with their clinicians.
In fact, incentives were not used by the PCTs and it appeared that NHS Trust 
managers and clinicians communicated rarely about commissioning issues. In case 
studies A and B, it was more likely for PCT and NHS Trust managers to work 
together to achieve shared objectives than for NHS Trust managers and their 
clinicians to work together. In case study C, it was more likely for the NHS Trust 
management to make decisions independent of the PCTs, but not through deliberate 
collusion with the consultants.
Despite claims to the contrary, creeping commissioning did exist. There were 
examples in each case study of new services or techniques being introduced without
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prior agreement from the commissioners. In case study A, creeping commissioning 
appeared to be initiated mainly at consultant level; in C it was initiated at NHS Trust 
management level. In B, it was not clear at which level creeping commissioning was 
initiated. It may have been taking place at both levels. A possible reason for these 
differences was that, compared with C, the commissioners in A (the Health 
Authority) had a greater degree of control over their NHS Trusts and as a result a 
greater alignment of objectives. The NHS Trust management was therefore more 
likely to work in collaboration with the commissioners. In C, the control by the 
commissioners of the NHS Trust was weak and the level of shared vision of the 
future low. The NHS Trust management, not the consultants, therefore initiated new 
developments without the agreement of the PCTs. In B, the situation was mixed.
The strongest control appeared to be at the level of clinical director.
Creeping commissioning is the result of a lack of appropriate control of agents by 
their principals. The remainder of this section considers why creeping 
commissioning emerged at different levels in these case studies.
i) National targets versus local control
The strength of the government drive to meet national targets affects commissioning 
in a number of ways. Targets can be seen as generally helpful as well as inhibiting 
local developments. They can increase the likelihood of managers in different 
organisations having the same objectives. They can also increase the likelihood of 
managers and clinicians in the same organisation having different objectives. In 
addition, the perceived need by NHS Trust management to meet government targets 
can encourage them to place less emphasis on the demands of their commissioners if 
these demands are not consistent with government targets. The pressure that each 
case study found itself under may have contributed to the degree of collusion 
between managers, consultants and organisations, and therefore the level at which 
creeping commissioning emerged.
One reason for the difference between managers and clinicians in compliance with 
the targets may be the way in which responsibility for meeting targets is structured. 
Targets are seen as management targets, not clinical targets. Targets can be set only 
for measurable events. As such, they are not related directly to the clinical quality of 
care. If targets are not reached, it is the management that are penalised, either by
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stricter monitoring and control from external bodies, or more personally through the 
loss of their jobs. Clinicians are penalised only through the effects of working in an 
organisation that has failed to meet its targets. There is no direct personal incentive 
to meet the targets.
Pressure can come in many forms, but in these case studies was either local pressure 
through strong management or external pressure through government demands.
NHS Trust A was subject to immense pressure from strong Health Authority 
management. NHS Trust C was under the most severe pressure from government to 
meet access and financial targets; they were in deficit and failing to meet many 
targets. NHS Trust B lay between the two. NHS Trust B did have a large deficit and 
some long waiting times but local management pressures were less strong than in A 
and government pressures less strong than in C.
Through the strong target approach of the HA and its strong control of the NHS 
Trust management, NHS Trust A’s management objectives were aligned with their 
principal’s, the HA. This strong control appeared to create a backlash by the 
consultants. The consultant and management objectives were different. NHS Trust 
management expected their clinicians to meet the management’s requirements. The 
consultants felt that some of their autonomy had been taken away. They were 
therefore likely to initiate unapproved developments. To solve this problem of 
creeping commissioning, stronger internal controls were needed in the NHS Trust. 
The controls at tier 2 were stronger than tier 3 and so creeping commissioning was 
evident mainly at tier 3.
In case study C, control of the NHS Trust management by the PCTs was not strong, 
nor was there strong alignment of objectives. The PCTs did not trust the NHS Trust, 
expecting them to try to follow a model of service delivery focused on acute care. 
However, the PCT did not introduce incentives to compensate for this. The NHS 
Trust management were frustrated that they were not able to negotiate service 
developments with the PCTs and so decided to introduce what they considered to be 
important initiatives without prior permission or funding. Consultants claimed that 
they were restricted in their freedoms to initiate new developments not only by their 
own internal management but also by external monitoring. Creeping commissioning 
in this case study appeared at the level of NHS Trust management. The weak level
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of control by the PCTs (at tier 2) combined with the strong pressure from the 
government may have led to NHS Trust management into attaching a higher level of 
importance to government than PCT objectives.
Case study B is a difficult case because the views and the evidence are divided. The 
NHS Trust management undoubtedly introduced services (or at least allowed their 
introduction) without the knowledge or agreement of the PCTs. Discussions held in 
the SaFF meetings about the status of funds and the sharing of deficits as a result of 
new developments illustrate this. Similarly, the clinical director discussed his 
methods for trying to reduce creeping commissioning, which he accepted existed at 
consultant level. Again, the managers’ and clinicians’ objectives were different, 
predominantly because of the pressure on management to deliver government 
targets. The PCTs’ control of the NHS Trust management was not through 
incentives but through the allocation of funding envelopes and negotiated 
agreements. The relatively weak (compared to A) control of the NHS Trust 
management and the relatively weak (compared to C) control of consultants resulted 
in the clinical director level having to take responsibility for constraining creeping 
commissioning.
ii) Styles of control
The methods as well as strengths of control in the different principal-agent tiers 
impacted on compliance with commissioning decisions.
Despite a lack of trust by all commissioners of their NHS Trust agents, incentives 
were not used in commissioning. Case study A commissioners tended to rely on 
command and control methods such as threats to job security and a stringent 
financial regime. Case study C PCTs attempted to mirror this by restricting the 
funds available to the NHS Trust, but did not have the same power as the HA 
commissioner in A to “bully” the NHS Trust into co-operating. Case study B PCTs 
attempted to have a hands-off approach. They restricted funds but tried to trust the 
NHS Trust to achieve its targets within those funds. However, they did not in fact 
have a sufficient level of trust and showed “micro-management” tendencies. In case 
studies B and C, the introduction of incentives to influence the NHS Trusts’ 
behaviour should increase co-operation and decrease the need for micro­
management at tier 2.
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Control by commissioners was undoubtedly strongest in case study A. Indeed, a 
management view from case study A was that, due to the lack of sufficient numbers 
of high-calibre leaders, the NHS should be organised around effective leaders rather 
than organisations. So what was it about Health Authority A that gave it such 
control over the objectives of NHS Trust A? One reason may be that the Health 
Authority in A was working within a principal-agent system, but one in which the 
NHS Trust was treated as an internal agent. That is, the methods being used to 
control the NHS Trust were consistent with those an employer may use to control his 
employees (Whitley, 1999). The system was a managerial hierarchy rather than a 
contractual relationship (Goodwin, 2000). However, as we have seen, this resulted 
in a loss of autonomy for agents. Wall et a l (2002) in their review of empowerment 
and performance suggest that empowerment of lower levels in a hierarchy can 
promote a broader perspective among employees. If NHS Trust doctors are 
considered to be at a lower level of the hierarchy, the command and control style in 
case study A disempowers them and as a result may narrow their perspective. A 
narrow perspective may mean that service developments are implemented that 
benefit individual patients and professionals but at the expense of the broader 
community objectives.
Also in case study A, a further form of pressure and a reason for consultant defiance 
of the commissioning rules may be related to “hard organisation”. In their in-depth 
study of the contracting process over a three-year period in a health authority in 
Wales, Hughes et al. (1997) compared their results with previous research on 
compulsory competitive tendering in local authorities. Both showed a process of 
change, from a “‘hard’ form of quasi-market organisation” to a more collaborative 
approach (Hughes et a l , 1997: 272). In each, attempts to implement contracts along 
commercial lines had resulted in a loss of trust and co-operation between the 
organisations.
Although the SLA in case study A did not resemble an incentive contract and the 
methods can not be considered “hard contracting”, they could be considered a “hard” 
form of negotiation and agreement between organisations. There was no equality in 
the partnership between the NHS Trust and the Health Authority in reaching the 
agreement, and no involvement of clinicians.
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This strong hierarchical system of control appeared to be a successful model of 
achieving the important process measure of agreeing funding and the level of 
commissioned services. As such, control at tier 2 was strong. However, the NHS 
Trust clinicians felt so controlled that they became demoralised and were tempted to 
cheat the system and initiate new developments that had not been agreed. The 
internal control within the NHS Trust was not sufficiently robust to stop this from 
happening. This is consistent with the suggestion by Hughes et a l (1997) that non- 
co-operation by consultants was an important factor in the inability of management 
to deliver agreed activity in commissioning.
Case studies B and C appeared to be less hierarchically organised than A with 
weaker control over the NHS Trusts. The financial control from the commissioners 
was not as strong. It follows that NHS Trust managers in B and C were in a stronger 
position than in A to initiate new developments without going through the formal 
commissioning channels, that is, without having developments approved by the 
PCTs. The NHS Trusts as a whole (rather than individual clinicians) were therefore 
in a more powerful position to initiate developments outside the commissioning 
system. The desire for hospital clinicians to cheat their own management may have 
been lessened because the management themselves were working in, relative to NHS 
Trust A, an uncontrolled environment.
One would expect that weak management would provide the opportunity for 
consultants to make unilateral decisions. There was some acknowledgement that 
control systems within NHS Trust A were not robust. Consultants in NHS Trust B 
complained that middle managers were weak; the complaint was that there was a 
“treacle layer” -  a layer of management that was not prepared to make decisions. 
Creeping commissioning was perceived to occur at tier 3 in both these case studies. 
The difference in C was that the weak management and fear of making difficult 
decisions lay at PCT level, that is, in tier 2 of the principal-agent chain.
iii) Mistrust
There was a degree of jealousy and mistrust between the consultants and the GPs 
that may have impacted on their willingness to comply with commissioning 
decisions. This appeared to be due mainly to a lack of understanding of the context 
in which each set of clinicians worked.
228
Many of the secondary care clinicians interviewed commented that GPs had more 
financial flexibility to develop their own clinical practice than did their hospital 
colleagues. Many of the GPs interviewed commented that the secondary care 
clinicians did not have ownership of their directorates’ budgets and as a result could 
not be trusted to provide care within budget. It was considered also that GPs had 
control of the consultants’ money. As a result, there was friction and the GPs were 
blamed for not funding developments. GPs tended to blame NHS Trust management 
for being too weak and not controlling the consultants. There was mistrust by the 
GPs because they saw vested interests; they believed that the consultants kept long 
waits in order to keep their private work high. On the other hand, both GPs and 
consultants were aware that any problems caused through initiating or stopping 
services before gaining agreement may be through a lack of understanding rather 
than any deliberately self-interested reasons. Neither professional group was aware 
of the impacts on others of their actions. There was also a view in case study B that 
clinician-to-clinician relationships were more positive than clinician-to-management 
relationships.
These differences of opinion may have resulted in increased loyalties to their own 
organisations and increased blame on others for failures. There was little belief by 
GPs that consultants were meeting community interests, and blame by consultants on 
GPs (as budget holders) that they were restricting developments. This lack of trust 
may have led to the consultants being tempted to remove their co-operation and 
proceed with developments unilaterally. The situation was similar in each case 
study.
There was also a degree of mistrust between the managers of the different 
organisations. Managers in both NHS Trusts B and C said that they felt naked in 
front of the PCTs. They felt that the NHS Trusts had to bare all whilst the PCTs kept 
on their clothes. The Director of Operations in NHS Trust B was adamant that if  the 
Trust had to bare all, so should the PCTs. There was a strong feeling that, as the 
PCTs were providers as well as commissioners, the PCTs should also be open to 
health community scrutiny of their provider arms. This tendency to mistrust and 
question the legitimacy of PCTs may have resulted in a feeling of unity between the 
NHS Trust management and clinicians. This would suggest that non-compliance 
with commissioning decisions would be likely at tier 2, as was the case in case
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studies B and C. This would be unlikely to occur in case study A where the 
legitimacy of the Health Authority as commissioner was not questioned.
iv) Dependency
Principal-agent theory assumes that markets are contestable. That is, principals can 
move to alternative agents if they are dissatisfied with the service provided, and vice 
versa. In the NHS this is not necessarily the case. Organisations are more dependent 
upon each other, and this may result in a greater tendency for compliance with 
commissioning agreements.
The managers in the PCTs and NHS Trusts in case studies A and B felt that they 
were dependent on each other. Some of PCT A ’s patients had access to an 
alternative provider within approximately a half hour drive. However, the 
management in NHS Trust A felt that they and PCT A were dependent upon each 
other; the term used was “mutually assured destruction”. Case study B was chosen 
because, for PCT B, there was no alternative local NHS provider. Equally, PCT B 
provided approximately 50% of NHS Trust B’s funding. The two organisations felt 
that they were bound together and the impact this had on them was to encourage 
them to work well together. They knew they had to work through any problem areas 
because neither had a choice to shift elsewhere.
In contrast, PCT C did have a choice of provider for at least some of its patients.
Case study C was selected for study because the PCTs had access to more than one 
NHS Trust provider. The PCT managers in case study C felt a loyalty to NHS Trust 
C and felt that many of their patients would not wish to use an alternative provider, 
but accepted that they had this option if chosen. One view by NHS Trust C and PCT 
C management was that if the PCTs moved some of their services to another 
provider, this relieved the pressure on NHS Trust C and helped it to achieve its own 
access targets. The view from primary and secondary care clinicians was that such 
disloyalty to the local NHS Trust merely destabilised the local economy and created 
problems for the future through a reduction in investment, when one of the reasons 
for the NHS Trust struggling to meet its targets was under investment.
Would you prefer to invest in your local corner shop than to 
go three miles down the road...? The answer's yes ... you'd 
want to support your local DGH... Taking money elsewhere
230
isn't going to help solve their problem or your problems in 
the long run. (GP PCT C 92/3 7)
As a result of these dependencies, NHS Trust managers in A and B may have been 
less likely to initiate unapproved developments than those in C. In A and B, the 
managers had to depend on each other’s support; they could not buy or sell services 
elsewhere. In C, the PCTs were more able to shift services to another NHS Trust, 
and equally, other PCTs were more able to shift services to NHS Trust C. The 
organisations were therefore not as dependent on each other and so perhaps more 
likely to follow their own agendas. Kirkpatrick (1999) suggests that years of 
fragmentation in quasi-markets have reduced loyalty and co-operation in the public 
sector. NHS Trust C, as a result of being situated near competitors, may have 
suffered such fragmentation and therefore been tempted to follow its own agenda 
and comply with the commissioned decisions of the PCTs less so than in the other 
case studies.
In summary, it seems that the following factors affected the degree of co-operation 
with commissioning decisions by different layers of clinicians and managers in these 
case studies: the ability of hospital management to bypass the commissioning 
system; the level and type of pressures felt by the key players in the system; the 
degree of “hardness” in management styles; mistrust and jealousy between players; 
and feelings of organisational loyalty and dependency.
These issues and those arising from the analysis of multiple principals and a 
common agent are discussed at a more macro level in the next chapter.
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Chapter Five: Discussion
This chapter summarises the evidence presented in the previous chapter and takes a 
broader perspective to discuss the findings at a macro level and in the light of other 
research. The first section summarises the main findings and aspects of the three 
case studies’ commissioning styles that conform to a principal-agent model as 
suggested by policy or to alternative models of organisation. Section two discusses 
the main factors that affected the commissioning relationships in these case studies. 
Section three offers some policy recommendations and section four speculates on the 
impact of these recommendations on the three case studies. Finally, section five 
considers the limitations of the research.
1) Summary of results: principals, agents or neither?
This section offers a brief overview of how and to what extent the case studies’ 
commissioning styles reflected a principal-agent model of commissioning in line 
with that put forward in policy guidance. The findings for each case study are 
summarised. The aspects that conform to a principal-agent framework and those that 
do not conform are then drawn out.
A basic assumption of principal-agent theory is that principals are active in 
attempting to align agents’ objectives to their own through incentive contracts. 
Agents are active only in their response to the contract (or choice of contracts) 
offered by the principal. The principal must choose a payment schedule that depends 
on outcome, the state of the world, the action taken by the agent and other costlessly 
available (and often imperfect) information. Good quality information is important 
as payment schedules depend upon variables that both principal and agent can 
observe (Rees, 1985a).
Given current policy for commissioning health care in the NHS, one would expect 
that a PCT should attempt to align an NHS Trust’s objectives with its own through 
incentive payments stated in Service Level Agreements. An NHS Trust should 
respond by either accepting or rejecting the SLA. Given the geographical nature of 
the NHS and the relative lack of choice of alternative commissioners and providers,
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an NHS Trust is likely to attempt to influence the content of an SLA rather than 
reject it in its entirety.
Total purchasing pilots were shown to achieve change and exercise control over 
resources by using contracts as a mechanism for regulating the transfer of resources 
between purchasers and providers (Robison, 1998). I expected at the start of this 
research that this would be the case for PCTs as well. It seemed likely in addition 
that information asymmetry and monitoring issues would be important. I expected 
that NHS Trusts would hide information from the PCTs, in particular, information 
about their costs. This would be consistent with previous findings. Ranade (1995) 
found that information deficiencies and a reliance on block contracts resulted in 
providers claiming for increases in costs, a claim that purchasers found difficult to 
verify. McCarthy (1998) found also that asymmetry of information about costs was 
important. He showed that NHS Trusts were able to alter their initial prices when 
they found out the health authority’s allocations and could also shift their cost 
pressures onto the health authorities in the form of higher prices. The long-term 
relationships and lack of competition prevented the health authorities from having 
the power to deal with this. In addition, McCarthy stated that many pressures, that 
the NHS Trust in his study claimed were due to admissions, were perceived rather 
than real, but without the appropriate information commissioners could not verify 
this. For these reasons, I anticipated that SLAs would be service specific, and 
monitoring of activity and expenditure within contracts routine.
In fact, none of the case studies developed incentive-based Service Level 
Agreements as predicted by principal-agent theory. Only one of the case studies (A) 
agreed an SLA at the start of the financial year. The Health Authority led in the 
drafting of this agreement. Case study C reached an agreement for the SaFF shortly 
after the start of the financial year and used the same document as an SLA. Case 
study B planned to write an SLA but this remained in draft until the following 
financial year. NHS Trust B led in the drafting of this agreement. In each case, the 
agreements were treated as performance management tools, not incentive contracts 
to align objectives. The alignment of objectives had taken place before the SLAs 
were written. All the case studies used SLAs as formal statements of the levels of 
service provision and finances that had been agreed previously. Some participants 
considered them performance management tools; no one described them as incentive
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contracts. This is consistent with previous findings that contracts in the quasi-market 
system were “best understood as resource allocation and accountability tools”
(Allen, 2002b: 172). When participants were interviewed, information asymmetry 
between the PCTs and NHS Trusts was not perceived as a problem. Monitoring by 
the PCTs was considered poor, although in A and B good quality information was 
available for monitoring. It should be remembered that all of these case studies were 
discussing only new growth money. The majority of spending was in line with 
historical patterns. This is contrary to Wilkin et a l (2002) who infer from their 
survey findings that there may be a limited reliance on historical spending patterns.
Despite these general observations, the extent to which, and certainly how, the case 
studies reflected a principal-agent approach was quite diverse.
Case study A was selected because it was of average size with a large proportion of 
rural patients. It was classified as “over resourced”, with a distance from target 
allocation in 2000/1 of 5.57%. Its host health authority was 2% over target. There 
was one main acute trust that the majority of patients attended for secondary care 
services, although another NHS Trust was situated approximately 15 miles away but 
was rarely used by the PCT. Another PCT commissioned services from NHS Trust 
A, but at the time of the study PCT A was not involved in any joint commissioning 
for secondary care services.
The research has shown that the Health Authority acted as the principal to the NHS 
Trust agent in case study A. The PCT played no direct role in commissioning 
secondary care services. The SLA was used as part of the performance management 
framework and contained no incentives. The objectives of the Health Authority 
were dominant and the Health Authority dominated discussions in SaFF meetings. 
Both PCT and NHS Trust considered themselves accountable to the Health 
Authority and driven by external targets. Pressure from the principal on the agent 
came in the form of a strong leader and hierarchical, command and control style 
management. There were no financial freedoms or choice of commissioning model 
because the local hierarchical model was imposed. The system for commissioning 
broke down to some extent at the consultant level; the consultants did not follow the 
same agenda as their management or the Health Authority. The Health Authority’s 
control of the NHS Trust management was considered effective but the NHS Trust 
management’s control of consultants less effective.
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Case study A conformed to the principal-agent model of commissioning in a number 
of ways. The Health Authority, as principal, aligned the NHS Trust’s objectives 
with its own. But this alignment was not achieved through the use of incentives. It 
was achieved through authority, exercised through the power of the Health Authority 
Chief Executive, backed up by threats to job security, a method normally associated 
with intra- rather than inter-firm relations (Whitley, 1999). The NHS Trust accepted 
the SLA set by the Health Authority with little question.
There are a number of ways in which case study A did not conform to the 
expectations of principal-agent theory. The NHS Trust did not act as an agent for the 
PCT. The NHS Trust and the PCT were seen as equals to each other, both 
subordinate to the Health Authority. The SLA was not an incentive-based contract; 
it was used as a performance management tool that stated separately the services to 
be delivered and finances available.
Case study B was selected for study because it was the largest PCT in its region.
The PCT was almost exclusively urban, with only 1.8% of its patients classed as 
rural. It was slightly “over resourced”, with a distance from target allocation in 
2000/1 of 1.03%. Its host health authority was 2% over target. One main acute trust 
provided secondary care and also tertiary care to PCT B. PCT B commissioned 
services jointly with another PCT and a PCG. NHS Trust B had some problems 
achieving access and financial targets.
The PCTs in case study B acted as joint principals. The SLA between PCT B and 
NHS Trust B was seen as a performance management agreement and was used by 
NHS Trust B as an internal management document. However, the SLA remained in 
draft and unsigned throughout the whole of the financial year. The SLA did not 
contain any financial incentives, although some activity was restricted in volume. 
NHS Trust B was involved actively in debates with the PCTs in SaFF meetings. The 
PCTs were not always successful in aligning the agent’s objectives with their own; 
the NHS Trust was able sometimes to force its own agenda on to the PCTs. The 
NHS Trust appeared to treat the PCTs as legitimate principals. The PCTs worked 
well together in SaFF negotiations but did not share a contract with the NHS Trust. 
They had shared access to information about NHS Trust B and their broad objectives 
were shared. The PCTs were concerned that their local objectives differed and that 
they no longer worked as closely as they had initially. The PCTs’ collective
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decisions increased their power over the NHS Trust. The parties felt dependant upon 
each other. Trust was publicly high although privately there were tensions and 
mistrust.
The community followed a model for commissioning that was a midpoint between a 
quasi-market and network. It was essentially a collaborative approach with the 
proviso that the PCTs retained financial control. Leadership of all organisations was 
strong and the leaders showed a lot of respect for each other. The PCT and NHS 
Trust management had different agendas, as did the NHS Trust management and 
clinicians. Although the PCTs appeared not to engage fully in monitoring the NHS 
Trust, they had a tendency for micro-management. There was a degree of mistrust 
between the PCTs and NHS Trust. Clinicians in primary and secondary care did not 
appear to understand the financial constraints within which their counterparts 
worked. This caused misunderstandings. The PCTs’ control of the NHS Trust was 
moderate. Consultants saw the control of them by NHS Trust management as strong 
and based on sanctions only, but primary care saw it as weak. Control at directorate 
level was strongest.
Case study B conformed to the principal-agent model in some ways. The PCTs 
shared objectives and information and, as predicted by principal-agent theory, joined 
forces to act as joint principal. They worked together and presented a single voice 
on the majority of issues. The PCTs’ power came from out-voting the NHS Trust. 
One of the advantages of collaboration between PCTs in commissioning has been 
shown to be a perceived increase in leverage over providers (Wilkin et al., 2002) but 
the reason for this sense of increased power has not been illustrated. Generally, NHS 
Trust B acted as agent for the PCTs.
However, other aspects of this case study were not as expected from a principal- 
agent perspective. The PCTs were not wholly successful in aligning the NHS 
Trust’s objectives with their own. The PCTs chose to allocate a funding envelope to 
the NHS Trust, which all concerned considered a fair proportion of the health 
community’s development funds. (This is consistent with the finding by Walsh et a l 
(1999) that PCGs are more likely to succeed in making changes if they work inside 
current arrangements rather than trying to make radical shifts in finances.) The 
PCTs did not link funds directly to particular services or activities. The NHS Trust 
was permitted to use these funds in the way that it saw as most appropriate in
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achieving its targets. The NHS Trust did not see itself as a passive agent; it was 
active in agreeing the services to be delivered. The SLA was not an incentive-based 
contract; it was perceived as an internal performance management tool developed for 
(and by) the NHS Trust. The SLA remained in draft for the whole of 2002/3.
Case study C was chosen because it was slightly above average size. Although it 
was predominantly urban, 8.6% of its patients were classified as rural. The PCT at 
the time was classed as “under resourced”, with a distance from target allocation in 
2000/1 o f-4.52%. The host health authority received approximately 1% under its 
target budget. PCT C had one main NHS provider for secondary care services but a 
sizeable minority of patients used a neighbouring NHS Trust approximately 10 miles 
away. Four PCG/Ts commissioned services jointly from NHS Trust C. NHS Trust 
C was failing to meet many access and financial targets.
The principals and agent in this case study appeared to have less distinct roles than in 
the other case studies. NHS Trust C appeared to accept the legitimacy of the PCTs 
as principals, but the PCTs themselves did not. The SaFF document was used also 
as the SLA. It did not contain any incentives. The agent’s issues dominated the 
SaFF agenda, possibly as a result of their problems in meeting targets. The PCTs did 
not work well together. They appeared to be acting independently from each other 
whilst creating the illusion of working together. The PCTs had equal access to 
information about NHS Trust C but that information was poor. The PCTs did not 
have shared objectives. There was jealousy and mistrust between the PCTs.
Members of PCT C and NHS Trust C worked closely together despite a degree of 
mistrust. Managers from all organisations accepted that they were not good at 
making difficult decisions. The pressure from the government on NHS Trust C was 
very strong. The NHS Trust management’s objectives were seen to be different to 
the clinicians’. The PCTs did not trust the NHS Trust to meet the PCTs’ objectives 
but did not introduce incentives to encourage them to do so. Leadership was weaker 
than in the other case studies, possibly due to an overly friendly approach between 
the leaders of the different organisations. The PCTs’ control over the NHS Trust 
was weak and therefore non-compliance by the NHS Trust with commissioning 
decisions appeared to be easier than in the other case studies. Control of consultants’ 
activity by NHS Trust management was seen by consultants to be strong.
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Case study C therefore offers few parallels to a principal-agent model of 
commissioning. The NHS Trust appeared to want to act as agent for the PCTs, but 
the PCTs did not appear inclined to act as principals. The NHS Trust wanted to 
know what the PCTs’ objectives were, but the PCTs were not clear about these 
themselves. The PCTs did not present a united front. The SLA was not an 
incentive-based contract; it was an agreement stating the services to be delivered 
within agreed finances. The participants in case study C were more likely to use the 
terms “joint planning” or “joint development” than “commissioning”. The 
separation between principal and agent was not clear. The participants tried to work 
as if organisational boundaries did not exist.
The findings have shown that these case studies were not acting wholly, or even 
largely, in accord with principal-agent theory. Complex interactions and different 
contexts have influenced the commissioning process in these case studies. This is 
not unusual. Others have indicated the importance of institutional frameworks 
(Bartlett et a l , 1998b) and the interaction of different governing structures over time 
and space (Exworthy et a l , 1999). Exworthy et a l (1999) suggest that governance 
structures may mix like a chemical reaction, with elements reacting in different ways 
under different circumstances. The uncertainty surrounding the interaction of these 
elements suggests that “the execution of hierarchical and contractual systems is by 
no means predetermined, and their interaction with local networks means that 
outcomes will be specific to particular areas and contingent upon prevailing policies” 
(Exworthy etal., 1999: 20”).
The spectrum of models of organising co-operation and exchange ranges from 
hierarchies to markets. It is assumed usually that networks and quasi-markets fall 
between the two. There also exist hybrid forms of organisation comprising features 
from more than one system.
Hughes et a l (1997) state that firms in long-term relationships often move away 
from market contracting to integration and internal organisation. NHS Trusts and 
their commissioners are by nature in long-term relationships; their populations are 
overlapping and geographically fixed. The quasi-market in the NHS was based on a 
degree of market contracting. With the shift in emphasis towards long-term 
partnership and collaboration (albeit whilst retaining contracts and choice), health 
care organisations are being encouraged to move away from market contracting, but
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to what? The following gives an overview of how the case studies reflect 
alternatives to quasi-market contracting.
Hierarchies and networks were defined and discussed in relation to the language of 
principal-agent theory in chapter two. In brief, a bureaucratic hierarchy is 
characterised by highly centralised policy-making and resource allocation with a 
limited degree of autonomy at the periphery. A hierarchy operates through a system 
of surveillance, evaluation and direction (Ouchi, 1980). Such types of organisation 
are often labelled “command and control”. They are “command in terms of policy 
goals and objectives, control in terms of the mechanisms to achieve such goals” 
(Exworthy et al., 1999). Case study A is a good illustration of a hierarchical 
arrangement between principals and agents. Incentives were not used. Instead, the 
Health Authority relied on its strong leaders, the enforcement of a stringent financial 
regime and its power over the security of managers’ employment. As discussed in 
chapter four, the relationship between principals and agents in this case study was 
one of managerial control rather than contractual control. Neither of case studies B 
or C demonstrated a hierarchical model of control by PCTs over NHS Trusts, 
although PCT B did show a tendency towards micro-management.
One reason for co-ordinating organisations as internally managed hierarchies is to 
reduce transaction costs. Transaction costs arise when the value of the goods or 
services to be exchanged is not easily determined. In a competitive market system 
where goods are traded regularly, the value at which they are traded is taken as 
legitimate. When goods or services are not traded via a competitive market, a third 
party may be called upon to estimate the value of the product and ensure that both 
seller and purchaser perceive the value as equitable (Ouchi, 1980). However, 
employment of a third party to help value services can be costly. To avoid this and 
other costs, the organisation purchasing the services may choose to provide those 
services in-house.
In the provision of health care in the NHS, there is no competitive market to 
legitimise the value of services. Transaction costs associated with agreeing and 
enforcing payments can therefore be high and it is feasible that a third party could be 
employed to determine a value of services perceived as fair.
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It appears at first sight, in case study A, that a third party was employed to help value 
the services to be provided. Health care services and finances were exchanged 
between the NHS Trust and the PCT. The Health Authority met independently with 
the NHS Trust and with the PCT and could therefore be seen as a third party.
However, on closer inspection, the purpose of those meetings was not to agree with 
the PCT and the NHS Trust a value for the services offered by the NHS Trust. These 
meetings were to agree, with the NHS Trust only, the services to be offered by the 
NHS Trust within given finances. The PCT later signed the agreement (the SLA) 
but played no part in its negotiation. Therefore the Health Authority was acting as a 
principal to the NHS Trust, internalising the arrangements as if the NHS Trust was a 
firm within a firm; it was not acting as an independent third party on behalf of both 
the PCT and NHS Trust. It was acting as a principal within a hierarchical structure.
It may be that some of the differences between the case studies are explained by 
transaction cost issues. Case study A had traditionally used a managerial hierarchy 
to control its agents. Perhaps the success of this approach in the past and concern 
about the potentially high transaction costs associated with negotiation rather than 
command had led A to remain faithful to the hierarchical approach. Indeed, if the 
number of meetings required to agree SaFFs and the cost of the staff attending those 
meetings is used as a proxy for transaction costs (see, for example, Posnett et al.,
1998 and Place et a l , 1998), transaction costs were kept low by holding a minimum 
number of formal meetings in case study A. In contrast, in case study B, many high- 
powered individuals attended monthly meetings to agree the SaFF. In C, a smaller 
number of equally high-powered individuals attended more frequent meetings. 
Although the costs of negotiations taking place outside the main meetings are not 
known, and neither is the relationship between ex-ante and ex-post costs, the visible 
costs of SaFF negotiations in A were less than either B or C.
Within the NHS organisations that are being discussed, there is no direct 
employment relation. Executives of both NHS Trusts and PCTs are employed by 
their own organisations, not the host health authority. Nevertheless, both are held to 
account by the health authority, that is, they are answerable to their health 
authorities. This gives health authorities a degree of legitimacy. Case study A is an 
illustration of strong leadership from the top of the hierarchy and as stated by 
Exworthy et a l (1999), there is little room for manoeuvre at the periphery. The NHS
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system of command and control by the centre has been implemented more locally in 
case study A.
Although the system for agreeing the SaFF was very different in case study B, there 
were some parallels with the hierarchical model used in case study A. The system 
for agreement in B was based on providing each organisation with an equitable share 
of the overall resources and discussing their use during meetings attended by all 
organisations. PCT B did not have the same legitimate authority over NHS Trust B 
as Health Authority A did over NHS Trust A. In comparison with case study A, the 
cost of these meetings in B seems high. However, in discussing the future 
arrangements for commissioning services, the Director of Finance at PCT B 
intimated that she preferred the low transaction cost method of discussing and 
agreeing service delivery with the NHS Trust and then trusting them to deliver, 
rather than the higher cost method of employing additional staff to monitor the NHS 
Trust more closely. This attitude may have important implications for the successful 
adoption of the new system of payment by results using standard tariffs (Department 
of Health, 2002c). The use of standard tariffs for the commissioning of certain 
specialties and the detailed monitoring that is required for PCTs to withdraw funds, 
if necessary, on a quarterly basis will increase the costs of enforcing SLAs.
Case study C did not show any signs of working to a hierarchical model.
If a return to a hierarchy is an appropriate way to deal with high transaction costs, as 
suggested by Kirkpatrick (1999), it seems that a legitimate and powerful leader, as 
seen in case study A, is required. The point of interest here is that where the PCTs 
do not have strong control and are not using incentives, they are tending instead 
towards micro-management. This will become costly. If policy is dictating that 
there should remain a separation of purchaser and provider and that direct control is 
not an option, then to decrease transaction costs, PCT should rely more strongly on 
incentives rather than micro-management.
Another option is to use networks to influence agents. Networks are often 
considered to be an alternative form of organisation to a hierarchy or market. 
However, the sustainability of networks in the NHS has been questioned (Goodwin, 
2000). Whilst some have suggested that networks should be temporary forms 
created to solve specific issues with key players leaving once their interests have
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been met (Uzzi, 1997), others see their advantage in long-term relationships that 
continue even when contracts are open-ended or unspecified (Exworthy et al., 1999; 
Kirkpatrick, 1999).
Of the three case studies, C is the one that found the process of agreeing a SaFF the 
most difficult and time consuming. Case study C was also the group that appeared 
most closely to resemble a network. No one organisation or individual took the lead 
role in negotiations in case study C. The Director of Operations at NHS Trust C 
played an important role in arranging meetings and agendas, but the Director of 
Commissioning in PCT C appeared also to play an important role. Other members 
of PCT C and neighbouring PCTs did not seem inclined to let any one person or 
organisation dominate. The result of this “flat” approach to decision-making in case 
study C appeared to be a chaotic format and lack of final agreement. PCT C felt 
strongly that there should be clinical champions to lead the commissioning process. 
If these leaders had been in place, the network may have been given more focus and 
the result could have been a more systematic approach.
Information was constantly requested by the PCTs from the NHS Trust for the PCTs 
to use in their decision-making. This suggests that the network type was one of, in 
Goodwin’s (2000) terminology, upward flowing information, with information 
assisting decision-makers. However, there was a lack of good quality information in 
this case study. The lack of available information may have contributed to the 
inability of the network to agree the details of commissioning within allotted 
timescales and to the poor functioning of the network.
Case study B showed some signs of acting as a network. The PCTs and the NHS 
Trust seemed to be willing to co-operate in agreeing the SaFF and at least some 
members of each team showed trust in each other. Other members however did not 
trust each other. Case study B therefore appeared to be part quasi-market model and 
part network with little evidence of hierarchy.
The organisations in case study A showed no signs of working as a network in the 
commissioning round studied.
In summary, incentive-based contracts were not considered important by any 
organisation. Wilkin et a l (2002) support this finding; they reported that 88% of 
PCG/Ts had not introduced financial incentives or penalties into SLAs.
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Organisations had other means by which they attempted to establish agreements. 
Case study A retained a hierarchical model, which is consistent with the move 
towards integration and internal organisation suggested by Hughes et a l (1997).
Case study B appears to be moving towards a network model but still adhering to the 
quasi-market model in terms of negotiations and relationships although it has 
abandoned the importance of contracts. Case study C has de facto become a network 
model.
None of the case studies can be described as having adopted in full the principal- 
agent approach suggested in policy documents. This suggests that a principal-agent 
model is not an exact description of reality for these case studies. However, neither 
do the case studies follow a single rival model. Each illustrates some aspects of a 
principal-agent relationship and some other forms of relationship.
2) Influences on commissioning relationships and 
styles
The basic assumptions of principal-agent theory are that there is information 
asymmetry between the principal and agent and they have different objectives. It is 
assumed that payment schedules are based on some combination of information 
about risk, uncertainty about the state of the world, outcome and any other available 
information. The results have shown that payment schedules as conceptualised in 
theory were not used and that information asymmetry, uncertainty and risk sharing 
were not considered major issues for the commissioning process in these case 
studies. The organisations did, however, have slightly different objectives.
This section discusses the complex interactions and contexts that have influenced 
commissioning relationships. They are discussed under the main headings of 
pressure, accountability and power, public service ethos, leadership, trust and 
history.
a) Pressure
Principal-agent theory assumes that, where there is no direct employment 
relationship or the relationship is between organisations, any pressure the principal 
puts on the agent is in the form of incentives. Incentives can be financial or non-
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financial, and positive or negative. However, when the agent is employed directly 
by the principal, particularly when the agent is an individual rather than an 
organisation, the pressure may be applied through direct commands (Whitley, 1999).
In this study, pressure has been shown to exist in two main ways: national pressures 
on organisations to meet access and financial targets, usually imposed by the 
government (or its agents), and local pressure on individuals, applied predominantly 
through threats to job security and credibility. In each case, the amount of pressure 
may motivate high performance. Alternatively it may be so intense that it results in 
de-motivation. In addition to these two types of pressure, the effects of these 
pressures may make organisations feel that to be seen to be complying with policy is 
as important as actually complying.
i) Nationally imposed pressures
The government applies pressure to NHS organisations in order to achieve politically 
important targets. Pressure can be positive or negative and is imposed top down by 
the Department of Health in a number of forms, including star-ratings and 
franchising. In addition, all organisations are expected to develop and implement 
Local Delivery Plans that show how government targets will be met under local 
capacity assumptions (Department of Health, 2002b). The pressures to achieve 
financial balance, improve access, achieve national targets and implement National 
Service Frameworks have been shown elsewhere to be key factors in shaping 
commissioning priorities (Wilkin et a l , 2002). They have also been shown to be key 
factors in discouraging the involvement of GPs in commissioning (Regen et al., 
2001).
Public sector managers work within a highly politicised context and with an intense 
media spotlight (Goodwin, 2000). Goodwin argues that health service leaders 
should have the ability to turn such constraining external environments into 
opportunities by helping others to make sense of situations. This appeared to be the 
situation in case study A where the Health Authority leaders ensured that if the NHS 
Trust (and PCT) worked within government constraints, they created “space” to 
develop local initiatives. This was not the case in case studies B and C. They felt 
that they were under direct government pressure to perform.
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In case study B, the pressure appeared to be sufficient to bring the community 
together and encourage all the organisations to work towards making the whole 
greater than the sum of the parts. The organisations in B could see the road to 
recovery. In B it appeared that the pressure on the organisations was sufficient to 
encourage them to work together whilst retaining some organisational self-interest.
In case study C, the context appeared to be so pressurised that organisational self- 
interest became paramount and any desire to compromise for the greater good of the 
community diminished.
The NHS is currently driven by the government’s desire to achieve targets laid out in 
the NHS Plan and National Service Frameworks. Politically, the most important 
targets are those that the general public is aware of; these are the access targets for 
secondary care and the need to achieve financial balance. The drive to achieve these 
two targets has been reflected directly in the annual Service and Financial 
Frameworks. All organisations must achieve financial balance at the same time as 
modernising service delivery and meeting access targets. The rewards for meeting 
these targets are non-financial. They include star-ratings and positive (or at least, no 
negative) publicity. Targets for reducing outpatient and inpatient waiting times have 
been met more successfully than locally set targets, for example, to improve 
discharge arrangements (Wilkin et al., 2002). This suggests that it is the nationally 
set targets that take priority. The reason for this is the relative strength of the 
penalties for not achieving national versus not achieving local targets.
Kunz and Pfaff (2002) makes the point that in business environments, people expect 
to be paid in return for providing labour, and so rewards are considered the norm. In 
the NHS this is also the case, but the tendency appears to be to use negative rewards 
(i.e. penalties and threats) that as one consultant suggested are not likely to be 
effective when dealing with a highly educated and caring profession.
The correct use of incentives has been shown to be effective in changing behaviour 
(see Burgess & Metcalfe, 1999 for a review). However, too much pressure can 
result in players working strictly in accordance with those pressures or incentives 
that have the greatest impact. In this case, the threats of zero star-ratings, of poor 
national press coverage and of the franchising of management systems result in 
organisations aiming solely to meet the short-term goals of annual targets. It is 
likely that health service managers are keen to meet the targets because their jobs
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depend on it; the numbers of chief executives and directors of poorly performing 
NHS Trusts to have resigned or been suspended in recent years bears testament to 
this. Organisations that have historically been funded poorly are more likely to have 
accumulated problems and hence face greater pressures currently. Case study C was 
chosen because it was under its target funding allocation. Of the three case studies, 
it faced the greatest external pressures and had the poorest joint working.
ii) Locally imposed pressures
This research has shown that some of the local pressure applied to individuals is 
perceived to be close to “corporate bullying”. In organisations where the financial 
and waiting time target pressures are severe, there is little requirement for additional 
local pressures to be imposed. Where these external pressures are not severe, they 
may be replaced by pressure from local leaders. For example, in case study A there 
were fewer immediate pressures on the organisations to improve than in cases B and 
C. NHS Trust A was in financial balance and meeting the majority of its access 
targets. The pressure felt by all respondents in case study A came from the Health 
Authority leaders, the Chief Executive in particular.
The pressure from an individual is not related directly to the structure of the system. 
That is, the system may change but if the individuals in positions of power remain, 
the personal pressures remain also. It is not possible from this research to conclude 
that achievement in terms of meeting commissioning deadlines in case study A were 
due to or even associated with a forceful approach by the Health Authority Chief 
Executive. However, it does suggest that external pressures may be replaced with 
internal pressures. However, those internal pressures on individuals to maintain 
performance may become so intense that there are repercussions elsewhere in the 
system. For example, the NHS Trust clinicians in case study A felt constrained and 
demoralised by the pressure imposed by the Health Authority. As a result, they 
threatened to by-pass the commissioning process.
This finding is consistent with research by Frey (1997) who formulates his theory of 
motivations and human behaviour within a principal-agent framework. He shows 
how different types of rewards, sanctions and other controls can have either positive 
or negative effects on overall performance through their impact on internal 
motivation. Whilst some argue that internal motivation is a poorly specified
246
hypothetical construct with little evidence to confirm its existence (see Kunz &
Pfaff, 2002 for a review), the consensus is that certain methods of control do have 
detrimental effects on performance, for reasons not yet agreed upon.
iii) Pressure to demonstrate compliance with policy
There are two policy requirements with which the case studies felt they should be 
seen to be complying. The first was using Service Level Agreements. The second 
was working in partnership.
Service Level Agreements were drawn up even though those developing and using 
them did not value them as incentive contracts. The view from the case studies in 
this research was that SLAs were an unnecessary hangover from the internal market 
and not meaningful in the new commissioning environment. They were developed 
as contracts even though they were not incentive contracts and did not add anything 
to the decisions and agreements that had been made already through negotiations. 
The case studies were developing something that they called an SLA merely to be 
seen to be conforming to policy requirements. The fact that there was a signed SLA 
between the commissioner and the provider at the beginning of the financial year in 
only one of these case studies suggests that, for them, SLAs were not considered an 
essential element of the commissioning process.
It is interesting to compare these results with those of Hughes et a l (1997). They 
studied commissioning in a health authority in Wales in the mid-1990s and described 
a similar finding. The authors showed that there was a discrepancy between public 
and private understandings of statements in official documents. Hughes et a l 
suggested that what appeared to be important in contracting in that study was the 
public visibility of penalty clauses in contracts as a symbol of commitment to 
centrally imposed goals. In private, the stated penalties were not as inflexible as they 
appeared. What appeared to be important for the case studies in my own research 
was the visibility to the regional offices and ultimately the Department of Health of 
having followed the correct procedures. These procedures included the drawing up 
of documents labelled Service Level Agreements.
The second element of policy with which the case studies felt they should comply 
was joint working. The need to be seen to be working in collaboration and 
partnership was so strong that case study C, in particular, appeared to be doing so
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even when it was not in their best interests. The result was a degree of chaos. 
Government policy states quite clearly that “/ w]here a service or centre covers the 
population o f a number o f Primary Care Groups or Health Authorities, Primary 
Care Groups are expected and encouraged to enter into collaborative 
commissioning arrangements with other Primary Care Groups within the area...” 
(NHS Executive, 1998b paragraph 51 (emphasis added)).
There is no mention in the government documents about what constitutes a positive 
environment for partnership working. The PCTs in case study C have attempted to 
follow the guidance and work in partnership despite a lack of shared objectives, a 
lack of trust between the organisations and poor quality information.
b) Power and accountability
A principal has a degree of power over its agent to ensure that the agent meets its 
obligations. In the context of a principal-agent chain, a high-level principal must 
ensure its agent meets requirements, and that agent must in turn ensure its agent 
lower down the chain meets its respective requirements. In commissioning, a health 
authority must ensure through performance management that a PCT meets its 
requirements and a PCT must ensure through commissioning that an NHS Trust 
meets its requirements. These power relations flow down the length of the principal- 
agent chain from principal to agent.
At the same time, an agent is accountable to its principal and as such must explain its 
actions to its principal. One would expect therefore that in a chain of principals and 
agents, a lower level agent would be accountable to its direct principal, and that 
principal would in turn be accountable to a higher-level principal. These lines of 
accountability flow up the length of the principal-agent chain from agent to 
principal. In commissioning, an NHS Trust should consequently be accountable to 
its PCT commissioners, and the PCTs should be accountable to their host health 
authorities.
In fact this is not the case. The lines of accountability do not flow up the principal- 
agent chain in a way that mirrors the way that power flows down it. Ambiguities in 
accountability lines have been shown to result in a disproportionate amount of time 
being devoted to managing the interface between organisations and the political 
process (Goodwin, 2000).
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The issue here is whether, in the NHS, the upward flowing lines of accountability 
should mirror the downward flowing lines of power. In essence, should there be 
only one organisation responsible for ensuring an agent meets its requirements, and 
only one organisation to which this agent is accountable? Furthermore, should these 
be the same organisation? If not, are PCTs strengthened or weakened as a result?
i) Power and lines of accountability
In the standard case of a principal and its agent, the lines of power and accountability 
are that the principal tries to ensure through contracts that the agent meets its 
requirements, and the agent is accountable to the principal. For example, in private 
firms based in a market economy, the principal has the power to “hire and fire” and 
search for an alternative agent if the original agent does not perform satisfactorily. 
This is the case for a firm contracting work to another firm as well as for the 
relationship between an employer and employee.
This, however, breaks down in the case of PCTs and NHS Trusts, primarily because 
of the intervention of a third organisation: the StHA. Whilst the commissioning 
structure implies that the PCTs should ensure that the NHS Trusts deliver the 
requirements of the PCTs, policy dictates that StHAs should ensure that NHS Trusts 
deliver government targets. Therefore, NHS Trusts have two principals: PCTs and 
the govemment/StHAs. If the government (or its regional office or StHA agents) is 
stronger than the PCTs in sanctioning NHS Trusts if requirements are not met, then 
NHS Trusts’ first priorities will be to their national not local commissioning 
requirements.
Furthermore, in a non-market context such as the NHS, where there is little practical 
choice of agent, the market power of the principal that permits it to “hire and fire” its 
agent is absent and replaced with a policy on accountability. However, this policy 
does not make NHS Trusts accountable to PCTs. Government policy dictates that 
both NHS Trusts and PCTs are accountable to Strategic Health Authorities 
(Department of Health, 2002d; Department of Health, 2002b). Both PCTs and NHS 
Trusts are therefore agents for a shared principal: the StHA.
The issue of concern is that an NHS Trust has different principals with different roles 
and the relative power of these principals is different also; that of the StHA is 
greater. Moreover, a PCT must treat its StHA as principal; a PCT is placed therefore
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on an equal level with an NHS Trust. For these two reasons, the power of a PCT as 
principal to an NHS Trust is weakened.
Respondents in the case studies made a number of comments. These included a 
belief that StHAs ought to hold to account PCTs more than NHS Trusts, because it 
was the PCTs that were commissioning services from NHS Trusts. This line of 
argument is consistent with the notion that lines of accountability should flow 
upwards, in the reverse direction but along the same pathway, as the lines of the 
principal-agent chain for commissioning, with PCTs higher up the accountability 
hierarchy than NHS Trusts. Respondents understood also that the power of PCTs 
was diminished because they were not the organisations that had the power to 
dismiss the managers of failing hospitals, that is, NHS Trusts were not accountable 
to them. It should be noted, however, that PCT managers did not want to take on 
this duty.
An alternative view is that the lines of accountability should be different, for the 
following reason. If PCTs were made accountable to StHAs for the performance of 
NHS Trusts, this may increase the potential for their collusion. McCarthy (1998) 
claims that some health authorities in 1996/7 overspent by millions of pounds 
because of high claims by NHS Trusts. The health authorities did not wish to see 
their Trusts fail financially (this would reflect poorly on the health authorities) and 
so they used their reserve funds to pay the NHS Trusts’ deficits. PCTs have been 
made responsible recently for the performance of NHS Trusts. PCTs are judged now 
on patients’ waiting times for inpatient and outpatient appointments by the star- 
rating system (see www.chi.nhs.uk/eng/ratings/ for details). This ought to give PCTs 
an incentive to stop NHS Trusts from failing to meet access targets. This could be 
achieved through strict contracting frameworks, but as shown, contracts and 
incentives do not appear to have played an important role in commissioning in these 
case studies. More likely, NHS Trusts will take advantage of the situation (that 
PCTs do not want NHS Trusts to be seen to be failing) by asking the PCTs to fund 
additional services to meet targets or to fund deficits.
The PCTs in B and C played the role of principal in commissioning services. In case 
study A, the Health Authority played this role. In all the case studies, the NHS 
Trusts were performance managed by their health authorities. Performance 
management includes ensuring that national targets are delivered. Therefore NHS
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Trust A served one principal for commissioned local and national services whereas 
NHS Trusts B and C served two. It is logical that NHS Trusts will focus their efforts 
in meeting the requirements of the organisation that imposes the severest sanctions 
or greatest incentives. That organisation, at the time of the research, was the health 
authority, and is now the StHA. It was not the PCTs. NHS Trusts may not have 
taken PCTs as seriously as they might should they have had the same power as 
health authorities or been their sole principals.
ii) Clinical freedoms and lines of accountability
Clinicians are accountable (that is, answerable) to their own professional bodies for 
the quality of their clinical care. This breaks the standard line of accountability 
between agent and principal and plays a part in the potential failure in the NHS of 
the principal-agent chain for commissioning. Themed editions of the British 
Medical Journal (22 March 2003) and the Health Service Journal (27 March 2003) 
have highlighted, and suggested possible solutions to, the different perspectives of 
doctors and managers, but neither considered their different lines of accountability. 
This research suggests a number of factors may be important.
First, hospital management does not have the power to hold fully to account hospital 
doctors for the amount or type of services they provide. If a consultant fails to meet 
the targets set by the government or local management, s/he will not be sacked. The 
management might be. Consultants will usually be sacked or struck off only if they 
breach clinical practice guidelines or provide a sub-standard quality of care. 
Consultants are perceived to be a scarce resource in comparison to managers and are 
not in fear for their jobs. Their professional power and separate line of 
accountability gives them the freedom to provide patient care as they judge best, not 
as the management might decree. Management power is therefore weakened with 
the result that meeting commissioned levels of service cannot be guaranteed.
Second, if the relationship between a hospital manager and consultant is viewed as a 
principal-agent relationship, there is the standard problem of information asymmetry 
between the principal and agent. The management are trying to manage a clinical 
system in which they have no experience of working as clinicians and, more 
importantly, they have no knowledge of what constitutes effective care. Doctors can 
therefore develop their own areas of interest and expertise without the management
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being able to identify whether or not it is in the patients’ or NHS Trust’s best 
interests. One way to deal with this problem is through the standard principal-agent 
route of setting incentives for doctors to align their objectives with those of the 
management. Alternatives are to strengthen the direct employment relation in an 
attempt to oblige consultants to achieve certain objectives on behalf of their 
employers or to involve clinicians directly in management decisions.
In addition, the inability of hospital managers to see and understand the implications 
of actions taken by the doctors can result in a delay in information moving further up 
the principal-agent chain. That is, if a hospital manager wishes to share information 
with his counterpart in a PCT in order to plan their joint strategy, he will not be able 
to do so unless he first extracts this information from his own agents, the doctors. In 
this case, the ability of the NHS Trust agent to meet the requirements of the PCTs is 
weakened.
Third, an NHS Trust is not a single entity. An NHS Trust is not a simple, uni­
dimensional firm producing a single product for its principal. An NHS Trust is 
comprised of a large number of sub-organisations that each act independently. It 
may be the case that there is little purpose in a PCT contracting with an NHS Trust 
to deliver care when the NHS Trust is merely a name for a number of diverse 
organisations. Likewise, “the PCT” is merely a name for a number of diverse 
general practices. The important thing is perhaps not relationships between 
organisations, but relationships within them. The key to ensuring objectives are met 
may lie in setting incentives at directorate and practice level. Government policy 
does encourage the use of incentives at practice level for commissioned services, but 
few incentive schemes have been implemented (Baxter et al., 2001). Other research 
has also found that the implementation at practice level of incentives associated with 
commissioned services is low, with only 10% using such schemes and three fifths 
having no plans to introduce them (Wilkin et al., 2002: 28). As for incentives at the 
directorate level, these may be introduced in part by the new consultant contract and 
its local alternatives (Department of Health, 2002a; Department of Health, 2003).
c) Public service ethos
Principal-agent theory assumes that all parties are driven by self-interest (Uzzi, 1997; 
Walker, 2000). Self-interest may include an element of “other interest”, that is, one
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individual’s well-being may be affected by the well-being of others. A public 
service ethos means that people are driven at least in part by their desire to serve the 
best interests of the general public. This public service ethos complicates the notion 
of self-interest of principals and agents because each is concerned in a large part with 
the interests of the NHS as a whole and of its patients. However, although the broad 
objectives of the organisations in the NHS may be related, each organisation’s 
conceptualisation of what constitutes the public interest, and how this should best be 
met, may differ. This was apparent in the case studies. PCTs had similar broad but 
different local objectives; NHS Trusts felt that the public’s interest could be served 
by advances in secondary or tertiary care whereas the PCTs felt that primary care 
was more important.
The public service ethos within the NHS reduces the divisions between NHS 
organisations. The boundaries between principals and agents may not be as distinct 
as those between private firms in a market system. In essence, NHS Trusts, PCTs 
and health authorities are sub-sections of one large firm, the NHS. Each is aiming to 
maximise the well-being of the public with regard to health, albeit in different ways. 
When the sub-sections are treated differently, this brings about a feeling of inequity 
between them. For example, PCTs provide primary and community services. NHS 
Trusts provide secondary and tertiary care services. These services are provided in 
the main to the same populations and for the same reasons: to improve health. 
However, NHS Trusts were required to discuss and agree their provision of services 
with the PCTs. The PCTs were not required to discuss their own provision of 
services with the NHS Trusts, even though that provision might impact on the level 
and type of care to be provided by the NHS Trust for those same patients.
Effectively, the PCTs were free to hide information about their own provision of 
services from their NHS Trust agents. Both NHS Trusts and PCTs saw that giving 
PCTs a provider as well as a commissioner role created a conflict of interest. The 
question is then why these organisations felt uncomfortable with the PCTs having a 
dual role of commissioner and provider when in other large organisations it is 
acceptable to choose when to contract with an external provider and when to produce 
in-house? The NHS Trust managers felt that the problem arose because the NHS is a 
public service where organisations are funded from a single source to serve shared 
patients. It was considered by some to be important for the PCTs to be open about
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their own funds and provider services even though this was not required by the 
system. This suggests there had been a breakdown of trust between the organisations 
that may be rectified if the PCTs were more transparent in their own decision­
making.
Within organisations, some of the clinicians (both GPs and consultants) suggested 
that their own motivation was being destroyed through repeated disappointments. 
These disappointments were caused by management refusing to allow new service 
developments because of the limited availability of funds. Consultants felt that they 
were not able to continue to develop their expertise because they were not given the 
opportunities to use newly acquired skills that could benefit patients.
This finding is entirely consistent with Frey’s (1997) propositions that the type of 
activity undertaken by agents and the uniformity of external interventions affect 
internal motivation. Frey suggests that when the type of activity undertaken by the 
agent is interesting, the agent’s internal motivation will be high and external 
interventions will be perceived to limit self-determination and thus reduce internal 
motivation. He suggests also that if the same external interventions are applied to all 
agents regardless of their level of internal motivation, those agents with a high level 
of internal motivation will be most severely demoralised because they will feel that 
their competence is not recognised.
More generally, these underlying motivations and the public service ethos can affect 
the implementation of policy. Changes in public sector management practice that 
are based on private sector practices and are imposed politically can fail because 
they are at odds with public service values (Goodwin, 2000). Koperski (1999) 
makes a similar point in comparing the changing role of primary care in the UK with 
that in the USA. He emphasises the importance of the different cultural values and 
speculates that one reason why the internal market reforms in the UK “did not 
succeed” was that the NHS has a culture of equity and national planning with tight, 
fixed budgets and the reforms were “contrary to important social values” (Koperski, 
1999: 143). Moreover, where contracts between purchasers and providers are not 
complete (and in health care they are not), some other form of guidance is essential, 
and in the past this has been from the professional culture of the clinicians (Dixon et 
a l , 2003).
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d) Leadership
My empirical work has shown that the style and effectiveness of local leadership 
affects the approach to commissioning. With regard to principal-agent theory, if  a 
strong leader is also the principal, the system may be strengthened. If, however, the 
leader is not the principal, but the agent, or if the principal is not seen as a legitimate 
leader, then the relationship may be weakened.
The importance of leadership to most people is self-evident, no matter what the 
setting (Van Wart, 2003). Leadership has been described as the ability to inspire 
others and cope with change (Goodwin, 2000) and to be based on assertive task- 
related behaviour as well as the evaluation of that behaviour in a given situation 
(Ridgeway, 2001). Goodwin (2000) stresses the need for a change in emphasis in 
leadership research from a person-person to a person-context focus, to take into 
account how leaders can be successful in constrained environments. Outstanding 
leaders have the ability to have a substantial emotional impact on their work force 
(Javidan & Waldman, 2003). In addition to high quality goods and services, 
effective leadership should provide a number of positive outcomes (Van Wart,
2003). These include high levels of satisfaction in those conducting the work, a 
healthy mechanism for innovation and creativity, and an overarching sense of 
direction and vision.
In all of the case studies, strong leadership was considered important even where the 
main PCT itself was not a strong leader. In case study A, the Health Authority 
dominated the system of commissioning; it sat at the top of a command and control 
style hierarchy and played the role of principal. The Chief Executive of the Health 
Authority was perceived as a very strong leader with a strong sense of objectives and 
ideas about how they should be achieved. In case study B, the Chief Executives of 
the PCTs and NHS Trust were perceived as strong leaders within their own 
organisations. However, the power of the PCTs as principals over the NHS Trust 
agent came from the PCTs’ greater number and so their ability to out-vote the NHS 
Trust. In case study C, the Chief Executive of PCT C appeared to be influential 
within the PCT but there was no obviously strong leader for commissioning amongst 
the different organisations. The organisations used a flatter structure for 
commissioning decisions where there was no clear role of principal or agent.
Clinical champions were visualised as the leaders of the future, independent of
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organisations. Walsh et a l (1999) conclude from their evaluation of total purchasing 
that leadership is important. Without a strong leader, they suggest that progress will 
be slow and unfocused. However, with a leader who is too dominant, the activities 
of others may be stifled.
Principal-agent theory does not state explicitly the importance of strong leadership. 
Implicitly, the theory assumes that the firm or individual that is the principal plays 
the role of leader through the assumption that the principal has the right and the 
ability to set a contract for the agent. The existence of tiers of principals and agents 
and of multiple principals complicates the leadership roles by introducing more than 
one potential leader.
The main differences in the case studies with respect to leadership are the perceived 
legitimacy of the principal to play that role and the danger of embeddedness (the lack 
of separation of principal and agent). An additional concern was raised that the 
number of top quality managers available nationally was not sufficient.
i) Legitimacy of leaders
Ridgeway (2001) discusses the problem of the worthiness of a leader’s status. She 
labels this as legitimacy and describes the perceived legitimacy of low-status groups 
acting with authority towards others. Legitimacy brings with it power from the 
normative support of others; if subordinates do not perceive a leader to be legitimate, 
they may resist attempts to assert authority (Ridgeway, 2001). Cable and Judge 
(2003) define legitimacy as consistency with organisational traditions.
Principal-agent theory in economics does not consider legitimacy. It assumes that by 
choosing to become agents and acting in accordance with the market process, agents 
empower principals with a legitimate right to set contracts for them.
Within the NHS, the roles of principal and agent have been imposed through 
government policy on PCTs and NHS Trusts respectively. Although there may be a 
need and a desire for a strong leader, that leader (whether it be an organisation or an 
individual) has to be legitimate in the eyes of those over whom it has power. This 
may not be the case in the NHS as it is structured at present or in the recent past.
The agents of total purchasing pilots did not always perceive them as legitimate 
commissioners of secondary care. Research suggests that the health authority in one
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case provided legitimacy to a TPP’s decision by adding its approval to a proposed 
service change (Goodwin et a l , 2000). Walsh et al. (1999: 74) refer to the issue of 
legitimacy as “followership”. Within the BIPP total purchasing pilot, they found 
that there were varying degrees of acceptance of the lead GPs by the non-lead GPs, 
that is, non-lead GPs did not always see as legitimate the role of the lead GPs.
With regard to the case studies, the Health Authority in case study A provided a 
strong and legitimate leadership. The PCTs and NHS Trusts in its area accepted the 
Health Authority’s level of authority. The hierarchical structure in A, with the NHS 
Trust and PCT being placed as equals below the Health Authority, removed the 
problem of competition for status between the NHS Trust and PCT and the lack of 
perceived legitimacy of the PCT as principal. With NHS Trusts being larger 
organisations, employing a bigger workforce and with senior staff members being 
paid substantially more than their counterparts in PCTs, it is unlikely that NHS 
Trusts are ever going to feel that PCTs have a legitimate place higher up the NHS 
hierarchy.
Although in the other two case studies there was no legitimate authority comparable 
to the Health Authority in case study A, the NHS Trusts in case studies B and C 
seemed to accept that the PCTs had been given the role of principal and were willing 
to work within that system. However, whilst the PCTs in B accepted this role, those 
in C did not. The PCTs as a group did not accept that they had a right to demand 
services from the NHS Trust, nor did they accept that PCT C had a right to act as 
leader for the group as a whole.
This finding, that it is the principals who do not accept their own legitimacy, rather 
than the agents that do not accept the principals’ legitimacy, is in contrast to that 
suggested in the sociological literature. The sociological literature (see Kiser, 1999; 
Simon, 1991) questions the validity of the assumption in economics that 
organisations have a right to act as principals; it is, however, the legitimacy of the 
imposed principal as perceived by the agent that is questioned, not the legitimacy of 
the principal as perceived by the principal.
ii) Collaboration between leaders
Where there are multiple principals, principal-agent theory predicts that these 
principals will collude if their objectives and access to information are the same.
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Although the theory predicts that contracts will be made jointly, and the sharing 
between principals of risks and output will be agreed in advance, it does not offer 
any insights into how colluding principals should organise their collusion.
PCTs in case study B adopted a principal-agent approach to this problem. Each PCT 
acted as a lead PCT (in effect, as an agent) for the other PCTs for one specialty and 
these inter-PCT relations were kept separate to PCT-NHS Trust relations. There 
were in effect two sets of principal-agent relations: one was between the group of 
PCTs and the lead PCT; the other was between the lead PCT and the NHS Trust. In 
both cases the principal was considered legitimate.
In case study C, the PCTs and NHS Trust attempted to work as partners in a network 
system rather than as principals and agents in a system resembling a quasi-market. 
No PCT took a strong leadership role. This network of PCTs was not distinct from 
the network set up to work with the NHS Trust. There was no obvious or legitimate 
principal in case study C. The main players were very friendly with each other but 
lacked an ability to make decisions. The organisations worked in circumstances that 
came to represent “overembeddedness”.
Overembeddedness occurs when there is a small number of buyers and suppliers in a 
market (Gluckler & Armbruster, 2003) and results in the social aspects of exchange 
superseding the economic imperatives (Uzzi, 1997). With small numbers, 
organisations inevitably have repeated contacts with each other and build up a degree 
of knowledge about each other. The result is that organisations are likely to be 
biased towards choosing partners that they have worked with previously.
Kirkpatrick (1999) suggests that feelings of friendship and obligation become so 
great between firms that one becomes the “relief organisation” of another and 
innovation is resisted. There is a danger, he suggests, that, because network models 
of working between organisations are intended to be temporary alliances to work on 
specific issues, long lasting networks can become overembedded.
In the NHS, there are very small (and in the short-term fixed) numbers of 
participants in the market. In addition, there may be common attitudes between 
professional types (for example, managers) across principal and agent organisations. 
This may influence behaviours and actions (Hughes et al., 1997) to the extent that
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these actions become very similar, further decreasing the distinction between 
principals and agents.
Case study B had avoided overembeddedness by retaining some facets of a quasi­
market style principal-agent relationship. The main players showed respect for each 
other’s abilities but were not afraid of making unpopular decisions and remained 
loyal in the first instance to their own organisations. However, as discussed in 
chapter two, if agents are active and decision-making is joint, decisions are more 
likely to be implemented successfully (Coleman Selden et al., 1999; Walsh et a l, 
1997). Whilst it may be important that individuals work well together, it may be 
equally important that their own organisation’s interests remain a priority. This 
would maintain a healthy debate and aid the implementation of agreements at the 
same time as ensuring results are not impeded by overembeddedness.
It is important to remember that until recently these organisations, particularly PCTs, 
did not exist in their current forms and their managers were employed often in their 
predecessor organisations. A similar situation is evident in the Netherlands where 
the social insurance market is characterised by a long history of co-operation; that 
strong co-operation is now limiting the effectiveness of the recently introduced 
market system (van den Brink et al., 2002). The authors state that it was not 
surprising that a high level of co-operation existed as the “circle of people charged 
with the negotiations [between hospitals and health care insurers] was often 
extremely small and those involved had known each other long before the system 
changed” (van den Brink et al., 2002: 209).
Another factor that may pre-dispose organisations to collaborate is gender. The 
senior managers in case study C were predominantly female whereas those in B were 
mixed and in A all male. A number of factors can affect the style and success of 
female leadership (Ridgeway, 2001). These include collaboration. The issue of 
collaboration is linked closely with legitimacy; it is not perceived as appropriate for 
women to act in assertive, hierarchical ways and so they are forced into using 
collaborative methods.
The managers and style used in case study C appear to relate closely to a softer, 
more collaborative approach associated with female leaders. In complete contrast,
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the managers and management style in case study A undoubtedly conform to a 
traditional male dominated hierarchy.
There is a large literature on gender and leadership style (see Eagly et al., 1995 for a 
review) and a suggestion that “women senior managers generally have a harder time 
than their male colleagues” (Broussine & Fox, 2002: 91). The importance of so- 
called “hard” skills associated with resource management, legal and other technical 
knowledge are often linked with a male approach to management, whereas a female 
style is associated with “softer” skills such as staff motivation, empowerment and 
consensus building (Broussine & Fox, 2002). These translate, respectively, into the 
traditional styles of leadership such as command and control and more collaborative 
approaches such as networking. Carli and Eagly (2001) suggest that people are more 
receptive now to the idea that women may exercise power in a different way to men.
iii) Workforce calibre
As discussed, the government has imposed the roles of principal and agent on 
organisations. This top down approach to deciding the number of principals and 
agents in the system brings with it the problem that the number of high quality 
effective managers available to take on the leading roles in these organisations may 
be less than the number required. Indeed, the successful implementation of policy 
without considerable additional capacity in the form of, among other things, 
leadership training, has been questioned (Dowling et al., 2002; Wilkin et a l, 2002).
Shifting the Balance o f Power (Department of Health, 2001) takes account of this 
potential problem by offering training to PCT Chief Executives.
"... The Chief Executives must be top rate managers. To 
help get the best people it is planned to update the 
competencies for PCT Chief Executives in the light o f the 
roles, relationships and responsibilities set out in section 13 
to 22. It is also intended to provide accelerated development 
and support fo r existing PCT Chief Executives. ”
Despite this promise, there are still concerns about the size of the task in front of 
PCT managers, and NHS Trusts still regard PCT Chief Executives and Directors as 
second best when compared to their NHS Trust counterparts. The gap in the rates of 
pay and the relative newness of PCT managers accentuate this problem.
260
Respondents from the case studies believed that they were lucky in their own areas 
to have high quality managers, but that other areas were not as lucky. A concern was 
raised that a system that required as many high calibre managers as the current one 
was almost destined to fail. An alternative suggestion was made that the structure of 
the NHS should be designed around the available good quality managers. Implicitly, 
this comment suggests that it is the management of the system, that is, the 
leadership, not the system itself, which results in success or failure.
e) Trust
Trust can affect principal-agent relationships by either undermining or reinforcing 
interactions. A lack of trust may also undermine other models of commissioning.
Trust (and the lack of trust) was evident in the case studies in a number of ways.
The first major theme was that the principals tended not to use contracts as binding 
agreements but as conduits for discussion. This could suggest either that agents can 
be trusted to meet requirements without fully specified contracts or perhaps that they 
cannot be trusted to meet requirements even with contracts. Second, the agents 
showed a lack of trust in the principals where allocation of funding between NHS 
Trust and PCT provided services was concerned. This was a problem to do with the 
dual role of PCTs as commissioners and providers. Third, trust between principals 
was shown to be a potential issue where there were multiple principals. In case 
study C, not only did the principals not trust the agent, but the principals lacked trust 
in each other as well. In case study B, the principals did trust each other and their 
system worked well.
The definition of trust is straightforward. Trust exists when “an actor states that 
(s)he will perform some way [and] (s)he will indeed perform in this manner, i.e.
(s)he will not distort the true nature of her/his intentions” (McMaster & Sawkins, 
1996: 150). This can mean that an individual is expected to comply with an 
agreement, and does so. It can mean equally that an individual is expected to renege 
on an agreement, and does so. In the majority of the literature, trust is assumed to be 
synonymous with “positive” trust, that is, that an individual is expected to act in a 
way that is beneficial to others, and does so. McMaster and Sawkins continue that 
trust removes the need to use sophisticated governance arrangements to protect 
exchanges and that the need for trust is greatest for non-routine, complex tasks.
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They are talking here about positive trust. Mills and Ungson (2003) give a different 
definition that also applies to positive trust. They define trust as an atomistic belief 
or faith that compensates for incomplete information due to uncertainty and risk, and 
as such, trust is an acceptance of risk. To comply with the use of the term trust in the 
general literature, trust here is defined as the belief by one person that another will 
act in a way that is seen to be appropriate.
Mills and Ungson (2003) take the idea of trust one step further and sub-divide it into 
routine and basic trust. Routine trust is a belief in the competencies of an individual 
and is built up over time. It is based on the knowledge of an individual. Basic trust 
occurs when there is little information about the object of trust. The latter is more 
closely associated with blind faith and can lay open the doorway to abuse through 
opportunistic behaviour.
Principal-agent theory does not discuss trust. Implicitly, the principal does not trust 
the agent to act in the principal’s interest. This is why the principal sets incentives 
for the agent.
In the three case studies, the NHS Trusts’ performance was not controlled through 
incentive contracts. Trust can impact on the reliance on contracts in a number of 
ways. The need for contracts or costly control mechanisms in economic transactions 
is reduced if the participants trust each other to make appropriate decisions (Mills & 
Ungson, 2003). In contrast, if the agent is not trusted (i.e. is expected to make 
inappropriate decisions from the point o f view of the principal), contracts may need 
to be so detailed that they cannot be specified fully and so another form of control is 
necessary. Williamson (1975) in his treatise on markets and hierarchies discusses 
the importance of a high trust culture in business. He makes two important points in 
relation to the present research. First, businessmen operating in competitive 
industries with a culture of trust will find that they incur excessive costs and render 
their business non-viable should they insist on contractual completeness and 
exacting execution of such contracts. Second, he cites work that has shown that the 
nature of contracts is more casual and their enforcement less exacting in business 
than is supposed by academics and other economists. This is consistent with my 
finding that discussions between primary and secondary care clinicians were more 
amiable when managers were not involved. It may be that the managers’ training
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and government guidance encourages managers to rely less on trust and to rely more 
on contracts than do clinicians.
In addition, if the principal does not trust the agent to comply with the contract, or 
where effective monitoring is not possible, there is little point in having one.
Previous research (see McCarthy, 1998) has suggested that health authorities have 
very little power over NHS Trust spending. Health authorities do not want their 
hospitals to go out of business, so may subsidise an overspending NHS Trust in 
order to maintain existing levels of service. (This issue was discussed also in 
relation to accountability.) A view from NHS Trusts in my own case studies was 
that the government would never allow an NHS Trust to go out of business.
Whether this is true or not, the belief by NHS Trusts that they will always be bailed 
out weakens the incentive effect of potential bankruptcies as a result of not 
complying with contracts.
If NHS Trusts cannot be trusted to comply with contracts, other methods of control 
need to be used. The different case studies worked in a variety of ways. In the 
command and control system in case study A, the Health Authority did not trust the 
NHS Trust to carry out the Health Authority’s objectives and so imposed a command 
and control system. In case studies B and C, there was also a lack of trust by the 
principals of the agents, but this was combined with the lack of an alternative, 
effective method of control. This resulted in attempts to micro-manage the NHS 
Trusts. A lack of trust combined with weak control appeared to result in attempts at 
hands-on management by the principal. Ultimately, this is akin to attempting to 
internalise the agent within a traditional hierarchy. Case study A illustrates the 
result.
The second major area of interest was that agents did not trust principals to allocate 
funds fairly or to commission alternative care (this issue was discussed also in 
relation to a shared public service ethos). NHS Trusts could not understand why 
PCTs had been given a provider role. They saw this as a conflict of interest and did 
not trust the PCTs to be fair in resource allocation. If PCTs were more open in their 
reasons for making funding decisions then the problems may be alleviated.
However, given the potential erosion through the commissioning system of the 
historical power of hospitals, and the fact that all NHS organisations are aiming to 
achieve the same general objective of improvements in population health but in
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different ways, it may be that the competition for funds and the temptation for PCTs 
to hide information will remain. Regen et a l (2001) likewise stress the importance 
of openness, trust and clarity in the demarcation of roles and responsibilities, albeit 
their findings relate to PCT boards and their executives. PCT B attempted to be as 
open as possible with how it made decisions about resource allocation but was not 
open about how it was spending its money. In case study C, the NHS Trust 
questioned percentage increases in funding allocated by the PCTs. The NHS Trust 
believed it was being treated unfavourably in comparison to the PCTs.
This conflict of interest arises in part from the NHS being a single entity with the 
funding available being limited explicitly and shared between NHS organisations. 
Any additional pound from a PCT’s overall funds allocated to services provided 
directly by the PCT results in a pound less being available for secondary care 
services. Wilkin et al. (2002) showed that these concerns are not unfounded. Up to 
half the PCG/Ts in their survey were shifting expenditure between budgets; the most 
common pattern was a shift away from hospital services towards community 
services, practice infrastructure and prescribing.
In addition to this link through funding, PCTs and NHS Trusts are also linked 
through their patients. NHS consultants do not trust other providers. They feel that 
they have to compensate for mistakes and complications resulting from care 
provided by GPs or non-NHS hospitals. If PCTs choose to commission European 
care or to provide care themselves, not only are they seen to be taking money away 
from NHS Trusts, but also potentially to be increasing the demands for NHS Trust 
services. These links are not standard in principal-agent relations. The actions of the 
principal (in particular, if  the principal chooses to provide services in-house) do not 
normally affect the ability of the agent to achieve the principal’s wishes.
Light (1998) addressed similar conflicts of interest. He asked whether the UK 
government in the first half of the 1990s was a provider trying to make performance 
look good, or whether it was a purchaser that evaluated performance by standing 
back. The same question can be asked of PCTs. Are they providers, providing 
services alongside NHS Trusts, aiming to improve the health care of the community, 
or are they commissioners, commissioning services at arms length with a 
disinterested evaluation role, aiming to improve the health of the community?
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The third area of interest in relation to trust is another unexpected one. There was a 
lack of trust between PCTs. This was noticeable especially between the PCTs in 
case study C, despite the fact that they appeared very friendly on a personal level.
Trust between organisations may have been lost to some extent through the 
contracting mechanisms of the internal market. In the market for local authority 
services, short-term contracts and time frames for re-tendering have been shown to 
have undermined confidence and trust and contributed to increased insecurity of 
providers (Vincent Jones, 1997 cited in Kirkpatrick 1999). The stability (or at least 
lack of competition) within the NHS acute sector should limit any feelings of 
insecurity, but the undermining of confidence and trust remains. Once that trust has 
been lost, it is not clear how it can be rekindled. This loss of trust is usually 
interpreted as being between principals and agents; it is unusual in these case studies 
that it is between groups of principals. This lack of trust may be related to the 
perceived illegitimacy by PCTs of their roles as principals and the imposition of 
these roles by government.
f) History
The traditional patterns of working and the histories of local management influenced 
the current patterns of working in the case studies. Local context and history was 
found to be important also for the development of total purchasing pilots (Goodwin 
et al., 2001). Where people have been in the same area for some time (even in a 
variety of posts) there is likely to be some attachment to the past and this may make 
significant changes in working styles more difficult to achieve. The effect of a 
policy based on principal-agent relations may therefore be weakened through local 
variations.
The importance of history in the development of systems is supported by the notion 
of path dependency. Path dependency is about continuity (Greener, 2002) and the 
“historical makeup” or inherited institutional structure (van den Brink et al., 2002).
A path dependant sequence of changes is one in which important influences on the 
outcome can be dominated by remote or chance elements rather than systematic 
forces (David, 1985). David (1985) explains the path dependency argument through 
the example of the world’s adherence to the QWERTY keyboard. Marginal changes 
to a layout designed originally to avoid jamming keys have resulted in a keyboard
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layout that is universal but not optimal for today’s requirements. As Greener (2002: 
164) suggests, “the path dependency approach focuses on theorising how policy can 
become so institutionalised and historically embedded that it becomes nearly 
impossible to break free from the established policy ‘path’”.
Principal-agent theory does not take history into account. It assumes that principals 
and agents have no prior knowledge of each other. Dixit (2002) does consider issues 
of prospective timescales, for example, the use of incentives when an agent 
undertakes a task several times and the principal observes this task several times. 
There is, however, no discussion of the previous history of relationships or 
knowledge of partner organisations. Indeed, the problem of adverse selection arises 
precisely because of a lack of such information. In practice there is not always such 
a lack of information. In the NHS, relationships are usually long-term and despite 
organisations regularly having undergone transformations that have affected their 
management and geographical relations, the histories and reputations of their senior 
staff are often well known.
Greener (2002) uses path dependency as a framework for analysis of the reforms in 
the NHS in the late 1980s and early 1990s. One of his conclusions is that agents, be 
they individuals or institutions, provide the “conjunctural” element of change. A 
conjuncture is the coming together of a number of events across time or space that 
make changes possible. He confines his discussion, however, to political agents and 
the role of the medical profession’s representative bodies. He does not discuss the 
role played by agents low down the hierarchical structure. As shown, agents further 
down the principal-agent chain play an important role in commissioning.
Torfing (2001) refers to the common use among social scientists of path dependency 
to explore the impact of institutional contexts on the actions of social and political 
agencies. Torfing uses the path dependency argument to analyse changes in the 
Danish welfare system. He concludes that there are a number of types of path 
dependency that all play a role and should be separated in discussions. Most 
relevant here is historical institutionalism which is concerned with the impact of 
tradition.
Those principals and agents that have been successful in the past in achieving their 
aims are likely to continue to use the same methods regardless of policy. The
266
approach used in case study A had been a hierarchical command and control 
approach for a number of years, led by the same senior directors. Despite a series of 
policy changes since the early 1990s, the system there had remained intact. The 
senior staff in the Health Authority and the NHS Trust were accustomed to working 
in that style. Although the PCT as an organisation and its staff were new, the 
previously entrenched system remained.
In case study C, the system had been less defined for a number of years, and 
remained so. One of the problems in case study C was that the four PCTs tasked to 
commission services from the NHS Trust were spread across three health authorities. 
The style of working in the three areas was different. The health authority 
boundaries had changed a number of times in the past, making the hospital directly 
managed by one health authority and then another. The recent restructuring of the 
health authorities into StHAs had resulted in the NHS Trust being situated on the 
boundary of two StHAs. PCT C expressed strong feelings that boundaries between 
organisations were not important; what was important to them was patient pathways 
of care, led by clinical champions. It may be that the history of boundary changes 
had made these organisations nervous of the implications of adopting a system that 
was not robust enough to remain stable through any future boundary changes. Their 
previous experiences had therefore forced them into a collaborative network 
approach.
McCarthy (1998) lends support to PCT C’s view. He suggests that contract 
negotiations can be problematic if they are based on provider boundaries rather than 
on health programmes that straddle organisations. Nonetheless, only where funds 
were ring-fenced by the Department of Health for certain diseases did he find in his 
case study that contracts accounted for provision by different organisations.
It was discussed earlier that the roles of principal and agent have been imposed on 
PCTs and NHS Trusts from above. They have not chosen them voluntarily. 
Similarly, the boundaries between organisations are often arbitrary, at least to the 
extent that they are based on practice catchment areas and previous health authority 
boundaries rather than population need. Goodwin (2000) suggests there should be a 
move away from leadership of institutions with defined boundaries to leadership of 
collaborations between services and professional groups. Any such move may be 
restricted by path dependant tendencies and policy requirements that encourage
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traditional systems of commissioning using contracts between conventional 
organisations.
3) Policy recommendations
To date, policy messages from the centre have been mixed, some call it confused or 
“pragmatic” (see for example Allen, 2002b). The rhetoric is of devolution and local 
empowerment (Department of Health, 2001) whilst in reality there is a feeling of 
tighter central control. PCTs are told that they have the freedom to commission 
services appropriate for their local populations but in reality the tight structure 
imposed through national frameworks, targets and the ring-fencing of funds restricts 
these freedoms. Guidance suggests that commissioning should be undertaken via a 
contracting mechanism, but at the same time organisations should work in 
partnership to plan services jointly (NHS Executive, 1998b). The amount of services 
delivered annually must be increased to meet targets whilst at the same time services 
should be restructured to meet long-term modernisation goals. There is an 
expectation that clinicians will be engaged fully in the commissioning process whilst 
it is the managers that are charged with making decisions and who are penalised for 
failures.
This section sets out policy recommendations based on the findings of this research.
The use of incentives in SLAs should be encouraged. None of the PCTs studied 
used incentives in their SLAs and all perceived SLAs as performance management 
tools rather than incentive-based contracts. Strictly speaking, performance 
management tools should manage performance and incentives are an appropriate 
method for doing this. According to policy, Service Level Agreements should 
“incorporate levers for quality and efficiency” and “include rewards for gains in 
outcomes and extra efficiency” (NHS Executive, 1998a: Appendix A). To 
compensate for the lack of influence through incentives, the commissioners in these 
case studies used either command and control methods and micro-management, or 
network methods (albeit poorly). If the purchaser/provider split and use of contracts 
is to be maintained, the use of incentives as the main means of influence, in 
preference to these methods, should be encouraged.
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The introduction of payment by results as described in Reforming NHS Financial 
Flows (Department of Health, 2002c) does create financial incentives for NHS 
Trusts. By receiving an average price (known as a standard tariff) for particular 
volumes of services, NHS Trusts with costs higher than the standard tariff will face 
an incentive to become more efficient and those with costs lower than standard tariff 
will be rewarded implicitly for their already efficient provision. In addition, PCTs 
are encouraged to withdraw funding from providers on a quarterly basis where those 
providers are not delivering agreed plans (Department of Health, 2002c: 23). This 
policy removes the need for PCTs to know NHS Trusts’ costs as part of the 
commissioning process and hence removes this potential problem of information 
asymmetry. It should also free organisations from negotiations around costs and 
allow them to concentrate on the planning and service development process. If 
monitoring is effective, the ability of PCTs to ensure that NHS Trusts comply with 
agreements for commissioned services should increase. However, without a prior 
agreement about the sharing of risks, there is an incentive for NHS Trusts to build up 
deficits which they can then impose on the whole health community. Organisations 
should be made aware also that the new style of contract is likely to increase the 
costs of monitoring. In addition, as discussed in chapter two, contracts have not 
been specified fully thus far in the NHS, and, where there are incentives, there is a 
danger that effort will be increased in service areas subject to incentives relative to 
those not subject to incentives. These potential problems do not preclude the use of 
incentives, but they do show that the type of incentives imposed must be chosen 
carefully.
Compliance with commissioned agreements depends in part on compliance by 
clinicians with those agreements. The strength and variety of methods of 
influencing the compliance of clinicians with commissioning agreements should 
be increased. Although this study aimed to explore commissioning relationships 
between PCTs and NHS Trusts, one of the findings is that the relationships between 
NHS Trust management and clinicians appear to be a weak link in the principal- 
agent chain. If government targets and frameworks are to be met through 
commissioning, it may be more appropriate to concentrate future efforts on aligning 
clinician with NHS Trust objectives as well as NHS Trust with PCT and government 
objectives. Although there are aspects of the NHS that make it function as a single
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firm, there are others that suggest it is a multiplicity of firms. Even individual 
organisations are not single entities. An NHS Trust is comprised of a number of 
directorates and specialties; a PCT is comprised of a number of independent 
practices. Incentives within organisations may be at least as important as those 
between organisations. This is consistent with current efforts to influence the 
working patterns of consultants in English hospitals through either the new 
consultant contract (Department of Health, 2002a) or local schemes based on annual 
bonuses to consultants for improving productivity, access, quality and service 
development (Department of Health, 2003). This research has not considered 
compliance by GPs with commissioned secondary care agreements. However, the 
dependency of NHS Trusts’ activity on the demand created in part by GP referrals 
suggests incentives should be strengthened in both primary and secondary care.
Recent attempts to introduce the new consultant contract have not been successful in 
England. Local agreements are currently being negotiated. Some of the concerns 
voiced about the new consultant contract have been related to greater management 
control of clinicians’ time and organisation of workload. Some consultants in this 
study complained that the management control was already too strong and that the 
methods used relied on rules and sticks rather than carrots. Such methods of control 
were felt to remove self-determination and result in demoralisation. Local 
agreements with consultants should emphasise the greater degree of self- 
determination that can be gained through making choices according to incentives and 
should concentrate also on using incentives rather than sanctions. If incentives are 
set in accordance with local commissioning agreements they should help NHS Trust 
management by making it easier to meet these agreements and help PCTs by 
curtailing the problem of creeping commissioning. They should also help 
consultants by giving them the freedom to make choices, albeit within financial 
limits. In a financially constrained system such as the NHS, this may not be 
perfection, but a good option given the circumstances (see Roberts, 1997).
With regard to primary care, the White Paper The New NHS: modern, dependable 
(Secretary of State for Health, 1997) envisaged that PCG/Ts would allocate their 
practices indicative budgets for commissioned services. A Health Service Circular a 
year later (NHS Executive, 1998b) gave details of financial incentives to be used in 
conjunction with indicative practice budgets. Using these schemes, individual
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practices would face incentives to manage their referral patterns and other use of 
hospital services to remain within budget. There has been slow progress in the 
implementation by PCTs of indicative practice level budgets and incentives for the 
use of these budgets (Wilkin et al., 2002). This may be because PCTs have been 
focusing on other tasks, but as they become more established in their roles, re­
emphasising the benefits of these policies should become a priority. Such incentives 
should ensure that PCTs’ own use of services (through referrals) is not excessive in 
comparison with the commissioned level and as a consequence does not create 
problems of provision for NHS Trusts. With the introduction of payment by results 
as described in Reforming NHS Financial Flows (Department of Health, 2002c), 
devolving and monitoring indicative budgets at practice level for at least some 
specialties should become more straightforward.
This research has highlighted in addition the fact that clinicians in primary and 
secondary care do not always understand the impacts of their actions on other areas 
of the health service, and have misperceptions about the financial constraints or 
freedoms in which each sector works. Joint educational seminars should increase 
understanding and at the same time build upon the levels of goodwill that exist 
already between primary and secondary care clinicians.
The organisations to which NHS Trusts are accountable are confusing and 
should be clarified. Currently, NHS Trusts are tasked to meet nationally set targets 
as laid out in the NHS Plan; for these, they are performance managed by their StHAs 
and given star-ratings by the Commission for Health Improvement. NHS Trusts are 
commissioned by one or more PCTs to provide secondary care services; PCTs are 
responsible for ensuring these services are delivered. However, the meeting of NHS 
Plan targets, and access targets and financial balance in particular, take priority.
NHS Trusts are held to account by StHAs. Failure to meet national targets and 
requirements results in national shaming of NHS Trusts. As a result, locally 
commissioned services particular to local populations can take a back seat. This can 
happen in two ways. First, if commissioning agreements include the delivery of 
services particular to the local population and these services do not assist the 
achievement of access targets or financial balance, delivery of these services will not 
be a priority for the NHS Trusts (Wilkin et al., 2002). Second, in agreeing the 
annual SaFFs, for NHS Trusts already finding difficulties in meeting access targets,
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it is unlikely that funds can be found within the budget available to develop locally 
needed services in addition to meeting the national requirements. The solution to 
these competing priorities is difficult. A balance needs to be found that ensures NHS 
Trusts take seriously and meet the local requirements of their commissioners at the 
same time as meeting national requirements.
As discussed, if NHS Trusts are faced with more than one principal, they will 
prioritise meeting the requirements of the organisation that imposes the strongest 
sanctions or incentives. However, if this problem is removed and NHS Trusts are 
faced with just one principal within a tier of principals and agents, for example a 
PCT, this introduces a new problem: the possibility of collusion. Without a realistic 
choice of alternative providers and the ability to remove custom and funds from an 
incumbent NHS Trust, making PCTs alone responsible for ensuring NHS Trusts’ 
delivery of services, and making PCTs accountable for this to StHAs, could result in 
greater collusion between NHS Trusts and PCTs rather than greater control.
PCTs have been made responsible recently (through star-ratings) for inpatient and 
outpatient waiting times and waits in A&E. This is consistent with the argument that 
PCTs should be the sole principal responsible for ensuring the delivery of NHS Trust 
services. But, PCTs must also “hold provider organisations to account for the 
services they have commissioned” whilst StHAs must “hold all NHS organisations to 
account for performance” (Department of Health, 2002b: 9). Thus, NHS Trusts are 
still expected to serve two principals. In addition, it is not clear what, if  any, 
sanctions a PCT will face on top of poorer star-ratings if NHS Trusts fail to meet 
access times for that PCT’s patients. If sanctions for failure are strong or incentives 
for truth-telling weak, it appears that the conditions for collusion resulting 
potentially in the manipulation of waiting list figures have been created. The role of 
the StHAs must be to ensure that this does not happen. PCTs should be made 
responsible for ensuring NHS Trusts meet national targets as well as locally 
commissioned services by imposing local incentives and sanctions for their 
achievement. NHS Trusts must, however, be accountable to (that is, must explain 
their actions to) StHAs who audit financial and activity data and who have the power 
to terminate both PCT and NHS Trust executives’ contracts if manipulation of the 
figures is proved. PCTs alone should be made responsible for ensuring the 
provision of services (and for these, PCTs should impose incentives and
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sanctions) but StHAs should hold NHS Trusts to account (that is, NHS Trusts 
should explain and justify their actions to StHAs).
PCTs need to be open with NHS Trusts about the proportion of funds they 
allocate to their own provider services if they are to allay any fears that they are 
favouring themselves. The level of trust by NHS Trusts of PCTs, as well as vice 
versa, is variable. PCTs have been given the dual role of providing services as well 
as commissioning them. This in itself may not be a problem, but is complicated by 
the fact that both organisations are providing services to the same population. This 
means that one organisation’s provision of care impacts on the demand for the other 
organisation’s care and its financial ability to provide it. If PCTs are honest about 
why and how they have allocated their funds, NHS Trusts’ fears may be allayed and, 
if not allayed, conflicts can at least be resolved openly.
PCTs should be helped to feel comfortable with their role as commissioners.
This research has shown that a potential problem in the commissioning process is the 
reluctance of PCTs to make and implement difficult commissioning decisions. This 
reluctance stems from a feeling by some PCTs that their position as commissioners 
of secondary care services, which places them above NHS Trusts in the NHS 
hierarchy, is not legitimate. Not only do NHS Trusts have to accept that the “new 
kids on the block’ control the finances but the PCTs need to accept that although 
they are new organisations, they have been given an important leadership and 
decision-making role. Failure to accept this role will result in confusion and a lack 
of direction. One reason why PCTs do not feel legitimate may be the emphasis in 
policy documents on collaboration and partnership working. On the one hand PCTs 
are tasked with being the lead organisations for commissioning and on the other they 
are expected to work in collaboration with those organisations over which they have 
been given a lead role. Different health communities may interpret these 
requirements differently and place a different emphasis on the importance of the lead 
role relative to the importance of partnership working. This research has shown that 
where there is no clear lead person or organisation, the commissioning process 
suffers. Emphasis should therefore be given to the role of PCTs as 
commissioners rather than the role of PCTs in ensuring that the health 
community works in partnership at all times.
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In addition, to ensure that PCTs are perceived by other organisations as competent 
commissioners of secondary care services, PCT executive officers should be trained 
to a standard necessary for the role. Concerns were raised in this study that the 
number of appropriate calibre leaders across the country was insufficient. This issue 
has been recognised by the Department of Health and is being addressed through the 
Modernisation Agency, in particular the Leadership Centre. One of the roles of the 
Leadership Centre is to “develop current and future NHS leaders and managers at 
all levels” fhttp://www.modem.nhs.uk/). In addition, the Workforce Development 
Confederations have roles that include changing the ways in which staff are trained 
and educated, and to develop and spread new ways of working 
fhttn://www.doh. gov.uk/workdevcon/guidance.html. These initiatives should be 
continued.
PCTs should be encouraged to work together in their commissioning of 
secondary care services only where the conditions for joint working are 
appropriate. PCTs should be encouraged to agree with each other, prior to any 
discussions with an NHS Trust, which services they can commission jointly and 
for which services this is not appropriate. Contrary to expectation, this research 
has shown that relationships between PCTs can be as problematic as those between 
PCTs and NHS Trusts. Although the broad objectives of the PCTs were the same, 
and those of the NHS Trusts were similar as well, the specific local objectives of 
PCTs and the ways in which the different organisations thought they should be 
reached, varied. Where PCTs do not share objectives, or are not able to reconcile 
local objectives, where commissioning information particular to individual PCTs is 
poor, where local capacity differs or where there is a lack of trust between the PCTs, 
joint commissioning will be problematic. A recognition and acceptance of these 
differences is important. If differences are recognised, they can be debated and 
resolved. If organisations refuse to take into account different agendas, they run the 
risk of alienating each other. For commissioning processes to be successful, there 
needs to be a positive local environment. Health Service Circular 1998(228) (NHS 
Executive, 1998b) states quite clearly that collaborative commissioning should be 
encouraged. It does not state under what circumstances it should be encouraged. 
Although a single agreement covering a number of PCTs makes the negotiation and 
provision of services simpler for an NHS Trust, attempts to make such an agreement
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where circumstances are not ideal results in problems for both NHS Trusts and 
PCTs.
Local patterns of working should not be allowed to dictate the degree to which 
policy is implemented. Current policy has been implemented in very different ways 
in these three case studies and these levels of implementation appear to be related to 
historical patterns of working and the perceived success of these patterns. If the aim 
of the Department of Health is for the NHS to achieve NHS Plan targets, then the 
method by which they are achieved should not be paramount. If, on the other hand, 
the aim of the Department of Health is to devolve responsibility to frontline staff and 
empower local organisations, as well as to achieve targets, then the method by which 
targets are achieved becomes important and that suggested by policy should be 
implemented. Part of the role of StHAs should be to ensure that appropriate styles of 
working are being implemented on the ground, and that organisations are not simply 
following procedure in name only. Organisations should be encouraged to break 
away from traditional methods of working and take on their new roles with 
conviction.
Finally, it is essential that StHAs have a strong regulatory role. If PCTs and 
NHS Trusts are not able to resolve their conflicts alone, another body must provide 
the mechanism to do so. The potential for lack of trust between organisations, lack 
of shared objectives and feelings of illegitimacy all suggest the need for an 
independent arbitrator. StHAs have been given this role (Department of Health, 
2002d: paragraph 2.2.6) and should use it.
4) The “success” of the case studies
This section examines how “successful” the case studies were and how modifying 
them in line with these policy recommendations might improve their success. In 
order to do this, first the term “success” needs to be defined.
Often, success is measured in terms of outcomes, and in the case of health care, 
health outcomes. This thesis has evaluated decision-making and relationships 
associated with commissioning; it has not been about the health outcomes of 
commissioning. It is not therefore possible to assess the relative impacts of the case
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studies’ different styles of commissioning on the population’s health. Instead, other 
definitions of success are needed. Multiple definitions are considered here.
First, a successful commissioning process could be seen to be one that has followed 
closely the process set by central policy. Briefly, central policy dictates that PCTs 
should act as principals to commission services from their collaborative NHS Trust 
agents through contracts called Service Level Agreements, with neighbouring PCTs 
as partners. Second, successful commissioning could be seen to result in the meeting 
of centrally imposed targets and frameworks. In this case, conforming to policy 
would be secondary. Third, a commissioning process that has been completed with 
low transaction costs could also be seen to be a success. Fourth, a process that 
provides the ability to make (rather than avoid) commissioning decisions could be 
viewed as successful. Here, there is a trade off between the speed of decision­
making and the level of involvement of, and agreement by, all concerned. Fifth, a 
high level of staff morale may be considered an important measure of success. 
Short-term success in achievements may be offset by longer-term demoralisation.
Each of the case studies demonstrated success in different ways. The following 
discussion illustrates in which areas the case studies were most successful, and how 
making changes in line with the policy suggestions could help them achieve a higher 
degree of overall success. The policy suggestions are:
1. A greater use of incentives both as part of commissioning agreements 
between organisations and within each organisation.
2. Clearer lines of accountability and responsibility.
3. Greater openness by PCTs about their provider function and its costs.
4. Promotion of PCTs’ roles as commissioners in preference to being guardians 
of partnership working.
5. Further training to improve the appropriateness of workforce competence.
6. Encouragement of joint working only where the conditions are appropriate.
7. Encouragement of policy implementation rather than the status quo.
8. Use of StHAs as regulators and arbitrators.
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Case study A was not successful in following the commissioning process set out in 
central policy. Although the appropriate processes appeared to be followed and the 
appropriate documents were signed, the Health Authority, not the PCT, led the 
process. There was no collaboration between the commissioner and provider; the 
provider was expected to supply the services that the commissioner requested. The 
process was one that resembled a hierarchical, intra-firm agreement rather than a 
quasi-market principal-agent relationship between two firms. If the government 
rated success by how commissioning results were achieved, this case study would 
have failed. However, this case study did appear to be successful in achieving 
central targets. There was a history in the case study area of, in the main, achieving 
waiting time targets and financial balance. If the government were concerned about 
achievement more than process, this case study would be a success. Likewise, if  low 
transaction costs of commissioning are considered a success, case study A appeared 
to be more successful that either B or C. This measure is, however, using a loose 
measure of transaction costs, that is, the number of major commissioning meetings 
and attendance at those meetings. Consideration of the fourth criteria, the ability of 
the system to result in decisions, suggests that case study A was successful here also. 
However, the ways in which agreements were reached were not inclusive and 
conflict with the fifth success criteria of maintaining staff morale. The hierarchical 
system of commissioning excluded debate and negotiation between the parties 
concerned. This failure is linked to the failure to comply with commissioning 
policy, which includes collaboration and partnership working. It was perceived also 
as being very “command and control” and as being lead by the managers’ drive to 
meet targets with little room for clinical input. This augmented the low morale of 
NHS Trust clinicians. Managers did not demonstrate low morale, but did feel 
constrained by the local system.
Case study A therefore failed on two main points. It did not follow the 
commissioning process outlined in policy (including a failure to involve fully all 
parties to agreements) and it failed to maintain a high level of morale amongst its 
NHS Trust clinicians. The question must then be asked, if case study A were 
modified in line with the policy recommendations suggested, would it be considered, 
overall, more or less successful than at present?
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Turning to case study B, the PCTs did act as principals, collaborate with the NHS 
Trust and work in partnership with each other. The PCTs agreed between 
themselves their joint objectives before entering negotiations with the NHS Trust. 
Once negotiations had begun, efforts were made to obtain agreement by all 
concerned with the commissioning decisions, but where this was not possible, the 
PCTs were aware that, as commissioners and budget holders, they should have the 
final say. As such, they were successful if  success is measured as complying with 
policy. However, they were less successful than case study A in achieving financial 
balance or waiting time targets. Organisations in case study B had large debts and 
were failing to meet some waiting time targets. As for transaction costs, 
commissioning in case study B took place in monthly meetings attended by a 
number of very senior staff from each organisation. Compared to case study A, 
transaction costs appeared to be higher. There was no advantage over case study A 
in terms of the group’s ability to make commissioning decisions. Both seemed able 
to reach agreements; case study A was quicker in doing so. However, in case study 
B, decisions were made in a more inclusive manner. Prior to the main 
commissioning meetings, two meetings were held at the NHS Trust for primary and 
secondary care clinicians to debate and agree priorities. Some clinicians also 
attended some commissioning meetings. Perhaps as a result, morale appeared, from 
managers and clinicians interviewed, to be higher than in case study A. However, it 
must not be forgotten that PCT B and NHS Trust B failed to sign a Service Level 
Agreement for 2002/3. This was still in draft in June 2003, three months after the 
end of the financial year, due to an inability to agree certain finances.
Case study B therefore failed on two criteria also: it failed to meet centrally imposed 
targets and it failed to operate within minimal transaction costs.
Finally, case study C. With regard to complying with commissioning policy, case 
study C complied in as far as collaboration and partnership working were concerned, 
but failed to take on the role of principal and failed to write a contract for the 
delivery of agreed services. (They used instead the SaFF document for reference.) 
They failed also to meet national access and financial targets. For this criterion, they 
were the least successful of the three case studies. However, NHS Trust C had 
financial and access problems prior to the creation of PCT C and its neighbours. If 
the government used either of these criteria to judge success in commissioning, case
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study C would fail. In addition, this failure was accompanied by what appeared to 
be high transaction costs and an inability to make decisions. Although only one 
individual per organisation normally attended commissioning meetings, on occasions 
the commissioning meeting was held jointly with the finance meeting, a series of 
meetings running in parallel. There were therefore some hidden costs as 
commissioning decisions could only be agreed once the finances had been agreed 
also. The two sets of meetings were therefore dependent upon each other.
Moreover, the number of meetings held was often bi-weekly and at times weekly. 
Despite this, commissioning decisions were often not reached with PCT managers 
being accused of “ostrich management”. Management morale appeared higher in the 
PCTs than the NHS Trust. Clinical morale appeared higher in the NHS Trust. All 
interviewees felt trapped by the financial context of their organisations.
Case study C therefore failed on all the stated criteria, but retained hope. If the 
policy recommendations suggested were implemented in these case studies, what 
would be the result?
First, what would be the effect of introducing incentives, both between PCTs and 
NHS Trusts as part of the commissioning process and internally for both 
organisations? None of the case studies were using incentives related to 
commissioning. If incentives for commissioning were introduced in line with 
Reforming NHS Financial Flows, rather than “command and control” in A, the NHS 
Trust might realise greater freedoms in how to achieve the commissioner’s 
objectives. However, PCT A had traditionally been funded generously (that is, over 
its target fair allocation). This generous funding would have been passed on to the 
NHS Trust in the past. Under Reforming NHS Financial Flows, the same prices are 
to be paid to all hospitals, regardless of their costs or past funding. It is likely 
therefore that NHS Trust A would see a reduction in its funding which may result in 
difficulties in maintaining its performance in relation to targets. In C, however, the 
opposite would apply. Organisations in case study C had been funded well below 
their target allocation. NHS Trust C should therefore receive more funding under the 
Reforming NHS Financial Flows rules and may as a result increase its ability to meet 
central targets. However, this could happen only if the PCTs were funded in line 
with their target allocation, otherwise the PCTs would not be able to afford to 
maintain current service levels, and targets would not be met. PCT B was funded
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about on target and NHS Trust B had average reference costs and so this policy 
would make little difference to success in achieving targets.
As for internal incentives in NHS Trusts, these should give NHS Trust clinicians a 
greater say in how they think the objectives should be reached. Staff morale, 
particularly in NHS Trust A, should increase as a result of these greater freedoms. 
However, transaction costs may rise as more individuals from the different tiers of 
the organisations are involved in decision-making, and decisions themselves may be 
harder to reach. However, once decisions are reached, implementation should be 
more successful.
Turning to accountabilities, in B and C, the NHS Trusts were answerable to their 
health authorities, and both health authorities and PCTs were responsible for 
ensuring the NHS Trusts’ provision of services. However, PCTs had little power 
other than through commissioning discussions. In A, the NHS Trust was 
accountable to and commissioned by its Health Authority. The PCT had no role in 
commissioning. Making PCTs responsible for NHS Trusts’ delivery of services 
could work only if PCTs introduced incentives. If PCT A were made responsible for 
the provision of local services and the meeting of national targets by NHS Trust A, 
but NHS Trust A was made answerable to the StHA, the current strong hierarchical 
structure would be lost. This would be replaced either with a flatter structure where 
the PCT and NHS Trust collaborated as equals or by another hierarchical structure 
where the PCT attempted to act in place of the Health Authority but without its 
legitimacy. The result of that may be that there would be a loss of control over the 
NHS Trust that, without the use of strong incentives, could compound into a loss of 
control over financial balance and the achievement of targets. In B, the situation 
would not change dramatically; perhaps the only improvement would be that the 
PCTs would have greater authority over the NHS Trust. PCTs in B, however, felt 
already that they had that authority by virtue of being commissioners. In C, the 
PCTs would be forced into taking on more responsibility. That could improve the 
commissioning process, particularly with respect to compliance with policy 
processes and the achievement of local and national targets.
NHS Trusts in B and C mistrusted the PCTs over their allocations to their own 
provider services. These allocations are important because both organisations serve 
the same populations and the provision of care by one impacts on the other.
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Openness about the levels of these allocations, why they have been decided and how 
the funds will be used can only improve relations. The problem had not been an 
issue in A due to the commissioning structure. A greater understanding of other 
organisations needs and plans could help to increase collaboration and joint 
planning, thus compliance with policy processes and perhaps achievement of targets.
PCT C was more successful in promoting partnership working than in taking 
responsibility for commissioning, and as a result was not prepared to take difficult 
decisions. Encouraging PCTs’ lead roles in commissioning should help to combat 
some of the indecision in case study C. If PCT C took the lead in defining the 
direction of development for the local community, and if it stated these intentions in 
a contract, backed up by financial or other incentives for the NHS Trust, then 
decisions could be made earlier. Indeed, NHS Trust C stated that it had reluctantly 
had to take a leading role in decision-making to fill the void left by the PCTs. PCT 
C intended to implement a system of commissioning lead by clinical champions. If 
this succeeds, it may fill that void. PCT B felt already that it had the right to take the 
final decision in commissioning; the balance between partnership working and 
leading commissioning appeared about right. PCT A had not had the chance to 
explore these trade-offs but given the strength of its Health Authority’s backing and 
style, it is likely that commissioning would take priority over partnership working.
Although most respondents in these case studies felt that their colleagues were well 
trained and capable of undertaking their roles, additional training could help to hone 
skills in relation to commissioning. Of particular note, the Chief Executives of the 
PCTs and NHS Trusts in case studies A and B had all been trained through the NHS 
Management Training Scheme. Both PCT Chief Executives had held senior 
management positions in secondary care. None of the respondents in case study C 
had followed the same training route; the Chief Executive of PCT C had never 
worked in the secondary care sector. Support and training relevant to their 
commissioning roles could enhance effective working in case study C, however 
defined.
PCTs in C struggled also with joint working whereas PCTs in B did not. If the PCTs 
in C feel under less pressure to collaborate with each other for commissioning, they 
may be able to set objectives for their own PCTs and make decisions about their 
implementation individually with NHS Trust C. Decision-making would be speeded
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up and the NHS Trust would be able to plan its delivery in a more timely fashion. 
Although the NHS Trust may find that meeting the different requirements of up to 
four PCTs difficult, it should be easier than dealing jointly with four commissioners 
who cannot agree objectives. PCTs could collaborate in the commissioning of 
certain services only.
Case study A was failing more than the other case studies to meet policy 
requirements with regard to the process of commissioning. This appeared to be as a 
result of a history of successful outcomes gained through the use of a hierarchical 
approach. A greater compliance with policy in A may result in a lesser achievement 
in terms of targets. It seems then that the Health Authority in case study A may have 
to allow the PCT to take some responsibility for commissioning and accept the risk 
of some deterioration in meeting targets. In case study C, the history of joint 
working and the problems of embeddedness were not stopping organisations from 
conforming to policy requirements for partnership working, but were created 
problems for leadership and taking responsibility. These issues could be addressed 
through training as discussed.
Finally, if the StHAs took on a role as regulator and arbitrator, the PCTs in each case 
study could be supported and encouraged in their commissioning role. The Health 
Authority in A was taking on this role already, although arbitration was not an issue 
given the commissioning structure. The health authority in B took a low profile in 
commissioning but their presence was felt (for example, they chaired an occasional 
meeting) when progress was slow. In C, the health authority also took a low profile, 
but a strong regulator and arbitrator could help the organisations to succeed in all the 
areas considered. If the PCTs were supported in accepting the legitimacy of their 
role as commissioners, compliance with policy and perhaps achievement of targets 
may increase.
5) Limitations of the research
This research has been undertaken in a period of change. Many researchers have 
struggled with the problems of evaluating policy in a changing and complex policy 
environment (Collins et a l , 1999; Le Grand et a l , 1998a; Leese et al., 2001; Mays et 
al., 2001a). The first PCGs were created in April 1999 and the first PCTs in April
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2000. The PCTs in this study became PCTs in April 2001. The observations of 
meetings took place from November 2001 to March 2002 and the interviews from 
April 2002 to January 2003. The commissioning relationships in preparation for the 
financial year 2002/3 were studied. As a consequence, the year under study was, for 
these case studies, the first year in which they had undertaken the whole of the 
commissioning process as PCTs. Some of the phenomena observed may have been 
particular to this early phase of development. At the end of the data collection 
period, for the year 2003/4, PCT A in particular was expected to take on a different 
role; it was planned that PCT A would become more active in commissioning once 
the original Health Authority had been superseded by the StHA. However, the 
organisation of the other two case studies was not due to be changed. The fact 
remains that all three case studies were in the early stages of learning their new roles. 
The trust between the organisations and the feelings of legitimacy may increase with 
time and experience.
In addition, the policy framework within which the organisations were working 
changed also. During the research period, a number of major policy reforms relevant 
to commissioning were announced and initiated. These include the following: 
Shifting the Balance o f Power within the NHS: Securing Delivery (Department of 
Health, 2001), Shifting the Balance o f Power: the Next Steps (Department of Health, 
2002d), Reforming NHS Financial Flows (Department of Health, 2002c), the new 
consultant contract (Department of Health, 2002a; Department of Health, 2003) and 
the inclusion of NHS Trust access times in the criteria for star-rating PCTs (see 
www.chi.nhs.uk/eng/ratings/). Each affected the ways in which the PCTs and NHS 
Trusts were working at the time of the research and planning to work in the future. 
Inevitably, these and future policy changes will alter the ways in which services are 
commissioned and delivered. This research has concentrated on relationships 
between organisations. The general nature of these relationships should remain and 
therefore the findings of this research should remain relevant despite detailed 
changes in specific areas of policy.
The sample of case studies was chosen according to a sampling frame and quota that 
depicted characteristics relevant to a principal-agent framework. This quota 
included one small and one large PCT, one rural and one urban, one with a level of 
funding below target and one above, one where PCTs had no choice of provider and
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one with a choice, one where the NHS Trust dealt mainly with a single PCT and one 
where a number of PCTs used the same NHS Trust. Except for the size criteria, all 
of these conditions were met. Of the case study PCTs, one was average sized (23 
practices), one slightly above average (27 practices) and one was very large (over 35 
practices). None were small. One PCG and one PCT had declined to take part in the 
research. Both of these were smaller than average. The PCT comprised 13 practices 
and the PCG 19. The PCG declined to take part because they were in the process of 
merging with a neighbouring PCG. The PCT agree to take part but later declined 
because the PCTs with whom they collaborated for commissioning did not wish to 
have an observer present at commissioning meetings. In addition, the case study 
PCT of average size had been a small PCG of 16 practices but had recently merged. 
As a result of these mergers and refusals to participate, this research has not been 
able to consider the effect on commissioning of a very small organisation that 
potentially has increased flexibility in terms of being able to shift services between 
providers. Others (see Wilkin et al., 2003) have, however, considered the 
relationships between size and performance in primary care organisations, and 
concluded that optimal size is likely to vary for different functions.
I have explored commissioning by following the SaFF process. Negotiation and 
agreement of the SaFF may not be considered by some to be synonymous with 
commissioning. In fact, one respondent commented that commissioning was 
something that went on in spite of the SaFF. However, in my initial approach to the 
case studies, I requested permission to observe the commissioning process and 
interview participants about that process. The Chief Executives of the PCTs, or their 
delegates, in each case study independently, directed me to the SaFF process. This 
suggests that, for them, the SaFF round was at least analogous to commissioning. In 
addition, the SLAs could be drawn up only after the SaFF had been agreed. In one 
case study the documents were identical. The SaFF process was the main process by 
which the PCTs in these case studies agreed what services the NHS Trusts were to 
deliver. Since the research took place, the SaFF process has been abolished and 
replaced with three year planning and priorities frameworks called Local Delivery 
Plans (Department of Health, 2002b). These are working documents that should be 
amended to allow for corrective action and new initiatives. They are community- 
wide plans, although PCTs are responsible for creating local plans to incorporate
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community needs and national priorities, and each NHS Trust is responsible for 
creating its own plans which show how they will deliver national and local priorities 
“and f i t  within the plans o f its PCT commissioners” (Department of Health, 2002b: 
7). Despite having a different label, these plans are not dissimilar to SaFFs and 
necessitate joint working between, amongst others, PCTs and NHS Trusts. The 
results of this research are therefore pertinent to these new arrangements.
I considered, in the early stages of the research, looking at commissioning by 
specialty. This did not at the time, at these case studies, appear possible. 
Commissioning did not appear to take place at specialty level. As the research 
progressed, it became evident that there were discussions at a lower, sub-group level, 
but these discussions fed into the SaFF process and ultimately the SLAs were 
developed based on SaFF agreements, not negotiations around individual specialties. 
SLAs were not specialty specific but based on broader areas of care. These 
processes have changed for 2003/4. Reforming NHS Financial Flows (Department 
of Health, 2002c: 4) states that for “at least 6 surgical specialties, SLAs should be set 
at specialty level”. For 2003/4 and 2004/5, the use of the standard tariff in specialty 
level SLAs is only for “volume growth above 2002/3 SLA/plan leveF (Department of 
Health, 2002c: 18). By 2005/6, both baseline and volume growth services will be 
commissioned in this way. If the research were to be repeated now and in the future, 
the participants’ experiences may thus be different. However, the broad issues, such 
as competing lines of responsibility, compliance by clinicians with commissioning 
decisions, levels of trust and problems of joint working, would likely remain.
I observed only meetings relating directly to the agreement of the SaFF, and only a 
proportion of those meetings in some case studies. Other smaller meetings and 
discussions between individuals took place that I did not observe. On a practical 
point, it was not possible as a single researcher to be present at all relevant 
discussions or to be party to impromptu meetings and telephone discussions. In 
addition, one PCT declined to take part in the research because the number of 
participants in their commissioning meetings was small and they were concerned 
that the presence of an observer would alter the dynamics. The fact that only the 
SaFF meetings were observed may mean that some important negotiations and 
methods of reaching agreements between organisations have been missed. However, 
in terms of making comparisons between the three case studies, my methods were
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consistent. Each case study had their own style of agreeing the SaFF, but part of the 
reason for employing a case study design was to allow the testing of ideas relating to 
the same process in different settings.
A further limitation of the research is that only two consultants and two GPs were 
interviewed in each case study. The aim of the research was to concentrate on 
principal-agent relations between PCTs and NHS Trusts, not between managers and 
clinicians. Clinicians were chosen for interview to illustrate any similarity in or 
contrasting of views compared to management views. Clinicians did have different 
views to management and in this respect the decision to interview them was 
successful. However, the clinicians, and consultants in particular, also had views 
different to each other. Saturation point was reached for the management data, that 
is, no new themes were arising from the final management interviews, but the 
clinicians’ views were not always consistent with each other and each provided some 
new themes. Saturation point was not reached for the clinicians. However, data 
gathered in the interviews showed that relations between NHS Trust management 
and consultants were an important step in the commissioning process. For this 
reason, the results chapter presented an analysis of “tier 3” in the principal-agent 
chain for commissioning. If the research had been designed specifically to 
concentrate on the principal-agent relations between NHS Trust managers and 
clinicians, a different design would have been adopted that included a wider range of 
consultant types with a wider range of experiences of commissioning. As a result, 
although the findings have discussed principal-agent relations between managers and 
clinicians in the NHS Trusts, this has been in an attempt to shed light on how these 
relations impact on the commissioning relationships and decisions between the PCTs 
and NHS Trusts. To gain a greater understanding of management control and the 
use of incentives in “tier 3” would need further research designed specifically for 
that purpose. Likewise, the research has not attempted to evaluate internal PCT 
relations between managers and GPs, although these also affect commissioning. The 
research has concentrated on one set of principal-agent relations in a complex web of 
such interactions.
This research has taken a case study approach and used qualitative techniques for 
data collection and analysis. These findings are therefore not generalisable in the 
sense that a quantitative evaluation based on a random sample of the whole
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population of PCTs would be generalisable. Other evaluators have taken such 
approaches (Regen et a l , 2001; Wilkin et a l , 2002). The combination of 
characteristics of the three case study PCTs and their commissioning environments 
are unique to them. Other PCTs and the circumstances of their local commissioning 
will be very different. However, the case study PCTs were selected so that each 
characteristic individually would be apparent in other PCTs. The purpose of using a 
case study approach is to test theories in different situations in order to search for 
results that are meaningful and true in each situation. The findings of this research 
should therefore be recognisable not only to the case study PCTs but to other PCTs 
in England. This research generates a level of understanding that large scale 
quantitative evaluations are not able to generate.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
1) Introduction
Many studies have considered transaction costs, equity, efficiency, size, choice and 
accountability in the context of primary care organisations as purchasers, but no one 
to date has taken a principal-agent perspective of the commissioning relationships 
between PCTs and NHS Trusts. Little is known about the extent and nature of the 
relationships between PCTs as commissioners of secondary care services and their 
NHS Trust agents. This study has begun to fill this gap in knowledge by providing 
an in-depth analysis of the nature of these commissioning relationships.
The chosen research strategy has brought together case study research, qualitative 
methods and “realistic evaluation” (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). A case study approach 
has allowed the use of multiple sources of data to investigate contemporary 
phenomena in context, where the boundaries between the phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident. The benefit of using qualitative research is that it is not 
necessary to specify a hypothesis at the outset (Silverman, 1993); instead, the 
method is interpretative, studies people in their natural settings, provides in-depth 
exploration of an issue, the understanding of processes, and seeks explanations of 
why and how phenomena occur. “Realistic evaluation” considers specific 
mechanisms and contexts in order to attempt to identify what works for whom under 
what circumstances.
Through the use of these methods I was able to carry out an in-depth evaluation of 
the commissioning relationships between primary care trusts and NHS Trusts in 
three case studies, using multiple levels of analysis (main PCTs, other PCTs, NHS 
Trusts, managers and clinicians). I used multiple sources of data (observations, 
interviews and documents) that were analysed using qualitative techniques to give 
insights into theory and policy.
2) Summary of study
This research explored the role of PCTs as commissioners of secondary care. Three 
case studies each comprising a main PCT and NHS Trust were selected using
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information from nationally available databases. These were selected to vary in 
factors considered key to principal-agent relationships. These factors were PCT size, 
the urban/rural mix of its patients, the distance of the main PCT from its target 
allocation, whether or not the PCT had a choice of main provider and whether or not 
the PCT commissioned alone or with other PCTs. The case studies were recruited in 
the summer and autumn of 2001.
Data were collected from observations of meetings, interviews with managers and 
clinicians, and documentary evidence including copies of SaFFs and SLAs. The 
meetings that were observed were called commissioning meetings by the case study 
members; they were primarily to agree the Service and Financial Framework for 
2002/3. Meetings were observed between November 2001 and March 2002. 
Interviews with managers that were key to this process were undertaken between 
April and September 2002. Primary and secondary care clinicians were interviewed 
about the commissioning process between August 2002 and January 2003.
Interview and observation data were analysed using computer assisted qualitative 
data analysis software. Copies of SaFFs and SLAs were analysed in conjunction 
with the interview and observation data.
3) Summary of key findings
The key findings of this research are as follows:
1. PCTs do not always accept the legitimacy of their role as principal, that is, as 
commissioner of secondary care services. This is important as it undermines 
effective working even where NHS Trusts accept the PCTs legitimacy. Both 
principals and agents must accept the legitimacy of the principal.
2. Where principals do feel legitimate but where there are multiple principals, 
they need to have joint objectives or a mechanism for resolving such conflicts 
if they are to work together. Joint working is not appropriate where there are 
different objectives, where there is poor quality information, where there is a 
lack of trust between PCTs or where local capacity differs. Relationships 
between principals can be as problematic as those between principal and 
agent.
289
3. Relationships between NHS Trust management, and their directorates and 
clinicians may be as big a problem or more so than relationships between 
PCTs and NHS Trusts.
4. The dual nature of the principal’s role affects directly the ability of the agent 
to achieve the principal’s wishes. This arises because the PCTs do not act 
solely as principals; they have also an agent role. They are providers that 
provide services to the same populations as the NHS Trusts. Furthermore, 
PCTs control the funds that are allocated to each type of service provision.
In this respect, PCTs are in direct competition for funds with NHS Trusts. 
These two roles can create a conflict of interests.
5. Too many conflicting pressures from national and local targets force 
organisations into prioritising the delivery of services that serve their own 
rather than the community’s best interests. These pressures can undermine 
co-operation.
6. Multiple lines of accountability weaken the power of PCTs to ensure NHS 
Trusts meet commissioned agreements.
7. A public service ethos and awareness that the NHS is one large organisation 
can strengthen the joint interests of organisations, although the perceived best 
methods of achieving these joint interests may differ.
8. Local circumstances and history can dictate the degree and success of 
implementation of policy.
The policy recommendations are that:
1. there should be a greater use of incentives both as part of commissioning 
agreements between organisations and within organisations.
2. there should be clearer lines of accountability and responsibility.
3. there should be a greater openness by PCTs about their provider function and 
associated costs.
4. PCTs’ roles as commissioners should be promoted in preference to their roles 
as champions of partnership working.
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5. there should be further training to improve the appropriateness of workforce 
competence.
6. there should be encouragement of joint working between PCTs only where 
the conditions are appropriate. These conditions should be made explicit.
7. if the government is concerned about having a single system of 
commissioning throughout the NHS, organisations should be encouraged to 
implement policy according to guidance rather than adapting it to be a 
continuation of historical patterns of working.
8. StHAs should act as regulators and arbitrators.
4) Future research
This research has shed light on a number of important issues related to PCTs as 
commissioners of secondary care services. It has, however, illuminated also areas 
where further research would be of value.
The policy context within which the NHS works is changing frequently and, 
although the findings of this research will remain relevant to the general nature of 
commissioning, recent policy changes will affect specific areas. For example, the 
introduction of standard tariffs for the commissioning of key specialties as outlined 
in Reforming NHS Financial Flows (Department of Health, 2002c) will introduce 
financial incentives to the commissioning process and increase the level of 
monitoring of NHS Trusts’ service delivery. The management costs associated with 
this monitoring may increase, and the co-operation and goodwill between 
organisations may decrease in response to contracts becoming more exacting. In 
addition, the commissioning decisions made by PCTs will need to be robust enough 
to withstand variations in demand and activity, and joint commissioning by PCTs 
may become more problematic as activity and finances must be disentangled. One 
of the limitations of the current research is that it was not able to consider 
commissioning or incentives related to individual specialties. This is now possible. 
Research to determine the best methods and outcomes of this new form of 
contracting is essential.
The current research has highlighted the fact that relationships between NHS Trust 
management and their clinical directorates and consultants may be as important for
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commissioning and the implementation of decisions as those between PCT and NHS 
Trust management. Negotiations are taking place currently with regard to the new 
consultant contract. Whether or not a new contract is agreed in England, and 
whether it is implemented nationally or locally, research into the effectiveness of 
such internal control mechanisms and incentives is crucial. It is important also to 
understand how and why hospital doctors react to such measures. Of particular 
interest would be an understanding of how clinicians’ motivations are affected by the 
use of incentives, financial or otherwise. Although consultants have to date rejected 
the new consultant contract in England, it may give them more freedoms for service 
development and local initiatives than the current system in which managers 
working within tight budgets are perceived as vetoing many proposals.
In a similar vein, this study did not consider the role of GPs as agents for PCTs. 
Compliance with commissioning decisions depends not only on the delivery of 
services by NHS Trusts but also on the management of demand by GPs. At the time 
the research began, few incentives were in place to encourage GPs to act in 
accordance with PCTs’ commissioned activity. It would be interesting to see if this 
has changed and how well GPs are achieving these goals. In addition is the question 
of how active GPs are as principals, that is, how involved GPs are in deciding on the 
level of services to be commissioned.
Gender, leadership skills and historical patterns of working may all have played a 
role in the style of commissioning undertaken in these case studies. The interaction 
between and relative importance of these issues is not known. Given that 
respondents showed concern over the calibre of leaders and the government has 
created the Leadership Centre to resolve this issue, it is important to determine 
exactly what is required of PCT leaders and how training can best accomplish this.
This research has shown that there are multiple and conflicting lines of 
accountability and pressures to achieve targets, and that these weaken the ability of 
PCTs to ensure that NHS Trusts deliver commissioned services. Improvement, 
expansion and reform (Department of Health, 2002b) does not make the situation 
any clearer with respect to accountability. NHS Trusts are held to account by PCTs 
for the delivery of commissioned services and by StHAs for performance. It is not 
clear what levers PCTs have to hold NHS Trusts to account, nor how “commissioned 
services” differ from “performance”. There is the added complication that PCTs’
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star-ratings depend now in part on the performance (if performance includes the 
achievement of access targets) of NHS Trusts. NHS Trusts appear to be held to 
account by two organisations. The effect of this system, and the most appropriate 
organisation to which NHS Trusts should be locally and nationally responsible and 
answerable, needs to be determined.
Finally, with respect to principal-agent theory, the agent’s ability to meet the 
principal’s requirements is assumed usually to be affected by the agent’s actions, the 
agent type and random, exogenous factors over which neither agent nor principal has 
control. The assumptions of principal-agent theory state that the agent knows the 
first two of these conditions and may know the third. The principal may not know 
any. This study has shown that when applied to health care organisations in the 
NHS, an additional factor can affect an agent’s output. That factor is the behaviour 
of the principal, arising from the principal’s additional role as agent. The actions of 
the principal affect the needs of the population to which the external agent must 
deliver care. Information asymmetry is reversed; the principal knows their own 
actions in advance but the agent may not. If the formal model of agency is to be 
applied to health care, this issue should be considered.
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Appendix 1
Summary of postal survey of primary care groups 
and trusts
This appendix reports one part of the findings from a survey undertaken in 2001.
The survey was designed to ascertain general information about principal-agent 
relationships associated with commissioning and detailed information about methods 
used by PCG/Ts to influence GPs. Findings relating to the devolution of budgets 
and responsibilities to PCG/Ts are reported in the Health Service Journal (Baxter et 
a l, 2002). The results reported here relate to the use of incentives within PCG/Ts. 
Further details are available in an unpublished project report (Baxter et al., 2001).
Methods
This study was funded by the South and West NHS Executive region in England and 
focused on the PCG/Ts within that area.
Data were collected by postal questionnaires in February 2001, with a small number 
of interviews in October 2000 to help develop the questionnaire and in summer 2001 
to shed light on issues arising from the questionnaire.
Initial interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes each and covered the following:
1. The context within which PCG/Ts were working, including the division of 
responsibilities between health authorities and PCG/Ts, the devolution of 
management responsibilities and budgets, and progress in the development of 
commissioning arrangements
2. The availability of routine data such as variations in referral rates and 
demographic information.
Pilot questionnaires were sent to four Chief Officers within and a GP Chair outside 
the southwest. Minor changes were made and the final version of the questionnaire
i L
was posted to all remaining PCG/Ts in the southwest on February 5 2001, with a
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postal reminder on February 22nd and a telephone reminder during the week 
beginning March 12th. The deadline for return of questionnaires was March 31st.
The final version of the questionnaire consisted of eight sides of A4 and was 
comprised of mainly closed questions, with a small number of open questions to 
allow respondents to explain some issues. The questionnaire had five sections: basic 
characteristics, the budget, perceptions of working together, hypothetical problem 
scenarios, and incentives and activity management.
A small number of GPs were interviewed as a follow up to the questionnaire: three 
who held official roles within their PCG/Ts and two with no official involvement. 
There were two aims to these GP interviews: first, to give a greater understanding of 
the use of incentives and other mechanisms designed to affect GP behaviour and 
second, to determine the feasibility of making comparisons between GPs and NHS 
Trusts as agents for PCTs.
Questionnaires were analysed using the statistical analysis software ST AT A. No 
comparisons were made between PCGs and PCTs due to the small number of PCTs 
(four).
Results
The postal questionnaire was sent to all 49 PCG/Ts in the South West region in 
February 2001. Twenty eight (57%) completed questionnaires were returned. Three 
were completed on behalf of two PCG/Ts jointly. Information was therefore 
received about 31 (63%) of a possible 49 PCG/Ts. Percentages are based on the 
number of valid responses (maximum 28) to individual questions. The majority (24, 
86%) of respondents were level 2 PCGs. Four were PCTs; one of these was a level 3 
trust, the remainder were level 4.
The results reported here relate to the section of the questionnaire on incentives and 
activity management. It asked about any incentive schemes or other methods used 
by the PCG/Ts to influence their patterns of activity use and to encourage GPs to be 
aware of the financial implications of their decisions. The questions were presented 
in four sub-sections relating to different types of incentives and controls. The first 
sub-section aimed to find out about the prevalence of financial incentives. The 
second considered the availability of other, practice-based, services as a way of
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minimising the use of secondary care services. Third, controls were considered in 
the form of rules and regulations. Finally, the questionnaire asked about motivating 
GPs and practices.
Table 1 shows the use of financial incentives to manage activity and budgets.
Table 1 Financial incentives to help manage activity and budgets
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National incentive scheme 
for prescribing and 
commissioning
13 (50%) 1 (4%) 4(15%) 8 (31%) 26
Additional funds given if 
targets achieved
6 (27%) 4 (18%) 0 12 (55%) 22
Under spends can be carried 
across years
4 (19%) 3 (14%) 2 (10%) 12 (57%) 21
Practices have autonomy in 
deciding how under spends 
are used
4 (17%) 4 (17%) 2 (8%) 14 (58%) 24
Funds can be moved 
between budgets and 
services
3 (14%) 7 (33%) 1 (5%) 10 (48%) 21
Access to additional funds 
withdrawn if targets not 
reached
0 6 (27%) 4 (18%) 12 (55%) 22
A striking finding was that, except for the national prescribing and commissioning 
scheme, around half of the PCG/Ts had not considered the introduction of any form 
of financial incentive scheme. A possible reason for this is that PCG/Ts were at the 
time concentrating their efforts on other aspects of their large agenda. Indeed, the 
Tracker Survey of PCG/Ts reported that PCG/Ts were concentrating their efforts in 
the areas of organisational development, primary care development, clinical 
governance and relationships with other agencies (Wilkin et al., 2001).
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Half of all PCG/Ts stated that they were using the national incentive scheme for 
prescribing to include commissioning. Although the question asked specifically 
about commissioning, it is not possible to tell whether those stating that they were 
using the scheme were using it for commissioning as well as prescribing, or for 
prescribing alone. It seems unlikely that they were using the scheme for 
commissioning as only one had any practice level budgets. Three PCGs did state 
that their answers for the section on financial incentives referred solely or 
predominantly to prescribing; it is likely therefore that the results are an overestimate 
of the importance of financial incentives in managing commissioning activity and 
budgets.
Interview data appeared to support the findings, with a belief that financial 
incentives were the best way to engage GPs ( “money would incentivise me ”) but that 
they also stored up problems for the future ( “i f  you use the incentive to prime a 
service, the backlash when you remove that incentive is high
Another reason why only half of the PCG/Ts were using financial incentives may be 
related to the view that driving change through financial incentives results in change 
for the wrong reasons, and perhaps the wrong kind of change. One PCT was 
“actually creating a financial incentive for patients not to be referred ... but without 
there being an alternative ”.
To avoid some of these perceived problems, one view was that it was preferable to 
reward GPs and practices for setting up systems, reviewing patients, or learning the 
skills to undertake these activities, rather than paying for achieving specific 
outcomes or targets: “We gave them money to start and then money to complete 
successfully. ” Others mentioned “cash for change” policies and pump-priming 
money as incentives.
The interviews revealed that rewards were not always paid by, or initiated from, 
primary care. The pressure on NHS Trusts to meet access targets meant that they 
were asking GPs to help by reviewing waiting patients, and rewarding them for this: 
“£10 to £15 for doing that and sending it back whether that took them o ff the list or 
not”.
A limitation of financial schemes, particularly for prescribing, was the general lack 
of resources. A number of respondents complained that their health authority or
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PCG/T was massively overspending on prescribing, resulting in payments to 
practices under the prescribing incentive scheme being unable to be made: “[the] 
prescribing incentive scheme is a joke” and “we haven’t got any money”.
The second sub-section on incentives asked about the options available to practices 
as an alternative to referral to hospital services. These are shown in Table 2. Many 
practices would have had practice-based services (for example, outreach clinics) as a 
result of fund-holding.
Table 2 Availability o f alternatives as a means o f  helping to manage activity and 
budgets
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Individual practice based 
services (as a substitute for 
hospital services)
16 (62%) 7 (27%) 2 (8%) 1 (4%) 26
Shared practice based services 
(as a substitute for hospital 
services)
14 (52%) 13 (48%) 0 0 27
Inter-practice referrals 12 (46%) 9 (35%) 2 (8%) 3 (12%) 26
The interview data also suggested that creating alternative services, such as GP or 
nurse specialists, was important, either linked with financial incentives or as 
incentives in themselves.
The third section (see Table 3) showed that many rules and regulations were in place 
or yet to be considered; few had been considered and rejected. For those options that 
involve the authorisation of referrals, it is not known from the questionnaire who 
makes the authorisation - the practices, PCG/Ts or health authorities.
Table 3 Rules and regulations to help manage activity and budgets
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Authorisation of referrals 
outside main SLAs
19 (73%) 2 (8%) 2 (8%) 3 (12%) 26
Adherence to guidelines and 
protocols
14 (54%) 10 (38%) 0 2 (8%) 26
Authorisation of expensive 
referrals
12 (48%) 1 (4%) 3 (12%) 9 (36%) 25
Authorisation of tertiary 
referrals
11 (46%) 3 (13%) 2 (8%) 8 (33%) 24
PCG/T manages waiting 
times
5 (22%) 5 (26%) 1 (4%) 11 (48%) 23
Limits on numbers of 
outpatient follow up visits
3 (13%) 8 (35%) 1 (4%) 11 (48%) 23
Restrictions on quantity of 
referrals (ceilings)
2 (9%) 4 (18%) 3 (14%) 13 (59%) 22
Authorisation of referrals 
made by locums
0 2 (8%) 0 22 (92%) 24
The interview data suggested that GPs and managers within the PCT made some 
decisions internally, for example in out-of-area treatment groups; other decisions 
were imposed by the local health authority.
The final sub-section asked about motivating GPs and practices to manage their 
referral activity, predominantly through the provision of information. The results are 
shown in Table 4. Peer pressure, informal feedback on practice and GP activity, and 
written feedback on practice activity were most common. Few PCG/Ts were 
providing written feedback on GPs’ activity. The majority (64%) had not yet 
considered supplying information about the cost of activity in secondary care, rather 
than supplying information on activity alone.
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Table 4 Motivations used to help manage activity and budgets
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Education of GPs 18 (72%) 5 (20%) 0 2 (8%) 25
Peer pressure 12 (52%) 6 (26%) 0 5 (22%) 23
Informal feedback on 12 (52%) 5 (22%) 0 6 (26%) 23
practice activity
Written feedback on 11 (46%) 5 (21%) 1 (4%) 7 (29%) 24
practice activity
Informal feedback on GPs’ 10 (43%) 7 (30%) 0 6 (26%) 23
activity
Written feedback on GPs’ 4 (17%) 8 (35%) 1 (4%) 10 (43%) 23
activity
Provision of information 3 (14%) 5 (23%) 0 14 (64%) 22
on cost of secondary care
Education of patients 2 (9%) 7 (30%) 0 14 (61%) 23
The interview data suggest that the use of the word “incentive” tends to lead people 
into thinking about financial incentives, but, consistent with the survey finding that 
non-financial schemes were common, respondents emphasised the benefits of non- 
financial schemes: “The reward doesn’t have to be money” and incentives can be 
“peer pressure, don't have to be financial GPs stressed the importance of
improving the care (and speed of care) for their patients, and of improving their own 
working environments: “We [are] quite often incentivised in ‘yourpatient will get 
seen sooner ' terms ” and also through “an improvement in your working 
environment
On the whole, the interviews supported the findings from the questionnaire: 
incentives are helpful in encouraging change, although organisations should be wary 
of relying on purely financial incentives.
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Conclusion
It was not clear that GPs were acting as agents for PCG/Ts. Incentives for their 
control were not widespread. The range of incentives and other methods of control 
to encourage GPs to use HCHS activity in line with the PCG/Ts’ wishes was not 
well developed. The use of financial or other formal incentives was particularly 
uncommon. Half the PCG/Ts stated that they were using the national incentive 
scheme for prescribing extended to commissioning. This is probably an over 
estimate; only one had the indicative practice-level budgets necessary to run the 
scheme. Non-financial incentives were used more commonly than financial ones. 
Education, peer pressure and feedback on activity were common methods to try to 
influence GP behaviour.
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Appendix 2
This is an example of a topic guide. It is designed for interviewing PCT managers. 
The topic guides for managers from other organisations and for clinicians differed 
only slightly.
Topic guide for interviews
Commissioning process: PCT perceptions
This is a PhD research study funded to explore the commissioning process in the 
NHS.
The aim of the research is to provide information that will help to improve the 
understanding and operation of the commissioning process.
Specific objectives o f the research are to:
• consider the effect on commissioning o f  organisations ’ objectives 
(including whether they are always self-interested) and the way these are 
met
• assess the effect on the process o f information availability and asymmetry
• examine the roles o f the organisations -  particularly perceptions o f  
power, legitimacy, mutual dependency and third parties
• consider the impact o f targets and monitoring (including incentives) of, 
or by, other organisations.
Study design
The study has already included observations of meetings between PCTs and NHS 
Trusts, and will involve in-depth interviews with some participants of those meetings 
and, later, with clinicians. Three PCTs were chosen as case studies. Interviews will 
be with members of these PCTs, their main acute NHS Trust providers, and other 
organisations that have been involved in commissioning issues. These respondents 
should provide a broad range of views and information about the process.
April 2002
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Commissioning process: PCT perceptions
1. Background/experience [BRIEF -  5 minutes]
• Respondent’s position and responsibilities
• Involvement in commissioning
• Previous posts -  what and which organisation type
• Views of SaFF process/meetings -  general, how they went
• Distinctions between the SaFF and the SLA -  their own views/definitions
2. Objectives and meeting those objectives [10 minutes]
• What are their objectives? Why?
PROBE: financial break even, monitoring & targets, government influence, high/best 
quality services, reputation/centre of excellence/expansion 
PROMPT: minimum requirement of PCT (reservation utility)
• What do they think the objectives of the NHS Trust are?
PROBE: joint/whole community objectives v. self-interested 
PROMPT: minimum requirement of NHS Trust (reservation utility)
• How are their objectives determined and then discussed? Why this way?
PROMPT: within own organisation, with other organisations
• How do they try to make sure their objectives are met? (LINKS WITH MONITORING)
PROBE: whose objectives are most important to meet -  own, other, govt? 
how are any risks shared? (financial or not meeting objectives)
• Do they think, on the whole, that their objectives are met, or that, on the whole, the other 
party’s objectives are met? (Who wins?)
PROMPT: Do they see a conflict between the objectives of the PCT and the NHS Trust? 
How are any conflicts resolved?
303
3. Information asymmetry and availability [10 minutes]
• What kinds of information do they feel they need for the commissioning process? How 
accessible/available is this?
PROBE: own, others’, activity, finance, quality, plans, risks, modelling assumptions, 
previous year’s achievements, effort/action
PROMPT: modelling assumptions (knowledge of relationship between effort/exogenous 
to output)
• In what circumstances do they share all information with the NHS Trust, and when are 
they tempted to keep some back? (A to P sharing?) Why these circumstances?
PROMPT: for examples of circumstances changing to benefit themselves, but where 
they did not feel the need to tell the NHS Trust?
e.g. (exogenous change) mid-year change, policy or target change, staff changes, 
donations, other purchasers/providers, purchasing private care
- What if the change was to their detriment, not benefit?
- How easy or difficult would it be to keep information quiet, if desired?
• What examples are there of the NHS Trust planning/implementing a change that the 
respondent was not aware of at the time?
- how did they feel about this?
4. Roles -power, legitimacy and mutual dependency [10 minutes]
• How do they feel about discussing the NHS Trust’s provision of services & finances 
with them?
PROBE: internal management, directorate or practice (agent) compliance, financial, 
service delivery
Does they think they (the PCT) have a right to do this? Also a right to monitor 
performance?
• If they have no alternative/one main provider, do they think this changes they way they 
work together? Vice versa. Why?
PROBE: impact of single/choice of provider/PCT (multiple principal/agents)
PROMPT: does it make them more or less willing to solve difficult issues, be the first to 
offer solutions?
• How willing do they think the NHS Trust is to accept help from them? (shared 
responsibility). How willing is the PCT to give help?
PROMPT: to achieve targets, financial balance
• Who leads in the design of SLAs? Does that feel right? Why/why not?
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PROMPT: what if Trust not happy with it? (passive or active agent)
- Who generally dominates commissioning discussions?
- Who generally dominates development of SLAs?
• If there is a hierarchy of organisations, where do they see themselves? 
PROMPT: above or below NHS Trusts?
If not a hierarchy, what is the current set up? Is it right? Why/why not?
• Is the current set up in the NHS the best way to meet their objectives?
PROBE: perceptions of the NHS Trust’s feelings on being led by GPs, 
immature/small/new organisations, is it a ‘primary care led’ NHS?
5. Targets and monitoring of, or by, other organisations [10 minutes]
FINAL SECTION -
• How does the PCT try to stay aware of what the Trust is doing and how close they are to 
meeting the PCT’s requirements?
PROBE: what do they monitor (effort/action), how often, how easy?
How this monitoring makes them feel - powerful, uncomfortable?
• How does monitoring help the achievement of objectives?
PROMPT: PCT’s own and NHS Trust’s
• Do they think should be monitoring the NHS Trusts? Why?
• How do national targets & guidance affect the commissioning process?
PROBE: effect of external pressures on ability to commission, constraints on the right to 
commission/make choices
PROMPT: local and media pressures, reference costs & benchmarking
• In conclusion, any other points they would like to make?
Thank the respondent
Re-affirm confidentiality and anonymous reporting 
Explain again how the data will be used
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Appendix 3
List of codes used for analysis of data
This appendix gives a comprehensive list of the codes with which text from the 
observation and interview transcripts was labelled.
The following codes were developed from ‘free codes ", created, in the first instance, 
prior to analysis and based on the key elements and assumptions o f principal-agent 
theory. Many o f the original codes were modified, merged or expanded as the 
analysis progressed.
agent - active 
agent -  passive
behaviour - output relevant/process 
irrelevant
behaviour - shared decisions 
behaviour - shared information 
behaviour - unshared decisions 
behaviour - unshared information
contracts do matter 
contracts don't matter
dependency
effort - reason for 
effort - assumptions about 
effort - type of 
effort/outcome relationship
external/third parties
information asymmetry - agent effort 
information asymmetry - agent 
type/adverse selection 
information asymmetry - 
uncertainty/state of the world
legitimacy
multiple principles 
multiple/choice of agents
objectives - clinicians 
objectives - government/must do's 
objectives - HA 
objectives - NHS Trust 
objectives -  PCT
power - agent 
power - other 
power - principal 
power -  professional
incentives - risk
incentives/levers/sanctions
incentives - threats from above
These codes were created as it became apparent from the data that these issues were 
important.
agenda - joint agent's agents
agenda - self-interest/own
agenda - tertiary services attitude - 'us and them' mentality
attitude - frustration with partners
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attitude - gap in understanding 
attitude - it's not my fault 
attitude - trust 
attitude -  willingness
barriers to sharing
behaviour - avoiding decision-making 
behaviour - clinical relationships 
behaviour - communication 
behaviour - creeping commissioning 
behaviour - inactive principal 
behaviour - micro-management 
behaviour - monitoring
benchmarking
capacity/referral modelling 
catalysts to sharing 
clinical roles
conflict - commissioner/provider 
conflict
conflict - competing pressures 
conflict - recovery and modernisation 
conflict -  resolution
context - context 
context - past experiences 
context -  tradition
definition - commissioning 
definition - SaFF 
definition -  SLA
feeling - de-motivation 
feeling - disempowered 
feeling - empowerment 
feeling - engagement 
feeling - mission impossible 
feeling -  ownership
finances - cost pressures 
finances - deficit 
finances - funding constraints 
finances - general 
finances - ring fenced 
finances - sources of funding
immature organisations
in the driving seat
information - desired 
information - good standard 
information - poor standard 
information - rejection of 
information - use of 
information overload 
information vacuum
left hand doesn't know...
managing expectation
organisational sophistication 
own preconceptions
PA role reversal 
patient pathways/networks 
PCT's own agents 
PCT's own services
people - leadership style/personality 
people - personal relationships 
people - treacle layer 
people - workforce calibre
power - games 
power -  vacuum
prioritising 
private sector
reference costs 
responsibility - collective 
responsibility - confused 
responsibility -  single
setting the ground rules 
single agent - effect of 
status/hierarchy
system - accountability/performance 
management
system - conflicting messages 
system - cross boundary decisions 
system - organisational boundaries 
system - partnership 
system - policy commitments 
system - views of the system
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targets - clarity 
targets - feeling trapped
time pressures
These codes were applied to observational data only and were designed to mark 
examples o f specific events or participants in SaFF meetings. These codes were 
applied in addition to those given above.
meeting - lack of preparation 
meeting - agreement 
meeting - casual 
meeting - clinician agent 
meeting - clinician principal 
meeting - conciliation 
meeting - defensive 
meeting - disagreement 
meeting - disarray 
meeting - HA principal (A only) 
meeting - inpatients 
meeting - manager agent 
meeting - manager principal 
meeting - outpatients 
meeting - principal's principals 
meeting -  tension
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